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							 		 						Figure	5.1:	Fatmawati	(1943,)											Figure	5.2:	“Bung	Karno	in	the	midst	of			 							Painting	by	Basuki	Abdullah.														his	family.”	Wanita,	1953,	no.	13,	p.	282.	
	
 104	“…	apa	sedang	mengenangkan	zaman	‘Ibu	Guntur’	masih	gadis	jelita,	masih	langsing?”	Wanita,	1953,	no.	13,	p.	282.	
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Activist	women	did	not	leave	their	criticism	of	the	marriage	to	Hartini	at	that,	however.	Instead,	they	also	used	the	conception	of	the	“First	Lady,”	for	whom	their	model	was	Eleanor	Roosevelt,	to	insist	on	the	establishment	of	a	hierarchy	between	Sukarno’s	two	wives.	In	a	series	of	meetings	held	with	representatives	of	the	President’s	office	towards	the	end	of	1953,	leaders	of	the	women’s	movement	insisted	that	Indonesia	could	only	properly	have	a	single	First	Lady,	Fatmawati.	Hartini,	they	said,	should	be	barred	from	ever	representing	the	nation	officially.	To	allow	her	to	do	so,	they	argued,	would	make	it	seem	that	Indonesian	women	were	insufficiently	modern,	particularly	on	the	international	stage.	In	support	of	this	argument,	they	insisted	that	Hartini	should	never	take	up	residence	in	the	Presidential	Palace	in	Jakarta,	even	though	Fatmawati	had	moved	herself	and	her	children	to	a	private	residence	in	the	city	following	the	marriage	to	Hartini.	Following	this,	Hartini	was	essentially	expelled	from	having	a	public	life	in	Jakarta,	and	certainly	one	inside	its	elite	social	circles.	She	decamped	to	a	presidential	residence	in	Bogor,	in	the	mountains	outside	the	capital.	While	she	traveled	with	Sukarno	to	events	internally	on	occasion,	she	remained	notably	excluded,	at	the	insistence	of	politically	prominent	and	connected	women,	from	playing	any	public	role	in	large-scale	and	prominent	national	events,	including	the	Hari	Ibu	celebrations	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	at	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung	in	1955.		Thus,	nationally	prominent	women	used	the	political	pressure	they	were	able	to	exert	as	true	mothers	to	shape	what	they	would	accept	as	a	proper	arrangement	for	the	President’s	wives.	While	Sukarno,	and	therefore	other	men	were	free	to	take	concurrent	wives	as	part	of	their	personal,	private	lives,	when	it	came	to	representing	the	nation,	only	Fatmawati,	the	singular	“Mother	of	the	Nation,”	would	be	recognized.	Again,	activist	women	sought	to	enforce	a	gap	between	the	personal	and	the	national	so	that	the	good	name	of	Indonesian	women	would	not	be	slighted	in	public	by	this	second	marriage,	either	domestically	or	internationally.	The	good	name	of	Indonesian	women	also	came	to	be	front	and	center	at	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	April,	1955,	which	is	particularly	striking	because	the	conference	itself	paid	scant	attention	to	women’s	issues.	Sukarno	intended	the	Bandung	Conference	to	be	Indonesia’s	breakout	as	a	major	player	on	the	world	stage.	Bringing	together	the	leaders	of	29	“non-aligned,”	and	mostly	socialist	nations,	the	conference	attempted	to	stake	out	a	new	
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role	for	these	countries	and	their	leaders	within	the	developing	international	Cold	War	framework	that	asked	newly	independent	post-colonial	states	to	declare	whether	they	would	primarily	orbit	around	America	or	the	Soviet	Union.		Bandung,	therefore,	was	intended	to	create	a	new	centrifugal	field	within	which	these	new	leaders	could	control	much	of	their	own	national	paths	on	an	international	level,	forging	new	bonds	of	both	economic	and	cultural	cooperation	between	“non-aligned”	nations.	The	conference’s	final	communiqué	outlined	specific	ways	in	which	the	countries	could	build	such	bonds,	while	also	strongly	condemning	the	use	of	“racialism”	as	a	means	of	cultural	and	economic	suppression	and	the	continuation	of	a	colonial	outlook	by	western	powers.	But	while	the	final	communiqué	discussed	race	and	racism	in	detail,	it	did	not	contain	a	single	reference	to	women	or	“women’s	issues.”	Nor	were	these	concerns	discussed	at	any	length	during	the	proceedings.	The	vast	majority	of	national	leadership	that	attended	the	conference	were	men,	some	accompanied	by	their	wives,	others	not.		It	is	interesting	that	men’s	fashion	played	a	role	here.	Most	of	the	Asian	men	in	attendance	wore	western	clothing,	though	Indian,	Pakistani	and	Burmese	swadeshi	fashion105	were	the	notable	exception.	The	Indonesian	hosts,	however,	specifically	commented	multiple	times	that	African	leaders,	most	notably	those	from	Ghana,	Guinea	and	Saudi	Arabia,	wore	what	was	called	“authentic”	(“asli”)		African	and	national	dress,	(although	photos	of	the	conference	itself	show	that	many	of	the	members	of	support	delegations	from	Africa	dressed	in	western	suits,	so	those	men	were	able	to	use	western	fashion	to	play	an	interesting	game	about	their	legitimacy	as	both	African	and	modern	leaders.)	The	same	photos	show	that	wives,	however,	who	mostly	attended	a	series	of	social	and	cultural	events	rather	the	working	sessions	of	the	conference	itself,	were	almost	exclusively	dressed	in	some	form	of	“national	dress.”		This	was	largely	true	of	the	Indonesian	delegation	as	well.	Sukarno	wore	his	military	uniform	while	the	other	official	Indonesian	representatives	donned	suits	and	ties.	Indonesian	women	were	a	significant	presence	at	the	conference,	but	they	were	not	a	part	of	the	official	delegation,	and	were	charged	most	particularly	with	performing	the	duties	of	
 105	“Swadeshi”	is	a	Hindi/Sanskrit	term	that	is	the	equivalent	of	asli.	In	the	Gandhian	movement,	Indian	nationalists	wore	
swadeshi	clothing,	that	they	also	made	the	fabric	for	themselves,	as	a	repudiation	of	the	English	colonial	extraction	involved	in	the	cotton	industry,	and	as	a	rejection	of	English	claims	of	cultural	superiority.	
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hostesses	and	social	organizers.	In	these	roles,	and	by	presidential	order,	they	exclusively	wore	kain-kebaya	and	konde.	The	conference	was	an	important	occasion	at	which	Indonesian	women	were	expected	to	represent	Indonesia	as	an	efficient,	but	also	refined	and	fundamentally	eastern	nation.	Multiple	international	sources	remarked	on	the	presence	and	style	of	these	Indonesian	women	representing	their	country,	noting	that	although	the	political	outcomes	of	the	conference	only	somewhat	served	Indonesia’s	direct	interests,	that	the	“efficiency	and	flair”	of	the	women	who	oversaw	the	conference’s	“gracious	hospitality”	was	something	with	which	foreign	visitors	“could	not	fail	to	be	impressed.”106	A	French	journalist	was	said	to	have	reported	the	sight	of	Indonesian	hostesses	in	kain-kebaya	was	quite	“lovely,”	(“manis.”)107	The	Indonesian	women	clearly	worked	diligently	to	produce	a	series	of	events	apart	from	the	official	conference	proceedings	that	they	referred	to	as	“social	events”	intended	both	to	entertain	and	to	enlighten	their	foreign	visitors	about	Indonesia.	Ellaka	Mohamad	Ali,	the	wife	of	the	Pakistani	Prime	Minister,	for	instance,	was	taken	to	visit	an	orphanage	in	Bandung	by	her	Indonesian	hostesses,	and	Keluarga	magazine	noted	that	Mrs.	Ali	made	a	donation	of	Rp.	1000	to	support	the	home’s	work.108		The	Indonesian	women’s	main	social	event	for	their	visitors,	however,	was	a	fashion	show.	Keluarga	reported	for	its	readers	who	couldn’t	come	to	Bandung	for	themselves	that	the	exhibition	“drew	the	attention	of	many	people.”	The	show,	though	not	a	formal	part	of	the	proceedings,	was	intended	to	“demonstrate	how	Indonesian	women	dress	in	certain	circumstances.”109	The	show,	“which	was	boldly	called	a	‘batikshow,’	exhibited	authentic	
 106	Boyd	R.	Compton,	“Indonesia	and	the	Bandung	Conference,”	a	report	to	the	Institute	of	Current	World	Affairs,	New	York.	Dated	June	15,	1955,	Modjokerto,	East	Java,	pp.	1-2.	107	See	“Bandung	That	Lovely	City,”	the	title	in	English,	in	Wanita,	1955,	no.	9,	5	May,	pp.	221-225.		108	See	“Antara	Kita”	(“Amongst	Us,”)	in	Keluarga,	1955,	no.	6,	June,	p.	7.	The	accompanying	photo	shows	Mrs.	Ali	wearing	Pakistani	clothing,	including	a	head	scarf,	and	her	four	Indonesian	hostesses	wearing	kain-kebaya	with	selendang,	their	hair	all	in	tight	kondé,	although	the	hair	style	of	one	of	the	four,	who	also	appears	to	be	younger	than	the	other	three	Indonesians	shows	a	modern	kondé	style	in	which	the	hair	is	parted	and	mounded	on	top	of	her	head,	rather	than	being	slickly	drawn	back.	The	style	was	considered	to	reflect	a	Hollywood,	and	particularly	Claudette	Colbert,	sensibility.	109	“jang	menarik	perhatian	banjak	orang.	.	.	.	Tetapi	untuk	lebih	meriahkan	pekan	Asia	Afrika	itu,	maka	diluar	atjara	
diadakan	pameran	pakaian	Indonesia	untuk	menundjukkan	bagaimana	wanita	Indonesia	berpakaian	pada	saat2	tertentu.”	“Pameran	Pakaian	Selama	Pekan	Asia-Afrika,”	(“A	Fashion	Show	for	Asia-Africa	Week.”).	Keluarga,	1955,	no.	6,	June,	p.	21.	
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Indonesian	clothing,	as	well	as	dresses	made	from	authentic	fabric,	our	kain	that	is	famously	known	to	be	beautiful.”110		One	of	the	photos	included	in	the	Keluarga	report	showed	two	young	women	dressed	up	in	bridal	fashion,	reflecting	patterns	in	fashion	show	programs	discussed	in	previous	chapters.	The	caption	read	“Note	the	long	blouse	that	is	worn	by	the	beautiful	bride.	Old-style	wedding	clothing	is	always	sweet	to	see.	Her	attendant	is	wearing	
kawung,111	typical	of	Jogjakarta.	She	is	not	wearing	a	blouse.	This	is	an	old	style.”112	In	the	midst	of	representing	the	nation	to	the	world,	of	providing	what	they	termed	an	“open	door”113	on	Indonesia,	the	politically	elite	women	who	organized	this	exhibition	intentionally	used	batik	in	both	traditional	and	modern	styles.	Thus,	they	represented	Indonesian	women	as	simultaneously	modern	and	traditional,	while	remaining	fully	“asli”	because	they	were	using	batik.	At	the	same	time,	they	managed	to	fire	a	small	shot	at	those	who	considered	strapless	fashion	to	be	morally	questionable.	The	playing	field	of	the	moral	crisis	debate	was	ever-present.	Yet	Indonesian	women	soon	found	themselves	in	quite	a	different	moral	crisis	provided	for	them	by	Indonesian	men	and	their	attempts	to	provide	a	certain	set	of	social	entertainment	as	well.	A	scandal	regarding	prostitution	broke	out	during	the	conference.	The	scandal	was	referenced	obliquely	in	several	women’s	magazines,	but	it	came	to	my	attention	through	the	report	American	researcher	Boyd	Compton	wrote	for	the	Institute	of	Current	World	Affairs	in	New	York.114	His	writing	about	the	Bandung	Conference	was	unusual	for	English	language	sources	in	that	his	first	concern	was	not	the	political	outcomes	of	the	conference,	but	rather	its	implications	for	Indonesia’s	self-image.	Perhaps	
 110	“Demikianlah	pada	pameran	pakaian,	jang	dengan	gagah	disebut	‘batikshow’	dipamerkan	pakaian	asli	Indonesia,	dan	
djuga	gaun2	jang	dibuat	dari	bahan	asli,	kain	kita	jang	terkenal	indah	itu.”	Keluarga,	1955,	no.	6,	June,	p.	21.	111	Kawung	is	a	distinctive	batik	pattern	based	on	elongated	ovals	that	form	into	squares.	It	is	one	of	the	oldest	batik	motifs,	and	was	one	whose	use	was	originally	limited	members	of	the	royal	family.	It	is	particularly	connected	to	Sakti,	the	Hindu	goddess	of	creation.	The	philosophy	behind	the	pattern	is	linked	to	the	sacred	creation	of	human	life,	that	is,	it	reflects	the	special	place	of	moral	motherhood	in	creating	a	strong	kingdom.	112	That	is,	she	was	only	wearing	a	breast	cloth.	“Perhatikan	badju	pandjang	jang	dipakai	penganten	aju	itu.	Pakaian	
penganten	setjara	kuno	selalu	manis	dilihatnja.	Pengiringnja	memakai	kawung,	typis	Jogjakarta.	Tidak	memakai	badju.	
Inipun	suatu	tjara	kuno.”	Keluarga,	1955,	no.	6,	June,	p.	21.	113	“pintu	terbuka,”	Keluarga,	1955,	no.	6,	June,	p.	21.	The	term	was	used	in	several	women’s	magazine	articles	to	describe	Indonesian	women’s	intentions	for	their	programming	at	the	Bandung	Conference.	114	Boyd	R.	Compton	was	a	Princeton	graduate	in	the	Class	of	1946,	and	was	a	fellow	of	the	IFWCA	between	1952-1957.	During	this	time,	he	turned	out	a	fascinating	set	of	occasional	reports	on	Indonesia,	Islam,	politics,	elections	and	Sukarno,	and	was	always	attentive	to	the	nuances	of	local	place	and	language.	The	datelines	of	his	reports	show	that	he	first	stayed	in	a	university	student	hostel	in	Jakarta	when	he	arrived	for	about	a	year,	and	then	appears	to	have	settled	largely	in	Modjokerto,	East	Java,	though	also	traveling	significantly	to	Sumatra,	including	to	Aceh.		
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because	unlike	other	foreign	journalists	covering	the	conference,	he	was	resident	in	Indonesia,	his	reporting	is	much	more	attuned	to	the	dynamics	of	Indonesian	identity	at	play	in	bringing	“the	world”	to	Bandung.	Although	his	report	ended	with	a	lengthy	discussion	of	the	role	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	was	able	to	stake	out	at	the	conference,	(certainly	the	information	his	New	York-based	sponsors	were	most	interested	in),	Compton	began	his	own	report	with	a	significant	discourse	on	“Prestige	at	Home.”	This	beginning	noted	that	many	Indonesians	had	“clear	enough	ideas	on	the	conference	aims	(‘lessen	world	tension’,	‘opposition	to	colonialism’,	‘promote	world	peace’).”	But	he	noted,	“outside	the	conference	area,	the	meeting	seemed	to	be	another	mystery	and	wonder	to	the	illiterate	millions	who	are	little	influenced	by	government	posters	and	banners	proclaiming	great	purposes	in	high,	stilted	Indonesian.”	Only	local	inhabitants	seemed	to	“catch	the	spark	of	excitement	that	burned	for	ten	days	in	Djakarta	and	Bandung,	as	many	of	the	notables	of	the	world	sped	through	town	escorted	by	screaming	sirens	and	police	motorcycles.”115	Yet	behind	all	the	arrangements	and	pageantry,	Compton	reported,	the	most	important	outcome	was	a	boost	in	the	self-esteem	of	the	metropolitan	Indonesian	elite.	On	this	he	quoted	Herawati	Diah,	who	had	written	in	The	Indonesian	Observer	that,		Those	who	were	doubtful	of	the	conference’s	achievement	now	talk	differently	and	are	completely	convinced	that	in	spite	of	ideological	differences	Asians	and	Africans	have	something	in	common	.	.	.	The	Asian-African	Conference	has	helped	a	few	people	to	get	rid	of	their	inferiority	complex	of	being	an	Asian.	This	I	would	call	the	greatest	achievement	of	the	Asian-African	Conference.116		It	is	clear	that	in	the	minds	of	the	Indonesian	national	elite	that	planned	the	event,	Indonesian	national	prestige	was	on	full	display	to	the	rest	of	the	world.	This	was	as	equally	true	for	the	women	as	for	the	men.	With	that	lens	in	mind,	Compton’s	lengthy	observations	about	the	prostitution	scandal,	which	he	addressed	before	taking	on	any	real	analysis	of	the	global	politics	of	the	meetings,	are	interesting.	He	wrote:	It	was	certainly	for	the	sake	of	appearance	and	‘face’	that	the	Bandung	police	rounded	up	and	detained	over	five	hundred	prostitutes	and	vagrants	before	
 115	Boyd	R.	Compton,	“Indonesia	and	the	Bandung	Conference,”	p.	2.		116	Boyd	R.	Compton,	“Indonesia	and	the	Bandung	Conference,”	p.	3.	The	quote	from	Herawati	Diah	was	attributed	to	the	April	29	edition	of	the	Indonesian	Observer,	the	Jakarta-based	English	language	newspaper	Ibu	Herawati	and	her	husband	founded	and	published	at	Sukarno’s	direct	request.	
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the	conference.	Old	timers	in	Bandung	remarked	on	the	dearth	of	usual	‘night	butterflies’117	soliciting	strangers	from	dark	doorways	and	corners.	Unfortunately,	however,	the	relative	absence	of	private	prostitutes	contributed	indirectly	to	the	now	famous	“hospitality	committee”	scandal.		According	to	the	opposition	press,118	a	“hospitality	commitee”	[sic.]	was	set	up	to	provide	delegates	with	prostitutes	selected	and	sponsored	by	the	government.	One	newspaper	published	documentary	evidence	in	great	detail,	and	the	existence	of	some	such	organization	can	hardly	be	doubted.	As	far	as	I	know,	however,	these	services	were	only	provided	at	the	loud	insistence	of	foreign	delegates	who	could	not	find	what	they	wanted	in	the	“purged”	city.		Such	an	arrangement	would	case	little	stir	in	a	more	cosmopolitan	country,	but	Indonesian	society	is	generally	puritanical.		.	.	.	Religious,	youth,	and	women’s	groups	reacted	vigorously	and	spoke	out	against	the	government	with	indignation.	.	.	.			For	more	than	a	week,	items	on	the	scandal	overshadowed	other	Asian	African	stories	in	the	national	press.119	With	almost	sadistic	enjoyment,	the	government’s	tormentors	let	it	be	known	that	the	outside	world	was	laughing	at	the	government’s	folly,	while	the	Indonesian	world	was	deeply	shocked	at	its	lack	of	Eastern	morality.120		Women’s	magazines	did	not	pick	up	on	the	scandal	explicitly	over	the	long	term.	I	only	found	a	single	reference	to	the	ways	in	which	Indonesian	women’s	“good	name”	had	been	besmirched	in	Bandung	in	Wanita.	But	there	is	little	doubt	that	such	events	would	have	been	experienced	by	Indonesian	women	activists	as	a	clear	and	embarrassing	incident	of	moral	crisis,	and	as	a	repudiation	of	all	their	work	on	building	not	only	their	personal,	but	more	importantly	their	collective	identity	as	the	moral	guardians	of	the	nation.			
	
Sudden	violence	as	a	Response	to	Moral	Crisis:	Pak	Kromo	Mau	Internasional	Minded	Several	sources,	including	Boyd	Compton’s	report,	and	cartoons	and	short	stories	in	women’s	and	entertainment	magazines,	suggest	that	responses	to	incidences	of	moral	crisis	such	as	the	Bandung	Conference	“hospitality	committee”	scandal	were	quite	lively,	or	
 117	This	is	the	English	translation	of	a	standard	Indonesian	expression	for	prostitutes,	“kupu-kupu	malam.”	118	Despite	several	attempts,	I	have	unfortunately	not	yet	been	able	to	find	any	examples	of	this	“opposition	press”	coverage	of	the	scandal	yet.	119	This	was	not	the	sense	I	got	in	reading	the	Indonesian	newspaper	accounts	that	are	available	in	the	collections	at	Cornell.	120	Boyd	R.	Compton,	“Indonesia	and	the	Bandung	Conference,”	pp.	4-5.	
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“ramai.”	In	particular,	these	somewhat	unfiltered	responses	in	the	media	such	as	cartoons	reflected	a	particular	cultural	reaction	to	moral	crisis.	That	is,	they	suggest	that	a	fundamental	response	of	ordinary	people	in	these	circumstances	included	sudden	bouts	of	mob	violence	aimed	at	the	perceived	sources	of	the	crisis.	This	reaction	was	also	central	to	Sylvia	Tiwon’s	analysis	of	various	literary	sources	in	which	women	were	assigned	the	role	of	“maniacs.”121	The	previous	chapter	discussed	two	anti-polygamy	cartoons	published	in	Wanita	in	December	1953.122	Both	cartoons	used	women’s	(righteous)	anger	at	men	as	their	foil	to	make	their	point	about	polygamy.	The	cartoons	also	suggested	that	physical	violence	was	a	part	of	the	social	response	fueled	by	this	anger.	The	second	cartoon,	which	called	for	polygamy	to	be	“eradicated”	(“diberantas,”	the	same	word	one	would	use	for	infestations	of	vermin	or	insects,)	depicted	the	women	having	beaten	up	the	man	one	of	them	was	dragging	through	the	streets,	an	action	very	much	at	odds	with	the	stated	behavioral	expectations	of	good	Indonesian	wives	and	mothers.	This	was	not	the	only	instance	of	such	a	reaction	in	the	cartoons	of	the	day,	which	were	often	included	in	the	Indonesian	versions	of	the	“funny	pages”	in	the	back	of	entertainment	magazines.	A	particularly	illustrative	example	of	this	is	the	comic	strip	“Pak	Kromo”	(a	Javanese	name	roughly	translatable	as	“Old	Fuddy	Duddy”)	that	ran	weekly	in	
Gembira	magazine	in	1952,	a	time	which	as	we	have	seen	was	approaching	the	height	of	the	early	instances	of	national	moral	crisis	over	modernity.		The	character	Pak	Kromo,	who	wore	old-style	Javanese	men’s	clothing	of	a	kain,	jas	(jacket)	and	blangkon	(wrapped	batik	head	cloth),	lived	in	a	world	where,	as	at	the	Bandung	Conference,	cars	were	something	officials	sped	by	in	on	the	street	and	where	the	incomprehensible	layers	of	the	new	bureaucracy	were	a	constant	source	of	bewilderment,	(even	while	new	layers	of	bureaucratic	corruption	were	completely	expected.)	Pak	Kromo	spoke	in	Indonesian	rather	than	Javanese,	so	in	that	way	he	represented	old	fogies	everywhere,	not	just	in	Java,	who	found	themselves	confronted	with	the	strange	new	world	they	now	lived	in.	Pak	Kromo,	an	Indonesian	Mr.	Magoo,	was	blindly	and	somewhat	
 121	See	Sylvia	Tiwon,	“Models	and	Maniacs,”	in	Laurie	Sears,	ed.,	Fantasizing	the	Feminine,	and	her	discussion	of	violent	crowd	reactions	both	in	Idrus’	short	story	Surabaya,	about	the	aftermath	of	a	Revolutionary	battle	(discussed	on	pp.	62-64,)	and	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	(discussed	on	pp.	64-65.)	Her	argument	is	discussed	in	Chapter	1	of	the	dissertation.	122	See	Figures	4.1	and	4.2	in	Chapter	4.	
 
 
296 
blissfully	unaware	of	the	changes	swirling	around	him,	and	represented	the	social	dislocation	felt	by	much	of	Indonesia’s	masses	that	were	left	out	of	the	country’s	quick	modern	urban	development.	In	one	episode,	however,	Pak	Kromo	flipped	the	playing	field.	The	strip	was	entitled	“Pak	Kromo	Mau	International	Minded,”	or,	roughly,	“Pak	Kromo	Wants	To	Be	International	Minded.”123	In	it,	Pak	Kromo	decided	he	wanted	to	go	out	on	the	town	for	an	evening	at	a	fancy	hotel	restaurant,	so	he	dressed	up	in	a	suit	and	tie	(while	retaining	his	blankon),	and	had	his	friend	serve	as	chauffeur.	While	Pak	Kromo	was	inside	the	Hotel	Du	Pavillion,124	his	friend/driver	stood	outside	with	the	car,	and	was	shocked	to	see	Pak	Kromo	through	the	hotel’s	large	plate	glass	window	dancing	“western	style”	with	a	young	woman	who	wore	a	dress,	her	hair	styled	in	a	smart	western	bob.	(See	Figure	5.1).	Suddenly,	the	reader	could	see	a	sense	of	shock	register	on	Pak	Kromo’s	face.	He	turned	away	from	his	dance	to	see	an	angry	crowd	of	men	descending	on	the	hotel,	their	arms	raised	in	protest	and	their	mouths	open,	shouting	and	yelling.	In	the	cartoon’s	next	frame,	Pak	Kromo	was	being	carried	by	his	driver,	clearly	having	been	beaten	up	by	the	mob,	which	continued	to	fight	in	the	background,	outside	the	hotel.	The	cartoon’s	final	frame	showed	the	driver	speaking	the	only	words	of	the	entire	strip,	as	he	scratched	his	head	and	said,	in	English,	“No	comment!”		While	probably	mostly	intended	by	the	cartoonist125	as	a	commentary	on	the	separation	of	the	lives	and	morals	of	the	elites	from	the	men	in	the	street,	this	particular	piece	also	demonstrated	that	the	idea	of	a	mob	attacking	an	instance	of	moral	crisis	was	so	easily	understandable	that	it	could	be	used	as	the	central	element	of	a	cartoon	without	any	explanation	whatsoever.	This	reaction	was	also	be	seen	later	in	cartoons	from	the	early	1960’s	during	another	national	moment	built	on	a	large-scale	perception	of	national	moral	crisis,	Sukarno’s	Konfrontasi	campaign.126			
 123	See	Gembira,	1	March,	1952,	p.	13.	124	While	the	cartoon	is	not	explicitly	situated	in	any	particular	Indonesian	city,	the	Hotel	du	Pavillon	was	the	primary	colonial	era	first-class	hotel	in	Semarang.	125	The	strips	are	unsigned,	and	none	of	the	current	Indonesian	cartoon	artists	I	spoke	with	about	the	strip	knew	who	had	drawn	it.	126	These	other	examples	are	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
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Figure	5.3:	Pak	Kromo	Mau	International	Minded	
Gembira,	March	1,	1952,	p.	13.			The	possibility	of	violence	being	directed	against	morally	failed	women	was	addressed	in	a	short	story	in	Wanita	in	its	first	year,	in	August	1950.127	The	short	story	by	Tien	Pranjoto,128	“Sepandjang	Djalan,”	(“All	Along	the	Road,”)	published	in	Wanita,	therefore,	serves	as	an	appropriate	conclusion	to	this	chapter,	and	the	first	section	of	the	dissertation	on	the	early	1950’s.	It	needs	little	discussion.					
 127	Wanita,	1950,	no.	15,	pp.	264-65.	128	I	can	find	nothing	on	this	author,	but	the	name	is	a	woman’s,	and	it	most	likely	Javanese.	
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All	Along	the	Road	Madiun129	.	.	.	.	.	.		at	night	.	.	.	.	.	.		Her	cheeks	thickly	chalked,	not	less	thick	than	the	chalk	on	the	wall	of	a	prison	cell.	Her	lips	painted	red	.	.	.	like	the	flag	of	Viet	Nam	waving	in	the	air.	Her	eyes	seek	an	opponent,	resembling	the	search	light	of	a	patrol	car.	A	sweet	smell	invades	the	nose	like	five	Chinese	bridal	couples	passing	by	in	a	row	.	.	.	.	.	A	small	titter	.	.	.	.		sometimes	a	loud	laugh.	The	electric	light	is	dim	on	the	road’s	edge,	a	strategic	place	to	find	a	mate.	Who	knows	whether	it’s	to	satisfy	lust,	or	to	look	for	something	to	fill	an	empty	stomach	.	.	.	.	.	only	they	know.	 .	.	.	.	.	.	The	night	grows	deeper.	People	making	their	way	home	become	fewer.	The	electric	light	remains	dim.	Whispering,	fondling	.	.	.	.	paired	in	action,	giving	up	nothing	to	the	moves	of	Errol	Flynn	and	Olivia	de	Havilland	on	the	silver	screen	.	.	.	.	—“What	a	shame,”	says	the	saté	vendor	on	the	side	of	the	road.	—“What	is?”	asks	his	friend	the	ginger	tea	seller,	while	lighting	a	cigarette.	—“That,	that	big	guy,	wearing	nice	clothes,	being	trapped	by	the	night	butterfly,130	who’s	hanging	around	like	a	bee	when	the	flowers	are	in	bloom.”	—“Hiiiiih	.	.	.	.	.	.	that’s	hideous	.	.	.	.	.	.	society’s	trash	needs	to	be	thrown	out.		They	just	need	to	be	crushed,	like	you’d	squash	a	bedbug	.	.	.	.	.”	—“Remember	though,	brother,	why	is	it	they’re	doing	that?	Are	they	being	driven	by	the	effects	of	the	war	.	.	.	.	or	do	they	really	have	the	soul	of	a	lady	of	the	evening	.	.	.	.	.	.	But	.	.	.	.	.	.	they	really	do	need	to	be	eradicated,	they’re	as	dangerous	as	an	atomic	bomb	.	.	.	.	.	—“Just	wait	for	the	government	to	take	action	.	.	.	.”	An	empty	silence	.	.	.	.	becoming	more	quiet	.	.	.	.	only	their	laughter	that	then	gives	way	to	their	lust	under	the	trees,	deep	into	the	night	.	.	.	.			A	prostitute,	society’s	trash,	entraps	a	well-off	Indonesian	man	with	moves	learned	from	a	Hollywood	film.	Perhaps	she	was	injured	morally	by	the	war,	the	two	Indonesian	every-men	wonder,	but	nonetheless,	she	needs	to	be	“eradicated.”	Like	an	atomic	blast,	she	and	her	ilk	could	destroy	the	nation.	In	the	artwork	accompanying	the	story,	the	woman	is	dressed	in	a	nice	kain.	Her	hair	is	pulled	back	in	a	konde.	Her	kebaya,	on	the	other	hand,	is	perhaps	too	flashy.	But	the	look	of	her	face	betrays	her.	Her	eyebrows	are	carefully	drawn	
 129	A	provincial	city	in	East	Java,	and	the	site	of	a	Communist	rebellion	in	1926	and	of	particularly	strong	fighting	and	violence	during	the	Indonesian	Revolution,	1945-1949.	130	In	Indonesian,	“kupu-kupu	malam,”	the	expression	for	a	prostitute	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter.	
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Figure	5.4:	Sepandjang	Djalan	
Wanita,	1950,	no.	15,	pp.	264-65.	
	in	high	arches.	Her	lips	are	carefully	rouged.	Most	importantly,	her	eyes	are	searching,	as	she	glances	engagingly—ensnaringly?—towards	her	potential	client.	These	subtleties	of	representation	point	to	the	danger	she	poses.	She	is	a	broken	woman,	who	can	in	turn	break	society	with	her	ruined	internal	character.		The	next	two	chapters	of	the	dissertation	explore	the	decade	from	1955-1965.	They	look	first	at	the	cultural	expression	of	gender	in	Indonesia	and	its	increasing	connection	to	national	identity	and	politics,	and	then	at	the	use	of	a	story	about	female	sexual	immorality	as	the	lynchpin	for	justifying	genocide.		But,	in	reviewing	the	previous	four	chapters	that	have	explored	the	multiple	layers	of	the	developing	web	of	modern	Indonesian	national	identity	between	1949	and	1955,	it	is	important	to	see	the	parallels	of	Sepandjang	Djalan	with	the	story	of	Lewat	Djam	Malam,	with	their	late	night	assignations	with	a	prostitute	by	a	well-situated	young	man	who	then	must	deal	with	a	possible	violent	outcome	as	a	result.	In	Ismail’s	film,	it	is	the	young	returning	veteran	who	becomes	the	victim	of	violence,	but	out	of	confusion	and	through	some	form	of	mistake.	In	Sepandjang	Djalan,	however,	it	bears	stressing	that	it	was	not	the	sexually	impure	young	man	but	rather	the	sexually	impure	woman	who	was	the	potential	
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victim	of	violence,	and	rather	than	being	shot	mistakenly	and	in	confusion,	she	was	likely	to	be	eradicated.	In	both	cases,	the	root	cause	of	the	violence	was	the	result	of	women’s	sexual	impropriety.	On	the	same	day	as	the	opening	of	the	Asia-Africa	Conference,	the	Indonesian	film	industry	held	its	first	national	awards.	The	prizes	for	best	actor	and	actress	went	to	the	stars	of	Lewat	Djam	Malam,	A.N.	Alcaff	as	the	returning	veteran	Iskandar,	and	Dahlia	as	the	mentally	unstable	widow/prostitute	Laila.	Even	at	the	highest	level	of	Indonesia’s	cultural	production,	then,	a	film	specifically	intended	to	be	shown	overseas	and	to	demonstrate	the	nation’s	modernity,	and	fêted	just	as	the	world’s	leaders	arrived	in	Jakarta,	the	central	cultural	experience	being	explored	was	moral	crisis.	It	revolved	around	women,	their	choices	about	clothing	and	morality,	the	display	or	covering	of	their	bodies,	and	their	sexuality.	Their	beauty	and	allure,	if	misused,	held	destructive	potential	for	the	nation.	This	danger	came	at	times	when	the	future	of	the	nation	was	most	in	question,	when	the	world	felt	most	particularly	rickety	and	wobbly.	And	violence	by	masses	of	the	people,	or	its	threat,	was	considered	to	be	and	acceptable	possible	solution	to	that	danger.		This	pattern	would	be	repeated	at	several	instances	between	1955-1965,	but	increasingly	magnified	in	its	scope	and	intensity,	until	it	erupted	in	the	violent	reaction	to	the	narrative	created	and	propagated	by	the	military	about	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.	It	is	to	this	process	of	repetition,	magnification	and	intensification	that	the	final	two	chapters	of	the	dissertation	now	turns.
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CHAPTER	6	
 
Tall	Hair,	Short	Skirts	and	Moral	Crisis:	
The	Politics	of	Beauty	and	of	Confrontation,	1955-1965		
	.	.	.	saja	amat	.	.	.	bergembira	.	.	.	bahwa	Kongres	Wanita	Indonesia	
djuga	akan	aktif	sekali	dalam	memberantas	imperialisme	kulturil.	Ja	rambut	
sasak,	ja	rambut	beetle,	ja	spanrok-spanrokan,	ja	twist-twist-an,	ja	rock-and-
roll-rock-and-roll-an,	ja	Elvys	Presley	Elvys	Presley-an,	ja	Nat	King	Cole	Nat	
King	Cole-an,	matjam-matjam,	Saudara-saudara.	Tetapi	terutama	sekali	kita	
harus	waspada	terhadap	kepada	intervensi	dan	subversi	politik.	Waspadalah,	
waspadahlah!		.	.	.	I	am	exceedingly	.	.	.	happy	.	.	.	that	the	Indonesian	Women’s	Congress	will	also	play	an	active	role	in	smashing	cultural	imperialism.	Yes	teased	and	ratted	hair,	yes	Beatle	hair,	yes	miniskirts,	yes	the	twist,	yes	rock-and-roll,	yes	Elvis	Presley	stuff,	yes	Nat	King	Cole	stuff,	all	sorts	of	things,	brothers	and	sisters.	But	above	all	we	must	be	alert	and	vigilant	towards	political	intervention	and	subversion.	Beware,	beware!	—Sukarno,	to	the	delegates	of	Kowani,									July	19641		During	an	eight-day	span	in	July	1964,	President	Sukarno	gave	speeches	at	the	opening	ceremonies	of	two	national	congresses	of	Indonesian	women’s	organizations	in	Jakarta.	The	first,	given	on	July	16	to	the	5th	Congress	of	Wanita	Demokrat	Indonesia,2	was	entitled	“The	Indonesian	Revolution	Will	Not	Succeed	Without	Women!”3	The	second,	“Indonesian	Women	Are	Always	Active	in	the	Revolutionary	Ranks!,”4	opened	the	10th	
 1	“Wanita	Indonesia	Selalu	Ikut	Bergerak	Dalam	Barisan	Revolusioner!”	Published	by	the	Departemen	Penerangan	RI	as	Special	Publication	No.	332.	Transcription	of	speech	by	Sukaro	to	the	Kongres	Wanita	Indonesia,	or	Indonesian	Women’s	Congress,	July	24,	1964.	Yosef	Djakababa	commented	that	the	“-an”	suffix	in	this	case	conveys	a	strong	sense	of	the	modified	elements	as	being	fake,	or	not	real.	The	term	“mobil-mobil-an,”	for	instance,	means	a	toy	car	rather	than	a	real,	full-sized	mobil.	Personal	correspondence,	12/7/2019.	2	Indonesian	Democratic	Women,	the	women’s	wing	of	Sukarno’s	Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Nationalist	Party,)	or	PNI.		3	“Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”	Published	by	the	Departemen	Penerangan	RI	(Department	of	Public	Information	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia)	as	Special	Publication	No.	329.	4	“Wanita	Indonesia	Selalu	Ikut	Bergerak	Dalam	Barisan	Revolusioner!”	The	verb	“bergerak”	literally	means	“to	move”	in	the	sense	that	a	political	movement	is	referred	to	by	the	noun	based	on	the	same	word,	“gerakan,”	as	in	Gerakan	Wanita	
Indonesia.	
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national	meeting	of	the	Kongress	Wanita	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Women’s	Congress,	or	Kowani,)	on	July	24.		Both	speeches	reflected	the	hyper-active	political	energy	and	rhetoric	of	the	day,	in	which	Sukarno	exhorted	Indonesians	to	“finish”	their	national	revolution.	A	month	after	these	two	speeches,	responding	in	particular	to	the	Konfrontasi	(Confrontation)5	campaign	against	Malaysia,	Sukarno	famously	called	on	Indonesians	to	embark	on	a	“Year	of	Living	Dangerously,”6	in	which	the	then	nearly	20-year-old	nation	would	strive	to	completely	throw	off	the	yoke	of	western	imperialism	and	neo-colonialism.	He	called	on	Indonesians	to	reject	Western	interference	in	the	nation,	whether	it	came	in	political,	economic	or	cultural	forms.	But	in	these	speeches	in	July	1964—alongside	the	exhortations	to	“go	to	hell	with	this	‘Malaysia’,”7	and	to	“build	a	new	world,	and	to	expel	all	imperialism	and	colonialism	from	this	world”8—Sukarno	paid	attention	to	what	might	seem	to	be	an	insignificant	detail:	the	clothing	and	beauty	of	the	women	assembled.	“When	I	see	women	gathered,”	he	said	to	the	Kowani	delegates,		with	their	variously	colored	kebaya,	when	I	see	their	very	best	batik	cloth,	see	their	radiant	faces,	see	their	eyes	that	shine	like	stars	in	the	eternal	sky,	at	those	times	I	say,	I	have	the	feeling	that	I	am	engaged	in	revolutionary	struggle	inside	a	beautiful	garden.		.	.	.		Here	I	see	the	color	blue,	but	instead	I	see	what	looks	like	the	painting	of	a	Kartini	blossom,	with	a	stalk	and	a	white	flower.	Hey	comrades	from	West	Irian,	[you]	are	the	stalk,	the	women	police	officers	from	Sukabumi	[you]	are	the	green	leaves,	the	stalk	moves	upward,	on	the	top	there	is	white,	which	is	the	flower.	.	.	.	See,	over	there	is	red,	and	then	blue	again,	here	I	see	the	color	yellow	from	the	Women	Military	
 5	The	Konfrontasi	(Confrontation)	with	newly	independent	Malaysia	was	based	on	the	British	inclusion	of	two	regions	of	Borneo,	Sabah	and	Serawak,	in	the	Malaysian	nation.	Indonesia,	which	controlled	the	majority	of	the	island,	saw	this	as	a	continuation	of	British	imperialism	on	their	sovereign	space.	6	“Tahun	Vivere	Pericoloso,”	shorted	to	“Tavip,”	which	would	be	the	title	of	Sukarno’s	National	Day	speech	on	August	17,	1964.	The	phrase	however,	was	already	in	use	at	this	time,	including	in	the	concluding	paragraph	of	the	Wanita	Indonesia	speech.	7	In	English	in	the	original.	Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	speech,	p.	22.	8	“membangun	satu	dunia	baru,	.	.	.	membuang	segenap	imperialisme	dan	kolonialisme	didunia	ini.”		Sukarno,	“Revolusi	
Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”	p.	24.	
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Volunteers9	and	the	Women	Ministers,	here	again	I	see	colors	that	are	very	beautiful,	I	see	brilliant	greens	from	the	comrades	from	West	Irian.10		Why,	in	the	midst	of	inherently	political	speeches,	did	Sukarno	take	time	to	note	the	quality	of	the	women’s	colorful	clothing,	the	radiance	of	their	complexions	and	the	brilliance	of	their	eyes?	As	the	discussion	in	previous	chapters	of	this	dissertation	would	suggest,	there	was	significantly	more	than	either	simple	flattery	or	some	sort	of	patriarchal	condescension	at	play	in	his	descriptions	of	these	women’s	appearance.	Rather,	Sukarno	was	deploying	a	politics	of	feminine	beauty	that	linked	Indonesian	women’s	appearance	with	a	conception	of	Indonesian	modernity	and	national	identity.	Most	importantly,	this	politics	concerned	their	inner	character	and	moral	strength	and	their	collective	identity	as	women.	In	doing	so,	it	deployed	a	web	of	definitions	of	proper	national	femininity	that	had	been	developing	since	the	beginnings	of	the	Indonesian	nationalist	movement	in	the	early	1920s.			Sukarno	was	also	connecting	this	beauty	politics	to	the	revolutionary	politics	of	the	day.	The	types	of	women	he	chose	to	highlight—women	police	and	military	officers,	and	comrades	from	West	Irian,	(a	region	that	recently	“retaken”	from	the	Dutch),	about	which	Sukarno	had	created	a	significant	rhetorical	campaign11—reflected	the	tighter	connections	that	had	developed	between	beauty	and	the	ideal	representation	of	the	nation.	The	references	to	political	situations	were	particularly	cogent	and	emotionally	resonant	at	the	time.		
 9	As	part	of	the	mass	mobilization	of	Indonesian	society	during	Konfrontasi,	each	of	the	military	branches	either	began	or	expanded	special	women’s	detachments	referred	to	as	sukarelawati,	or	“volunteers.”	These	women’s	detachments	received	significant	coverage	in	women’s	magazines,	particularly	for	their	training	exercises,	which	included	training	in	riflery	and	other	firearms.	There	were	also	women	in	the	national	police	force,	whose	brigades	saw	increased	militarization	of	their	training	at	this	point	as	well.	Beyond	this,	many	of	the	various	political	parties	and	organizations	put	together	“volunteer”	brigades	as	well,	some	of	which	also	engaged	in	various	sorts	of	training	exercises.	This	provided	the	general	circumstances	under	which	Gerwani	women	were	present	at	Lubang	Buaya	on	the	night	of	September	30-October	1,	1965.	10	“.	.	.	kalau	saja	melihat	wanita-wanita	berkumpul	dengan	badju	kebajanja	jang	pantjawarna	atau	aneka-warna,	melihat	
kain	batiknja	jang	bagus-bagus,	melihat	mukanja	jang	berseri-seri,	melihat	sinar	matanja	jang	laksana	sinar	bintang	
dilangit	jang	abadi,	pada	waktu	itu	saja	berkata,	saja	mempunjai	perasaan	bahwa	saja	ini	berdjoang	dalam	taman-sari	jang	
indah.		.	.	.		melihat	sana	ada	warna	biru,	sana	malahan	melihat	ada	lukisan	bunga	Kartini	.	.	.	tangkainja	ada,	bunganja	
putih.	Hé	Saudara-saudari	dari	Irian	Barat,	itu	tangkai	itu,	polisi	wanita	dari	Sukabumi,	daunnja	hidjau,	tangkai	terus	
mengatas,	diatas	ada	putih,	itu	bunga	.	.	.	Melihat	di	sana	ada	merah,	biru	lagi,	melihat	disini	warna	kuning	daripada	Ibu-ibu	
Sukarelawati,	Ibu-ibu	Menteri,	melihat	disinipun	warna-warna	jang	amat	indah,	melihat	hidjau-hidjau	tjemerlang	daripada	
saudari-saudari	dari	Irian	Barat.”	Sukarno,	“Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”,	p.	7.	Recall	the	description	of	the	nation	as	a	garden,	with	Sukarno	at	its	center,	that	was	included	in	the	first	issue	of	Wanita	in	August	1949,	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		11	See	the	discussion	of	Trikora	later	in	this	chapter.	
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The	politics	of	beauty	Sukarno	used	in	July	1964	had	developed	beyond	the	version	that	had	been	at	play	at	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung	in	1955.	Women’s	beauty	was	no	longer	merely	a	projection	of	a	strong	moral	nationalism.	By	1964,	it	was	also	evoked	as	a	protective	talisman	against	specific	dangers	of	the	modern	world:	the	“Elvis	
Presley-Elvis	Presley-an”’s	and	“rock-and-roll-rock-and-roll-an”’s,12	and,	as	this	chapter	will	explore	in	particular,	the	“spanrok-spanrok-an”	(“mini-skirt	stuff,”)	that	threatened	to	diminish	the	morals	of	young	Indonesians,	female	and	male.	Beauty	politics	therefore	were	no	longer	only	a	positive	attribute	supporting	the	nation;	they	had	come	to	form	a	dike	that,	if	breached,	would	lead	to	the	complete	inundation	of	the	nation	by	imperialist	forces.		Following	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung	in	April	1955,	the	discussion	of	fashion	in	Indonesian	women’s	magazines	entered	a	new	phase.	Largely,	the	magazines	demonstrated	that	elite,	cosmopolitan	women	still	enjoyed	a	significant	set	of	sartorial	options	from	1955	to	the	early	1960’s.	In	1955,	following	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung,	however,	Sukarno	began	to	refocus	his	and	the	nation’s	attention	on	the	development	of	a	new	politics	that	included	more	stress	on	developing	an	Indonesian	national	identity.	From	that	point	on,	representations	of	women	in	magazines	increasingly	deployed	ideal	types	that	reflected	the	developing	interests	of	the	Sukarno	regime.		The	prevalence	of	these	ideal	representations	was	connected	to	the	ebb	and	flow	of	Sukarno’s	political	control	of	the	nation.	During	periods	when	Sukarno	asserted	less	de	
facto	control,	and	the	central	government	was	more	focused	on	political	or	military	maneuvering,	the	images	of	women	aligned	less	to	narrowly	cast	types.	But	when	impulses	towards	internal	political	control	and	its	enhanced	rhetoric	grew	firmer,	these	ideal	types	connected	to	national	identity	were	recruited	more	heavily.	This	was	not	a	random	process.	Sukarno	managed	it	through	a	creeping	strictness	in	changes	in	the	press	laws,	as	newspapers	and	magazines	were	increasingly	required	to	reflect	and	promote	the	cultural	and	political	interests	of	the	state	at	various	specific	times.	In	October	1956,	Sukarno	introduced	a	new	conception	(“konsepsi”)	of	the	Indonesian	state	to	the	nation.	He	proposed	that	Indonesia	enter	a	system	of	“Guided	
 12	This	construction	in	Indonesian,	which	I	translated	in	the	opening	quotation	as	“Elvis	Presley	stuff,”	was	used	by	Sukarno	in	a	highly	evocative	manner.	The	rhetorics	of	it,	discussed	in	fn#1	of	this	chapter,	allow	the	things	being	criticized	to	be	both	specific	and	generalized	at	the	same	time.	
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Democracy,”	in	which	the	presidency	would	be	strengthened.	The	modern,	national	elements	of	the	economy,	still	largely	under	Dutch	ownership	and	control,	were	largely	nationalized	through	a	series	of	unilateral	workers’	actions	in	1956-1957	as	part	of	the	campaign	against	the	continuing	Dutch	presence	in	West	Papua.13		Though	the	occupation	of	nearly	every	Dutch-owned	business	was	led	largely	by	worker’s	unions	affiliated	with	the	PKI,	when	the	businesses	were	nationalized,	they	were	taken	over	by	the	army,	which	then	used	the	most	advanced	sectors	of	the	economy	to	finance	the	military.		Politically,	the	strength	of	political	parties	was	undercut	as	the	legislature	was	appointed	to	represent	“functional	groups”	rather	than	being	elected	directly	from	party	lists.	Indonesian	“national	identity”	was	deployed	as	the	source	for	political	and	cultural	processes,	which	were	increasingly	focused	on	“finishing	the	Indonesian	Revolution,”	that	is,	on	a	building	a	nation	that	was	not	dependent,	culturally,	politically	or	economically,	on	the	west.	Several	incidents—an	ongoing	Islamic	guerrilla	movement,14	regional	rebellions	that	lasted	from	1957-1961,15	and	a	period	of	Martial	Law	in	195716—impeded,	or	perhaps	stoked	the	process	of	insisting	on	centralized	control.	In	any	case,	despite	strong	backing	for	the	konsepsi	from	both	the	army	and	the	PKI,	Sukarno	was	unable	to	begin	the	full	implementation	of	Guided	Democracy	until	1959-1960.		The	critical	structural	political	change	of	Guided	Democracy	was	the	devolution	of	the	official	structures	of	political	power	to	the	presidency—and	therefore	to	Sukarno—through	the	re-adoption	of	elements	of	the	1945	Constitution	that	had	originally	provided	for	a	strong	executive.	This	was	reflected	in	Sukarno’s	promulgation	of	his	Political	
 13	See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	26.	Dutch	managers	were	expelled	from	the	country.	This	showed	up	interestingly	in	women’s	magazines,	when	regularly	running	full-page	advertisements	for	some	of	these	Dutch	companies	were	suddenly	left	empty.	14	From	1949	on,	the	Jakarta	government	was	actively	opposed	by	the	Darul	Islam	movement,	which	called	for	the	establishment	of	Indonesia	as	an	Islamic	Republic.	Born	out	of	Islamic	guerilla	movements	during	the	Revolution,	Darul	
Islam	was	particularly	strong	in	rural	areas	of	West	Java,	South	Sulawesi	and	Aceh,	and	carried	out	intermittent	guerrilla	actions	against	the	central	government	in	those	regions.	15	Permesta,	(Piagam	Perjuangan	Semesta,	or	the	Universal	Struggle	Charter,)	was	a	regionally	based	rebellion	against	the	central	government	declared	on	March	2,	1957	by	civil	and	military	authorities	in	the	eastern	islands	of	Indonesia.	The	regional	leadership	not	only	felt	cultural	distance	from	the	Republic’s	Javanese	center,	they	also	felt	that	their	economic	advancement	was	being	limited	by	central	government	policies	that	privileged	Javanese	advancement.		The	PRRI	(Pemerintah	Revolusioner	Republic	Indonesia,	or	Revolutionary	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia)	was	a	rebellious	government	declared	in	opposition	to	the	Sukarno	government	on	February	15,	1958.	It	was	centered	in	Sumatra,	and	was	also	largely	focused	on	opposing	the	Javanese	center	of	power	in	the	nation.	The	two	movements	recognized	each	other	formally,	and	their	efforts	are	referred	to	jointly	in	the	historiography	as	PRRI-Permesta.		16	In	March	1957,	nominally	in	response	to	the	Permesta	rebellion	but	also	because	of	the	continuing	incursions	of	Darul	Islam	forces,	the	military,	under	the	leadership	of	General	Nasution,	began	to	exert	political	control	regionally.		
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Manifesto,	(Manifesto	Politik,	or	Manipol.)	Saskia	Wieringa	described	the	substance	of	the	1959	National	Day	speech	in	which	Sukarno	laid	out	Manipol	as	follows:	In	vague	terms	(‘the	demands	of	the	Indonesian	people	must	be	met	in	an	overwhelmingly	revolutionary	manner’)	it	outlined	certain	government	priorities—food	and	clothing	for	the	people,	internal	security	and	the	continuation	of	the	struggle	against	imperialism—and	long-term	objectives,	including	a	‘just	and	prosperous	society.’17			But,	she	also	noted,	“As	presidential	power	increased	and	political	and	social	chaos	ensued	there	was	mounting	pressure	to	couch	everything	in	Sukarno’s	terminology,	such	as	Manipol,	‘socialism	à	la	Indonesia’,	‘unfinished	revolution.’	Yet	the	boundaries	of	these	concepts	shifted	and	inter-party	polemics	turned	into	a	struggle	over	the	interpretation	of	Sukarno’s	words.”18	In	his	canonical	work	on	Guided	Democracy,	Daniel	Lev	argued	that	although	“it	was	not	always	evident,	because	of	the	dominating	figure	of	Soekarno,	the	main	driving	force	behind	Guided	Democracy	was	the	army.”19	Although	the	army	did	not	take	over	the	actual	running	of	the	government,	“[o]ffices	of	particular	importance	.	.	.	quickly	came	under	direct	army	control.	But	the	martial	law	administration	was	enabled	to	intervene	anywhere	and	at	any	time	it	chose.”20	There	was	resistance	to	the	military	control	of	the	nation,	particularly	from	the	Indonesian	Communist	Party	and	its	affiliated	unions	and	organizations,	as	well	as	from	elements	of	Islamic	leadership.	The	military,	on	the	other	hand,	used	its	power	to	control	union	activism,	and	to	assert	martial	law	at	various	times,	and	even	to	detain	PKI	members	in	political	prisoner	camps	when	it	felt	its	authority	was	endangered.21	Merle	Ricklefs,	however,	writing	a	generation	later	than	Lev,	described	Guided	Democracy	as	“a	fluid	system,	born	of	crisis	and	constantly	changing	through	one	of	the	most	disturbed	periods	of	Indonesian	history.”22	His	analysis	places	Sukarno	in	the	middle	of	this	consistently	shifting	political	landscape,	although	“joined	by	others	in	maintaining	his	central	position.	But	this,”	he	writes,	“was	all	in	support	of	a	political	balance	that	not	
 17	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	103.	18	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	104.	19	Daniel	Lev,	The	Transition	to	Guided	Democracy,	pp.	76-77.	20	Daniel	Lev,	The	Transition	to	Guided	Democracy,	p.	78.	21	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	28.	22	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	
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even	Sukarno	could	maintain,	one	which	represented	a	compromise	among	irreconcilable	interests	and	was	therefore	satisfactory	to	no	one.”23	Sukarno,	therefore,	with	his	significant	rhetorical	ability	to	“define”	the	country,	set	about	creating	a	national	ideology	with	which	he	attempted	to	keep	divergent	powers	in	check.	His	goal	was	to	play	the	three	main	aliran	off	against	each	other	by	binding	them	all	together	in	a	platform	of	loyalty	towards	his	new	plans	for	the	nation.	This	was	dependent	on	the	promulgation	of	a	cult	of	loyalty	to	himself	as	president,	based	on	his	status	as	the	“Great	Leader	of	the	Revolution.”24		To	do	this,	Sukarno	created	a	national	unity	ideology	known	as	NASAKOM,	an	acronym	that	combined	Indonesia’s	three	broad	political	groupings,	25	and	in	which	all	three	elements—nationalism,	religion	and	communism/socialism—were	held	to	be	central	to	the	nation’s	core	belief	system.	But	all	three	revolved	in	orbit	around	Sukarno,	the	revolution’s	central	star.	Ricklefs	describes	Sukarno’s	oratorical	power.	Sukarno,	he	wrote,		was	a	skilled	manipulator	of	men	and	of	symbols.	He	could	harangue	a	crowd	or	charm	a	potential	adversary	with	equal	ease,	although	he	was	also	very	adept	at	hating	his	enemies.	He	offered	Indonesians	something	to	believe	in,	something	which	many	hoped	would	give	them	and	their	nation	dignity	and	pride.26		What	Sukarno	offered	Indonesians	as	something	to	“believe	in,”	was	a	five-point	plan	connected	Manipol	and	intended	to	assure	its	general	implementation.	Known	as	USDEK,	the	plan	stressed	five	areas	in	which	the	government	would	assert	new	powers	politically,	economically	and	culturally.27	While	stressing	the	centralized	control	of	both	politics	(democracy)	and	the	economy	and	the	renewed	political	position	of	the	presidency,	USDEK	also	included	two	elements	that	referred	specifically	to	the	installation	of	
 23	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	24	There	are	various	ways	historians	interpret	the	balance	of	power	among	Sukarno	and	the	three	major	aliran	during	this	period.	Daniel	Lev,	as	quoted	above,	draws	the	military	and	its	increasing	control	of	the	economy	as	the	major	driving	force	of	the	era,	to	which	Sukarno	must	react.	Max	Lane,	on	the	other	hand,	sees	the	PKI	and	union	and	peasant	activism	as	driving	the	national	dynamic,	and	suggests	Sukarno	was	moving	strongly	leftward	from	the	late	1950’s	on,	in	part	in	reaction	to	the	growth	of	the	military	power.	(See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	pp.	36-38.)	Anthony	Reid	focuses	his	explanation	of	the	period	on	the	tensions	between	the	regions	and	the	center,	and	on	Sukarno’s	use	of	Guided	Democracy	to	address	those	geographical	tensions	more	than	to	hold	various	political	groups	at	bay.	(See	Anthony	Reid,	To	Nation	by	
Revolution,	p.	139-140.)	25	Nas	(nasionalis,	or	nationalist,	which	specifically	accounted	for	the	political	power	of	the	armed	forces),	A	(agama,	or	religion,	though	mainly	here	referring	to	the	large	Islamic	groups	Muhammadiyah	and	Nadhlatul	Ulama),	and	Kom	(komunis,	or	communist,	which	included	not	only	the	PKI,	but	also	Gerwani	and	other	leftist	political	organizations.)	26	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	27	See	the	discussion	of	USDEK	in	Chapter	1.		
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Indonesian	cultural	elements	as	bases	for	the	political	and	cultural	transformation	of	the	nation.	The	first	was	the	adoption	of	“socialism	à	la	Indonesia,”28	which	was	to	some	extent	an	adoption	of	elements	of	Mao	Zedong	thought	that	stressed	the	necessity	for	Chinese	socialism	to	adapt	to	the	cultural	and	political	realities	of	1950s	China.	The	other	key	element	was	the	necessity	of	the	development	of	an	Indonesian	national	identity	(“keprebadian	nasional”)	as	the	core	of	the	nation’s	self-expression	in	all	areas.		In	the	introduction	to	a	collection	of	five	speeches	Sukarno	gave	about	kepribadian	
nasional	in	1959,	Hadji	Achmad	Notosoetardjo	reflected	earlier	language	about	the	necessity	of	making	good	choices	about	modernity	and	identity	that	had	concerned	Indonesian	women	from	the	earliest	days	of	the	new	nation.	“We	are	always	modern,”	he	wrote,		because	we	want	to	live	in	tune	with	[“sesuai	dengan”]	the	climate	of	the	times,	we	are	always	infatuated	with	developments	that	are	equal	with	those	peoples	who	are	already	more	advanced	.	.	.	This	is	a	sign	of	progress,	of	moving	forward.		.	.	.	[But]	in	the	upheaval	of	catching	up	to	the	terms	“modern”	and	“advanced”	we	must	not	let	go	of	our	own	Indonesian	identity.29			The	fear	of	losing	critical	elements	of	local	culture	to	the	“upheaval”	of	modernity	remained	an	important	part	of	how	Indonesians	conceived	of	their	own	experience.	As	part	of	USDEK,	under	the	rubric	of	kepribadian	nasional,	it	had	then	also	become	a	formal	element	of	national	ideology.	Manipol-USDEK,	as	much	as	anything,	was	expressed	through	a	set	of	slogans	and	ambitions.	Political	action	revolved	around	Sukarno	as	a	person	and	figure	rather	than	around	political	parties	and	institutions,	and	suffered	in	its	implementation	as	a	result.	The	one	arguable	exception	to	this	was	the	promulgation	of	Operation	Trikora,30	from	November	1961-August	1962,	which	resulted	in	the	end	of	Dutch	control	of	West	Irian	and	
 28	As	was	mentioned	in	the	quote	from	Saskia	Wieringa	above.	29	“Kita	senantiasa	modern,	karena	kita	ingin	hidup	sesuai	dengan	iklimnja	zaman,	kita	senantiasa	gandrung	kepada	
kemadjuan	jang	setaraf	se-tidak2nja	dengan	bangsa-bangsa	jang	telah	lebih	madju	.	.	.	Itu	tandanja	progress,	itu	tandanja	
madju	.	.	.	Didalam	pergolakan	mengedjar	istilah	‘moderen’	dan	‘madju’	kita	tidak	bisa	terlepas	daripada	kepribadian	
Indonesia	sendiri.”	Notosoetardjo,	Kepribadian	Revolusi	Bangsa	Indonesia,	p.	11.	30	“Trikora,”	an	acronym	for	“Tri	Komando	Rakjat”	or	“The	People’s	Triple	Command,”	was	the	popular	name	Sukarno’s	military	and	political	efforts	to	claim	the	western	half	of	Papua	for	Indonesia	and	to	liberate	it	from	Dutch	colonial	control.	The	campaign	lasted	from	December	1961	to	August	1962,	when	the	region	was	annexed	into	the	Indonesian	Republic.	This	was	the	first	of	his	two	such	major	pushes	by	Sukarno	during	the	early	1960’s,	the	second	of	which	was	Konfrontasi	with	Malaysia,	also	referred	to	as	“Dwikora,”	short	for	“Dwi	Komando	Rakjat,”	or	“The	People’s	Double	Command.	
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the	region	being	annexed	into	the	Indonesian	state	in	1962.	Trikora	was	carried	out	largely	by	the	military,	however,	one	of	the	few	institutions	capable	of	implementing	large-scale	projects	at	the	time,	and	essentially	to	meet	its	own	needs.		But	the	period	was	accompanied	by	what	Indonesian	analyst	Soedjati	Djiwandono	referred	to	in	1966	as	a	policy	of	“progressive	mobilization”	of	the	people.31	In	this	arena	specifically,	Manipol-USDEK	strongly	affected	the	tenor	of	an	increasingly	revolutionary	rhetoric,	the	usage	of	which	became	increasingly	required	in	the	public	sphere	at	several	key	points.		With	much	of	politics	enveloped	in	rhetoric,	an	important	element	of	Sukarno’s	extension	of	political	control	involved	a	major	revision	of	the	national	press	law	in	November	1960.	The	new	regulations	required	magazines	and	newspapers	to	adopt	approaches	that	were	specifically	in	line	with	Manipol,	and	to	“serve	as	tools	to	drive	the	masses	to	finish	the	Indonesian	revolution	towards	a	just	and	prosperous	society.”32	All	publications	were	obligated	to	apply	for	new	permits	in	a	process	that	included	a	review	of	the	political	reliability	of	their	staff	and	the	appropriateness	of	their	editorial	content.33	Women’s	magazines	largely	focused	on	the	last	of	the	five	USDEK	conceptions,	
kepribadian	nasional.	The	magazines	increasingly	featured	Indonesian	models	and	actresses	or	patriotic	subjects	on	their	covers	while	the	coverage	of	Hollywood	fashion	and	style	diminished.	More	importantly,	the	images	of	Indonesian	women	within	magazines	
 31	See	J.	Soedjati	Djiwandono,	Konfrontasi	Revisited:	Indonesia’s	Foreign	Policy	Under	Soekarno,	p.	135.	32		“	.	.	.	dapat	dipergunakan	sebagai	alat	penggerak	massa	untuk	menyelesaikan	revolusi	Indonesia	menuju	pada	
masyarakat	adil	dan	makmur.”	In	order	to	receive	a	SIT	(Surat	Izin	Terbit,	or	Publishing	License),	publishers	were	required	to	sign	onto	19	principals	affirming	their	support	of	Manipol-USDEK.	The	order	is	cited	in	full	in	H.	Soebagijo,	
Sejarah	Pers	Indonesia,	pp.	121-125.	This	quote	from	p,	121.	The	new	spelling	system	is	from	the	source.		This	book	is	part	of	a	series	edited	by	Nugroho	Notosusanto,	one	of	the	authors	of	the	“official”	history	of	Lubang	Buaya,	and	it	proffers	a	New	Order	interpretation	of	the	Guided	Democracy	era.	Soebagio	notes	that	the	announcement	of	this	new	press	policy	coincided	with	a	ban	on	all	political	activity	in	the	military	district	including	Jakarta	between	September	15	and	November	1,	1960.							The	two	concepts	here,	“menyelesaikan	revolusi	Indonesia,”	(“finishing	the	Indonesian	revolution,”)	and	building	a	“masyarakat	adil	dan	makmur,”	(“just	and	prosperous	society,”)	which	were	often	presented	in	Sukarnoist	rhetoric	as	a	matched	pair,	were,	in	Max	Lane’s	analysis,	at	the	core	of	the	socialist	conception	of	the	nation,	and	therefore	somewhat	at	odds	with	the	continued	power	sought	by	the	military	and	the	nationalist	urban	elites	who	made	up	a	significant	element	of	the	“nationalist”	group.	See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	27.	33	One	of	the	distinct	fears	that	emerged	during	Guided	Democracy	was	that	Indonesia	was	beset	by	not	only	by	external	enemies,	but	critically,	by	internal	ones	as	well.	One	set	of	these	were	Islamist	forces	involved	in	both	the	Darul	Islam	and	PRRI	Rebellions.	Masyumi,	the	political	party	that	had	encompassed	both	the	modernist	Muhammadiyah	and	the	more	traditionally	Javanese	Nahdlatul	Ulama	began	to	divide	over	the	question	of	what	to	do	with	its	members	who	had	been	involved	in	the	PRRI	rebellion.	NU-oriented	members	largely	withdrew,	and	the	party	itself	was	banned.	Suara	‘Aisjijah	did	not	publish	for	several	years,	but	the	women	in	charge	of	their	archive	insisted	several	times	to	me	that	they	had	never	been	banned	during	this	period.	
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were	increasingly	tailored	to	reflect	“Indonesian	values.”	Elements	of	western	culture,	particularly	those	that	were	not	considered	to	be	“aligned	with	Indonesian	identity”	were	increasingly	criticized.		Although	many	of	the	exterior	forms	under	attack	were	clearly	originally	western,	what	was	at	play	were	their	Indonesian	expressions.	Wearing	western	clothing	remained	quite	acceptable,	particularly	in	daily	life.	But	it	was	important	for	women	to	understand	what	wearing	a	miniskirt	or	teased	hair	or	dancing	the	twist	meant	in	a	revolutionary	Manipol-USDEK	context,	and	more	importantly,	what	it	meant	about	being	Indonesian.		It	was	critical	to	know	why	those	particular	expressions	were	to	be	avoided,	and	eventually,	forbidden.		A	stronger	version	of	the	press	law	went	into	effect	in	1963,	connected	directly	to	the	explosion	of	revolutionary	zeal	that	Sukarno	deployed	as	an	important	element	of	
Konfrontasi.		While	the	rhetoric	of	Konfrontasi	was,	in	theory	at	least,	aimed	externally	and	internationally	at	Malaysia,	its	overwhelming	effect	was	internal	and	national.	If	anything,	the	minor	border	skirmishes	against	Malaysia	in	Borneo,	and	popular	attacks	on	the	British	Embassy	in	Jakarta34	were	a	pretense	for	Sukarno’s	attempts	to	hold	an	increasingly	fractious	alliance	of	nationalists,	Islamic	religious	organizations	and	communists	together	under	the	rhetoric	of	NASAKOM.		The	attempts	at	unity	however,	remained	largely	rhetorical,	dependent	more	on	language	and	sloganeering	than	on	actual	policy.	On	the	ground,	the	economy	paid	a	heavy	price.	Rice	supplies	were	tight,	lines	to	buy	that	and	other	staples	were	frequent	and	long,	prices	were	volatile,	and	rice	riots	were	not	unheard	of.	Unable	to	actually	affect	economic	change	and	growth,	with	the	basics	of	both	a	Guided	Democracy	and	a	Guided	Economy	failing,	the	energy	behind	USDEK	was	poured	into	Sosialism	à	la	Indonesia,	increasingly	expressed	through	the	large-scale	adoption	of	various	political	slogans,	and	through	the	promulgation	of	a	more	“revolutionary”	Indonesian	national	identity.35	Magazines	and	
 34	As	part	of	a	mass	demonstration	against	the	British	and	Malaysian	embassies	in	September	1963,	the	British	embassy	was	over-run	and	burned	to	the	ground.	This	is	an	important	example	of	mob	violence	being	focused	against	enemies	of	the	revolution.	Following	these	demonstrations,	Indonesia	broke	political	ties	with	both	nations.	The	American	embassy	was	also	a	frequent	target	of	demonstrations,	but	the	crowds	that	would	gather	in	front	of	the	compound,	which	sits	on	the	south	side	of	Merdeka	Square	(discussed	in	Chapter	7,)	never	made	serious	attempts	to	breach	the	gates.	35	My	argument	for	the	contingency	of	the	increase	of	various	elements	of	USDEK	over	others	given	historical	shifts	in	politics	will	form	a	critical	element	of	the	argument	of	Chapter	7,	and	is	based	originally	on	Arno	Mayer’s	work	on	timing	
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newspapers,	again,	were	a	primary	site	in	which	this	increasingly	sloganized	revolutionary	ethos	was	expressed.		This	is	why	Sukarno	obsessed	about	Indonesian	expressions	of	western	culture	in	his	speeches	to	women.	Women’s	choices	about	certain	styles	of	clothing	were	a	particular	area	of	focus	because,	as	the	dissertation	has	shown	in	earlier	chapters,	women’s	clothing	was	freighted	with	national	meaning.	Women’s	clothing	became—to	a	much	greater	extent	than	ever	before—the	subject	of	both	political	punditry	and	on-the-street	measures	of	control,	a	morality	play	acted	out	in	the	public	political	and	revolutionary	national	realm	of	a	country	living	dangerously.	In	the	global	context	of	the	Cold	War,	Indonesian	women’s	“proper”	appearance	and	comportment,	that	which	was	in	line	with	national	identity,	were	increasingly	framed	as	a	critical	bulwark	against	the	cultural	invasion	of	the	west,	a	world	of	teased	hair,	miniskirts,	dancing	the	twist	to	Elvis	Presley,	and	listening	to	the	Beatles.		It	would	be	easy—in	fact	simplistic—to	analyze	Sukarno’s	attention	to	western	culture	and	fashion	as	merely	a	nationalist	reaction	to	political	imperialism.	Although	that	was	also	clearly	at	play,	I	would	suggest	that	such	a	reading	would	ignore	the	local	and	national	dynamics	of	the	cultural	politics	of	the	formation	of	the	Indonesian	nation.	Instead,	I	argue	that	it	is	important	to	see	Sukarno’s	focus	on	female	beauty	overwhelmingly	as	a	product	of	national	rather	than	global	forces	and	tensions.		Indeed,	this	deployment	of	ideological	reactions	to	women’s	fashion	was	one	of	the	more	visible	cultural	elements	of	building	the	new	Indonesian	national	identity.	Women’s	magazines	were	instructed	to	adjust	their	editorial	content,	which	they	did	if	they	wished	to	continue	publishing.	Women’s	magazines	became	an	important	space	in	which	groups	and	types	of	women	were	upheld	as	important	examples	for	all	women	to	either	emulate	or	avoid,	for	the	sake	of	the	success	of	the	revolution.	Because	they	involved	women	and	their	position	in	revolutionary	society,	the	national	identity	elements	of	the	Guided	Democracy	complex	were	increasingly	expressed	in	relation	to	various	ideal	types	of	national	women,	rather	than	in	relation	to	individual	women	themselves.		This	chapter	of	the	dissertation	traces	these	changes	of	representations	of	Indonesian	women	in	national	magazines	between	1955-1965,	and	their	increasingly	
 of	the	development	of	the	Nazi	impulse	towards	the	annihilation	of	Europe’s	Jews	in	his	monograph	Why	Did	The	Heavens	
Not	Darken?	
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strong	connection	to	Sukarno’s	national	political	project.	It	makes	the	argument	that	as	the	President	ramped	up	the	revolutionary	rhetoric	of	Guided	Democracy	and	Konfrontasi,	representations	of	Indonesian	women	in	the	media	increasingly	relied	on	ideal	types	connected	to	a	discourse	of	women’s	moral	fitness.	What	came	to	be	discussed	in	women’s	magazines,	then,	was	not	Indonesian	women	themselves,	but	rather,	the	images	of	what	Indonesian	women	were	either	expected	or	feared	to	be.	What	was	at	play	was	not	the	lives	or	experiences	of	real	women,	but	the	ideological	health	of	the	nation.	This	transposition	happened	during	a	time	of	particular	political	tension,	freighting	it	with	additional	meanings	that	would	come	to	bear	during	the	events	of	September/October	1965.	It	is	to	this	transposition	in	the	decade	from	1955-1965	that	the	dissertation	now	turns.		
“Traditional	Clothing	is	Popular	Again”	In	the	aftermath	of	the	Bandung	conference	in	1955,	women’s	magazines	exhibited	a	renewed	interest	in	the	subject	of	Indonesian	national	fashion.	Coverage	of	western	fashion	did	not	disappear	during	the	move	to	an	increasingly	non-aligned	(and	arguably	the	start	of	an	anti-Western)	cultural	space	beginning	in	1955.	But	magazines	began	to	stress	greater	options	for	“dressing	Indonesian.”	Wanita,	for	instance,	adjusted	the	flow	of	its	regular	patterns	and	designs	of	western	fashions	to	offer	a	month’s	worth	of	design	options	for	
kebaya,	a	subject	it	had	barely	broached	in	1954.		In	a	similar	issue,	Keluarga	began	exploring	new	uses	for	traditional	clothing	to	replace	western	fashion	in	certain	circumstance.	A	1956	article	in	Keluarga	was	entitled	“Regional	Clothing	is	Most	Popular	Again!”	(“Pakaian	Daereh	Terpopuler	Lagi!”)	The	article	suggested	that	traditional	Acehnese	clothing	which	consisted	of	a	long	kebaya	worn	over	trousers	rather	than	a	kain	could	“also	be	worn	to	go	picnicking,	instead	of	American	‘jeans.’”36		
 36	“boleh	djuga	untuk	pergi	pick-nick,	daripada	memakai	‘jankee’	Amerika.”	The	use	of	“jankee”	here,	to	mean	jeans	or	long	pants,	is	interesting,	and	is	specifically	derived	from	“yankee,”	or	American	soldier.	The	term	is	used	in	several	articles	about	clothing	across	magazines,	sometimes	only	referring	to	jeans,	and	other	times	to	any	version	of	women’s	long	trousers.	There	is	also	at	this	same	time	a	modern	architectural	style	that	begins	in	Indonesia,	called	“jengki,”	with	the	term	signifying	a	“distinctive	architecture	is	an	expression	of	the	political	spirit	of	freedom	among	the	Indonesians.	.	.	The	spirit	of	freedom	translated	into	an	architecture	that	differs	from	what	the	Dutch	had	done.	The	modern	cubic	and	strict	geometric	forms	are	transformed	into	more	complicated	volumes,	such	as	pentagons	or	other	irregular	solids.	Roofs	are	pitched,	the	surface	and	composition	are	festive.	These	characteristics	are	not	commonly	found	elsewhere	in	Europe	and	America.”	See	Josef	Prijotomo,	“When	West	Meets	East:	One	Century	of	Architecture	in	Indonesia	(1890s-1990s).”	
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Earlier	chapters	of	the	dissertation	have	suggested	that	while	North	Sumatran	fashion	had	not	likely	been	particularly	“popular”	in	the	rest	of	the	archipelago,	it,	along	with	other	“regional”	and	“authentic”	clothing	styles	had	been	widely	presented	in	fashion	shows	in	Jakarta	and	other	major	cities	from	the	early	1950s	on.	But	this	new	use,	to	replace	jeans	on	a	picnic,	underlined	a	growing	sense	that	cultural	elements	from	across	the	archipelago	now	“belonged”	to	all	Indonesians,	no	matter	what	their	own	ethnic	identities	might	also	have	been.37	The	ability	to	claim	clothing	styles	from	across	the	nation	as	their	“own”	was	a	critical	way	in	which	Indonesian	women	were	formed	into	a	national	group,	no	matter	where	they	came	from.	Building	on	the	success	of	the	various	“batikshow’s,”	the	magazines	began	featuring	photo	spreads	of	batik	clothing	with	western	style	and	cut	that	allowed	women	increased	options	that	read	simultaneously	as	both	Indonesian	and	modern.	But	the	idea	of	wearing	
batik	western-style	was	not	simply	an	issue	of	personal	choice	or	self-expression.	Alongside	articles	on	fashion	shows	featuring	batik	used	for	western	style	dresses,	from	September-December	1955,	Keluarga	carried	a	series	of	advertisements	from	the	
Gabungan	Koperasi	Batik	Indonesia	(GKBI,	Association	of	Indonesian	Batik	Cooperatives.)38	The	ads	featured	photographs	of	western	dresses,	pajamas,	home	furnishing	and	the	like,	all	made	of	batik.	The	ads	specifically	tied	the	delight	of	wearing	batik	to	the	love	of	one’s	own	culture,	to	nourishing	the	growth	of	the	national	economy	and	providing	work	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	batik	workers.	(See	Figures	6.1.	and	6.2.)	Nonetheless,	simultaneously,	magazines	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	continued	to	show	a	large	and	culturally	varied	world	within	which	both	elite	and	the	growing	numbers	of	urban	middle-class	Indonesian	women	lived.	Hollywood	films	and	their	American	and	European	movie	stars	were	markedly	present,	but	so	too	were	actresses	from	Indonesia’s	emerging	film	industry.	These	young	Indonesian	women	were		
 37	Jennifer	Lindsay	also	discusses	this	in	terms	of	the	performing	arts,	particularly	among	dancers	from	across	the	nation	who	learned	“each	other’s”	dances	when	preparing	for	overseas	artistic	missions.	Indeed,	she	notes,	when	donning	costumes	not	“one’s	own,”	“this	appears	not	to	have	been	a	major	concern.	The	image	the	cultural	missions	presented	of	Indonesia	made	up	of	various	different	regions	was	not	one	of	mutual	exclusivity.	Rather,	being	Indonesian	allowed	for	an	embracing	of	other	regions	as	one’s	own.	This	was	the	sense	of	liberation	from	one’s	own	‘suku’	[“ethnicity”]	and	the	leap	to	national	consciousness	.	.	.	the	regions	were	not	denied,	but	they	now	belonged	to	all.”	Jennifer	Lindsay,	“Performing	Indonesia	Abroad”	in	Jennifer	Lindsey	and	Maya	Liem,	eds.,	Heirs	to	world	culture,	Being	Indonesian,	1950-1965.	p.	210.	38	This	is	the	same	organization	that	ran	the	ad	in	Film	Review	in	December	1952	featuring	an	ideal	Indonesian	woman	wearing	kain-kebaya	that	is	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
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Figures	6.1,	6.2:		Batik	pajamas	and	dresses	for	culture	and	the	economy.	The	text	reads		“Delighting	in	wearing	batik	means:	Loving	one’s	own	culture!	Nourishing	the	national	economy!	Bringing	work	to	hundreds	of	thousands	of	laborers!”39	
Keluarga,	October	1955,	p.	27,	and	December	1955,	p.	4.		represented	as	hip	and	modern,	yet	wholesome,	both	in	new	film	magazines	such	as	Varia40	as	well	as	magazines	such	as	Wanita.			When	new	actresses	were	introduced	to	the	public,	they	were	usually	photographed	wearing	western	clothing	while	carrying	out	a	young	modern	life:	chatting	on	the	phone	with	girlfriends,	listening	to	records,	or	riding	their	motorcycles.	But,	almost	without	fail	in	such	features	in	1959	and	1960,	they	were	also	shown	either	wearing	kain-kebaya	in	at		least	one	photograph,	or,	for	those	who	were	also	Javanese	dancers,	in	dance	costume	that	also	featured	kain	batik.41		(See	Figure	6.3).		
 39	“Gemar	memakai	batik	berarti:	Tjinta	kebudajaan	sendiri!	Memupuk	ekonomi	nasional!	Memberi	lapangan	bekerdja	
rastusan-ribu	kaum	buruh!”	Keluarga,	October	1955,	p.	27.	40	Varia,	which	began	publication	in	1957,	initially	based	loosely	on	and	drawing	its	title	from	the	American	movie	publication	Variety.	Though	strictly	speaking	it	was	an	“entertainment”	(hiburan)	magazine,	it	is	a	strikingly	rich	source	about	women	and	modernity.	Its	focus	on	film	reflects	the	wide-spread	presence	and	influence	of	the	cinema	in	Sukarno-era	Indonesia,	and	its	effects	on	perceptions	of	modernity	by	Indonesians.	Varia	was	a	one	of	a	series	of	titles	published	by	Keng	Po,	an	ethnic	Chinese-owned	media	consortium,	mostly	aimed	at	the	entertainment	market.	The	magazine	was	founded	by	Hadely	Hasibuan,	a	political	chameleon	of	a	journalist	who	possessed	a	striking	ability	to	shift	editorial	directions	with	the	prevailing	political	winds.	Given	the	particular	character	and	aims	of	its	editor,	whose	own	biography	suggests	he	sought	to	move	close	to	whomever	was	in	power,	Varia—“the	magazine	with	the	pretty	women	on	the	cover”—serves	as	a	tightly	calibrated	bellweather	of	the	shifting	politics	of	both	the	late	Sukarno	era	and	the	early	New	Order.	See	Hasibuan,	Hadely.	Hadely	Hasibuan	:	memoar	mantan	menteri	penurunan	harga.	(Hadely	Hasibuan:	Memoir	of	a	
former	Minister	for	the	Reduction	of	Prices,)	and	the	discussion	of	Varia	in	Chapter	1.	41	Varia	No.	65	(July	15,	1959),	p.	14.	
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Figure	6.3:	“Film	star	Roosilawaty	doesn’t	yet	want	to	be	called	a	star	.	.	.			Her	ambition	is	to	dedicate	herself	to	art.”	Varia	No.	65,	July	15,	1959,	p.	14		The	overwhelming	image	projected	of	these	young	stars,	however,	was	not	very	different	from	those	of	Hollywood	actresses	in	similar	profiles	churned	out	by	American	film	studios.	The	publicity	output	about	stars	from	the	Hollywood	public	relations	machine	continued	to	be	reprinted	in	Indonesian	movie	magazines	through	the	late	1950s,	with	the	original	English	translated	into	Indonesian.	These	profiles	used	the	same	photos	as	
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American	entertainment	news	sources,	so	the	visual	style	and	content	flowing	from	this	was	well	established	in	Indonesian	magazines	by	the	early	to	mid	1950s.		The	formula	was	used	for	Indonesian	stars	as	well,	although,	it	should	be	noted,	almost	exclusively	with	young	women.42	A	principal	feature	of	both	the	American	and	Indonesian	versions	of	this	celebrity	layout	was	the	pretense	of	seeing	these	stars	“at	home”	and	in	their	“everyday	lives,”	so	there	were	ample	photos	in	both	versions	of	informally	posed	domestic	and	family	photos.	There	was	almost	always	a	more	formal	“glamour”	shot	in	both	versions	as	well.	In	the	Indonesian	case,	this	was	almost	always	taken	with	the	star	wearing	kain-kebaya,	and	her	hair	in	a	konde.	She	needed	to	remain	an	Indonesian	beauty,	an	aspirational	national	model	for	other	young	Indonesian	women.		
‘Adjusting’	(to)	Indonesian	Modernity	Some	elements	of	fashion	journalism	remained	quite	practical,	however,	even	as	they	projected	aspirations	of	modernity.	A	1956	spread	on	lingerie	in	Keluarga,	for	instance,	opined	that	“if	a	woman	wishes	to	be	called	modern,	it’s	not	only	the	exterior	that	must	appear	modern,	dapper	and	neat,	but	even	your	underwear	must	be	‘adjusted’.”43	(“disesuaikan.”)	The	article	addressed	the	need	to	make	the	correct	choice	of	undergarment,	based	on	what	dress	or	skirt	a	woman	chose	to	wear.	As	with	previous	articles	on	bras,	the	drawings	showed	structural	darts	and	were	presented	in	a	way	that	would	allow	a	woman	to	make	her	own	versions	at	home.	(See	Figure	6.4)	Occasional	articles	on	how	to	sew	one’s	own	underwear,	including	increasingly	technical	drawings	of	bras,	remained	a	regular	feature	of	many	magazines	concerned	with	women’s	fashion	into	the	early	1960s	and	beyond.		Elite	Indonesian	women,	therefore,	continued	to	be	presented	with	a	series	of	fashion	choices	and	variations	within	which	they	were	encouraged	to	find	their	own	looks,	their	own	personal	expressions	of	being	modern.	Whether	wearing	western	dresses	made	from	batik,	going	picnicking	in	Acehnese	pantsuits,	or	wearing	new-style	kebaya,	they	were	
 42	I	have	seen	very	few	“star”	articles	written	about	male	Indonesian	actors.	As	female	stars	aged,	or	became	more	established,	they	only	received	the	“young	star”	treatment	on	rare	occasions.	In	any	case,	the	appetite	among	readers	for	information	about	and	photos	of	the	newly	emerging	stars	seems	to	have	been	significant,	based	on	the	reader	letter	sections	of	the	magazines	that	consistently	requested	information	on	new	actresses	as	they	made	their	film	debuts.	43	“Djika	njonja	ingin	dikatanakan	modern,	tak	hanja	luarnja	sadjalah	jang	harus	kelihatan	modern,	netjis	dan	rapi,	tetapi	
pakain	dalampun	harus	disesuaikan.”	Keluarga,	March	1956,	p.	23.	Again,	notice	the	use	of	“adjusted”	(“disesuaikan.”)		
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largely	free	to	play	in	a	wide	range	of	choices,	which,	as	long	as	they	were	properly	made,	remained	an	acceptable	way	of	expressing	their	modernity	and	their	Indonesian	identity	without	creating	internal	conflicts	over	who	they	were.		
	
Figure	6.4:	“If	you	want	to	be	considered	modern,	even		your	underwear	must	be	adjusted.”	Keluarga,	March	1956,	p.	23.		An	important	shift	in	beauty	standards,	perhaps	most	easily	seen	through	changes	in	advertising,	occurred	between	1955	and	1960.	Although	beauty	product	advertising	initially	focused	on	western	movie	stars,	as	the	dissertation	explored	in	Chapter	2,	beauty	standards	became	more	broadly	expressed	in	the	mid-1950’s.	Both	western	and	eastern	influences	were	visible,	demonstrating	that	Indonesian	women	had	access	to	multiple	influences	for	being	beautiful.		
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Two	sets	of	advertisements	for	perfume	and	lotions	that	often	ran	near,	and	sometimes	directly	opposite	each	other	in	the	pages	of	Wanita	and	Keluarga,	provide	an	interesting	example	of	such	a	contrast.	The	tagline	for	Vinolia,	a	European	beauty	brand	offering	a	range	of	lotions,	soaps,	cold	creams	and	scented	oils,	was	simple:	“Cantik,	
Menarik,”which	translates	as	“Beautiful,	Attractive.”44	The	ads	showed	various	images	of	a	woman	looking	over	her	shoulder	at	the	reader,	wearing	a	chic	western	dress,	with	her	hair	piled	up	on	her	head.	(See	Figure	6.5).	Colibrita,	another	European-made	perfumed	toilet	soap,	on	the	other	hand,	chose	to	use	images	reflecting	women	as	Javanese	goddesses	and	multiple-stanza	Indonesian-language	poems	as	an	inspiration	for	beauty	in	their	ads.	(See	Figure	6.6).	
	
			 							 	
Figure	6.5:	Vinolia,	“Beautiful,	Attractive.”				Figure	6.6:	Colibrita:	Indonesian	Goddesses	
Keluarga,	April	1956,	p.	12																																					Keluarga,	March	1957,	p.	4			
 44	Or,	alternatively,	“Beautiful,	Interesting.”	
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By	the	early	1960’s,	responding	to	the	changing	political	and	cultural	milieu,	Vinolia	altered	the	imagery	it	used,	switching	the	picture	to	that	of	a	woman	more	clearly	Indonesian	in	her	features,	wearing	kain-kebaya.	Their	tagline,	however,	remained	the	same.	(See	Figure	6.7.)	When	women	were	identified	as	mothers	in	advertising,	on	the	other	hand,	(usually	for	items	like	margarine	or	laundry	soaps,	but	even	in	ads	for	modern	household	goods	such	as	refrigerators,	and	reaching	back	to	the	early	1950s)	they	were	nearly	always	shown	wearing	kain-kebaya.	(See	Figure	6.8).	Women	as	mothers	and	women	as	beauty	figures	clearly	spoke	to	slightly	different	versions	of	national	beauty,	but	ones	that	converged	as	the	importance	of	national	identity	increased.		
					 	
	
Figure	6.7:	Vinolia	in	kain-kebaya							 Figure	6.8:	Modern	Westinghouse	Mother	
Wanita,	December	15,	1961,	p.	734														Wanita,	August	15,	1961,	p.	475.		
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Miss	Varia	1959	As	late	as	September	1959,	a	major	women’s	magazine	could	still	explore	glamour	without	actively	appealing	to	a	nationalized	style	of	beauty.	The	“Miss	Varia	1959”	contest	provides	an	interesting	example.	Varia	magazine,	which	ran	the	contest,	solicited	entries	from	young	women	across	Indonesia	who	felt	they	could	be	the	next	big	movie	star.	The	editor,	Hadely	Hasibuan’s,	stated	goal	was	to	identify	the	first	potential	Miss	Indonesia	candidate,	with	the	hope	of	taking	her	to	represent	the	nation	in	the	Miss	Universe	pageant.	Given	a	generally	negative	view	of	pageants	in	Indonesia	at	the	time,45	this	was,	in	and	of	itself,	an	audacious	proposal.	But	at	the	time,	Varia	was	one	of	the	most	Hollywood-inflected	publications	in	the	country.	Each	entrant	was	asked	to	submit	two	professionally	taken	photos	of	themselves,	one	a	headshot,	and	the	other	a	full	body	photo.	Twenty	finalists	from	across	the	country	were	chosen,	and	were	introduced	over	the	course	of	several	issues	of	the	magazine	beginning	in	May,	1959.	Readers	were	then	invited	to	clip	ballots	from	the	magazine	to	mail	in	their	choice	for	Miss	Varia	over	the	course	of	several	months.	In	the	end,	Varia	received	over	36,000	votes	in	the	contest,	each	of	which	needed	to	be	accompanied	by	a	coupon.46	The	photos	of	the	finalists	are	particularly	interesting	because	of	both	the	clothing	and	the	backgrounds	the	young	women	and	their	photographers	chose.47	These	include	both	studio	shots,	and	photos	taken	outdoors	both	in	“nature”	and	in	front	of	cars	and	scooters,	with	an	observable	regional	variation.	Candidates	from	Jakarta,	Bandung	and	Surabaya,	including	ethnic	Chinese	women,	tended	to	dress	more	in	a	western	vein,	and	to	present	themselves	as	active,	athletic,	modern	young	women.	Candidates	from	more	conservative	areas	such	as	Central	Java	or	Sumatra	more	often	chose	photos	in	which	they	wore	kain-kebaya,	in	some	cases	with	a	head	covering	as	well.	(See	Figure	6.9)	It	was	quite	
 45	See	the	discussion	of	the	konde	competition	in	Jakarta	in	1953	in	Suara	‘Aisjijah	in	Chapter	5.	Indonesia	was	quite	different	in	this	respect	than	the	Philippines,	where	beauty	pageants	were	(and	remain)	an	important,	and	highly	popular,	arena	of	national	femininity.	Filipino	beauty	pageant	promoters	had	been	trying	to	bring	pageant	culture	to	Indonesia	since	the	early	1950’s,	without	any	success	at	all.	Indonesian	women	generally	rejected	these	proposals,	saying	they	were	too	showy,	and	would	reflect	badly	on	the	character	of	the	young	women	who	would	be	tempted	to	participate	in	them.	46	In	an	interesting	intersection	of	traces	of	real	life	interrupting	the	settledness	of	the	archive,	one	of	the	copies	of	Varia	in	the	University	of	Michigan	collections	from	this	time	has	the	ballot	carefully	clipped	out	of	the	bottom	of	the	page.	47	See	Karen	Strassler’s	work	on	photography	in	Java,	particularly	the	role	of	photograph	studios	in	building	a	culture	of	fashion	glamor	shots	as	representing	the	skill	of	the	photographer,	and	of	the	uses	of	headshots	(“pasphoto,	or	the	photos	taken	and	used	for	identity	passes	in	the	New	Order).		Karen	Strassler,	Refracted	Visions:	Popular	Photography	and	
National	Modernity	in	Java.	
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clear	that	in	1959,	women	involved	in	the	world	of	Indonesian	glamor	were	still	able	to	express	significant	personal	variation	in	their	self-presentation.	
	
Figure	6.9:	Fashion	variation	in	the	Miss	Varia	1959	headshots	of	16	of	20	finalists.	
Varia,	No.	75,	September	23,	1959,	pp.	2-3.		
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The	winner	of	Miss	Varia	1959,	by	an	overwhelming	margin,	was	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	the	young	wife	of	an	Air	Force	officer	from	Bandung.48	Her	victory	was	announced		in	the	September	23,	1959	issue,	when	the	names	and	hometowns	of	all	twenty	finalists	were	also	revealed.	The	issue	also	took	pains	to	demonstrate	the	transparency	of	the	vote	tabulation	process,	including	photos	of	the	counting	process	and	several	pages	of	tabulated	data	matching	each	candidate’s	votes	to	the	cities	in	which	they	were	cast.49	In	the	same	issues,	the	continuing	popularity	of	Hollywood	was	demonstrated	by	a	full-page	production	still	of	a	bare-chested	Tony	Curtis	in	the	1958	United	Artists	film	The	Vikings.	(See	Figure	6.10.)	
	
Figure	6.10:	Miss	Varia	1959	announced	and	accounted	for,	with	Tony	Curtis	looking	on.	
Varia,	No.	75,	September	23,	1959,	Front	Inside	Cover	and	p.	1.	
 48		Dhewayani	received	13,349	votes	from	across	the	country.	This	was	more	than	the	number	of	votes	received	by	the	runner-up,	Soetji	Relowati,	from	Surabaya,	(6,771	votes),	and	the	second-runner	up,	Lanny	Tijam,	also	from	Bandung	(5,589	votes)	combined.	The	information	provided	in	the	pages	of	Varia	reported	the	number	of	votes	that	were	cast	for	each	of	the	candidates	of	the	over	36,000	ballots	mailed	in.		49	The	auditor’s	report	listed	what	the	votes	were	from	each	of	the	cities	named	from	across	the	nation,	providing	a	fascinating	possible	case	study	on	the	regional	and	ethnic	variations	of	beauty	in	Indonesia	at	that	time.		A	list	of	220	“thank	you”	prize	recipients,	drawn	at	random	from	those	who	mailed	in	ballots,	was	also	published	with	their	names	and	addresses.	The	data	offers	a	rare	glimpse	at	who	the	readership	for	the	magazine	was.	It	markedly	included	a	significant	number	of	ethnic	Chinese	readers.	An	extended	analysis	of	this	data,	a	project	for	the	future,	would	provide	interesting	insights	on	the	reach	of	Varia	and	other	similar	magazines.	Coincidentally,	the	publication	permit	for	the	magazines	was	published	on	the	bottom	of	the	facing	page	of	the	announcement	of	the	contest	winner.	It	noted	that	the	total	publication	run	was	61,000	copies	per	issue.	
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In	the	next	issue,	on	September	30,	in	keeping	with	their	desire	to	crown	a	new	star,	
Varia	published	a	“meet	the	celebrity	at	home”	photo	story	that	showed	Dhewayani	with	her	Air	Force	officer	husband.	They	were	living	a	life	of	late	1950s	modern	splendor	that	could	have	been	lifted	out	of	an	American	magazine,	down	to	the	furniture	and	the	curtains	of	their	Scandinavian-design-looking	house.	Deetje,	as	she	was	called,	was	shown	riding	her	Vespa,	playing	tennis	and	swimming	at	the	Bandung	Country	Club.	She	modeled	a	swimsuit	poolside	in	Hollywood	pinup-style	poses,	hung	out	casually	at	home	with	her	friends	or	her	husband,	and	helped	him	type	his	office	paperwork	on	her	portable	typewriter.	Interestingly,	she	was	not	shown	in	kain-kebaya,	or,	for	that	matter,	in	any	form	of	batik	at	all	in	the	layout.		(See	Figures	6.11	and	6.12.)		
		
Figure	6.11:	Miss	Varia	1959,	the	modern	Indonesian	pin-up	girl.	
Varia	no	76,	September	30,	1959,	p.	15.	
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The	Miss	Varia	1959	contest	marked	a	high	point	of	the	images	of	modern	Indonesian	woman	on	a	western	model	in	Varia,	which	was	soon	to	undergo	a	significant	change.	The	western-ness	of	Dhewayani’s	beauty	was	presented	quite	unproblematically,	including	her	comments	about	not	having,	or	wanting	to	have,	children	for	the	moment.	The	photo	spread	demonstrated	a	variety	of	tropes	of	modernity	common	to	Indonesian	media	at	the	time—the	young	girl	on	the	Vespa,	or	listening	to	records	with	a	friend—and	one	in	particular—the	swimsuit	pinup	shot—that	was	well	known	from	Hollywood.	This	was,	however,	quite	rare,	and	exceptionally	daring	within	most	Indonesian	cultural	contexts.	The	tight	mimicking	of	a	Hollywood	“at-home”	shoot,	the	Air	Force	Officer	husband,	and	the	life	in	Bandung	were	all	markers	that	Dhewayani	was	living	a	life	far	out	of	reach	for	most	Indonesian	women.			
	
Figure	6.12:	Miss	Varia	1959,	the	batik-less	Air	Force	wife	at	home	and	going	out	
Varia	no	76,	September	30,	1959,	pp.	16-17.	
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The	pictorial	marked	the	edge	to	which	Indonesians	might	go,	but	even	then,	perhaps	only	if	they	received	the	exceptions	granted	to	movie	stars	who	were	allowed	to	be	flashier	than	the	average	woman.50	Within	a	year,	such	a	contest	would	no	longer	be	possible.	Despite	the	clear	intent	in	1959	to	hold	a	Miss	Varia	1960	contest,	this	would	no	longer	be	politically	possible,	and	the	second	contest	never	took	place.	
	
Magazines	to	Finish	the	National	Revolution	The	new	Guided	Democracy	press	law	was	passed	on	October	12,	1960,	less	than	two	weeks	after	Sukarno	addressed	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	New	York	on	September	30	in	a	speech	in	which	he	called	on	UN	member	states	to	“Build	the	World	Anew.”	His	UN	speech	built	on	themes	addressed	in	his	August	17,	1960	National	Day	speech	“Toward	Freedom	and	the	Dignity	of	Man.”	Late	summer	1960	was	a	period	when,	Fred	Bunnell	noted,	Sukarno	had	finally	been	able	to	“consolidat[e]	his	own	power	and	erect	.	.	.	the	institutions	of	Guided	Democracy,”	thereby	freeing	himself	up	to	“follow	his	predictions	for	a	vigorous	confrontation	foreign	policy.”51	The	changes	in	the	press	law	were	occasioned	by	Sukarno’s	desire	to	exert	a	higher	degree	of	ideological	control	over	the	nation’s	media,	and	went	into	effect	on	November	1.	Guided	Democracy	was	not	a	new	idea	in	1960,	but	the	instability	of	the	Sukarno	government	between	1957-1960	had	allowed	magazine	editors	to	explore	a	variety	of	content.	Although	Sukarno	announced	his	“konsepsi”	(conception)	for	Guided	Democracy	in	1957,	it	was	not	until	1959	that	he	was	able	to	largely	put	his	concept	into	effect.	Further,	as	Bunnell	notes,	he	was	not	able	to	fully	effect	control	over	this	new	governmental	format	until	late	1960,	at	which	point	he	became	more	interested	in	shaping	the	content	of	
 50	I	tried	to	interview	Ibu	Dhewayani	about	this	period	of	her	life.	She	lives	in	Jakarta,	but	refused	my	requests	for	an	interview,	saying	she	didn’t	want	to	talk	about	“politics.”	Her	husband	from	those	days	was	an	aide	to	Air	Marshall	Omar	Dani,	who	was	implicated	in	the	events	of	1965.	She	divorced	him	soon	after	Lubang	Buaya,	and	married	a	shipping	and	concrete	magnate.	She	stated	that	she	“did	not	want	to	relive	those	days”	and	“had	nothing	to	be	proud	of,”	and	was	now	devoting	her	attentions	to	her	church.	I	have	not	been	able	to	find	out	what	happened	to	her	first	husband	after	the	events	of	1965-66.	(Personal	communication,	October	2013,	via	Philip	Soelistyo.)	51	Fred	Bunnell,	“Guided	Democracy	Foreign	Policy:	1960-1965	President	Sukarno	Moves	from	Non-Alignment	to	Confrontation.”	p.	45.	Nonetheless,	there	were	still	lingering	elements	of	various	regional	civil	wars	on-going	in	Indonesia,	which	helps	explain	some	of	Sukarno’s	desire	to	control	the	press.	The	Darul	Islam,	PRRI	and	Pemesta	rebellions	ended	between	April	and	October	1961.	In	terms	of	controlling	the	press,	Sukarno’s	government	had	essentially	closed	the	country’s	Chinese	language	press,	allowing	only	11	Indonesian	Chinese	language	newspapers	to	continue	publishing,	and	forcing	foreign-owned	Chinese	publications	to	adopt	new	Indonesian	language	names.	See	Tribuana	Said,	Sejarah	Pers	
Nasional	dan	Pembangunan	Pers	Pancasila,	pp.	109-110.	
 
 
326 
magazines	toward	his	“revolutionary”	aims.	While	some	publications	were	closed,	there	does	not	appear	to	have	been	direct	censorship	of	the	content	of	magazines	that	remained	in	print.	Rather,	magazines	began	to	alter	their	own	content,	either	in	agreement	with	Sukarno’s	new	directions,	or	in	an	attempt	to	stay	ahead	of	him.52		A	particularly	interesting	example	of	this	quick	adjustment	to	the	changing	political	landscape	can	be	seen	in	the	covers	of	Varia	magazine.	Hadely	Hasibuan	was	not	a	particularly	ideological	journalist,	but	he	was	highly	attuned	to	the	changes	in	political	winds.	The	new	press	regulations	went	into	effect	on	November	1,	and	the	magazine,	published	weekly,	had	a	rather	quick	production	cycle.	Leading	up	to	November	1960,	
Varia	had	featured	both	Hollywood	and	Indonesian	stars	on	its	covers,	but	western	actors	and	actresses	had	predominated.	The	November	2	cover	featured	Indonesian	actress	Ratna	Djuita.	The	November	9	cover	was	of	Hollywood	actor	Dirk	Bogarde,	but	also	carried	the	magazine’s	new	publication	permit	number	on	the	cover	as	well.	The	November	16	cover	used	a	photo	of	another	Indonesian	actress,	Ida	Nustantry.	The	magazine	only	featured	a	western	actor	or	actress	on	its	cover	once	again,	notably	on	the	first	edition	published	after	October	1,	1965,	when	Hungarian	actress	Erbzebet	Hazy,	blonde	haired,	blue	eyed	and	bare	shouldered,	made	an	unusual	appearance	on	the	front	cover.	(See	Figures	6.13-15.)	Some	magazines,	particularly	those	connected	with	the	Indonesian	left,	were	already	ahead	of	the	curve	on	these	issues.	Api	Kartini,53	a	magazine	connected	to	Gerwani,	was	a	prominent	source	of	education	and	commentary	about	the	new	revolutionary	formulations	put	forward	with	Guided	Democracy.	Api	Kartini	also	regularly	published	about	western	women’s	fashion,	with	a	particular	proletarian	focus	on	keeping	clothing	simple,	neat	and	orderly.	They	also	regularly	commented	on	issues	of	kepribadian	nasional.		The	magazine	ran	regular	advice	columns	for	mothers,	for	instance,	and	in	this	venue,	women	expressed	a	series	of	moral	concerns,	(though	not	quite	yet	raised	to	the	level	of	moral	crisis,)	about	their	daughters.	One	mother,	for	instance,	inquired	about	the	
 52	There	is	not	good	material	on	this	in	the	historiography,	and	this	claim	takes	some	reading	into	the	primary	documents.	In	my	2012	interview	with	Herawati	Diah,	she	suggested	that	Sukarno	did	try	to	meddle	with	publications	at	times	after	1957,	though	somewhat	indirectly.	She	attributed	her	husband’s	own	appointment	as	Indonesian	ambassador	to	Czechoslovakia	and	Hungary	in	1959	(and	then	on	to	England	in	1962	and	to	Thailand	in	1964)	as	an	attempt	to	quiet	the	independence	of	B.M.	Diah’s	own	journalistic	voice.	But	she	also	insisted	that	their	editorial	content	was	never	subject	to	direct	review	or	control	by	the	government	in	any	of	their	publications.	53	“Fire	of	Kartini,”	a	magazine	from	Gerwani	that	was	focused	on	women	involved	in	the	organization’s	kindergartens	and	child	care	centers,	but	was	widely	read	by	progressive	women.	
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Figures	6.13,	6.14,	6.15,	6.16:	Varia’s	Last	Hollywood	Cover,	Dirke	Bogarde		(November	9,	1960,)	between	Indonesian	actresses	Ratna	Djuita	(November	2,)	and		Ida	Nusantry	(November	16.)	The	magazine’s	new	permit	number	is	visible	above	the	red	
Varia	logo	for	the	first	time	on	the	November	9	cover.	The	cover	for	October	13,	1965	was	the	first	to	portray	a	European	actor	since	the	Bogarde	cover,	but	of	a	safely	socialist	Hungarian	actress,	Erbzebet	Hazy	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya.		tension	she	felt	between	allowing	her	daughter	to	follow	fashion	trends	and	feeling	that	these	whims	might	keep	her	from	advancing	properly	as	a	revolutionary	Indonesian:	Question:	the	problem	is	with	my	eldest	child,	a	girl,	who	is	now	almost	15	years	old.	She	loves	to	primp	and	preen,	trying	out	whatever	trends	are	“now”	like	wearing	her	hair	in	a	pony	tail,	the	latest	dresses,	all	of	this	she	likes	to	go	along	with.	Within	some	limits,	I	go	along	with	her	desires	.	.	.		I	
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fear	she	will	become	too	backward	and	behind	in	her	advancement	to	the	point	that	she	won’t	keep	up	with	the	progress	of	society	today.54		The	editor’s	response	cited	a	familiar	trope	connecting	gender	to	fears	of	the	moral	crises	of	modernity:	Answer:	We	agree	with	you	that	we	need	to	take	the	right	attitude	in	guiding	the	development	of	our	girls.	We	shouldn’t	be	too	restricted,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	is	also	a	mistake	to	follow	all	our	children’s	desires	lest	they	become	victims	of	the	various	excesses	of	today’s	‘modern’	society.55		In	this	case,	an	interesting	switch	occurred.	The	mother’s	fear	was	that	by	dressing	according	to	western	fashion	trends,	her	daughter	would	“be	behind	in	her	[socialist]	advancement”	and	“not	keep	up	with	the	progress	of	society.”	The	leftist	moral	crisis	was	developing	to	a	place	where	women	might	be	both	too	sexual	and	too	western	and	be	behind	the	times	simultaneously.	But	there	was	a	clear	sense	still	that	modern	society	brought	with	it	the	possibility	of	dangerous	excess.	
Api	Kartini	reflected	the	progressive	thinking	of	the	socialist	vanguard,	and	took	a	lead	among	women’s	magazines	in	ridding	itself	of	western	content.56	Other	magazines	lagged	behind	to	some	extent	in	this	matter,	but	over	the	course	of	the	next	two	years,	1960-1962,	the	primacy	of	the	Hollywood	content	in	magazines	like	Varia	diminished.	Magazines	took	a	broader	perspective	on	international	film,	particularly	increasing	their	coverage	of	film	from	socialist	countries.	Gerwani	began	to	formulate	objections	to	the	salaciousness	of	Hollywood	offerings	from	positions	they	had	sought	and	achieved	on	the	Indonesian	Film	Censor	Board.57	
 54	“Pertanjaan:	masalah	anak	saja	jang	sulung,	perempuan,	sekarang	sudah	hampir	15	tahun.	Ia	suka	sekali	bersolek,	model	
apa	sadja	djaman	sekarang	seperti	rambut	buntut-kuda,	jurk	model	sekarang	dsb.	ingin	sekali	ia	ikati.	Dalam	batas2	
tertuntu	saja	turuti	kemauanja	.	.	.	saja	takut	djika	ia	mendjadi	terlalu	terbelakang	dan	terlambat	kemadjuannja	sehingga	
djuga	tidak	sesuai	dengang	kemadjuan	masjarakat	sekarang.”	Api	Kartini,	October	1960,	p.	7.	55	“Djawaban:	Kami	sependapat	dengan	Njonja	bawha	kita	harus	mengambil	sikap	jang	tepat	dalam	memimbing	
perkembangan	gadis	kita.	Tidak	boleh	terlalu	mengekang,	dan	sebaliknja	djuga	salah	djika	kita	terlalu	menurut	kemaun	
anak	sehingga	ia	menjadi	korban	berbagai	ekses	masjarakat	‘modern’	sekarang	ini.”	Api	Kartini,	October	1960,	p.	7.	56	It	did	not,	however,	come	across	as	strictly	Communist.	Saskia	Wieringa	writes	that	“Api	Kartini	was	designed	to	draw	middle-class	housewives	into	the	‘revolutionary	family.’	Its	editors	included	women	who	were	not	members	of	Gerwani,	and	the	magazine	carried	articles	on	cooking,	dress-making	and	other	general	women’s	issues.	While	this	periodical	seldom	reported	on	the	daily	activities	of	Gerwani,	its	editorials	do	reflect	the	changing	ideological	preoccupations	of	the	organization.	Through	its	short	stories	and	articles,	a	particular	ideological	climate	was	created,	with	many	optimistic	stories	about	communist	countries.”	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	22.	57	Again,	note	the	irony	that	it	was	Gerwani,	who	took	one	of	the	more	puritanical	approaches	to	the	public	expression	of	sexuality,	who	would	in	turn,	have	the	puritanical	construction	of	women’s	sexuality	used	against	them.	
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These	general	rumblings	about	building	the	revolution	became	an	out-and-out	explosion	in	the	late	summer	of	1963.	This	was	a	time	when,	according	to	Fred	Bunnell,	under	Sukarno’s	strong	political	guidance,	“Indonesia	adopted	a	policy	of	all-out	confrontation	not	only	toward	Malaysia	but	toward	the	International	Olympic	Committee,	the	United	Nations,	and	other	manifestations	of	what	Sukarno	viewed	as	Western	domination	of	the	new	nations.”58		In	an	article	on	Sukarno’s	political	temperament,	Peter	Hausdewell	notes	there	was	a	“radical	trend	in	both	domestic	and	foreign	policy	which	marked	Guided	Democracy	after	the	‘watershed’	of	late	summer	1963.”59		But	very	little	actual	energy	was	focused	on	the	border	between	Malaysia	and	Indonesia	in	Kalimantan	itself	that	was	in	theory	at	the	center	of	the	Konfrontasi	policy.	Instead,	the	era’s	political	energy	was	centered	on	shoring	up	Sukarno’s	position	in	a	domestic	political	arena	increasingly	polarized	by	competing	claims	to	political	power	by	the	military	and	the	PKI,	and	on	an	economy	shaken	by	a	serious	financial	crisis.	As	a	primary	tactic	to	maintain	political	control	of	the	nation,	Sukarno	sought	to	control	the	media	more	directly	than	he	had	previously,	and	insisting	that	journalists	increase	the	energy	behind	their	coverage	of	revolutionary	cultural	projects	and	slogans.	From	late	1963	on,	the	representations	of	women	in	almost	all	Indonesian	magazines	changed.	Instead	of	representing	individuals,	the	images	of	women	in	magazines	began	to	reflect	several	stock	categories,	the	ideal	types	that	were	connected	to	the	construction	of	moral	crisis.	As	they	had	before,	women	were	shown	as	being	neat	and	orderly,	and	images	of	traditional	Javanese	dancers,	representing	Indonesian	women	as	holders	of	traditional	reserve	also	made	a	resurgence.	But	overwhelmingly,	material	about	women	took	on	a	highly	nationalist	bent,	in	which	images	of	women	as	symbols	and	national	archetypes	took	over	from	the	more	varied	and	relaxed	images	of	women	that	had	filled	magazines	previously.			
 58	Bunnell,	“Guided	Democracy	Foreign	Policy:	1960-1965	President	Sukarno	Moves	from	Non-Alignment	to	Confrontation.”	p.	45.	59	Peter	Christian	Hauswedell,	“Sukarno:	Radical	or	Conservative?	Indonesian	Politics	1964-5,”	in	Indonesia,	No.	15,	p.	114.	In	his	dissertation	on	the	nationalization	of	western	businesses	by	Sukarno,	Will	Redfern	also	argued	that	1963	was	a	watershed	in	the	politics	and	political	economy	of	Indonesia.	See	Will	Redfern,	Sukarno's	Guided	Democracy	and	the	
Takeovers	of	Foreign	Companies	in	Indonesia	in	the	1960s,	p.	3.	
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Puspa	Wanita:	The	Move	from	Glamour	Model	to	Model	Indonesian	Woman	This	juxtaposition	and	intertwining	of	the	national	and	the	feminine,	as	well	as	the	politically	enforced	nature	of	the	content,	can	be	seen	particularly	well	in	Puspa	Wanita,60	a	fashion	and	lifestyle	magazine	from	Bandung.	Even	following	the	new	press	laws	of	1960,	
Puspa	Wanita	had	not	concerned	itself	significantly	with	the	politics	of	the	ongoing	national	revolution.	While	it	had	a	national	distribution,	the	magazine	focused	significantly	on	the	women’s	social	scene	that	had	grown	up	around	Bandung’s	fashion	industry.	Of	all	the	fashion-centered	magazines	I	have	seen	in	my	research,	Puspa	Wanita	was	the	most	up-to-date	with	developments	in	western	fashion,	and	with	American	fashion	in	particular.	In	part,	this	likely	reflected	the	presence	of	Air	Force	officers’	wives,	whose	husbands,	while	stationed	in	Bandung,	frequently	traveled	to	the	United	States	for	training,	sometimes	accompanied	by	their	wives.		In	any	case,	the	pages	of	Puspa	Wanita	regularly	reported	on	the	latest	fashion	shows	from	Braga	Street	designers	who	had	created	the	leading	edge	of	“modern”	Indonesian	fashion	since	the	1930s.61	It	also	regularly	covered	the	social	world	that	revolved	around	local	institutions	like	the	Marion	Glamour	School,	which	trained	young	women	to	be	models,	and	the	Lembaga	Wanita	Sempurna,	(or	the	“League	of	Refined	Women,”)	an	organization	that	instructed	young	military	wives	on	the	details	of	fashion	and	etiquette.	The	covers	of	Puspa	Wanita	regularly	“introduced”	the	city’s	new	models	or	emerging	“Refined	Women”	to	the	magazine’s	readers.	But	in	response	to	Sukarno’s	ramped	up	campaign	to	“Crush	Malaysia,”	and	the	new	press	regulations	of	May	1963	that	accompanied	it,62	the	content	of	Puspa	Wanita	changed	radically	over	the	course	of	three	issues.	Issue	“No.	3,”	which	is	undated,	but	that	was	published	before	August	1963,63	matched	much	of	the	content	of	previous	issues	of	the	
 60	“Flower	of	Womanhood”	is	probably	the	best	translation,	though	strictly	the	title	means	“Flower	Woman.”	61	See	the	discussion	of	the	forward-looking	and	exploratory	nature	of	Bandung	fashion	in	Chapters	2	and	3.	62	Konfrontasi	was	also	referred	to	as	“Dwikora,”	an	acronym	for	“Dwi	Komando	Rakyat”	or	“The	People’s	Double	Command,”	with	the	clear	intention	of	linking	the	opposition	to	the	Federalization	of	Malaysia	and	its	accompanied	border	disputes	in	Borneo	to	the	successful	annexation	of	West	Irian	from	the	Dutch	in	the	Trikora	campaign	in	1962.	The	new	regulations	essentially	were	put	in	place	to	require	all	publications	to	seek	a	new	permit,	and	to	allow	an	opportunity	for	political	review	and	control	of	their	content	by	the	Sukarno	government.	For	the	text	of	the	regulations,	see	PenPres	no	6/1963.	http://www.pta-makassarkota.go.id/peraturan_perundangan/PENPRES/PENPRES_1963_6.pdf.	63	Putting	dates	to	the	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita	from	1963	on	is	a	challenge.	Unlike	many	magazines,	Puspa	Wanita	did	not	use	publication	dates,	so	formally,	this	is	issue	is	“Year	VII,	No.	3,”	and	it	carries	a	1963	publication	year	on	its	cover.	While	this	might	seem	to	indicate	a	March	date,	the	Year	VII,	No.	4	issue	has	a	new	publishing	permit	attached	to	it,	dated	July	29,	1963,	so,	at	earliest,	No.	4	is	an	August	issue.	The	new	press	law,	PenPres	no.	6/1963,	had	been	issued	by	
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magazine.	The	articles	on	fashion	were	largely	locally	sourced	and	focused.	The	lead	article	profiled	Nj.	E.	Kusumanegara,	the	leader	of	the	Marion	Glamour	School	Bandung.	She	had	begun	her	career	in	glamour	and	fashion	at	the	school’s	Jakarta	branch	in	1955,	and	had	spent	a	year	in	Europe	learning	more	about	fashion	and	makeup	in	1957-1958	before	returning	to	Indonesia	and	opening	the	Bandung	school,	which	quickly	“had	many	students.”64		The	life	of	the	school	took	an	interesting	turn	in	1961,	when	“[c]onnected	with	the	heated	spirit	of	Trikora	at	the	end	of	1961,	all	activities	were	halted	for	a	while.”65	Nj.	Kusumunegara	used	the	opportunity	to	travel	to	the	Philippines,	the	article	noted,	and	carry	out	special	training	in	the	latest	techniques	in	hair-dressing	and	makeup.	The	profile	also	reported	that	Nj.	Kusumanegara	had	recently	organized	a	fashion	show	as	a	fundraiser	for	the	victims	of	the	explosion	of	Gunung	Agung	in	Bali.66	The	magazine	carried	a	story	
 Soekarno	on	May	15,	without	an	apparent	lag	put	in	place	for	the	law	to	be	implemented.	Perhaps	no	editions	were	printed	in	the	intermittent	months	while	the	magazine	waited	for	its	permit	finally	issued	in	late	July?							Wanita	magazine	only	published	13	issues	in	1963,	rather	than	its	normal	22-24,	and	they	were,	for	the	first	time	in	the	magazine’s	history,	undated,	except	for	the	year.	Varia	changed	its	permit,	but	did	not	miss	an	issue.	But	the	Varia	publisher	was	by	that	time	rather	close	to	the	Sukarno	camp,	and	the	content	of	Varia	had	already	shifted	gradually	over	the	course	of	the	previous	three	years	to	be	supportive	of	Sukarnoist	rhetoric	and	worldview.							We	do	know	that	Issue	No.	3	was	published	prior	to	August,	while	No.	4	cannot	have	been	published	before	the	end	of	July.	However,	issue	No.	5	clearly	references	an	event	on	October	19,	1963,	the	naming	of	Fatmawati,	Sukarno’s	first	and	senior	wife,	as	“Ibu	Agung”	or	“Great	Mother”	of	the	nation.	The	editor’s	note	below	the	feature	reads	“Bandung,	Oktober	1963.”	Whatever	the	actual	publication	dates	may	be,	there	are	clear	“before”	(No.	3),	and	“after”	(No.	5)	issues,	with	No.	4	hanging	in	some	sort	of	inter-space.	The	dates	for	“Year	VII”	then	move	into	1964,	beginning	with	No.	6,	and	No.	11,	still	in	“Year	VII,”	is	a	“New	Years	and	Lebaran	1965”	issue	(There	were	two	Ramadans	in	1965,	one	in	early	February,	and	the	other	in	late	December),	that	also	features	a	short	story	on	Christmas.	The	New	Year’s	article,	on	the	political	future	of	
Konfrontasi	and	Nekolim,	reads	“The	New	Year	1965	has	already	arrived.”	So	it	appears	that	the	magazine	came	out	intermittently	at	best.	Sometimes	content	allows	us	to	locate	a	particular	issue	more	closely,	sometimes	it	is	less	precisely	visible.		64	“mendapat	siswa	banjak.”	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	211.	65	“Berhubungan	dengan	hangat2nja	semangat	Trikora	akhir	1961	segala	kegiatan	untuk	sementara	dihentikan.”	Puspa	
Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	211.	66	The	eruption	of	Gunung	Agung	in	March	1963	provides	a	fascinating	study	of	the	interplay	of	modern	Indonesian	politics	and	the	persistence	of	traditional	belief.	The	volcano	is	the	primary	mountain	on	the	island	of	Bali,	and	the	“mother	temple”	of	Balinese	Hinduism,	Besakih,	lies	on	its	southwest	slope.	A	once-in-a-century	ritual	at	the	temple,	Eka	Dasa	Rudra,	which	involves	the	mass	sacrifice	of	animals,	including	rare	ones	such	as	eagles	and	anteaters	that	have	cosmological	significance.	When	the	mountain	started	“belching”	in	early	1963,	the	temple	priests	postponed	the	ritual,	scheduled	for	February,	taking	the	mountain’s	seismological	activity	as	a	portent	that	the	Gods	were	not	pleased.	Sukarno,	however,	had	invested	a	significant	amount	of	political	capital	in	inviting	world	leaders	to	Bali	for	the	ceremonies	as	an	example	of	the	strength	and	depth	of	Indonesian	national	identity	and	culture,	and	he	commanded	the	priests	to	continue	with	the	originally	scheduled	ritual.	The	eruption	of	the	volcano	killed	1500	people,	and	lava	flows	just	barely	missed	the	temple	complex	itself,	all	before	the	full	cycle	of	the	ritual	could	be	completed.	In	Bali,	this	was	taken	as	a	sign	that	the	world	had	entered	a	“time	of	troubles,”	and	it	led	to	significant	social	unrest.	Whether	this	unrest	added	to	the	particularly	violent	and	expansive	nature	of	the	killings	in	Bali	in	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya	is	a	question	that	historians	have	debated.	But	when	speaking	with	older	Balinese	about	their	lives,	the	eruption	of	the	mountain	is	one	of	the	clear	markers	of	time	and	transition	in	their	memories,	along	with	the	Japanese	era.	The	eruption	of	Gunung	Agung	though	is	also	often	used	as	a	coded	way	of	referring	to	the	killings	in	late	1965	and	early	1966	without	actually	mentioning	them.	For	older	Balinese,	the	two	events	remain	linked.	I	hope	to	carry	out	future	research	about	this	connection	sometime	in	the	near	future,	while	the	older	generation	that	remembers	them	is	still	present	and	able	to	be	interviewed.	
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about	the	fashion	show	later	in	the	issue,	including	pictures	of	Marion	Glamour	School	models	wearing	“new”	on-trend	western	dresses	presented	without	any	nod	to	“Indonesian”	fashion.67	(See	Figure	6.17.)		
	
Figure	6.17:	An	all-western	“new”	fashion	lineup	in	Bandung,	May	1963.	
Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	216-217.		The	forward	and	western	focused	outlook	of	Puspa	Wanita	was	also	evident	in	a	number	of	articles	in	the	issue	that	addressed	questions	of	child	rearing	and	sexuality,	and	were	direct	translations	of	American	magazine	articles.	The	article	on	sexuality	was	particularly	unusual	for	Indonesian	women’s	magazines	since	it	directly	addressed	several	questions—homosexuality	and	masturbation	were	just	two	examples—that	I	never	saw	discussed	in	any	other	instances	in	my	research.	In	providing	answers	from	“experts	about	the	20	most	frequently	asked	questions	about	SEX,”68	the	translation	of	an	article	by	Phyllis	W.	Goldman	reflected	progressive	positions	on	sexuality,	even	within	an	American	social	
 67	“Mode	Baru	Bermuntjulan	di	dalam	FASHION	SHOW	Gunung	Agung.”	(“New	Fashions	Shown	at	the	Gunung	Agung	FASHION	SHOW.”)	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	216-217.	68	“Djawaban	para	ahli	atas	20	pertanjaan	tentang	SEX	yg	paling	sering	ditanjakan,”	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,		p.	226-27.	
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context,	not	to	mention	Indonesia’s	significantly	more	sexually	conservative	worldview.69	The	issue	also	included	a	long	article	on	“Abortus,”	meaning	miscarriage	rather	than	abortion,	which,	though	written	by	a	local	doctor,	Sujono	Hadi,	reported	the	latest	theories	from	American	scientists	about	the	psychological	effects	of	women	losing	pregnancies	to	miscarriage.70	In	Issue	No.	3,	then,	Puspa	Wanita	covered	materials	and	presented	women	in	ways	that	were	significantly	out	of	line	from	the	images	of	revolutionary	Indonesian	women	that	had	already	largely	been	the	norm	in	magazines	such	as	Varia.	The	(likely)	August	or	September	1963	edition	of	Puspa	Wanita,	No.	4,	showed	both	continuities	and	several	significant	changes	from	the	previous	issue.	The	front	matter	on	the	inside	front	cover	of	the	magazine	continued,	as	it	had	previously,	to	introduce	the	cover	model	for	the	issue	and	previewing	the	highlights	of	that	month’s	magazine.	In	No.	4.	the	copy	discussed	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	shown	on	the	cover	in	kain-kebaya	and	konde,	four	years	after	her	batik-less	photo	shoot	as	Miss	Varia	1959.	It	read:		—	We	introduce—Nj.	Dewayani	Pribadi—in	a	pose—captivating—who	can’t	be	envious—who	was	caught—by	our	photographer—previously—at	an	interesting	event—the	braga	festival—where	she—served—as—a	model.71		The	introductory	text	continued	with	a	discussion	about	the	interplay	between	fashion	and	models,	something	it	said	was	“pleasing.”	It	then	invited	readers	to	peruse	the	fashion	pages	at	the	middle	of	the	issue.		
 69	On	homosexuality:	“How	can	you	tell	if	your	child	is	a	homosexual?”	(Answer:	if	by	age	8	they	only	want	to	play	with	children	of	the	other	sex,	this	is	a	sign.	By	this	age,	children	prefer	strongly	to	play	with	children	of	their	own	gender.	Most	important	here	is	a	strong	relationship	between	father	and	son.	“Hubungan	baik	antara	ajah	dan	anak	laki2	adalah	
terpenting.”		The	answer	did	not	address	same-sex	attraction	among	girls	specifically.		On	masturbation:	“Does	“does	masturbation	cause	harm?”	(menggangu?)	Answer:	Not	if	it’s	done	in	“normal”	amounts,	it’s	only	a	problem	when	it’s	“unusual	(not	normal’),”	(“luar	biasa	(tidak	normal),”	and	then	it’s	“very	bothersome.”	(“menganggu	sekali.”)	Puspa	
Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	226-27.	70	“Abortus:	Pertolongan	dan	Pentjegahan,”	(“Abortion:	Help	and	Prevention.”)	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	229-230.	The	article	noted	that	there	were	two	other	forms	of	“abortus,”	“medical	abortion	for	medical	reasons,	and	medical	abortion	for	non-medical	reasons,	the	latter	which	was	“illegal	according	to	the	constitution.”	(“jang	dapat	dihukum	
menurut	undang2	dasar,”)	and	which	the	article	expressly	did	not	write	about	further.	71	“—Kami	perkenalkan—Nj.	Dewayani	Pribadi—dalam	pose—menawan	hati—siapa	tak	iri—jang	didjumapi—juruptret	
kita—dalam	atjara	menarik—braga	festival—dimana	dia—bertindak—selaku—pergawati.	//	—bitjara	tentang—
pergawati—masalah	mode—merupakan—soal—jang—hangat—karena—pergawati	dan	mode—merupakan—dua	hal—
jang	saling	berhubungan—satu	dengan	lain—maka	perhatikanlah—hidangan	PW—nomor—ini—dihalaman—tengah—	//	
—pakaian	dan	wanita—djuga—seperti—suatu	masalah—jang	erat	sekali—angkut—paunja—namun	bagi	mereka—
jang—naik—remadja—peristiwa	alamiah—menstruasi—bukanlah—peristiwa—jang	mesti—ditjemaskan.”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	4,	Front	Inside	Cover.	The	long	dashes	are	in	the	original	text.	The	cover	image	showed	Dewayani	dressed	in	kain-kebaya,	but	also	wearing	the	crown	and	sash	of	a	beauty	contest	winner.	She	had	indeed	used	her	Miss	Varia	1959	crown	to	move	into	the	world	of	professional	modeling,	but	this	time,	clearly	also	wearing	Indonesian	clothing	as	well.	The	Braga	Festival	was	a	prominent	annual	celebration	held	in	Bandung,	focused	on	the	city’s	main	business	thoroughfare	from	which	it	took	its	name.	
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These	pages	featured	four	new	western-style	creations	specifically	made	for	teenagers,	one	of	them	sleeveless	(called	a	“you	can	see”),	which	the	article	said	was	“nota	
bene	up	until	now	well-liked	by	a	large	number	of	our	young	women	because	of	Indonesia’s	climate,	which	is	probably	too	hot???”72	The	front	matter	then	mentioned	that	something	else	related	to	teenagers	was	the	approach	of	menstruation,	and	pointed	to	an	article	on	the	subject	also	included	in	the	issue.	The	facing	page	featured	an	article	on	Nj.	E.	Supardi,	an	Air	Force	wife,	and	leader	of	the	Lembaga	Wanita	Sempurna,	(or	the	“League	of	Refined	Women,”)	an	organization	that	instructed	young	military	wives	on	the	details	of	fashion	and	etiquette.	(See	Figure	6.18).	But	aside	from	this,	the	Bandung-focused	content	was	noticeably	reduced	in	amount	and	in	scope,	consisting	largely	of	short	stories	by	male	Indonesian	writers.	These	had	not	been	a	particular	feature	of	earlier	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita,	although	it	was	a	staple	of	many	other	women’s	magazines.	In	place	of	local	content,	the	issue	featured	more	Indonesian	language	translations	of	American	articles	on	women’s	health,	a	profile	of	Brigitte	Bardot,73	translations	of	European	short	stories,	an	article	on	Chekov,	and	a	three-page	spread	of	western	fashion	with	drawings	of	white,	western	models.		The	overwhelming	presence	of	short	stories,	rather	than	features,	showed	a	markedly	different	profile	to	the	magazine,	as	if	the	editors	were	putting	content	“on	hold”	while	they	sorted	out	the	emerging	political	situation.	Notably,	this	edition	also	featured	a	new	publishing	permit	number,	dated	July	30,	1963,	reflecting	the	issuance	of	a	new	press	law	signed	by	Sukarno	on	May	15,	1963.	In	the	next	issue,	No.	5.,	published	in	October	1963,	the	tenor	of	the	magazine’s	front	space	changed	completely.	The	issue	took	on	a	whole	new—and	much	more	political—language	and	tone,	one	completely	in	line	with	Sukarno’s	cultural	and	political	projects	attached	to	the	Konfrontasi	with	Malaysia.	While	much	of	the	content	of	the	magazine	followed	Puspa	Wanita’s	previous	style,	the	front	few	pages	were	dominated	by	articles	in	a	new	vernacular	that	interrupted	the	earlier	feel	of	the	magazine,	both	rhetorically	and	visually.		
 72	“jg	notabene	sampai	sekarang	ini	masih	digemari	sebagian	besar	gadis2	kita	karena	iklim	Indonesia	jang	barangkali	
terlalu	panas???”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	4.,	p.	263.	73	While	many	western	actresses	would	become	anathema	in	publications	in	the	last	years	of	Sukarno’s	presidency,	Brigitte	Bardot,	known	for	her	socialist	leanings	at	the	time,	remained	a	favorite,	and	acceptable	sexy	western	model.	
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Figure	6.18:	Puspa	Wanita	Front	Matter,	August	1963,	with	Dewayani	Pribadi,	upper	left,	in	kain-kebaya.	The	new	publication	permit	information	is	visible	on	the	upper	right	of	the	first	page.		 The	cover	description	still	introduced	the	model,	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho,	who	was	shown	wearing	a	sleeveless	yellow	dress,	with	a	pearl	necklace	and	a	cascading	western	hairstyle.	But	it	used	a	completely	different	rhetoric	to	describe	her:		—we—introduce—her	name	is	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho—young	woman—[from]	Bandung—with	her—smile—sparkling—towards—the	future—homeland—Indonesia—that	is	currently—striving	to	finish/complete—its	national—revolution—to—attain—a	society—[of]	Indonesian—socialism—that	doesn’t	know—the	exploitation	of	man—by—man74			
 74	“—kami—perkenalkan—namanja	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho—dara—bandung—dengan—senjuman—tjemerlang—
menghadapi—masa—depan—tanah	air—indonesia—jang	kini-sedang—berdjuang	menjelesaikan—revolusi—
nasionalnja—untuk—mentjapai—masjarakat—sosialisme—indonesia—jang—tidak—mengenal—exploitation	l’home	[sic]—par—‘lhome	[sic]—	”		Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	The	long	dashes	are	in	the	original	text.		“Exploitation	l’homme	par	l’homme,”	was	a	Sukarno	catch-phrase,	which	he	sprinkled	into	many	of	his	speeches	and	writings,	using	the	French.	
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The	column	continued	with	similar	language,	stressing	the	special	roles	women	had	to	play	in	the	revolutionary	process.	As	part	of	their	duties	to	build	an	“Indonesian	national	revolution”	and	to	“awaken	a	new	world,”75	the	editors	suggested	that	“we	as	Indonesian	women	must	of	course	not	remain	silent	in	making	Ganefo76	a	success.”77	The	text	then	took	a	rambling,	but	highly	informative,	turn.		Ganefo	I	must	be	successful.	That	is	the	blessing	of	Indonesian	women	[“kaum	wanita	Indonesia”]	that	today	has	an	exalted	mother	[“ibu	agung”78],	Ibu	Fatmawati,	the	first	lady	Indonesia,79	who	has	rendered	so	much	service	for	the	advancement	of	our	women	[“kaum	wanita	kita”]	and	has	also	worked	greatly	to	uplift	religion	and	humanitarianism.		The	emancipation	of	our	women	[“kaum	wanita	kita”]	must	point	towards	constructive	measures	for	the	advancement	of	the	nation,	and	because	of	that,	we	follow	the	correct	advice	of	the	great	leader	of	our	revolution80	who	
 75	“—membangun—dunia	baru—”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	This	is	the	same	language	Sukarno	used	in	the	1964	speeches	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter.	76	GANEFO,	the	Games	of	the	New	Emerging	Forces,	held	in	Jakarta	in	November	1964,	was	Sukarno’s	latest	large-scale	project	to	build	the	non-aligned	movement	internationally.	GANEFO	was	intended	to	provide	a	level	playing	field	in	athletics	for	countries	from	Asia,	African	and	Latin	America,	and	from	other	socialist	countries.	Sukarno	initiated	the	project	as	part	of	the	anti-Olympic	plank	of	his	New	World	platform,	and	it	occasioned	the	building	of	a	great	deal	of	infrastructure	around	Jakarta.	The	International	Olympic	Committee	had	suspended	Indonesia	from	the	Olympic	Games	in	February	1963,	in	response	to	an	incident	in	which	the	Indonesians	failed	to	provide	visas	to	athletes	from	Israel	and	“Nationalist	China”	(Taiwan)	for	the	1962	Asian	Games	that	were	also	held	in	Jakarta.		Fifty-one	national	teams	attended	GANEFO,	some	official	government	delegations,	and	other	unofficial.	The	games	occasioned	the	building	of	Jakarta’s	first	by-pass	over	Blvd	Djendral	Soedirman,	which	was	covered	in	multiple	magazines,	including	Varia.	Schools	were	shut	for	two	weeks	so	students	could	act	as	guides	and	ushers,	and	electricity	was	rationed	ahead	of	the	games	to	make	certain	there	would	be	sufficient	power	to	light	the	games	during	their	duration.	For	a	period	of	intensifying	economic	pressure,	both	in	terms	of	infrastructure	and	general	expenses,	GANEFO	represented	a	huge	investment	of	real	and	political	capital	by	Sukarno	and	the	Indonesian	government.	Politically,	the	games	were	linked	to	both	an	analysis	of	the	New	Emerging	Forces	(Nefos)	v.	the	Old	Established	Forces	(Oldefos)	and	their	“imperialistic”	outlook.	Furthermore,	Sukarno	directly	linked	GANEFO	to	the	“Crush	Malaysia”	efforts,	and	a	ubiquitous	slogan	at	the	games	was	“Sukseskan	GANEFO	Ganjang	
Malaysia.”	(Make	GANEFO	a	success	Crush	Malaysia),	which	RAND	analyst	Ewa	Pauker	pointed	out,	put	these	two	separate	ideas	together	without	any	intermediary	punctuation.	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	
Djakarta.		77	“—kita—sebagai—wanita—Indonesia—tentu—sadja—tidak—tinggal—diam—dalam—mensukseskan—ganefo.”	Puspa	
Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	78	“Agung”	is	a	Sanskrit	word	shared	in	both	Javanese	and	Balinese	that	means	“high,”	“exalted”	and	“large/mighty,”	with	the	connotation	of	being	above	all	others.	The	largest	gong	in	a	gamelan	ensemble,	which	strikes	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	each	piece,	and	each	cycle	within	a	piece	(and	in	the	cyclical	structure	of	gamelan	music,	those	first	and	last	tones	happen	at	the	same	“time”	in	the	cycle),	is	called	“gong	agung.”	The	word	can	be	reverential	and	replete	with	cultural	meaning.	The	term	implies	that	Fatmawati	was	the	highest	mother	of	all	mothers.	79	This	phrase	is	in	English,	reflecting	its	origins	in	Indonesian	political	debates	about	Fatmawati’s	place	in	the	nation	in	the	aftermath	of	Sukarno’s	marriage	to	Hartini	in	1953,	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	80	Normally,	this	formal	title	would	be	capitalized.	In	keeping	with	the	format	of	Puspa	Wanita’s	formatter,	however,	I	have	left	it	uncapitalized	here.	
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emphatically	says—stop81—beauty—oh	my—contests	because	they	are	not	in	line	[“sesuai”]	with	our	identity	and	the	rhythm	of	our	revolution.82	83			
	
Figure	6.19:	Fatmawati	accorded	the	title	of	the	“High	Mother”	of	the	nation.	
Puspa	Wanita,	October	1963,	No.	5,	p.	283.		It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	Puspa	Wanita	was	the	most	glamour-focused	of	the	women’s	magazines.	Of	all	the	women’s	magazine’s	they	were	the	most	likely	to	have	championed	and	supported	beauty	pageants	as	an	appropriate	expression	for	young	Indonesian	women’s	beauty.	So,	whether	the	interjected	“aduh”84	is	an	exclamation	of	loss	
 81	“Stop”	in	English.	82	“ganefo	I—harus	sukses—itulah—doa	restu—kaum	wanita—indonesia—jang	kini—sudah—pula—memiliki—ibu	
agunja—ibu	fatmawati—the	first	lady	indonesia—jang	sudah—banjak—djasanja—untuk—kemadjuan—kaum	wanita	
kita—dan	banjak—pula	usahanja—dalam—membangkitkan—semangat—beragama—dan	peri—kemanusiaan—	//	—
emansipasi—kaum—wanita—kita—haruslah—diarahkan—kepada—usaha2—konstrukip—pada—kemadjuan—
bangsa—oleh—karena—tepat—andjuran—pemimpin—besar	revolusi—kita—jang—tegas2—mengatakan—stop—
kontes2-an—adu—ketjantikkan—karena—tidak—sesuai—dengan	kepribadian—dan	iramanja	revolusi—kita—”	Puspa	
Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	83	The	entire	text,	like	the	versions	immediately	above,	is	divided	by	long	dashes.	For	ease	of	reading	here,	I	have	reproduced	the	text	without	them,	but	did	choose	to	insert	them	back	in	around	the	interjection—“adu,”	translatable	as	“oh	my,”	or	“my	gosh”—where	the	flow	of	the	idea	is	somewhat	broken.		84	With	the	“h”	on	the	end	it	its	more	prevalent	spelling.	
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over	a	treasured	idea	or	of	a	newly	found	“revolutionary”	tut-tutting	about	outdated	past	practices	wasn’t	fully	clear	here.	Perhaps	it	was	both,	but	it	most	certainly	was	a	marker	of	sudden	change.	On	the	facing	inside	front	page,	readers	were	greeted	by	a	large	photograph	of	a	smiling	Fatmawati,	along	with	a	large	headline	proclaiming	that	she	had	been	given	the	title	of	“Ibu	Agung,”	or	“Supreme	Mother”	of	Indonesia.85	Though	shown	wearing	Indonesian	fashion	and	a	light,	sheer	head	covering	that	had	long	been	her	standard	dress	at	public	events,	Fatmawati	also	sported	a	pageant-queen	sash	with	her	new	title	embroidered	on	it,	an	interesting	appropriation	of	beauty	queen	imagery	for	a	middle-aged	mother	and	first-lady	of	the	nation.	(Again,	see	Figure	6.19).	The	most	explicitly	political	article	of	the	issue	appeared	on	the	next	page.	It	exhorted	women	to	help	bring	about	the	success	of	GANEFO.	The	GANEFO	slogan,	“Onward,	No	Retreat”86	ran	(in	English)	in	large	print	across	the	bottom	of	the	page,	while	other	slogans	(in	Indonesian)	ran	in	a	column	down	the	left	side	of	the	facing	page.	Visually,	the	pages	of	Puspa	Wanita	were	turned	into	a	billboard	for	the	games	and	its	revolutionary	messaging.87	(See	Figure	6.20).	Reflecting	Sukarno’s	“many	public	appeals	asking	that	everyone	do	all	that	is	in	[their]	power	to	make	GANEFO	a	success,”88	Puspa	Wanita	called	on	its	female	readers	specifically	as	women	to	do	their	part	in	that	national	effort,	writing:	WE	Indonesian	women	cannot	keep	silent.	We	will	make	GANEFO	I	successful	in	all	areas	that	are	necessary.	It	is	not	only	our	female	athletes	and	our	women	artists	who	will	make	a	splash	directly	in	the	various	fields	of	the	festival	of	sport	and	the	arts,	but	we,	Indonesian	women	as	a	whole	must	pray	that	GANEFO	I	is	a	success,	that	it	runs	smoothly	according	to	plan,	and	that	there	are	no	deficiencies.	We	wish,	with	a	hope	that	is	sincere	and	holy,	that	God	the	Most	High	will	bestow	all	bounty	upon	the	Indonesian	people	who	are	in	the	midst	of	completing	their	revolution,	and	of	organizing	
 85	The	title	was	given	to	her	on	October	4,	1963,	by	the	Ikatan	Pegawai	Wanita,	(Association	of	Women	Civil	Servants)	in	a	specifically	tailored	event	in	Jakarta	for	her	work	on	“social,	women’s	and	humanitarian	issues.”	Nancy	Florida	notes	that	“Ratu	Agung”	is	the	title	given	in	Central	Javanese	kratons	to	the	mother	of	a	king.	86	Pauker	points	out	that	the	slogan	went	on	to	become	a	principal	slogan	for	the	Crush	Malaysia	campaign.	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	Djakarta,	p.	16.	87	Similar	adaptations	are	also	visible	in	Wanita	and	Varia.	Clearly	all	magazines	were	expected	to	help	exhort	the	Indonesian	people	to	“Sukeskan	GANEFO.”	88	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	Djakarta,	p.	12.	She	continues	“In	this	way	everyone	was	made	to	feel	that	he	was	in	some	way	contributing	personally	to	the	success	of	the	Games,	and,	thereby,	to	the	prestige	of	his	country.	It	was	very	effective.”	The	use	of	male	assumed	gender	in	Pauker’s	language	belies	the	content	of	Puspa	Wanita.	
 
 
339 
GANEFO	I,	which	we	hold	to	be	a	manifestation	of	the	national	philosophy	of	Indonesia	of	building	a	new	world.89			
	
Figure	6.20:	Puspa	Wanita	becomes	a	billboard	for	the	“sukses”	of	GANEFO	
Puspa	Wanita,	no.	5,	October	1963,	pp.	284-285.		
Puspa	Wanita’s	female	readers,	therefore,	were	being	explicitly	called	to	play	a	specifically	gendered	role	in	“successing”	the	national	revolution.	They	were	tasked	with	prayer	(something	everyone	was	capable	of	doing,	but	also	an	interesting	rhetorical	intervention	in	the	previously	non-religious	tone	of	Puspa	Wanita)	to	assure	everything	would	go	smoothly	in	that	regard.	This	ran	alongside	articles	providing	advice	on	which	necklace	to	wear	or	how	to	dress	for	an	outing	in	the	country.		
 89	“KITA	kaum	wanita	Indonesia	tidak	boleh	tinggal	diam.	Kita	sukseskan	Ganefo	I	disegala	bidang	jang	diperlukan.	Bukan	
sadja	atlit2	puteri	kita	dan	seniwati2	kita	jang	berketjimpung	langsung	dibidangnja	masing2	dalam	pesta	olah	raga	dan	
seni,	tapi	kita	kaum	ibu	Indonesia	harus	mendo’akan	agar	GANEFO	I	ini	sukses,	berdjalan	lantjar	menurut	rentjana	semula,	
dan	tidak	kurang	suatu	apa.	Kita	berharap	dengan	harapan	jang	tulus	dan	sutji,	semoga	Tuhan	Jang	Maha	Esa,	tetap	
melimpahkan	segala	karunianja	kepada	bangsa	Indonesia	jang	sedang	menjelesaikan	revolusinja,	dan	dalam	
penjelenggaraan	Ganefo	I	ini,	kita	menganggapnja	sebagian	suatu	menifestasi:	palsafah	negara	Indonesia	dalam	
membangun	dunia	baru.”	Puspa	Wanita,	no.	5.,	October	1963,	p.	284.	
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Over	the	course	of	the	next	several	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita,	reaching	into	early	1965,	several	important	and	highly	divergent	new	images	of	Indonesian	women	also	emerged.	While	retaining	some	elements	of	its	earlier	layouts,	editions	of	Puspa	Wanita	increasingly	featured	articles	and	images	of	women	as	ideal	types,	rather	than	as	individuals,	that	is,	as	various	expressions	of	a	kaum	wanita.	The	December	1964	edition,	a	“Combined	Special	New	Years	and	Lebaran”90	version,	was	exemplary	in	this	regard.	The	cover	image	was	of	a	model	dressed	as	an	ideal	beauty.	She	wore	an	elegant	sheer	green	kebaya	with	a	tailored	bef,	and	a	fine	kain	batik	in	a	refined	parang	rusak	motif.	Over	her	shoulder	lay	an	exquisite	green	silk	selendang.	Her	gold	jewelry	was	spare	and	refined,	a	gold	and	diamond	necklace,	two	gold	pins	and	gold	earrings.	On	her	head,	she	wore	a	gold	fabric	crown,	as	she	was	crowned	the	queen	of	the	Braga	Festival.	The	title	holder	was	none	other	than	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	whose	transformation	from	ultra-modern	fashion	model	to	proper	Indonesian	woman	was	now	complete.	(See	Figure	6.21).	
	
Figure	6.21:	Puspa	Wanita	celebrates	New	Year	and	Lebaran	1965.	Dhewayani	Pribadi	as	a	winning	model	from	the	Braga	Festival	in	Bandung.	
 90	“Nomor	Gabungan	Istimewa	Tahun	Baru	dan	Lebaran	1965.”	1965	was	an	odd	year	in	the	cycle	for	Lebaran,	with	two	incidents	of	the	fasting	month,	one	at	the	beginning	of	the	year,	celebrated	here,	and	the	other,	as	is	noted	in	Chapter	7,	coming	in	December	1965.	
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CHAPTER	6	
 
Tall	Hair,	Short	Skirts	and	Moral	Crisis:	
The	Politics	of	Beauty	and	of	Confrontation,	1955-1965		
	.	.	.	saja	amat	.	.	.	bergembira	.	.	.	bahwa	Kongres	Wanita	Indonesia	
djuga	akan	aktif	sekali	dalam	memberantas	imperialisme	kulturil.	Ja	rambut	
sasak,	ja	rambut	beetle,	ja	spanrok-spanrokan,	ja	twist-twist-an,	ja	rock-and-
roll-rock-and-roll-an,	ja	Elvys	Presley	Elvys	Presley-an,	ja	Nat	King	Cole	Nat	
King	Cole-an,	matjam-matjam,	Saudara-saudara.	Tetapi	terutama	sekali	kita	
harus	waspada	terhadap	kepada	intervensi	dan	subversi	politik.	Waspadalah,	
waspadahlah!		.	.	.	I	am	exceedingly	.	.	.	happy	.	.	.	that	the	Indonesian	Women’s	Congress	will	also	play	an	active	role	in	smashing	cultural	imperialism.	Yes	teased	and	ratted	hair,	yes	Beatle	hair,	yes	miniskirts,	yes	the	twist,	yes	rock-and-roll,	yes	Elvis	Presley	stuff,	yes	Nat	King	Cole	stuff,	all	sorts	of	things,	brothers	and	sisters.	But	above	all	we	must	be	alert	and	vigilant	towards	political	intervention	and	subversion.	Beware,	beware!	—Sukarno,	to	the	delegates	of	Kowani,									July	19641		During	an	eight-day	span	in	July	1964,	President	Sukarno	gave	speeches	at	the	opening	ceremonies	of	two	national	congresses	of	Indonesian	women’s	organizations	in	Jakarta.	The	first,	given	on	July	16	to	the	5th	Congress	of	Wanita	Demokrat	Indonesia,2	was	entitled	“The	Indonesian	Revolution	Will	Not	Succeed	Without	Women!”3	The	second,	“Indonesian	Women	Are	Always	Active	in	the	Revolutionary	Ranks!,”4	opened	the	10th	
 1	“Wanita	Indonesia	Selalu	Ikut	Bergerak	Dalam	Barisan	Revolusioner!”	Published	by	the	Departemen	Penerangan	RI	as	Special	Publication	No.	332.	Transcription	of	speech	by	Sukaro	to	the	Kongres	Wanita	Indonesia,	or	Indonesian	Women’s	Congress,	July	24,	1964.	Yosef	Djakababa	commented	that	the	“-an”	suffix	in	this	case	conveys	a	strong	sense	of	the	modified	elements	as	being	fake,	or	not	real.	The	term	“mobil-mobil-an,”	for	instance,	means	a	toy	car	rather	than	a	real,	full-sized	mobil.	Personal	correspondence,	12/7/2019.	2	Indonesian	Democratic	Women,	the	women’s	wing	of	Sukarno’s	Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Nationalist	Party,)	or	PNI.		3	“Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”	Published	by	the	Departemen	Penerangan	RI	(Department	of	Public	Information	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia)	as	Special	Publication	No.	329.	4	“Wanita	Indonesia	Selalu	Ikut	Bergerak	Dalam	Barisan	Revolusioner!”	The	verb	“bergerak”	literally	means	“to	move”	in	the	sense	that	a	political	movement	is	referred	to	by	the	noun	based	on	the	same	word,	“gerakan,”	as	in	Gerakan	Wanita	
Indonesia.	
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national	meeting	of	the	Kongress	Wanita	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Women’s	Congress,	or	Kowani,)	on	July	24.		Both	speeches	reflected	the	hyper-active	political	energy	and	rhetoric	of	the	day,	in	which	Sukarno	exhorted	Indonesians	to	“finish”	their	national	revolution.	A	month	after	these	two	speeches,	responding	in	particular	to	the	Konfrontasi	(Confrontation)5	campaign	against	Malaysia,	Sukarno	famously	called	on	Indonesians	to	embark	on	a	“Year	of	Living	Dangerously,”6	in	which	the	then	nearly	20-year-old	nation	would	strive	to	completely	throw	off	the	yoke	of	western	imperialism	and	neo-colonialism.	He	called	on	Indonesians	to	reject	Western	interference	in	the	nation,	whether	it	came	in	political,	economic	or	cultural	forms.	But	in	these	speeches	in	July	1964—alongside	the	exhortations	to	“go	to	hell	with	this	‘Malaysia’,”7	and	to	“build	a	new	world,	and	to	expel	all	imperialism	and	colonialism	from	this	world”8—Sukarno	paid	attention	to	what	might	seem	to	be	an	insignificant	detail:	the	clothing	and	beauty	of	the	women	assembled.	“When	I	see	women	gathered,”	he	said	to	the	Kowani	delegates,		with	their	variously	colored	kebaya,	when	I	see	their	very	best	batik	cloth,	see	their	radiant	faces,	see	their	eyes	that	shine	like	stars	in	the	eternal	sky,	at	those	times	I	say,	I	have	the	feeling	that	I	am	engaged	in	revolutionary	struggle	inside	a	beautiful	garden.		.	.	.		Here	I	see	the	color	blue,	but	instead	I	see	what	looks	like	the	painting	of	a	Kartini	blossom,	with	a	stalk	and	a	white	flower.	Hey	comrades	from	West	Irian,	[you]	are	the	stalk,	the	women	police	officers	from	Sukabumi	[you]	are	the	green	leaves,	the	stalk	moves	upward,	on	the	top	there	is	white,	which	is	the	flower.	.	.	.	See,	over	there	is	red,	and	then	blue	again,	here	I	see	the	color	yellow	from	the	Women	Military	
 5	The	Konfrontasi	(Confrontation)	with	newly	independent	Malaysia	was	based	on	the	British	inclusion	of	two	regions	of	Borneo,	Sabah	and	Serawak,	in	the	Malaysian	nation.	Indonesia,	which	controlled	the	majority	of	the	island,	saw	this	as	a	continuation	of	British	imperialism	on	their	sovereign	space.	6	“Tahun	Vivere	Pericoloso,”	shorted	to	“Tavip,”	which	would	be	the	title	of	Sukarno’s	National	Day	speech	on	August	17,	1964.	The	phrase	however,	was	already	in	use	at	this	time,	including	in	the	concluding	paragraph	of	the	Wanita	Indonesia	speech.	7	In	English	in	the	original.	Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	speech,	p.	22.	8	“membangun	satu	dunia	baru,	.	.	.	membuang	segenap	imperialisme	dan	kolonialisme	didunia	ini.”		Sukarno,	“Revolusi	
Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”	p.	24.	
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Volunteers9	and	the	Women	Ministers,	here	again	I	see	colors	that	are	very	beautiful,	I	see	brilliant	greens	from	the	comrades	from	West	Irian.10		Why,	in	the	midst	of	inherently	political	speeches,	did	Sukarno	take	time	to	note	the	quality	of	the	women’s	colorful	clothing,	the	radiance	of	their	complexions	and	the	brilliance	of	their	eyes?	As	the	discussion	in	previous	chapters	of	this	dissertation	would	suggest,	there	was	significantly	more	than	either	simple	flattery	or	some	sort	of	patriarchal	condescension	at	play	in	his	descriptions	of	these	women’s	appearance.	Rather,	Sukarno	was	deploying	a	politics	of	feminine	beauty	that	linked	Indonesian	women’s	appearance	with	a	conception	of	Indonesian	modernity	and	national	identity.	Most	importantly,	this	politics	concerned	their	inner	character	and	moral	strength	and	their	collective	identity	as	women.	In	doing	so,	it	deployed	a	web	of	definitions	of	proper	national	femininity	that	had	been	developing	since	the	beginnings	of	the	Indonesian	nationalist	movement	in	the	early	1920s.			Sukarno	was	also	connecting	this	beauty	politics	to	the	revolutionary	politics	of	the	day.	The	types	of	women	he	chose	to	highlight—women	police	and	military	officers,	and	comrades	from	West	Irian,	(a	region	that	recently	“retaken”	from	the	Dutch),	about	which	Sukarno	had	created	a	significant	rhetorical	campaign11—reflected	the	tighter	connections	that	had	developed	between	beauty	and	the	ideal	representation	of	the	nation.	The	references	to	political	situations	were	particularly	cogent	and	emotionally	resonant	at	the	time.		
 9	As	part	of	the	mass	mobilization	of	Indonesian	society	during	Konfrontasi,	each	of	the	military	branches	either	began	or	expanded	special	women’s	detachments	referred	to	as	sukarelawati,	or	“volunteers.”	These	women’s	detachments	received	significant	coverage	in	women’s	magazines,	particularly	for	their	training	exercises,	which	included	training	in	riflery	and	other	firearms.	There	were	also	women	in	the	national	police	force,	whose	brigades	saw	increased	militarization	of	their	training	at	this	point	as	well.	Beyond	this,	many	of	the	various	political	parties	and	organizations	put	together	“volunteer”	brigades	as	well,	some	of	which	also	engaged	in	various	sorts	of	training	exercises.	This	provided	the	general	circumstances	under	which	Gerwani	women	were	present	at	Lubang	Buaya	on	the	night	of	September	30-October	1,	1965.	10	“.	.	.	kalau	saja	melihat	wanita-wanita	berkumpul	dengan	badju	kebajanja	jang	pantjawarna	atau	aneka-warna,	melihat	
kain	batiknja	jang	bagus-bagus,	melihat	mukanja	jang	berseri-seri,	melihat	sinar	matanja	jang	laksana	sinar	bintang	
dilangit	jang	abadi,	pada	waktu	itu	saja	berkata,	saja	mempunjai	perasaan	bahwa	saja	ini	berdjoang	dalam	taman-sari	jang	
indah.		.	.	.		melihat	sana	ada	warna	biru,	sana	malahan	melihat	ada	lukisan	bunga	Kartini	.	.	.	tangkainja	ada,	bunganja	
putih.	Hé	Saudara-saudari	dari	Irian	Barat,	itu	tangkai	itu,	polisi	wanita	dari	Sukabumi,	daunnja	hidjau,	tangkai	terus	
mengatas,	diatas	ada	putih,	itu	bunga	.	.	.	Melihat	di	sana	ada	merah,	biru	lagi,	melihat	disini	warna	kuning	daripada	Ibu-ibu	
Sukarelawati,	Ibu-ibu	Menteri,	melihat	disinipun	warna-warna	jang	amat	indah,	melihat	hidjau-hidjau	tjemerlang	daripada	
saudari-saudari	dari	Irian	Barat.”	Sukarno,	“Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!”,	p.	7.	Recall	the	description	of	the	nation	as	a	garden,	with	Sukarno	at	its	center,	that	was	included	in	the	first	issue	of	Wanita	in	August	1949,	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		11	See	the	discussion	of	Trikora	later	in	this	chapter.	
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The	politics	of	beauty	Sukarno	used	in	July	1964	had	developed	beyond	the	version	that	had	been	at	play	at	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung	in	1955.	Women’s	beauty	was	no	longer	merely	a	projection	of	a	strong	moral	nationalism.	By	1964,	it	was	also	evoked	as	a	protective	talisman	against	specific	dangers	of	the	modern	world:	the	“Elvis	
Presley-Elvis	Presley-an”’s	and	“rock-and-roll-rock-and-roll-an”’s,12	and,	as	this	chapter	will	explore	in	particular,	the	“spanrok-spanrok-an”	(“mini-skirt	stuff,”)	that	threatened	to	diminish	the	morals	of	young	Indonesians,	female	and	male.	Beauty	politics	therefore	were	no	longer	only	a	positive	attribute	supporting	the	nation;	they	had	come	to	form	a	dike	that,	if	breached,	would	lead	to	the	complete	inundation	of	the	nation	by	imperialist	forces.		Following	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung	in	April	1955,	the	discussion	of	fashion	in	Indonesian	women’s	magazines	entered	a	new	phase.	Largely,	the	magazines	demonstrated	that	elite,	cosmopolitan	women	still	enjoyed	a	significant	set	of	sartorial	options	from	1955	to	the	early	1960’s.	In	1955,	following	the	Asia-Africa	Conference	in	Bandung,	however,	Sukarno	began	to	refocus	his	and	the	nation’s	attention	on	the	development	of	a	new	politics	that	included	more	stress	on	developing	an	Indonesian	national	identity.	From	that	point	on,	representations	of	women	in	magazines	increasingly	deployed	ideal	types	that	reflected	the	developing	interests	of	the	Sukarno	regime.		The	prevalence	of	these	ideal	representations	was	connected	to	the	ebb	and	flow	of	Sukarno’s	political	control	of	the	nation.	During	periods	when	Sukarno	asserted	less	de	
facto	control,	and	the	central	government	was	more	focused	on	political	or	military	maneuvering,	the	images	of	women	aligned	less	to	narrowly	cast	types.	But	when	impulses	towards	internal	political	control	and	its	enhanced	rhetoric	grew	firmer,	these	ideal	types	connected	to	national	identity	were	recruited	more	heavily.	This	was	not	a	random	process.	Sukarno	managed	it	through	a	creeping	strictness	in	changes	in	the	press	laws,	as	newspapers	and	magazines	were	increasingly	required	to	reflect	and	promote	the	cultural	and	political	interests	of	the	state	at	various	specific	times.	In	October	1956,	Sukarno	introduced	a	new	conception	(“konsepsi”)	of	the	Indonesian	state	to	the	nation.	He	proposed	that	Indonesia	enter	a	system	of	“Guided	
 12	This	construction	in	Indonesian,	which	I	translated	in	the	opening	quotation	as	“Elvis	Presley	stuff,”	was	used	by	Sukarno	in	a	highly	evocative	manner.	The	rhetorics	of	it,	discussed	in	fn#1	of	this	chapter,	allow	the	things	being	criticized	to	be	both	specific	and	generalized	at	the	same	time.	
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Democracy,”	in	which	the	presidency	would	be	strengthened.	The	modern,	national	elements	of	the	economy,	still	largely	under	Dutch	ownership	and	control,	were	largely	nationalized	through	a	series	of	unilateral	workers’	actions	in	1956-1957	as	part	of	the	campaign	against	the	continuing	Dutch	presence	in	West	Papua.13		Though	the	occupation	of	nearly	every	Dutch-owned	business	was	led	largely	by	worker’s	unions	affiliated	with	the	PKI,	when	the	businesses	were	nationalized,	they	were	taken	over	by	the	army,	which	then	used	the	most	advanced	sectors	of	the	economy	to	finance	the	military.		Politically,	the	strength	of	political	parties	was	undercut	as	the	legislature	was	appointed	to	represent	“functional	groups”	rather	than	being	elected	directly	from	party	lists.	Indonesian	“national	identity”	was	deployed	as	the	source	for	political	and	cultural	processes,	which	were	increasingly	focused	on	“finishing	the	Indonesian	Revolution,”	that	is,	on	a	building	a	nation	that	was	not	dependent,	culturally,	politically	or	economically,	on	the	west.	Several	incidents—an	ongoing	Islamic	guerrilla	movement,14	regional	rebellions	that	lasted	from	1957-1961,15	and	a	period	of	Martial	Law	in	195716—impeded,	or	perhaps	stoked	the	process	of	insisting	on	centralized	control.	In	any	case,	despite	strong	backing	for	the	konsepsi	from	both	the	army	and	the	PKI,	Sukarno	was	unable	to	begin	the	full	implementation	of	Guided	Democracy	until	1959-1960.		The	critical	structural	political	change	of	Guided	Democracy	was	the	devolution	of	the	official	structures	of	political	power	to	the	presidency—and	therefore	to	Sukarno—through	the	re-adoption	of	elements	of	the	1945	Constitution	that	had	originally	provided	for	a	strong	executive.	This	was	reflected	in	Sukarno’s	promulgation	of	his	Political	
 13	See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	26.	Dutch	managers	were	expelled	from	the	country.	This	showed	up	interestingly	in	women’s	magazines,	when	regularly	running	full-page	advertisements	for	some	of	these	Dutch	companies	were	suddenly	left	empty.	14	From	1949	on,	the	Jakarta	government	was	actively	opposed	by	the	Darul	Islam	movement,	which	called	for	the	establishment	of	Indonesia	as	an	Islamic	Republic.	Born	out	of	Islamic	guerilla	movements	during	the	Revolution,	Darul	
Islam	was	particularly	strong	in	rural	areas	of	West	Java,	South	Sulawesi	and	Aceh,	and	carried	out	intermittent	guerrilla	actions	against	the	central	government	in	those	regions.	15	Permesta,	(Piagam	Perjuangan	Semesta,	or	the	Universal	Struggle	Charter,)	was	a	regionally	based	rebellion	against	the	central	government	declared	on	March	2,	1957	by	civil	and	military	authorities	in	the	eastern	islands	of	Indonesia.	The	regional	leadership	not	only	felt	cultural	distance	from	the	Republic’s	Javanese	center,	they	also	felt	that	their	economic	advancement	was	being	limited	by	central	government	policies	that	privileged	Javanese	advancement.		The	PRRI	(Pemerintah	Revolusioner	Republic	Indonesia,	or	Revolutionary	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia)	was	a	rebellious	government	declared	in	opposition	to	the	Sukarno	government	on	February	15,	1958.	It	was	centered	in	Sumatra,	and	was	also	largely	focused	on	opposing	the	Javanese	center	of	power	in	the	nation.	The	two	movements	recognized	each	other	formally,	and	their	efforts	are	referred	to	jointly	in	the	historiography	as	PRRI-Permesta.		16	In	March	1957,	nominally	in	response	to	the	Permesta	rebellion	but	also	because	of	the	continuing	incursions	of	Darul	Islam	forces,	the	military,	under	the	leadership	of	General	Nasution,	began	to	exert	political	control	regionally.		
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Manifesto,	(Manifesto	Politik,	or	Manipol.)	Saskia	Wieringa	described	the	substance	of	the	1959	National	Day	speech	in	which	Sukarno	laid	out	Manipol	as	follows:	In	vague	terms	(‘the	demands	of	the	Indonesian	people	must	be	met	in	an	overwhelmingly	revolutionary	manner’)	it	outlined	certain	government	priorities—food	and	clothing	for	the	people,	internal	security	and	the	continuation	of	the	struggle	against	imperialism—and	long-term	objectives,	including	a	‘just	and	prosperous	society.’17			But,	she	also	noted,	“As	presidential	power	increased	and	political	and	social	chaos	ensued	there	was	mounting	pressure	to	couch	everything	in	Sukarno’s	terminology,	such	as	Manipol,	‘socialism	à	la	Indonesia’,	‘unfinished	revolution.’	Yet	the	boundaries	of	these	concepts	shifted	and	inter-party	polemics	turned	into	a	struggle	over	the	interpretation	of	Sukarno’s	words.”18	In	his	canonical	work	on	Guided	Democracy,	Daniel	Lev	argued	that	although	“it	was	not	always	evident,	because	of	the	dominating	figure	of	Soekarno,	the	main	driving	force	behind	Guided	Democracy	was	the	army.”19	Although	the	army	did	not	take	over	the	actual	running	of	the	government,	“[o]ffices	of	particular	importance	.	.	.	quickly	came	under	direct	army	control.	But	the	martial	law	administration	was	enabled	to	intervene	anywhere	and	at	any	time	it	chose.”20	There	was	resistance	to	the	military	control	of	the	nation,	particularly	from	the	Indonesian	Communist	Party	and	its	affiliated	unions	and	organizations,	as	well	as	from	elements	of	Islamic	leadership.	The	military,	on	the	other	hand,	used	its	power	to	control	union	activism,	and	to	assert	martial	law	at	various	times,	and	even	to	detain	PKI	members	in	political	prisoner	camps	when	it	felt	its	authority	was	endangered.21	Merle	Ricklefs,	however,	writing	a	generation	later	than	Lev,	described	Guided	Democracy	as	“a	fluid	system,	born	of	crisis	and	constantly	changing	through	one	of	the	most	disturbed	periods	of	Indonesian	history.”22	His	analysis	places	Sukarno	in	the	middle	of	this	consistently	shifting	political	landscape,	although	“joined	by	others	in	maintaining	his	central	position.	But	this,”	he	writes,	“was	all	in	support	of	a	political	balance	that	not	
 17	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	103.	18	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	104.	19	Daniel	Lev,	The	Transition	to	Guided	Democracy,	pp.	76-77.	20	Daniel	Lev,	The	Transition	to	Guided	Democracy,	p.	78.	21	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	28.	22	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	
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even	Sukarno	could	maintain,	one	which	represented	a	compromise	among	irreconcilable	interests	and	was	therefore	satisfactory	to	no	one.”23	Sukarno,	therefore,	with	his	significant	rhetorical	ability	to	“define”	the	country,	set	about	creating	a	national	ideology	with	which	he	attempted	to	keep	divergent	powers	in	check.	His	goal	was	to	play	the	three	main	aliran	off	against	each	other	by	binding	them	all	together	in	a	platform	of	loyalty	towards	his	new	plans	for	the	nation.	This	was	dependent	on	the	promulgation	of	a	cult	of	loyalty	to	himself	as	president,	based	on	his	status	as	the	“Great	Leader	of	the	Revolution.”24		To	do	this,	Sukarno	created	a	national	unity	ideology	known	as	NASAKOM,	an	acronym	that	combined	Indonesia’s	three	broad	political	groupings,	25	and	in	which	all	three	elements—nationalism,	religion	and	communism/socialism—were	held	to	be	central	to	the	nation’s	core	belief	system.	But	all	three	revolved	in	orbit	around	Sukarno,	the	revolution’s	central	star.	Ricklefs	describes	Sukarno’s	oratorical	power.	Sukarno,	he	wrote,		was	a	skilled	manipulator	of	men	and	of	symbols.	He	could	harangue	a	crowd	or	charm	a	potential	adversary	with	equal	ease,	although	he	was	also	very	adept	at	hating	his	enemies.	He	offered	Indonesians	something	to	believe	in,	something	which	many	hoped	would	give	them	and	their	nation	dignity	and	pride.26		What	Sukarno	offered	Indonesians	as	something	to	“believe	in,”	was	a	five-point	plan	connected	Manipol	and	intended	to	assure	its	general	implementation.	Known	as	USDEK,	the	plan	stressed	five	areas	in	which	the	government	would	assert	new	powers	politically,	economically	and	culturally.27	While	stressing	the	centralized	control	of	both	politics	(democracy)	and	the	economy	and	the	renewed	political	position	of	the	presidency,	USDEK	also	included	two	elements	that	referred	specifically	to	the	installation	of	
 23	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	24	There	are	various	ways	historians	interpret	the	balance	of	power	among	Sukarno	and	the	three	major	aliran	during	this	period.	Daniel	Lev,	as	quoted	above,	draws	the	military	and	its	increasing	control	of	the	economy	as	the	major	driving	force	of	the	era,	to	which	Sukarno	must	react.	Max	Lane,	on	the	other	hand,	sees	the	PKI	and	union	and	peasant	activism	as	driving	the	national	dynamic,	and	suggests	Sukarno	was	moving	strongly	leftward	from	the	late	1950’s	on,	in	part	in	reaction	to	the	growth	of	the	military	power.	(See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	pp.	36-38.)	Anthony	Reid	focuses	his	explanation	of	the	period	on	the	tensions	between	the	regions	and	the	center,	and	on	Sukarno’s	use	of	Guided	Democracy	to	address	those	geographical	tensions	more	than	to	hold	various	political	groups	at	bay.	(See	Anthony	Reid,	To	Nation	by	
Revolution,	p.	139-140.)	25	Nas	(nasionalis,	or	nationalist,	which	specifically	accounted	for	the	political	power	of	the	armed	forces),	A	(agama,	or	religion,	though	mainly	here	referring	to	the	large	Islamic	groups	Muhammadiyah	and	Nadhlatul	Ulama),	and	Kom	(komunis,	or	communist,	which	included	not	only	the	PKI,	but	also	Gerwani	and	other	leftist	political	organizations.)	26	M.C.	Ricklefs,	A	History	of	Modern	Indonesia,	p.	294.	27	See	the	discussion	of	USDEK	in	Chapter	1.		
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Indonesian	cultural	elements	as	bases	for	the	political	and	cultural	transformation	of	the	nation.	The	first	was	the	adoption	of	“socialism	à	la	Indonesia,”28	which	was	to	some	extent	an	adoption	of	elements	of	Mao	Zedong	thought	that	stressed	the	necessity	for	Chinese	socialism	to	adapt	to	the	cultural	and	political	realities	of	1950s	China.	The	other	key	element	was	the	necessity	of	the	development	of	an	Indonesian	national	identity	(“keprebadian	nasional”)	as	the	core	of	the	nation’s	self-expression	in	all	areas.		In	the	introduction	to	a	collection	of	five	speeches	Sukarno	gave	about	kepribadian	
nasional	in	1959,	Hadji	Achmad	Notosoetardjo	reflected	earlier	language	about	the	necessity	of	making	good	choices	about	modernity	and	identity	that	had	concerned	Indonesian	women	from	the	earliest	days	of	the	new	nation.	“We	are	always	modern,”	he	wrote,		because	we	want	to	live	in	tune	with	[“sesuai	dengan”]	the	climate	of	the	times,	we	are	always	infatuated	with	developments	that	are	equal	with	those	peoples	who	are	already	more	advanced	.	.	.	This	is	a	sign	of	progress,	of	moving	forward.		.	.	.	[But]	in	the	upheaval	of	catching	up	to	the	terms	“modern”	and	“advanced”	we	must	not	let	go	of	our	own	Indonesian	identity.29			The	fear	of	losing	critical	elements	of	local	culture	to	the	“upheaval”	of	modernity	remained	an	important	part	of	how	Indonesians	conceived	of	their	own	experience.	As	part	of	USDEK,	under	the	rubric	of	kepribadian	nasional,	it	had	then	also	become	a	formal	element	of	national	ideology.	Manipol-USDEK,	as	much	as	anything,	was	expressed	through	a	set	of	slogans	and	ambitions.	Political	action	revolved	around	Sukarno	as	a	person	and	figure	rather	than	around	political	parties	and	institutions,	and	suffered	in	its	implementation	as	a	result.	The	one	arguable	exception	to	this	was	the	promulgation	of	Operation	Trikora,30	from	November	1961-August	1962,	which	resulted	in	the	end	of	Dutch	control	of	West	Irian	and	
 28	As	was	mentioned	in	the	quote	from	Saskia	Wieringa	above.	29	“Kita	senantiasa	modern,	karena	kita	ingin	hidup	sesuai	dengan	iklimnja	zaman,	kita	senantiasa	gandrung	kepada	
kemadjuan	jang	setaraf	se-tidak2nja	dengan	bangsa-bangsa	jang	telah	lebih	madju	.	.	.	Itu	tandanja	progress,	itu	tandanja	
madju	.	.	.	Didalam	pergolakan	mengedjar	istilah	‘moderen’	dan	‘madju’	kita	tidak	bisa	terlepas	daripada	kepribadian	
Indonesia	sendiri.”	Notosoetardjo,	Kepribadian	Revolusi	Bangsa	Indonesia,	p.	11.	30	“Trikora,”	an	acronym	for	“Tri	Komando	Rakjat”	or	“The	People’s	Triple	Command,”	was	the	popular	name	Sukarno’s	military	and	political	efforts	to	claim	the	western	half	of	Papua	for	Indonesia	and	to	liberate	it	from	Dutch	colonial	control.	The	campaign	lasted	from	December	1961	to	August	1962,	when	the	region	was	annexed	into	the	Indonesian	Republic.	This	was	the	first	of	his	two	such	major	pushes	by	Sukarno	during	the	early	1960’s,	the	second	of	which	was	Konfrontasi	with	Malaysia,	also	referred	to	as	“Dwikora,”	short	for	“Dwi	Komando	Rakjat,”	or	“The	People’s	Double	Command.	
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the	region	being	annexed	into	the	Indonesian	state	in	1962.	Trikora	was	carried	out	largely	by	the	military,	however,	one	of	the	few	institutions	capable	of	implementing	large-scale	projects	at	the	time,	and	essentially	to	meet	its	own	needs.		But	the	period	was	accompanied	by	what	Indonesian	analyst	Soedjati	Djiwandono	referred	to	in	1966	as	a	policy	of	“progressive	mobilization”	of	the	people.31	In	this	arena	specifically,	Manipol-USDEK	strongly	affected	the	tenor	of	an	increasingly	revolutionary	rhetoric,	the	usage	of	which	became	increasingly	required	in	the	public	sphere	at	several	key	points.		With	much	of	politics	enveloped	in	rhetoric,	an	important	element	of	Sukarno’s	extension	of	political	control	involved	a	major	revision	of	the	national	press	law	in	November	1960.	The	new	regulations	required	magazines	and	newspapers	to	adopt	approaches	that	were	specifically	in	line	with	Manipol,	and	to	“serve	as	tools	to	drive	the	masses	to	finish	the	Indonesian	revolution	towards	a	just	and	prosperous	society.”32	All	publications	were	obligated	to	apply	for	new	permits	in	a	process	that	included	a	review	of	the	political	reliability	of	their	staff	and	the	appropriateness	of	their	editorial	content.33	Women’s	magazines	largely	focused	on	the	last	of	the	five	USDEK	conceptions,	
kepribadian	nasional.	The	magazines	increasingly	featured	Indonesian	models	and	actresses	or	patriotic	subjects	on	their	covers	while	the	coverage	of	Hollywood	fashion	and	style	diminished.	More	importantly,	the	images	of	Indonesian	women	within	magazines	
 31	See	J.	Soedjati	Djiwandono,	Konfrontasi	Revisited:	Indonesia’s	Foreign	Policy	Under	Soekarno,	p.	135.	32		“	.	.	.	dapat	dipergunakan	sebagai	alat	penggerak	massa	untuk	menyelesaikan	revolusi	Indonesia	menuju	pada	
masyarakat	adil	dan	makmur.”	In	order	to	receive	a	SIT	(Surat	Izin	Terbit,	or	Publishing	License),	publishers	were	required	to	sign	onto	19	principals	affirming	their	support	of	Manipol-USDEK.	The	order	is	cited	in	full	in	H.	Soebagijo,	
Sejarah	Pers	Indonesia,	pp.	121-125.	This	quote	from	p,	121.	The	new	spelling	system	is	from	the	source.		This	book	is	part	of	a	series	edited	by	Nugroho	Notosusanto,	one	of	the	authors	of	the	“official”	history	of	Lubang	Buaya,	and	it	proffers	a	New	Order	interpretation	of	the	Guided	Democracy	era.	Soebagio	notes	that	the	announcement	of	this	new	press	policy	coincided	with	a	ban	on	all	political	activity	in	the	military	district	including	Jakarta	between	September	15	and	November	1,	1960.							The	two	concepts	here,	“menyelesaikan	revolusi	Indonesia,”	(“finishing	the	Indonesian	revolution,”)	and	building	a	“masyarakat	adil	dan	makmur,”	(“just	and	prosperous	society,”)	which	were	often	presented	in	Sukarnoist	rhetoric	as	a	matched	pair,	were,	in	Max	Lane’s	analysis,	at	the	core	of	the	socialist	conception	of	the	nation,	and	therefore	somewhat	at	odds	with	the	continued	power	sought	by	the	military	and	the	nationalist	urban	elites	who	made	up	a	significant	element	of	the	“nationalist”	group.	See	Max	Lane,	Unfinished	Nation,	p.	27.	33	One	of	the	distinct	fears	that	emerged	during	Guided	Democracy	was	that	Indonesia	was	beset	by	not	only	by	external	enemies,	but	critically,	by	internal	ones	as	well.	One	set	of	these	were	Islamist	forces	involved	in	both	the	Darul	Islam	and	PRRI	Rebellions.	Masyumi,	the	political	party	that	had	encompassed	both	the	modernist	Muhammadiyah	and	the	more	traditionally	Javanese	Nahdlatul	Ulama	began	to	divide	over	the	question	of	what	to	do	with	its	members	who	had	been	involved	in	the	PRRI	rebellion.	NU-oriented	members	largely	withdrew,	and	the	party	itself	was	banned.	Suara	‘Aisjijah	did	not	publish	for	several	years,	but	the	women	in	charge	of	their	archive	insisted	several	times	to	me	that	they	had	never	been	banned	during	this	period.	
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were	increasingly	tailored	to	reflect	“Indonesian	values.”	Elements	of	western	culture,	particularly	those	that	were	not	considered	to	be	“aligned	with	Indonesian	identity”	were	increasingly	criticized.		Although	many	of	the	exterior	forms	under	attack	were	clearly	originally	western,	what	was	at	play	were	their	Indonesian	expressions.	Wearing	western	clothing	remained	quite	acceptable,	particularly	in	daily	life.	But	it	was	important	for	women	to	understand	what	wearing	a	miniskirt	or	teased	hair	or	dancing	the	twist	meant	in	a	revolutionary	Manipol-USDEK	context,	and	more	importantly,	what	it	meant	about	being	Indonesian.		It	was	critical	to	know	why	those	particular	expressions	were	to	be	avoided,	and	eventually,	forbidden.		A	stronger	version	of	the	press	law	went	into	effect	in	1963,	connected	directly	to	the	explosion	of	revolutionary	zeal	that	Sukarno	deployed	as	an	important	element	of	
Konfrontasi.		While	the	rhetoric	of	Konfrontasi	was,	in	theory	at	least,	aimed	externally	and	internationally	at	Malaysia,	its	overwhelming	effect	was	internal	and	national.	If	anything,	the	minor	border	skirmishes	against	Malaysia	in	Borneo,	and	popular	attacks	on	the	British	Embassy	in	Jakarta34	were	a	pretense	for	Sukarno’s	attempts	to	hold	an	increasingly	fractious	alliance	of	nationalists,	Islamic	religious	organizations	and	communists	together	under	the	rhetoric	of	NASAKOM.		The	attempts	at	unity	however,	remained	largely	rhetorical,	dependent	more	on	language	and	sloganeering	than	on	actual	policy.	On	the	ground,	the	economy	paid	a	heavy	price.	Rice	supplies	were	tight,	lines	to	buy	that	and	other	staples	were	frequent	and	long,	prices	were	volatile,	and	rice	riots	were	not	unheard	of.	Unable	to	actually	affect	economic	change	and	growth,	with	the	basics	of	both	a	Guided	Democracy	and	a	Guided	Economy	failing,	the	energy	behind	USDEK	was	poured	into	Sosialism	à	la	Indonesia,	increasingly	expressed	through	the	large-scale	adoption	of	various	political	slogans,	and	through	the	promulgation	of	a	more	“revolutionary”	Indonesian	national	identity.35	Magazines	and	
 34	As	part	of	a	mass	demonstration	against	the	British	and	Malaysian	embassies	in	September	1963,	the	British	embassy	was	over-run	and	burned	to	the	ground.	This	is	an	important	example	of	mob	violence	being	focused	against	enemies	of	the	revolution.	Following	these	demonstrations,	Indonesia	broke	political	ties	with	both	nations.	The	American	embassy	was	also	a	frequent	target	of	demonstrations,	but	the	crowds	that	would	gather	in	front	of	the	compound,	which	sits	on	the	south	side	of	Merdeka	Square	(discussed	in	Chapter	7,)	never	made	serious	attempts	to	breach	the	gates.	35	My	argument	for	the	contingency	of	the	increase	of	various	elements	of	USDEK	over	others	given	historical	shifts	in	politics	will	form	a	critical	element	of	the	argument	of	Chapter	7,	and	is	based	originally	on	Arno	Mayer’s	work	on	timing	
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newspapers,	again,	were	a	primary	site	in	which	this	increasingly	sloganized	revolutionary	ethos	was	expressed.		This	is	why	Sukarno	obsessed	about	Indonesian	expressions	of	western	culture	in	his	speeches	to	women.	Women’s	choices	about	certain	styles	of	clothing	were	a	particular	area	of	focus	because,	as	the	dissertation	has	shown	in	earlier	chapters,	women’s	clothing	was	freighted	with	national	meaning.	Women’s	clothing	became—to	a	much	greater	extent	than	ever	before—the	subject	of	both	political	punditry	and	on-the-street	measures	of	control,	a	morality	play	acted	out	in	the	public	political	and	revolutionary	national	realm	of	a	country	living	dangerously.	In	the	global	context	of	the	Cold	War,	Indonesian	women’s	“proper”	appearance	and	comportment,	that	which	was	in	line	with	national	identity,	were	increasingly	framed	as	a	critical	bulwark	against	the	cultural	invasion	of	the	west,	a	world	of	teased	hair,	miniskirts,	dancing	the	twist	to	Elvis	Presley,	and	listening	to	the	Beatles.		It	would	be	easy—in	fact	simplistic—to	analyze	Sukarno’s	attention	to	western	culture	and	fashion	as	merely	a	nationalist	reaction	to	political	imperialism.	Although	that	was	also	clearly	at	play,	I	would	suggest	that	such	a	reading	would	ignore	the	local	and	national	dynamics	of	the	cultural	politics	of	the	formation	of	the	Indonesian	nation.	Instead,	I	argue	that	it	is	important	to	see	Sukarno’s	focus	on	female	beauty	overwhelmingly	as	a	product	of	national	rather	than	global	forces	and	tensions.		Indeed,	this	deployment	of	ideological	reactions	to	women’s	fashion	was	one	of	the	more	visible	cultural	elements	of	building	the	new	Indonesian	national	identity.	Women’s	magazines	were	instructed	to	adjust	their	editorial	content,	which	they	did	if	they	wished	to	continue	publishing.	Women’s	magazines	became	an	important	space	in	which	groups	and	types	of	women	were	upheld	as	important	examples	for	all	women	to	either	emulate	or	avoid,	for	the	sake	of	the	success	of	the	revolution.	Because	they	involved	women	and	their	position	in	revolutionary	society,	the	national	identity	elements	of	the	Guided	Democracy	complex	were	increasingly	expressed	in	relation	to	various	ideal	types	of	national	women,	rather	than	in	relation	to	individual	women	themselves.		This	chapter	of	the	dissertation	traces	these	changes	of	representations	of	Indonesian	women	in	national	magazines	between	1955-1965,	and	their	increasingly	
 of	the	development	of	the	Nazi	impulse	towards	the	annihilation	of	Europe’s	Jews	in	his	monograph	Why	Did	The	Heavens	
Not	Darken?	
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strong	connection	to	Sukarno’s	national	political	project.	It	makes	the	argument	that	as	the	President	ramped	up	the	revolutionary	rhetoric	of	Guided	Democracy	and	Konfrontasi,	representations	of	Indonesian	women	in	the	media	increasingly	relied	on	ideal	types	connected	to	a	discourse	of	women’s	moral	fitness.	What	came	to	be	discussed	in	women’s	magazines,	then,	was	not	Indonesian	women	themselves,	but	rather,	the	images	of	what	Indonesian	women	were	either	expected	or	feared	to	be.	What	was	at	play	was	not	the	lives	or	experiences	of	real	women,	but	the	ideological	health	of	the	nation.	This	transposition	happened	during	a	time	of	particular	political	tension,	freighting	it	with	additional	meanings	that	would	come	to	bear	during	the	events	of	September/October	1965.	It	is	to	this	transposition	in	the	decade	from	1955-1965	that	the	dissertation	now	turns.		
“Traditional	Clothing	is	Popular	Again”	In	the	aftermath	of	the	Bandung	conference	in	1955,	women’s	magazines	exhibited	a	renewed	interest	in	the	subject	of	Indonesian	national	fashion.	Coverage	of	western	fashion	did	not	disappear	during	the	move	to	an	increasingly	non-aligned	(and	arguably	the	start	of	an	anti-Western)	cultural	space	beginning	in	1955.	But	magazines	began	to	stress	greater	options	for	“dressing	Indonesian.”	Wanita,	for	instance,	adjusted	the	flow	of	its	regular	patterns	and	designs	of	western	fashions	to	offer	a	month’s	worth	of	design	options	for	
kebaya,	a	subject	it	had	barely	broached	in	1954.		In	a	similar	issue,	Keluarga	began	exploring	new	uses	for	traditional	clothing	to	replace	western	fashion	in	certain	circumstance.	A	1956	article	in	Keluarga	was	entitled	“Regional	Clothing	is	Most	Popular	Again!”	(“Pakaian	Daereh	Terpopuler	Lagi!”)	The	article	suggested	that	traditional	Acehnese	clothing	which	consisted	of	a	long	kebaya	worn	over	trousers	rather	than	a	kain	could	“also	be	worn	to	go	picnicking,	instead	of	American	‘jeans.’”36		
 36	“boleh	djuga	untuk	pergi	pick-nick,	daripada	memakai	‘jankee’	Amerika.”	The	use	of	“jankee”	here,	to	mean	jeans	or	long	pants,	is	interesting,	and	is	specifically	derived	from	“yankee,”	or	American	soldier.	The	term	is	used	in	several	articles	about	clothing	across	magazines,	sometimes	only	referring	to	jeans,	and	other	times	to	any	version	of	women’s	long	trousers.	There	is	also	at	this	same	time	a	modern	architectural	style	that	begins	in	Indonesia,	called	“jengki,”	with	the	term	signifying	a	“distinctive	architecture	is	an	expression	of	the	political	spirit	of	freedom	among	the	Indonesians.	.	.	The	spirit	of	freedom	translated	into	an	architecture	that	differs	from	what	the	Dutch	had	done.	The	modern	cubic	and	strict	geometric	forms	are	transformed	into	more	complicated	volumes,	such	as	pentagons	or	other	irregular	solids.	Roofs	are	pitched,	the	surface	and	composition	are	festive.	These	characteristics	are	not	commonly	found	elsewhere	in	Europe	and	America.”	See	Josef	Prijotomo,	“When	West	Meets	East:	One	Century	of	Architecture	in	Indonesia	(1890s-1990s).”	
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Earlier	chapters	of	the	dissertation	have	suggested	that	while	North	Sumatran	fashion	had	not	likely	been	particularly	“popular”	in	the	rest	of	the	archipelago,	it,	along	with	other	“regional”	and	“authentic”	clothing	styles	had	been	widely	presented	in	fashion	shows	in	Jakarta	and	other	major	cities	from	the	early	1950s	on.	But	this	new	use,	to	replace	jeans	on	a	picnic,	underlined	a	growing	sense	that	cultural	elements	from	across	the	archipelago	now	“belonged”	to	all	Indonesians,	no	matter	what	their	own	ethnic	identities	might	also	have	been.37	The	ability	to	claim	clothing	styles	from	across	the	nation	as	their	“own”	was	a	critical	way	in	which	Indonesian	women	were	formed	into	a	national	group,	no	matter	where	they	came	from.	Building	on	the	success	of	the	various	“batikshow’s,”	the	magazines	began	featuring	photo	spreads	of	batik	clothing	with	western	style	and	cut	that	allowed	women	increased	options	that	read	simultaneously	as	both	Indonesian	and	modern.	But	the	idea	of	wearing	
batik	western-style	was	not	simply	an	issue	of	personal	choice	or	self-expression.	Alongside	articles	on	fashion	shows	featuring	batik	used	for	western	style	dresses,	from	September-December	1955,	Keluarga	carried	a	series	of	advertisements	from	the	
Gabungan	Koperasi	Batik	Indonesia	(GKBI,	Association	of	Indonesian	Batik	Cooperatives.)38	The	ads	featured	photographs	of	western	dresses,	pajamas,	home	furnishing	and	the	like,	all	made	of	batik.	The	ads	specifically	tied	the	delight	of	wearing	batik	to	the	love	of	one’s	own	culture,	to	nourishing	the	growth	of	the	national	economy	and	providing	work	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	batik	workers.	(See	Figures	6.1.	and	6.2.)	Nonetheless,	simultaneously,	magazines	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	continued	to	show	a	large	and	culturally	varied	world	within	which	both	elite	and	the	growing	numbers	of	urban	middle-class	Indonesian	women	lived.	Hollywood	films	and	their	American	and	European	movie	stars	were	markedly	present,	but	so	too	were	actresses	from	Indonesia’s	emerging	film	industry.	These	young	Indonesian	women	were		
 37	Jennifer	Lindsay	also	discusses	this	in	terms	of	the	performing	arts,	particularly	among	dancers	from	across	the	nation	who	learned	“each	other’s”	dances	when	preparing	for	overseas	artistic	missions.	Indeed,	she	notes,	when	donning	costumes	not	“one’s	own,”	“this	appears	not	to	have	been	a	major	concern.	The	image	the	cultural	missions	presented	of	Indonesia	made	up	of	various	different	regions	was	not	one	of	mutual	exclusivity.	Rather,	being	Indonesian	allowed	for	an	embracing	of	other	regions	as	one’s	own.	This	was	the	sense	of	liberation	from	one’s	own	‘suku’	[“ethnicity”]	and	the	leap	to	national	consciousness	.	.	.	the	regions	were	not	denied,	but	they	now	belonged	to	all.”	Jennifer	Lindsay,	“Performing	Indonesia	Abroad”	in	Jennifer	Lindsey	and	Maya	Liem,	eds.,	Heirs	to	world	culture,	Being	Indonesian,	1950-1965.	p.	210.	38	This	is	the	same	organization	that	ran	the	ad	in	Film	Review	in	December	1952	featuring	an	ideal	Indonesian	woman	wearing	kain-kebaya	that	is	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
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Figures	6.1,	6.2:		Batik	pajamas	and	dresses	for	culture	and	the	economy.	The	text	reads		“Delighting	in	wearing	batik	means:	Loving	one’s	own	culture!	Nourishing	the	national	economy!	Bringing	work	to	hundreds	of	thousands	of	laborers!”39	
Keluarga,	October	1955,	p.	27,	and	December	1955,	p.	4.		represented	as	hip	and	modern,	yet	wholesome,	both	in	new	film	magazines	such	as	Varia40	as	well	as	magazines	such	as	Wanita.			When	new	actresses	were	introduced	to	the	public,	they	were	usually	photographed	wearing	western	clothing	while	carrying	out	a	young	modern	life:	chatting	on	the	phone	with	girlfriends,	listening	to	records,	or	riding	their	motorcycles.	But,	almost	without	fail	in	such	features	in	1959	and	1960,	they	were	also	shown	either	wearing	kain-kebaya	in	at		least	one	photograph,	or,	for	those	who	were	also	Javanese	dancers,	in	dance	costume	that	also	featured	kain	batik.41		(See	Figure	6.3).		
 39	“Gemar	memakai	batik	berarti:	Tjinta	kebudajaan	sendiri!	Memupuk	ekonomi	nasional!	Memberi	lapangan	bekerdja	
rastusan-ribu	kaum	buruh!”	Keluarga,	October	1955,	p.	27.	40	Varia,	which	began	publication	in	1957,	initially	based	loosely	on	and	drawing	its	title	from	the	American	movie	publication	Variety.	Though	strictly	speaking	it	was	an	“entertainment”	(hiburan)	magazine,	it	is	a	strikingly	rich	source	about	women	and	modernity.	Its	focus	on	film	reflects	the	wide-spread	presence	and	influence	of	the	cinema	in	Sukarno-era	Indonesia,	and	its	effects	on	perceptions	of	modernity	by	Indonesians.	Varia	was	a	one	of	a	series	of	titles	published	by	Keng	Po,	an	ethnic	Chinese-owned	media	consortium,	mostly	aimed	at	the	entertainment	market.	The	magazine	was	founded	by	Hadely	Hasibuan,	a	political	chameleon	of	a	journalist	who	possessed	a	striking	ability	to	shift	editorial	directions	with	the	prevailing	political	winds.	Given	the	particular	character	and	aims	of	its	editor,	whose	own	biography	suggests	he	sought	to	move	close	to	whomever	was	in	power,	Varia—“the	magazine	with	the	pretty	women	on	the	cover”—serves	as	a	tightly	calibrated	bellweather	of	the	shifting	politics	of	both	the	late	Sukarno	era	and	the	early	New	Order.	See	Hasibuan,	Hadely.	Hadely	Hasibuan	:	memoar	mantan	menteri	penurunan	harga.	(Hadely	Hasibuan:	Memoir	of	a	
former	Minister	for	the	Reduction	of	Prices,)	and	the	discussion	of	Varia	in	Chapter	1.	41	Varia	No.	65	(July	15,	1959),	p.	14.	
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Figure	6.3:	“Film	star	Roosilawaty	doesn’t	yet	want	to	be	called	a	star	.	.	.			Her	ambition	is	to	dedicate	herself	to	art.”	Varia	No.	65,	July	15,	1959,	p.	14		The	overwhelming	image	projected	of	these	young	stars,	however,	was	not	very	different	from	those	of	Hollywood	actresses	in	similar	profiles	churned	out	by	American	film	studios.	The	publicity	output	about	stars	from	the	Hollywood	public	relations	machine	continued	to	be	reprinted	in	Indonesian	movie	magazines	through	the	late	1950s,	with	the	original	English	translated	into	Indonesian.	These	profiles	used	the	same	photos	as	
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American	entertainment	news	sources,	so	the	visual	style	and	content	flowing	from	this	was	well	established	in	Indonesian	magazines	by	the	early	to	mid	1950s.		The	formula	was	used	for	Indonesian	stars	as	well,	although,	it	should	be	noted,	almost	exclusively	with	young	women.42	A	principal	feature	of	both	the	American	and	Indonesian	versions	of	this	celebrity	layout	was	the	pretense	of	seeing	these	stars	“at	home”	and	in	their	“everyday	lives,”	so	there	were	ample	photos	in	both	versions	of	informally	posed	domestic	and	family	photos.	There	was	almost	always	a	more	formal	“glamour”	shot	in	both	versions	as	well.	In	the	Indonesian	case,	this	was	almost	always	taken	with	the	star	wearing	kain-kebaya,	and	her	hair	in	a	konde.	She	needed	to	remain	an	Indonesian	beauty,	an	aspirational	national	model	for	other	young	Indonesian	women.		
‘Adjusting’	(to)	Indonesian	Modernity	Some	elements	of	fashion	journalism	remained	quite	practical,	however,	even	as	they	projected	aspirations	of	modernity.	A	1956	spread	on	lingerie	in	Keluarga,	for	instance,	opined	that	“if	a	woman	wishes	to	be	called	modern,	it’s	not	only	the	exterior	that	must	appear	modern,	dapper	and	neat,	but	even	your	underwear	must	be	‘adjusted’.”43	(“disesuaikan.”)	The	article	addressed	the	need	to	make	the	correct	choice	of	undergarment,	based	on	what	dress	or	skirt	a	woman	chose	to	wear.	As	with	previous	articles	on	bras,	the	drawings	showed	structural	darts	and	were	presented	in	a	way	that	would	allow	a	woman	to	make	her	own	versions	at	home.	(See	Figure	6.4)	Occasional	articles	on	how	to	sew	one’s	own	underwear,	including	increasingly	technical	drawings	of	bras,	remained	a	regular	feature	of	many	magazines	concerned	with	women’s	fashion	into	the	early	1960s	and	beyond.		Elite	Indonesian	women,	therefore,	continued	to	be	presented	with	a	series	of	fashion	choices	and	variations	within	which	they	were	encouraged	to	find	their	own	looks,	their	own	personal	expressions	of	being	modern.	Whether	wearing	western	dresses	made	from	batik,	going	picnicking	in	Acehnese	pantsuits,	or	wearing	new-style	kebaya,	they	were	
 42	I	have	seen	very	few	“star”	articles	written	about	male	Indonesian	actors.	As	female	stars	aged,	or	became	more	established,	they	only	received	the	“young	star”	treatment	on	rare	occasions.	In	any	case,	the	appetite	among	readers	for	information	about	and	photos	of	the	newly	emerging	stars	seems	to	have	been	significant,	based	on	the	reader	letter	sections	of	the	magazines	that	consistently	requested	information	on	new	actresses	as	they	made	their	film	debuts.	43	“Djika	njonja	ingin	dikatanakan	modern,	tak	hanja	luarnja	sadjalah	jang	harus	kelihatan	modern,	netjis	dan	rapi,	tetapi	
pakain	dalampun	harus	disesuaikan.”	Keluarga,	March	1956,	p.	23.	Again,	notice	the	use	of	“adjusted”	(“disesuaikan.”)		
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largely	free	to	play	in	a	wide	range	of	choices,	which,	as	long	as	they	were	properly	made,	remained	an	acceptable	way	of	expressing	their	modernity	and	their	Indonesian	identity	without	creating	internal	conflicts	over	who	they	were.		
	
Figure	6.4:	“If	you	want	to	be	considered	modern,	even		your	underwear	must	be	adjusted.”	Keluarga,	March	1956,	p.	23.		An	important	shift	in	beauty	standards,	perhaps	most	easily	seen	through	changes	in	advertising,	occurred	between	1955	and	1960.	Although	beauty	product	advertising	initially	focused	on	western	movie	stars,	as	the	dissertation	explored	in	Chapter	2,	beauty	standards	became	more	broadly	expressed	in	the	mid-1950’s.	Both	western	and	eastern	influences	were	visible,	demonstrating	that	Indonesian	women	had	access	to	multiple	influences	for	being	beautiful.		
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Two	sets	of	advertisements	for	perfume	and	lotions	that	often	ran	near,	and	sometimes	directly	opposite	each	other	in	the	pages	of	Wanita	and	Keluarga,	provide	an	interesting	example	of	such	a	contrast.	The	tagline	for	Vinolia,	a	European	beauty	brand	offering	a	range	of	lotions,	soaps,	cold	creams	and	scented	oils,	was	simple:	“Cantik,	
Menarik,”which	translates	as	“Beautiful,	Attractive.”44	The	ads	showed	various	images	of	a	woman	looking	over	her	shoulder	at	the	reader,	wearing	a	chic	western	dress,	with	her	hair	piled	up	on	her	head.	(See	Figure	6.5).	Colibrita,	another	European-made	perfumed	toilet	soap,	on	the	other	hand,	chose	to	use	images	reflecting	women	as	Javanese	goddesses	and	multiple-stanza	Indonesian-language	poems	as	an	inspiration	for	beauty	in	their	ads.	(See	Figure	6.6).	
	
			 							 	
Figure	6.5:	Vinolia,	“Beautiful,	Attractive.”				Figure	6.6:	Colibrita:	Indonesian	Goddesses	
Keluarga,	April	1956,	p.	12																																					Keluarga,	March	1957,	p.	4			
 44	Or,	alternatively,	“Beautiful,	Interesting.”	
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By	the	early	1960’s,	responding	to	the	changing	political	and	cultural	milieu,	Vinolia	altered	the	imagery	it	used,	switching	the	picture	to	that	of	a	woman	more	clearly	Indonesian	in	her	features,	wearing	kain-kebaya.	Their	tagline,	however,	remained	the	same.	(See	Figure	6.7.)	When	women	were	identified	as	mothers	in	advertising,	on	the	other	hand,	(usually	for	items	like	margarine	or	laundry	soaps,	but	even	in	ads	for	modern	household	goods	such	as	refrigerators,	and	reaching	back	to	the	early	1950s)	they	were	nearly	always	shown	wearing	kain-kebaya.	(See	Figure	6.8).	Women	as	mothers	and	women	as	beauty	figures	clearly	spoke	to	slightly	different	versions	of	national	beauty,	but	ones	that	converged	as	the	importance	of	national	identity	increased.		
					 	
	
Figure	6.7:	Vinolia	in	kain-kebaya							 Figure	6.8:	Modern	Westinghouse	Mother	
Wanita,	December	15,	1961,	p.	734														Wanita,	August	15,	1961,	p.	475.		
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Miss	Varia	1959	As	late	as	September	1959,	a	major	women’s	magazine	could	still	explore	glamour	without	actively	appealing	to	a	nationalized	style	of	beauty.	The	“Miss	Varia	1959”	contest	provides	an	interesting	example.	Varia	magazine,	which	ran	the	contest,	solicited	entries	from	young	women	across	Indonesia	who	felt	they	could	be	the	next	big	movie	star.	The	editor,	Hadely	Hasibuan’s,	stated	goal	was	to	identify	the	first	potential	Miss	Indonesia	candidate,	with	the	hope	of	taking	her	to	represent	the	nation	in	the	Miss	Universe	pageant.	Given	a	generally	negative	view	of	pageants	in	Indonesia	at	the	time,45	this	was,	in	and	of	itself,	an	audacious	proposal.	But	at	the	time,	Varia	was	one	of	the	most	Hollywood-inflected	publications	in	the	country.	Each	entrant	was	asked	to	submit	two	professionally	taken	photos	of	themselves,	one	a	headshot,	and	the	other	a	full	body	photo.	Twenty	finalists	from	across	the	country	were	chosen,	and	were	introduced	over	the	course	of	several	issues	of	the	magazine	beginning	in	May,	1959.	Readers	were	then	invited	to	clip	ballots	from	the	magazine	to	mail	in	their	choice	for	Miss	Varia	over	the	course	of	several	months.	In	the	end,	Varia	received	over	36,000	votes	in	the	contest,	each	of	which	needed	to	be	accompanied	by	a	coupon.46	The	photos	of	the	finalists	are	particularly	interesting	because	of	both	the	clothing	and	the	backgrounds	the	young	women	and	their	photographers	chose.47	These	include	both	studio	shots,	and	photos	taken	outdoors	both	in	“nature”	and	in	front	of	cars	and	scooters,	with	an	observable	regional	variation.	Candidates	from	Jakarta,	Bandung	and	Surabaya,	including	ethnic	Chinese	women,	tended	to	dress	more	in	a	western	vein,	and	to	present	themselves	as	active,	athletic,	modern	young	women.	Candidates	from	more	conservative	areas	such	as	Central	Java	or	Sumatra	more	often	chose	photos	in	which	they	wore	kain-kebaya,	in	some	cases	with	a	head	covering	as	well.	(See	Figure	6.9)	It	was	quite	
 45	See	the	discussion	of	the	konde	competition	in	Jakarta	in	1953	in	Suara	‘Aisjijah	in	Chapter	5.	Indonesia	was	quite	different	in	this	respect	than	the	Philippines,	where	beauty	pageants	were	(and	remain)	an	important,	and	highly	popular,	arena	of	national	femininity.	Filipino	beauty	pageant	promoters	had	been	trying	to	bring	pageant	culture	to	Indonesia	since	the	early	1950’s,	without	any	success	at	all.	Indonesian	women	generally	rejected	these	proposals,	saying	they	were	too	showy,	and	would	reflect	badly	on	the	character	of	the	young	women	who	would	be	tempted	to	participate	in	them.	46	In	an	interesting	intersection	of	traces	of	real	life	interrupting	the	settledness	of	the	archive,	one	of	the	copies	of	Varia	in	the	University	of	Michigan	collections	from	this	time	has	the	ballot	carefully	clipped	out	of	the	bottom	of	the	page.	47	See	Karen	Strassler’s	work	on	photography	in	Java,	particularly	the	role	of	photograph	studios	in	building	a	culture	of	fashion	glamor	shots	as	representing	the	skill	of	the	photographer,	and	of	the	uses	of	headshots	(“pasphoto,	or	the	photos	taken	and	used	for	identity	passes	in	the	New	Order).		Karen	Strassler,	Refracted	Visions:	Popular	Photography	and	
National	Modernity	in	Java.	
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clear	that	in	1959,	women	involved	in	the	world	of	Indonesian	glamor	were	still	able	to	express	significant	personal	variation	in	their	self-presentation.	
	
Figure	6.9:	Fashion	variation	in	the	Miss	Varia	1959	headshots	of	16	of	20	finalists.	
Varia,	No.	75,	September	23,	1959,	pp.	2-3.		
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The	winner	of	Miss	Varia	1959,	by	an	overwhelming	margin,	was	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	the	young	wife	of	an	Air	Force	officer	from	Bandung.48	Her	victory	was	announced		in	the	September	23,	1959	issue,	when	the	names	and	hometowns	of	all	twenty	finalists	were	also	revealed.	The	issue	also	took	pains	to	demonstrate	the	transparency	of	the	vote	tabulation	process,	including	photos	of	the	counting	process	and	several	pages	of	tabulated	data	matching	each	candidate’s	votes	to	the	cities	in	which	they	were	cast.49	In	the	same	issues,	the	continuing	popularity	of	Hollywood	was	demonstrated	by	a	full-page	production	still	of	a	bare-chested	Tony	Curtis	in	the	1958	United	Artists	film	The	Vikings.	(See	Figure	6.10.)	
	
Figure	6.10:	Miss	Varia	1959	announced	and	accounted	for,	with	Tony	Curtis	looking	on.	
Varia,	No.	75,	September	23,	1959,	Front	Inside	Cover	and	p.	1.	
 48		Dhewayani	received	13,349	votes	from	across	the	country.	This	was	more	than	the	number	of	votes	received	by	the	runner-up,	Soetji	Relowati,	from	Surabaya,	(6,771	votes),	and	the	second-runner	up,	Lanny	Tijam,	also	from	Bandung	(5,589	votes)	combined.	The	information	provided	in	the	pages	of	Varia	reported	the	number	of	votes	that	were	cast	for	each	of	the	candidates	of	the	over	36,000	ballots	mailed	in.		49	The	auditor’s	report	listed	what	the	votes	were	from	each	of	the	cities	named	from	across	the	nation,	providing	a	fascinating	possible	case	study	on	the	regional	and	ethnic	variations	of	beauty	in	Indonesia	at	that	time.		A	list	of	220	“thank	you”	prize	recipients,	drawn	at	random	from	those	who	mailed	in	ballots,	was	also	published	with	their	names	and	addresses.	The	data	offers	a	rare	glimpse	at	who	the	readership	for	the	magazine	was.	It	markedly	included	a	significant	number	of	ethnic	Chinese	readers.	An	extended	analysis	of	this	data,	a	project	for	the	future,	would	provide	interesting	insights	on	the	reach	of	Varia	and	other	similar	magazines.	Coincidentally,	the	publication	permit	for	the	magazines	was	published	on	the	bottom	of	the	facing	page	of	the	announcement	of	the	contest	winner.	It	noted	that	the	total	publication	run	was	61,000	copies	per	issue.	
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In	the	next	issue,	on	September	30,	in	keeping	with	their	desire	to	crown	a	new	star,	
Varia	published	a	“meet	the	celebrity	at	home”	photo	story	that	showed	Dhewayani	with	her	Air	Force	officer	husband.	They	were	living	a	life	of	late	1950s	modern	splendor	that	could	have	been	lifted	out	of	an	American	magazine,	down	to	the	furniture	and	the	curtains	of	their	Scandinavian-design-looking	house.	Deetje,	as	she	was	called,	was	shown	riding	her	Vespa,	playing	tennis	and	swimming	at	the	Bandung	Country	Club.	She	modeled	a	swimsuit	poolside	in	Hollywood	pinup-style	poses,	hung	out	casually	at	home	with	her	friends	or	her	husband,	and	helped	him	type	his	office	paperwork	on	her	portable	typewriter.	Interestingly,	she	was	not	shown	in	kain-kebaya,	or,	for	that	matter,	in	any	form	of	batik	at	all	in	the	layout.		(See	Figures	6.11	and	6.12.)		
		
Figure	6.11:	Miss	Varia	1959,	the	modern	Indonesian	pin-up	girl.	
Varia	no	76,	September	30,	1959,	p.	15.	
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The	Miss	Varia	1959	contest	marked	a	high	point	of	the	images	of	modern	Indonesian	woman	on	a	western	model	in	Varia,	which	was	soon	to	undergo	a	significant	change.	The	western-ness	of	Dhewayani’s	beauty	was	presented	quite	unproblematically,	including	her	comments	about	not	having,	or	wanting	to	have,	children	for	the	moment.	The	photo	spread	demonstrated	a	variety	of	tropes	of	modernity	common	to	Indonesian	media	at	the	time—the	young	girl	on	the	Vespa,	or	listening	to	records	with	a	friend—and	one	in	particular—the	swimsuit	pinup	shot—that	was	well	known	from	Hollywood.	This	was,	however,	quite	rare,	and	exceptionally	daring	within	most	Indonesian	cultural	contexts.	The	tight	mimicking	of	a	Hollywood	“at-home”	shoot,	the	Air	Force	Officer	husband,	and	the	life	in	Bandung	were	all	markers	that	Dhewayani	was	living	a	life	far	out	of	reach	for	most	Indonesian	women.			
	
Figure	6.12:	Miss	Varia	1959,	the	batik-less	Air	Force	wife	at	home	and	going	out	
Varia	no	76,	September	30,	1959,	pp.	16-17.	
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The	pictorial	marked	the	edge	to	which	Indonesians	might	go,	but	even	then,	perhaps	only	if	they	received	the	exceptions	granted	to	movie	stars	who	were	allowed	to	be	flashier	than	the	average	woman.50	Within	a	year,	such	a	contest	would	no	longer	be	possible.	Despite	the	clear	intent	in	1959	to	hold	a	Miss	Varia	1960	contest,	this	would	no	longer	be	politically	possible,	and	the	second	contest	never	took	place.	
	
Magazines	to	Finish	the	National	Revolution	The	new	Guided	Democracy	press	law	was	passed	on	October	12,	1960,	less	than	two	weeks	after	Sukarno	addressed	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	New	York	on	September	30	in	a	speech	in	which	he	called	on	UN	member	states	to	“Build	the	World	Anew.”	His	UN	speech	built	on	themes	addressed	in	his	August	17,	1960	National	Day	speech	“Toward	Freedom	and	the	Dignity	of	Man.”	Late	summer	1960	was	a	period	when,	Fred	Bunnell	noted,	Sukarno	had	finally	been	able	to	“consolidat[e]	his	own	power	and	erect	.	.	.	the	institutions	of	Guided	Democracy,”	thereby	freeing	himself	up	to	“follow	his	predictions	for	a	vigorous	confrontation	foreign	policy.”51	The	changes	in	the	press	law	were	occasioned	by	Sukarno’s	desire	to	exert	a	higher	degree	of	ideological	control	over	the	nation’s	media,	and	went	into	effect	on	November	1.	Guided	Democracy	was	not	a	new	idea	in	1960,	but	the	instability	of	the	Sukarno	government	between	1957-1960	had	allowed	magazine	editors	to	explore	a	variety	of	content.	Although	Sukarno	announced	his	“konsepsi”	(conception)	for	Guided	Democracy	in	1957,	it	was	not	until	1959	that	he	was	able	to	largely	put	his	concept	into	effect.	Further,	as	Bunnell	notes,	he	was	not	able	to	fully	effect	control	over	this	new	governmental	format	until	late	1960,	at	which	point	he	became	more	interested	in	shaping	the	content	of	
 50	I	tried	to	interview	Ibu	Dhewayani	about	this	period	of	her	life.	She	lives	in	Jakarta,	but	refused	my	requests	for	an	interview,	saying	she	didn’t	want	to	talk	about	“politics.”	Her	husband	from	those	days	was	an	aide	to	Air	Marshall	Omar	Dani,	who	was	implicated	in	the	events	of	1965.	She	divorced	him	soon	after	Lubang	Buaya,	and	married	a	shipping	and	concrete	magnate.	She	stated	that	she	“did	not	want	to	relive	those	days”	and	“had	nothing	to	be	proud	of,”	and	was	now	devoting	her	attentions	to	her	church.	I	have	not	been	able	to	find	out	what	happened	to	her	first	husband	after	the	events	of	1965-66.	(Personal	communication,	October	2013,	via	Philip	Soelistyo.)	51	Fred	Bunnell,	“Guided	Democracy	Foreign	Policy:	1960-1965	President	Sukarno	Moves	from	Non-Alignment	to	Confrontation.”	p.	45.	Nonetheless,	there	were	still	lingering	elements	of	various	regional	civil	wars	on-going	in	Indonesia,	which	helps	explain	some	of	Sukarno’s	desire	to	control	the	press.	The	Darul	Islam,	PRRI	and	Pemesta	rebellions	ended	between	April	and	October	1961.	In	terms	of	controlling	the	press,	Sukarno’s	government	had	essentially	closed	the	country’s	Chinese	language	press,	allowing	only	11	Indonesian	Chinese	language	newspapers	to	continue	publishing,	and	forcing	foreign-owned	Chinese	publications	to	adopt	new	Indonesian	language	names.	See	Tribuana	Said,	Sejarah	Pers	
Nasional	dan	Pembangunan	Pers	Pancasila,	pp.	109-110.	
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magazines	toward	his	“revolutionary”	aims.	While	some	publications	were	closed,	there	does	not	appear	to	have	been	direct	censorship	of	the	content	of	magazines	that	remained	in	print.	Rather,	magazines	began	to	alter	their	own	content,	either	in	agreement	with	Sukarno’s	new	directions,	or	in	an	attempt	to	stay	ahead	of	him.52		A	particularly	interesting	example	of	this	quick	adjustment	to	the	changing	political	landscape	can	be	seen	in	the	covers	of	Varia	magazine.	Hadely	Hasibuan	was	not	a	particularly	ideological	journalist,	but	he	was	highly	attuned	to	the	changes	in	political	winds.	The	new	press	regulations	went	into	effect	on	November	1,	and	the	magazine,	published	weekly,	had	a	rather	quick	production	cycle.	Leading	up	to	November	1960,	
Varia	had	featured	both	Hollywood	and	Indonesian	stars	on	its	covers,	but	western	actors	and	actresses	had	predominated.	The	November	2	cover	featured	Indonesian	actress	Ratna	Djuita.	The	November	9	cover	was	of	Hollywood	actor	Dirk	Bogarde,	but	also	carried	the	magazine’s	new	publication	permit	number	on	the	cover	as	well.	The	November	16	cover	used	a	photo	of	another	Indonesian	actress,	Ida	Nustantry.	The	magazine	only	featured	a	western	actor	or	actress	on	its	cover	once	again,	notably	on	the	first	edition	published	after	October	1,	1965,	when	Hungarian	actress	Erbzebet	Hazy,	blonde	haired,	blue	eyed	and	bare	shouldered,	made	an	unusual	appearance	on	the	front	cover.	(See	Figures	6.13-15.)	Some	magazines,	particularly	those	connected	with	the	Indonesian	left,	were	already	ahead	of	the	curve	on	these	issues.	Api	Kartini,53	a	magazine	connected	to	Gerwani,	was	a	prominent	source	of	education	and	commentary	about	the	new	revolutionary	formulations	put	forward	with	Guided	Democracy.	Api	Kartini	also	regularly	published	about	western	women’s	fashion,	with	a	particular	proletarian	focus	on	keeping	clothing	simple,	neat	and	orderly.	They	also	regularly	commented	on	issues	of	kepribadian	nasional.		The	magazine	ran	regular	advice	columns	for	mothers,	for	instance,	and	in	this	venue,	women	expressed	a	series	of	moral	concerns,	(though	not	quite	yet	raised	to	the	level	of	moral	crisis,)	about	their	daughters.	One	mother,	for	instance,	inquired	about	the	
 52	There	is	not	good	material	on	this	in	the	historiography,	and	this	claim	takes	some	reading	into	the	primary	documents.	In	my	2012	interview	with	Herawati	Diah,	she	suggested	that	Sukarno	did	try	to	meddle	with	publications	at	times	after	1957,	though	somewhat	indirectly.	She	attributed	her	husband’s	own	appointment	as	Indonesian	ambassador	to	Czechoslovakia	and	Hungary	in	1959	(and	then	on	to	England	in	1962	and	to	Thailand	in	1964)	as	an	attempt	to	quiet	the	independence	of	B.M.	Diah’s	own	journalistic	voice.	But	she	also	insisted	that	their	editorial	content	was	never	subject	to	direct	review	or	control	by	the	government	in	any	of	their	publications.	53	“Fire	of	Kartini,”	a	magazine	from	Gerwani	that	was	focused	on	women	involved	in	the	organization’s	kindergartens	and	child	care	centers,	but	was	widely	read	by	progressive	women.	
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Figures	6.13,	6.14,	6.15,	6.16:	Varia’s	Last	Hollywood	Cover,	Dirke	Bogarde		(November	9,	1960,)	between	Indonesian	actresses	Ratna	Djuita	(November	2,)	and		Ida	Nusantry	(November	16.)	The	magazine’s	new	permit	number	is	visible	above	the	red	
Varia	logo	for	the	first	time	on	the	November	9	cover.	The	cover	for	October	13,	1965	was	the	first	to	portray	a	European	actor	since	the	Bogarde	cover,	but	of	a	safely	socialist	Hungarian	actress,	Erbzebet	Hazy	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya.		tension	she	felt	between	allowing	her	daughter	to	follow	fashion	trends	and	feeling	that	these	whims	might	keep	her	from	advancing	properly	as	a	revolutionary	Indonesian:	Question:	the	problem	is	with	my	eldest	child,	a	girl,	who	is	now	almost	15	years	old.	She	loves	to	primp	and	preen,	trying	out	whatever	trends	are	“now”	like	wearing	her	hair	in	a	pony	tail,	the	latest	dresses,	all	of	this	she	likes	to	go	along	with.	Within	some	limits,	I	go	along	with	her	desires	.	.	.		I	
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fear	she	will	become	too	backward	and	behind	in	her	advancement	to	the	point	that	she	won’t	keep	up	with	the	progress	of	society	today.54		The	editor’s	response	cited	a	familiar	trope	connecting	gender	to	fears	of	the	moral	crises	of	modernity:	Answer:	We	agree	with	you	that	we	need	to	take	the	right	attitude	in	guiding	the	development	of	our	girls.	We	shouldn’t	be	too	restricted,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	is	also	a	mistake	to	follow	all	our	children’s	desires	lest	they	become	victims	of	the	various	excesses	of	today’s	‘modern’	society.55		In	this	case,	an	interesting	switch	occurred.	The	mother’s	fear	was	that	by	dressing	according	to	western	fashion	trends,	her	daughter	would	“be	behind	in	her	[socialist]	advancement”	and	“not	keep	up	with	the	progress	of	society.”	The	leftist	moral	crisis	was	developing	to	a	place	where	women	might	be	both	too	sexual	and	too	western	and	be	behind	the	times	simultaneously.	But	there	was	a	clear	sense	still	that	modern	society	brought	with	it	the	possibility	of	dangerous	excess.	
Api	Kartini	reflected	the	progressive	thinking	of	the	socialist	vanguard,	and	took	a	lead	among	women’s	magazines	in	ridding	itself	of	western	content.56	Other	magazines	lagged	behind	to	some	extent	in	this	matter,	but	over	the	course	of	the	next	two	years,	1960-1962,	the	primacy	of	the	Hollywood	content	in	magazines	like	Varia	diminished.	Magazines	took	a	broader	perspective	on	international	film,	particularly	increasing	their	coverage	of	film	from	socialist	countries.	Gerwani	began	to	formulate	objections	to	the	salaciousness	of	Hollywood	offerings	from	positions	they	had	sought	and	achieved	on	the	Indonesian	Film	Censor	Board.57	
 54	“Pertanjaan:	masalah	anak	saja	jang	sulung,	perempuan,	sekarang	sudah	hampir	15	tahun.	Ia	suka	sekali	bersolek,	model	
apa	sadja	djaman	sekarang	seperti	rambut	buntut-kuda,	jurk	model	sekarang	dsb.	ingin	sekali	ia	ikati.	Dalam	batas2	
tertuntu	saja	turuti	kemauanja	.	.	.	saja	takut	djika	ia	mendjadi	terlalu	terbelakang	dan	terlambat	kemadjuannja	sehingga	
djuga	tidak	sesuai	dengang	kemadjuan	masjarakat	sekarang.”	Api	Kartini,	October	1960,	p.	7.	55	“Djawaban:	Kami	sependapat	dengan	Njonja	bawha	kita	harus	mengambil	sikap	jang	tepat	dalam	memimbing	
perkembangan	gadis	kita.	Tidak	boleh	terlalu	mengekang,	dan	sebaliknja	djuga	salah	djika	kita	terlalu	menurut	kemaun	
anak	sehingga	ia	menjadi	korban	berbagai	ekses	masjarakat	‘modern’	sekarang	ini.”	Api	Kartini,	October	1960,	p.	7.	56	It	did	not,	however,	come	across	as	strictly	Communist.	Saskia	Wieringa	writes	that	“Api	Kartini	was	designed	to	draw	middle-class	housewives	into	the	‘revolutionary	family.’	Its	editors	included	women	who	were	not	members	of	Gerwani,	and	the	magazine	carried	articles	on	cooking,	dress-making	and	other	general	women’s	issues.	While	this	periodical	seldom	reported	on	the	daily	activities	of	Gerwani,	its	editorials	do	reflect	the	changing	ideological	preoccupations	of	the	organization.	Through	its	short	stories	and	articles,	a	particular	ideological	climate	was	created,	with	many	optimistic	stories	about	communist	countries.”	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	22.	57	Again,	note	the	irony	that	it	was	Gerwani,	who	took	one	of	the	more	puritanical	approaches	to	the	public	expression	of	sexuality,	who	would	in	turn,	have	the	puritanical	construction	of	women’s	sexuality	used	against	them.	
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These	general	rumblings	about	building	the	revolution	became	an	out-and-out	explosion	in	the	late	summer	of	1963.	This	was	a	time	when,	according	to	Fred	Bunnell,	under	Sukarno’s	strong	political	guidance,	“Indonesia	adopted	a	policy	of	all-out	confrontation	not	only	toward	Malaysia	but	toward	the	International	Olympic	Committee,	the	United	Nations,	and	other	manifestations	of	what	Sukarno	viewed	as	Western	domination	of	the	new	nations.”58		In	an	article	on	Sukarno’s	political	temperament,	Peter	Hausdewell	notes	there	was	a	“radical	trend	in	both	domestic	and	foreign	policy	which	marked	Guided	Democracy	after	the	‘watershed’	of	late	summer	1963.”59		But	very	little	actual	energy	was	focused	on	the	border	between	Malaysia	and	Indonesia	in	Kalimantan	itself	that	was	in	theory	at	the	center	of	the	Konfrontasi	policy.	Instead,	the	era’s	political	energy	was	centered	on	shoring	up	Sukarno’s	position	in	a	domestic	political	arena	increasingly	polarized	by	competing	claims	to	political	power	by	the	military	and	the	PKI,	and	on	an	economy	shaken	by	a	serious	financial	crisis.	As	a	primary	tactic	to	maintain	political	control	of	the	nation,	Sukarno	sought	to	control	the	media	more	directly	than	he	had	previously,	and	insisting	that	journalists	increase	the	energy	behind	their	coverage	of	revolutionary	cultural	projects	and	slogans.	From	late	1963	on,	the	representations	of	women	in	almost	all	Indonesian	magazines	changed.	Instead	of	representing	individuals,	the	images	of	women	in	magazines	began	to	reflect	several	stock	categories,	the	ideal	types	that	were	connected	to	the	construction	of	moral	crisis.	As	they	had	before,	women	were	shown	as	being	neat	and	orderly,	and	images	of	traditional	Javanese	dancers,	representing	Indonesian	women	as	holders	of	traditional	reserve	also	made	a	resurgence.	But	overwhelmingly,	material	about	women	took	on	a	highly	nationalist	bent,	in	which	images	of	women	as	symbols	and	national	archetypes	took	over	from	the	more	varied	and	relaxed	images	of	women	that	had	filled	magazines	previously.			
 58	Bunnell,	“Guided	Democracy	Foreign	Policy:	1960-1965	President	Sukarno	Moves	from	Non-Alignment	to	Confrontation.”	p.	45.	59	Peter	Christian	Hauswedell,	“Sukarno:	Radical	or	Conservative?	Indonesian	Politics	1964-5,”	in	Indonesia,	No.	15,	p.	114.	In	his	dissertation	on	the	nationalization	of	western	businesses	by	Sukarno,	Will	Redfern	also	argued	that	1963	was	a	watershed	in	the	politics	and	political	economy	of	Indonesia.	See	Will	Redfern,	Sukarno's	Guided	Democracy	and	the	
Takeovers	of	Foreign	Companies	in	Indonesia	in	the	1960s,	p.	3.	
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Puspa	Wanita:	The	Move	from	Glamour	Model	to	Model	Indonesian	Woman	This	juxtaposition	and	intertwining	of	the	national	and	the	feminine,	as	well	as	the	politically	enforced	nature	of	the	content,	can	be	seen	particularly	well	in	Puspa	Wanita,60	a	fashion	and	lifestyle	magazine	from	Bandung.	Even	following	the	new	press	laws	of	1960,	
Puspa	Wanita	had	not	concerned	itself	significantly	with	the	politics	of	the	ongoing	national	revolution.	While	it	had	a	national	distribution,	the	magazine	focused	significantly	on	the	women’s	social	scene	that	had	grown	up	around	Bandung’s	fashion	industry.	Of	all	the	fashion-centered	magazines	I	have	seen	in	my	research,	Puspa	Wanita	was	the	most	up-to-date	with	developments	in	western	fashion,	and	with	American	fashion	in	particular.	In	part,	this	likely	reflected	the	presence	of	Air	Force	officers’	wives,	whose	husbands,	while	stationed	in	Bandung,	frequently	traveled	to	the	United	States	for	training,	sometimes	accompanied	by	their	wives.		In	any	case,	the	pages	of	Puspa	Wanita	regularly	reported	on	the	latest	fashion	shows	from	Braga	Street	designers	who	had	created	the	leading	edge	of	“modern”	Indonesian	fashion	since	the	1930s.61	It	also	regularly	covered	the	social	world	that	revolved	around	local	institutions	like	the	Marion	Glamour	School,	which	trained	young	women	to	be	models,	and	the	Lembaga	Wanita	Sempurna,	(or	the	“League	of	Refined	Women,”)	an	organization	that	instructed	young	military	wives	on	the	details	of	fashion	and	etiquette.	The	covers	of	Puspa	Wanita	regularly	“introduced”	the	city’s	new	models	or	emerging	“Refined	Women”	to	the	magazine’s	readers.	But	in	response	to	Sukarno’s	ramped	up	campaign	to	“Crush	Malaysia,”	and	the	new	press	regulations	of	May	1963	that	accompanied	it,62	the	content	of	Puspa	Wanita	changed	radically	over	the	course	of	three	issues.	Issue	“No.	3,”	which	is	undated,	but	that	was	published	before	August	1963,63	matched	much	of	the	content	of	previous	issues	of	the	
 60	“Flower	of	Womanhood”	is	probably	the	best	translation,	though	strictly	the	title	means	“Flower	Woman.”	61	See	the	discussion	of	the	forward-looking	and	exploratory	nature	of	Bandung	fashion	in	Chapters	2	and	3.	62	Konfrontasi	was	also	referred	to	as	“Dwikora,”	an	acronym	for	“Dwi	Komando	Rakyat”	or	“The	People’s	Double	Command,”	with	the	clear	intention	of	linking	the	opposition	to	the	Federalization	of	Malaysia	and	its	accompanied	border	disputes	in	Borneo	to	the	successful	annexation	of	West	Irian	from	the	Dutch	in	the	Trikora	campaign	in	1962.	The	new	regulations	essentially	were	put	in	place	to	require	all	publications	to	seek	a	new	permit,	and	to	allow	an	opportunity	for	political	review	and	control	of	their	content	by	the	Sukarno	government.	For	the	text	of	the	regulations,	see	PenPres	no	6/1963.	http://www.pta-makassarkota.go.id/peraturan_perundangan/PENPRES/PENPRES_1963_6.pdf.	63	Putting	dates	to	the	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita	from	1963	on	is	a	challenge.	Unlike	many	magazines,	Puspa	Wanita	did	not	use	publication	dates,	so	formally,	this	is	issue	is	“Year	VII,	No.	3,”	and	it	carries	a	1963	publication	year	on	its	cover.	While	this	might	seem	to	indicate	a	March	date,	the	Year	VII,	No.	4	issue	has	a	new	publishing	permit	attached	to	it,	dated	July	29,	1963,	so,	at	earliest,	No.	4	is	an	August	issue.	The	new	press	law,	PenPres	no.	6/1963,	had	been	issued	by	
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magazine.	The	articles	on	fashion	were	largely	locally	sourced	and	focused.	The	lead	article	profiled	Nj.	E.	Kusumanegara,	the	leader	of	the	Marion	Glamour	School	Bandung.	She	had	begun	her	career	in	glamour	and	fashion	at	the	school’s	Jakarta	branch	in	1955,	and	had	spent	a	year	in	Europe	learning	more	about	fashion	and	makeup	in	1957-1958	before	returning	to	Indonesia	and	opening	the	Bandung	school,	which	quickly	“had	many	students.”64		The	life	of	the	school	took	an	interesting	turn	in	1961,	when	“[c]onnected	with	the	heated	spirit	of	Trikora	at	the	end	of	1961,	all	activities	were	halted	for	a	while.”65	Nj.	Kusumunegara	used	the	opportunity	to	travel	to	the	Philippines,	the	article	noted,	and	carry	out	special	training	in	the	latest	techniques	in	hair-dressing	and	makeup.	The	profile	also	reported	that	Nj.	Kusumanegara	had	recently	organized	a	fashion	show	as	a	fundraiser	for	the	victims	of	the	explosion	of	Gunung	Agung	in	Bali.66	The	magazine	carried	a	story	
 Soekarno	on	May	15,	without	an	apparent	lag	put	in	place	for	the	law	to	be	implemented.	Perhaps	no	editions	were	printed	in	the	intermittent	months	while	the	magazine	waited	for	its	permit	finally	issued	in	late	July?							Wanita	magazine	only	published	13	issues	in	1963,	rather	than	its	normal	22-24,	and	they	were,	for	the	first	time	in	the	magazine’s	history,	undated,	except	for	the	year.	Varia	changed	its	permit,	but	did	not	miss	an	issue.	But	the	Varia	publisher	was	by	that	time	rather	close	to	the	Sukarno	camp,	and	the	content	of	Varia	had	already	shifted	gradually	over	the	course	of	the	previous	three	years	to	be	supportive	of	Sukarnoist	rhetoric	and	worldview.							We	do	know	that	Issue	No.	3	was	published	prior	to	August,	while	No.	4	cannot	have	been	published	before	the	end	of	July.	However,	issue	No.	5	clearly	references	an	event	on	October	19,	1963,	the	naming	of	Fatmawati,	Sukarno’s	first	and	senior	wife,	as	“Ibu	Agung”	or	“Great	Mother”	of	the	nation.	The	editor’s	note	below	the	feature	reads	“Bandung,	Oktober	1963.”	Whatever	the	actual	publication	dates	may	be,	there	are	clear	“before”	(No.	3),	and	“after”	(No.	5)	issues,	with	No.	4	hanging	in	some	sort	of	inter-space.	The	dates	for	“Year	VII”	then	move	into	1964,	beginning	with	No.	6,	and	No.	11,	still	in	“Year	VII,”	is	a	“New	Years	and	Lebaran	1965”	issue	(There	were	two	Ramadans	in	1965,	one	in	early	February,	and	the	other	in	late	December),	that	also	features	a	short	story	on	Christmas.	The	New	Year’s	article,	on	the	political	future	of	
Konfrontasi	and	Nekolim,	reads	“The	New	Year	1965	has	already	arrived.”	So	it	appears	that	the	magazine	came	out	intermittently	at	best.	Sometimes	content	allows	us	to	locate	a	particular	issue	more	closely,	sometimes	it	is	less	precisely	visible.		64	“mendapat	siswa	banjak.”	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	211.	65	“Berhubungan	dengan	hangat2nja	semangat	Trikora	akhir	1961	segala	kegiatan	untuk	sementara	dihentikan.”	Puspa	
Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	211.	66	The	eruption	of	Gunung	Agung	in	March	1963	provides	a	fascinating	study	of	the	interplay	of	modern	Indonesian	politics	and	the	persistence	of	traditional	belief.	The	volcano	is	the	primary	mountain	on	the	island	of	Bali,	and	the	“mother	temple”	of	Balinese	Hinduism,	Besakih,	lies	on	its	southwest	slope.	A	once-in-a-century	ritual	at	the	temple,	Eka	Dasa	Rudra,	which	involves	the	mass	sacrifice	of	animals,	including	rare	ones	such	as	eagles	and	anteaters	that	have	cosmological	significance.	When	the	mountain	started	“belching”	in	early	1963,	the	temple	priests	postponed	the	ritual,	scheduled	for	February,	taking	the	mountain’s	seismological	activity	as	a	portent	that	the	Gods	were	not	pleased.	Sukarno,	however,	had	invested	a	significant	amount	of	political	capital	in	inviting	world	leaders	to	Bali	for	the	ceremonies	as	an	example	of	the	strength	and	depth	of	Indonesian	national	identity	and	culture,	and	he	commanded	the	priests	to	continue	with	the	originally	scheduled	ritual.	The	eruption	of	the	volcano	killed	1500	people,	and	lava	flows	just	barely	missed	the	temple	complex	itself,	all	before	the	full	cycle	of	the	ritual	could	be	completed.	In	Bali,	this	was	taken	as	a	sign	that	the	world	had	entered	a	“time	of	troubles,”	and	it	led	to	significant	social	unrest.	Whether	this	unrest	added	to	the	particularly	violent	and	expansive	nature	of	the	killings	in	Bali	in	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya	is	a	question	that	historians	have	debated.	But	when	speaking	with	older	Balinese	about	their	lives,	the	eruption	of	the	mountain	is	one	of	the	clear	markers	of	time	and	transition	in	their	memories,	along	with	the	Japanese	era.	The	eruption	of	Gunung	Agung	though	is	also	often	used	as	a	coded	way	of	referring	to	the	killings	in	late	1965	and	early	1966	without	actually	mentioning	them.	For	older	Balinese,	the	two	events	remain	linked.	I	hope	to	carry	out	future	research	about	this	connection	sometime	in	the	near	future,	while	the	older	generation	that	remembers	them	is	still	present	and	able	to	be	interviewed.	
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about	the	fashion	show	later	in	the	issue,	including	pictures	of	Marion	Glamour	School	models	wearing	“new”	on-trend	western	dresses	presented	without	any	nod	to	“Indonesian”	fashion.67	(See	Figure	6.17.)		
	
Figure	6.17:	An	all-western	“new”	fashion	lineup	in	Bandung,	May	1963.	
Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	216-217.		The	forward	and	western	focused	outlook	of	Puspa	Wanita	was	also	evident	in	a	number	of	articles	in	the	issue	that	addressed	questions	of	child	rearing	and	sexuality,	and	were	direct	translations	of	American	magazine	articles.	The	article	on	sexuality	was	particularly	unusual	for	Indonesian	women’s	magazines	since	it	directly	addressed	several	questions—homosexuality	and	masturbation	were	just	two	examples—that	I	never	saw	discussed	in	any	other	instances	in	my	research.	In	providing	answers	from	“experts	about	the	20	most	frequently	asked	questions	about	SEX,”68	the	translation	of	an	article	by	Phyllis	W.	Goldman	reflected	progressive	positions	on	sexuality,	even	within	an	American	social	
 67	“Mode	Baru	Bermuntjulan	di	dalam	FASHION	SHOW	Gunung	Agung.”	(“New	Fashions	Shown	at	the	Gunung	Agung	FASHION	SHOW.”)	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	216-217.	68	“Djawaban	para	ahli	atas	20	pertanjaan	tentang	SEX	yg	paling	sering	ditanjakan,”	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,		p.	226-27.	
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context,	not	to	mention	Indonesia’s	significantly	more	sexually	conservative	worldview.69	The	issue	also	included	a	long	article	on	“Abortus,”	meaning	miscarriage	rather	than	abortion,	which,	though	written	by	a	local	doctor,	Sujono	Hadi,	reported	the	latest	theories	from	American	scientists	about	the	psychological	effects	of	women	losing	pregnancies	to	miscarriage.70	In	Issue	No.	3,	then,	Puspa	Wanita	covered	materials	and	presented	women	in	ways	that	were	significantly	out	of	line	from	the	images	of	revolutionary	Indonesian	women	that	had	already	largely	been	the	norm	in	magazines	such	as	Varia.	The	(likely)	August	or	September	1963	edition	of	Puspa	Wanita,	No.	4,	showed	both	continuities	and	several	significant	changes	from	the	previous	issue.	The	front	matter	on	the	inside	front	cover	of	the	magazine	continued,	as	it	had	previously,	to	introduce	the	cover	model	for	the	issue	and	previewing	the	highlights	of	that	month’s	magazine.	In	No.	4.	the	copy	discussed	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	shown	on	the	cover	in	kain-kebaya	and	konde,	four	years	after	her	batik-less	photo	shoot	as	Miss	Varia	1959.	It	read:		—	We	introduce—Nj.	Dewayani	Pribadi—in	a	pose—captivating—who	can’t	be	envious—who	was	caught—by	our	photographer—previously—at	an	interesting	event—the	braga	festival—where	she—served—as—a	model.71		The	introductory	text	continued	with	a	discussion	about	the	interplay	between	fashion	and	models,	something	it	said	was	“pleasing.”	It	then	invited	readers	to	peruse	the	fashion	pages	at	the	middle	of	the	issue.		
 69	On	homosexuality:	“How	can	you	tell	if	your	child	is	a	homosexual?”	(Answer:	if	by	age	8	they	only	want	to	play	with	children	of	the	other	sex,	this	is	a	sign.	By	this	age,	children	prefer	strongly	to	play	with	children	of	their	own	gender.	Most	important	here	is	a	strong	relationship	between	father	and	son.	“Hubungan	baik	antara	ajah	dan	anak	laki2	adalah	
terpenting.”		The	answer	did	not	address	same-sex	attraction	among	girls	specifically.		On	masturbation:	“Does	“does	masturbation	cause	harm?”	(menggangu?)	Answer:	Not	if	it’s	done	in	“normal”	amounts,	it’s	only	a	problem	when	it’s	“unusual	(not	normal’),”	(“luar	biasa	(tidak	normal),”	and	then	it’s	“very	bothersome.”	(“menganggu	sekali.”)	Puspa	
Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	p.	226-27.	70	“Abortus:	Pertolongan	dan	Pentjegahan,”	(“Abortion:	Help	and	Prevention.”)	Puspa	Wanita,	Year	VII,	No.	3,	pp.	229-230.	The	article	noted	that	there	were	two	other	forms	of	“abortus,”	“medical	abortion	for	medical	reasons,	and	medical	abortion	for	non-medical	reasons,	the	latter	which	was	“illegal	according	to	the	constitution.”	(“jang	dapat	dihukum	
menurut	undang2	dasar,”)	and	which	the	article	expressly	did	not	write	about	further.	71	“—Kami	perkenalkan—Nj.	Dewayani	Pribadi—dalam	pose—menawan	hati—siapa	tak	iri—jang	didjumapi—juruptret	
kita—dalam	atjara	menarik—braga	festival—dimana	dia—bertindak—selaku—pergawati.	//	—bitjara	tentang—
pergawati—masalah	mode—merupakan—soal—jang—hangat—karena—pergawati	dan	mode—merupakan—dua	hal—
jang	saling	berhubungan—satu	dengan	lain—maka	perhatikanlah—hidangan	PW—nomor—ini—dihalaman—tengah—	//	
—pakaian	dan	wanita—djuga—seperti—suatu	masalah—jang	erat	sekali—angkut—paunja—namun	bagi	mereka—
jang—naik—remadja—peristiwa	alamiah—menstruasi—bukanlah—peristiwa—jang	mesti—ditjemaskan.”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	4,	Front	Inside	Cover.	The	long	dashes	are	in	the	original	text.	The	cover	image	showed	Dewayani	dressed	in	kain-kebaya,	but	also	wearing	the	crown	and	sash	of	a	beauty	contest	winner.	She	had	indeed	used	her	Miss	Varia	1959	crown	to	move	into	the	world	of	professional	modeling,	but	this	time,	clearly	also	wearing	Indonesian	clothing	as	well.	The	Braga	Festival	was	a	prominent	annual	celebration	held	in	Bandung,	focused	on	the	city’s	main	business	thoroughfare	from	which	it	took	its	name.	
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These	pages	featured	four	new	western-style	creations	specifically	made	for	teenagers,	one	of	them	sleeveless	(called	a	“you	can	see”),	which	the	article	said	was	“nota	
bene	up	until	now	well-liked	by	a	large	number	of	our	young	women	because	of	Indonesia’s	climate,	which	is	probably	too	hot???”72	The	front	matter	then	mentioned	that	something	else	related	to	teenagers	was	the	approach	of	menstruation,	and	pointed	to	an	article	on	the	subject	also	included	in	the	issue.	The	facing	page	featured	an	article	on	Nj.	E.	Supardi,	an	Air	Force	wife,	and	leader	of	the	Lembaga	Wanita	Sempurna,	(or	the	“League	of	Refined	Women,”)	an	organization	that	instructed	young	military	wives	on	the	details	of	fashion	and	etiquette.	(See	Figure	6.18).	But	aside	from	this,	the	Bandung-focused	content	was	noticeably	reduced	in	amount	and	in	scope,	consisting	largely	of	short	stories	by	male	Indonesian	writers.	These	had	not	been	a	particular	feature	of	earlier	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita,	although	it	was	a	staple	of	many	other	women’s	magazines.	In	place	of	local	content,	the	issue	featured	more	Indonesian	language	translations	of	American	articles	on	women’s	health,	a	profile	of	Brigitte	Bardot,73	translations	of	European	short	stories,	an	article	on	Chekov,	and	a	three-page	spread	of	western	fashion	with	drawings	of	white,	western	models.		The	overwhelming	presence	of	short	stories,	rather	than	features,	showed	a	markedly	different	profile	to	the	magazine,	as	if	the	editors	were	putting	content	“on	hold”	while	they	sorted	out	the	emerging	political	situation.	Notably,	this	edition	also	featured	a	new	publishing	permit	number,	dated	July	30,	1963,	reflecting	the	issuance	of	a	new	press	law	signed	by	Sukarno	on	May	15,	1963.	In	the	next	issue,	No.	5.,	published	in	October	1963,	the	tenor	of	the	magazine’s	front	space	changed	completely.	The	issue	took	on	a	whole	new—and	much	more	political—language	and	tone,	one	completely	in	line	with	Sukarno’s	cultural	and	political	projects	attached	to	the	Konfrontasi	with	Malaysia.	While	much	of	the	content	of	the	magazine	followed	Puspa	Wanita’s	previous	style,	the	front	few	pages	were	dominated	by	articles	in	a	new	vernacular	that	interrupted	the	earlier	feel	of	the	magazine,	both	rhetorically	and	visually.		
 72	“jg	notabene	sampai	sekarang	ini	masih	digemari	sebagian	besar	gadis2	kita	karena	iklim	Indonesia	jang	barangkali	
terlalu	panas???”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	4.,	p.	263.	73	While	many	western	actresses	would	become	anathema	in	publications	in	the	last	years	of	Sukarno’s	presidency,	Brigitte	Bardot,	known	for	her	socialist	leanings	at	the	time,	remained	a	favorite,	and	acceptable	sexy	western	model.	
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Figure	6.18:	Puspa	Wanita	Front	Matter,	August	1963,	with	Dewayani	Pribadi,	upper	left,	in	kain-kebaya.	The	new	publication	permit	information	is	visible	on	the	upper	right	of	the	first	page.		 The	cover	description	still	introduced	the	model,	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho,	who	was	shown	wearing	a	sleeveless	yellow	dress,	with	a	pearl	necklace	and	a	cascading	western	hairstyle.	But	it	used	a	completely	different	rhetoric	to	describe	her:		—we—introduce—her	name	is	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho—young	woman—[from]	Bandung—with	her—smile—sparkling—towards—the	future—homeland—Indonesia—that	is	currently—striving	to	finish/complete—its	national—revolution—to—attain—a	society—[of]	Indonesian—socialism—that	doesn’t	know—the	exploitation	of	man—by—man74			
 74	“—kami—perkenalkan—namanja	Ineke	Karamoy	Loho—dara—bandung—dengan—senjuman—tjemerlang—
menghadapi—masa—depan—tanah	air—indonesia—jang	kini-sedang—berdjuang	menjelesaikan—revolusi—
nasionalnja—untuk—mentjapai—masjarakat—sosialisme—indonesia—jang—tidak—mengenal—exploitation	l’home	[sic]—par—‘lhome	[sic]—	”		Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	The	long	dashes	are	in	the	original	text.		“Exploitation	l’homme	par	l’homme,”	was	a	Sukarno	catch-phrase,	which	he	sprinkled	into	many	of	his	speeches	and	writings,	using	the	French.	
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The	column	continued	with	similar	language,	stressing	the	special	roles	women	had	to	play	in	the	revolutionary	process.	As	part	of	their	duties	to	build	an	“Indonesian	national	revolution”	and	to	“awaken	a	new	world,”75	the	editors	suggested	that	“we	as	Indonesian	women	must	of	course	not	remain	silent	in	making	Ganefo76	a	success.”77	The	text	then	took	a	rambling,	but	highly	informative,	turn.		Ganefo	I	must	be	successful.	That	is	the	blessing	of	Indonesian	women	[“kaum	wanita	Indonesia”]	that	today	has	an	exalted	mother	[“ibu	agung”78],	Ibu	Fatmawati,	the	first	lady	Indonesia,79	who	has	rendered	so	much	service	for	the	advancement	of	our	women	[“kaum	wanita	kita”]	and	has	also	worked	greatly	to	uplift	religion	and	humanitarianism.		The	emancipation	of	our	women	[“kaum	wanita	kita”]	must	point	towards	constructive	measures	for	the	advancement	of	the	nation,	and	because	of	that,	we	follow	the	correct	advice	of	the	great	leader	of	our	revolution80	who	
 75	“—membangun—dunia	baru—”	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	This	is	the	same	language	Sukarno	used	in	the	1964	speeches	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter.	76	GANEFO,	the	Games	of	the	New	Emerging	Forces,	held	in	Jakarta	in	November	1964,	was	Sukarno’s	latest	large-scale	project	to	build	the	non-aligned	movement	internationally.	GANEFO	was	intended	to	provide	a	level	playing	field	in	athletics	for	countries	from	Asia,	African	and	Latin	America,	and	from	other	socialist	countries.	Sukarno	initiated	the	project	as	part	of	the	anti-Olympic	plank	of	his	New	World	platform,	and	it	occasioned	the	building	of	a	great	deal	of	infrastructure	around	Jakarta.	The	International	Olympic	Committee	had	suspended	Indonesia	from	the	Olympic	Games	in	February	1963,	in	response	to	an	incident	in	which	the	Indonesians	failed	to	provide	visas	to	athletes	from	Israel	and	“Nationalist	China”	(Taiwan)	for	the	1962	Asian	Games	that	were	also	held	in	Jakarta.		Fifty-one	national	teams	attended	GANEFO,	some	official	government	delegations,	and	other	unofficial.	The	games	occasioned	the	building	of	Jakarta’s	first	by-pass	over	Blvd	Djendral	Soedirman,	which	was	covered	in	multiple	magazines,	including	Varia.	Schools	were	shut	for	two	weeks	so	students	could	act	as	guides	and	ushers,	and	electricity	was	rationed	ahead	of	the	games	to	make	certain	there	would	be	sufficient	power	to	light	the	games	during	their	duration.	For	a	period	of	intensifying	economic	pressure,	both	in	terms	of	infrastructure	and	general	expenses,	GANEFO	represented	a	huge	investment	of	real	and	political	capital	by	Sukarno	and	the	Indonesian	government.	Politically,	the	games	were	linked	to	both	an	analysis	of	the	New	Emerging	Forces	(Nefos)	v.	the	Old	Established	Forces	(Oldefos)	and	their	“imperialistic”	outlook.	Furthermore,	Sukarno	directly	linked	GANEFO	to	the	“Crush	Malaysia”	efforts,	and	a	ubiquitous	slogan	at	the	games	was	“Sukseskan	GANEFO	Ganjang	
Malaysia.”	(Make	GANEFO	a	success	Crush	Malaysia),	which	RAND	analyst	Ewa	Pauker	pointed	out,	put	these	two	separate	ideas	together	without	any	intermediary	punctuation.	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	
Djakarta.		77	“—kita—sebagai—wanita—Indonesia—tentu—sadja—tidak—tinggal—diam—dalam—mensukseskan—ganefo.”	Puspa	
Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	78	“Agung”	is	a	Sanskrit	word	shared	in	both	Javanese	and	Balinese	that	means	“high,”	“exalted”	and	“large/mighty,”	with	the	connotation	of	being	above	all	others.	The	largest	gong	in	a	gamelan	ensemble,	which	strikes	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	each	piece,	and	each	cycle	within	a	piece	(and	in	the	cyclical	structure	of	gamelan	music,	those	first	and	last	tones	happen	at	the	same	“time”	in	the	cycle),	is	called	“gong	agung.”	The	word	can	be	reverential	and	replete	with	cultural	meaning.	The	term	implies	that	Fatmawati	was	the	highest	mother	of	all	mothers.	79	This	phrase	is	in	English,	reflecting	its	origins	in	Indonesian	political	debates	about	Fatmawati’s	place	in	the	nation	in	the	aftermath	of	Sukarno’s	marriage	to	Hartini	in	1953,	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	80	Normally,	this	formal	title	would	be	capitalized.	In	keeping	with	the	format	of	Puspa	Wanita’s	formatter,	however,	I	have	left	it	uncapitalized	here.	
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emphatically	says—stop81—beauty—oh	my—contests	because	they	are	not	in	line	[“sesuai”]	with	our	identity	and	the	rhythm	of	our	revolution.82	83			
	
Figure	6.19:	Fatmawati	accorded	the	title	of	the	“High	Mother”	of	the	nation.	
Puspa	Wanita,	October	1963,	No.	5,	p.	283.		It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	Puspa	Wanita	was	the	most	glamour-focused	of	the	women’s	magazines.	Of	all	the	women’s	magazine’s	they	were	the	most	likely	to	have	championed	and	supported	beauty	pageants	as	an	appropriate	expression	for	young	Indonesian	women’s	beauty.	So,	whether	the	interjected	“aduh”84	is	an	exclamation	of	loss	
 81	“Stop”	in	English.	82	“ganefo	I—harus	sukses—itulah—doa	restu—kaum	wanita—indonesia—jang	kini—sudah—pula—memiliki—ibu	
agunja—ibu	fatmawati—the	first	lady	indonesia—jang	sudah—banjak—djasanja—untuk—kemadjuan—kaum	wanita	
kita—dan	banjak—pula	usahanja—dalam—membangkitkan—semangat—beragama—dan	peri—kemanusiaan—	//	—
emansipasi—kaum—wanita—kita—haruslah—diarahkan—kepada—usaha2—konstrukip—pada—kemadjuan—
bangsa—oleh—karena—tepat—andjuran—pemimpin—besar	revolusi—kita—jang—tegas2—mengatakan—stop—
kontes2-an—adu—ketjantikkan—karena—tidak—sesuai—dengan	kepribadian—dan	iramanja	revolusi—kita—”	Puspa	
Wanita,	1963,	no.	5,	Front	Inside	Cover.	83	The	entire	text,	like	the	versions	immediately	above,	is	divided	by	long	dashes.	For	ease	of	reading	here,	I	have	reproduced	the	text	without	them,	but	did	choose	to	insert	them	back	in	around	the	interjection—“adu,”	translatable	as	“oh	my,”	or	“my	gosh”—where	the	flow	of	the	idea	is	somewhat	broken.		84	With	the	“h”	on	the	end	it	its	more	prevalent	spelling.	
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over	a	treasured	idea	or	of	a	newly	found	“revolutionary”	tut-tutting	about	outdated	past	practices	wasn’t	fully	clear	here.	Perhaps	it	was	both,	but	it	most	certainly	was	a	marker	of	sudden	change.	On	the	facing	inside	front	page,	readers	were	greeted	by	a	large	photograph	of	a	smiling	Fatmawati,	along	with	a	large	headline	proclaiming	that	she	had	been	given	the	title	of	“Ibu	Agung,”	or	“Supreme	Mother”	of	Indonesia.85	Though	shown	wearing	Indonesian	fashion	and	a	light,	sheer	head	covering	that	had	long	been	her	standard	dress	at	public	events,	Fatmawati	also	sported	a	pageant-queen	sash	with	her	new	title	embroidered	on	it,	an	interesting	appropriation	of	beauty	queen	imagery	for	a	middle-aged	mother	and	first-lady	of	the	nation.	(Again,	see	Figure	6.19).	The	most	explicitly	political	article	of	the	issue	appeared	on	the	next	page.	It	exhorted	women	to	help	bring	about	the	success	of	GANEFO.	The	GANEFO	slogan,	“Onward,	No	Retreat”86	ran	(in	English)	in	large	print	across	the	bottom	of	the	page,	while	other	slogans	(in	Indonesian)	ran	in	a	column	down	the	left	side	of	the	facing	page.	Visually,	the	pages	of	Puspa	Wanita	were	turned	into	a	billboard	for	the	games	and	its	revolutionary	messaging.87	(See	Figure	6.20).	Reflecting	Sukarno’s	“many	public	appeals	asking	that	everyone	do	all	that	is	in	[their]	power	to	make	GANEFO	a	success,”88	Puspa	Wanita	called	on	its	female	readers	specifically	as	women	to	do	their	part	in	that	national	effort,	writing:	WE	Indonesian	women	cannot	keep	silent.	We	will	make	GANEFO	I	successful	in	all	areas	that	are	necessary.	It	is	not	only	our	female	athletes	and	our	women	artists	who	will	make	a	splash	directly	in	the	various	fields	of	the	festival	of	sport	and	the	arts,	but	we,	Indonesian	women	as	a	whole	must	pray	that	GANEFO	I	is	a	success,	that	it	runs	smoothly	according	to	plan,	and	that	there	are	no	deficiencies.	We	wish,	with	a	hope	that	is	sincere	and	holy,	that	God	the	Most	High	will	bestow	all	bounty	upon	the	Indonesian	people	who	are	in	the	midst	of	completing	their	revolution,	and	of	organizing	
 85	The	title	was	given	to	her	on	October	4,	1963,	by	the	Ikatan	Pegawai	Wanita,	(Association	of	Women	Civil	Servants)	in	a	specifically	tailored	event	in	Jakarta	for	her	work	on	“social,	women’s	and	humanitarian	issues.”	Nancy	Florida	notes	that	“Ratu	Agung”	is	the	title	given	in	Central	Javanese	kratons	to	the	mother	of	a	king.	86	Pauker	points	out	that	the	slogan	went	on	to	become	a	principal	slogan	for	the	Crush	Malaysia	campaign.	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	Djakarta,	p.	16.	87	Similar	adaptations	are	also	visible	in	Wanita	and	Varia.	Clearly	all	magazines	were	expected	to	help	exhort	the	Indonesian	people	to	“Sukeskan	GANEFO.”	88	See	Ewa	T.	Pauker,	GANEFO	I:	Sports	and	Politics	in	Djakarta,	p.	12.	She	continues	“In	this	way	everyone	was	made	to	feel	that	he	was	in	some	way	contributing	personally	to	the	success	of	the	Games,	and,	thereby,	to	the	prestige	of	his	country.	It	was	very	effective.”	The	use	of	male	assumed	gender	in	Pauker’s	language	belies	the	content	of	Puspa	Wanita.	
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GANEFO	I,	which	we	hold	to	be	a	manifestation	of	the	national	philosophy	of	Indonesia	of	building	a	new	world.89			
	
Figure	6.20:	Puspa	Wanita	becomes	a	billboard	for	the	“sukses”	of	GANEFO	
Puspa	Wanita,	no.	5,	October	1963,	pp.	284-285.		
Puspa	Wanita’s	female	readers,	therefore,	were	being	explicitly	called	to	play	a	specifically	gendered	role	in	“successing”	the	national	revolution.	They	were	tasked	with	prayer	(something	everyone	was	capable	of	doing,	but	also	an	interesting	rhetorical	intervention	in	the	previously	non-religious	tone	of	Puspa	Wanita)	to	assure	everything	would	go	smoothly	in	that	regard.	This	ran	alongside	articles	providing	advice	on	which	necklace	to	wear	or	how	to	dress	for	an	outing	in	the	country.		
 89	“KITA	kaum	wanita	Indonesia	tidak	boleh	tinggal	diam.	Kita	sukseskan	Ganefo	I	disegala	bidang	jang	diperlukan.	Bukan	
sadja	atlit2	puteri	kita	dan	seniwati2	kita	jang	berketjimpung	langsung	dibidangnja	masing2	dalam	pesta	olah	raga	dan	
seni,	tapi	kita	kaum	ibu	Indonesia	harus	mendo’akan	agar	GANEFO	I	ini	sukses,	berdjalan	lantjar	menurut	rentjana	semula,	
dan	tidak	kurang	suatu	apa.	Kita	berharap	dengan	harapan	jang	tulus	dan	sutji,	semoga	Tuhan	Jang	Maha	Esa,	tetap	
melimpahkan	segala	karunianja	kepada	bangsa	Indonesia	jang	sedang	menjelesaikan	revolusinja,	dan	dalam	
penjelenggaraan	Ganefo	I	ini,	kita	menganggapnja	sebagian	suatu	menifestasi:	palsafah	negara	Indonesia	dalam	
membangun	dunia	baru.”	Puspa	Wanita,	no.	5.,	October	1963,	p.	284.	
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Over	the	course	of	the	next	several	issues	of	Puspa	Wanita,	reaching	into	early	1965,	several	important	and	highly	divergent	new	images	of	Indonesian	women	also	emerged.	While	retaining	some	elements	of	its	earlier	layouts,	editions	of	Puspa	Wanita	increasingly	featured	articles	and	images	of	women	as	ideal	types,	rather	than	as	individuals,	that	is,	as	various	expressions	of	a	kaum	wanita.	The	December	1964	edition,	a	“Combined	Special	New	Years	and	Lebaran”90	version,	was	exemplary	in	this	regard.	The	cover	image	was	of	a	model	dressed	as	an	ideal	beauty.	She	wore	an	elegant	sheer	green	kebaya	with	a	tailored	bef,	and	a	fine	kain	batik	in	a	refined	parang	rusak	motif.	Over	her	shoulder	lay	an	exquisite	green	silk	selendang.	Her	gold	jewelry	was	spare	and	refined,	a	gold	and	diamond	necklace,	two	gold	pins	and	gold	earrings.	On	her	head,	she	wore	a	gold	fabric	crown,	as	she	was	crowned	the	queen	of	the	Braga	Festival.	The	title	holder	was	none	other	than	Dhewayani	Pribadi,	whose	transformation	from	ultra-modern	fashion	model	to	proper	Indonesian	woman	was	now	complete.	(See	Figure	6.21).	
	
Figure	6.21:	Puspa	Wanita	celebrates	New	Year	and	Lebaran	1965.	Dhewayani	Pribadi	as	a	winning	model	from	the	Braga	Festival	in	Bandung.	
 90	“Nomor	Gabungan	Istimewa	Tahun	Baru	dan	Lebaran	1965.”	1965	was	an	odd	year	in	the	cycle	for	Lebaran,	with	two	incidents	of	the	fasting	month,	one	at	the	beginning	of	the	year,	celebrated	here,	and	the	other,	as	is	noted	in	Chapter	7,	coming	in	December	1965.	
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Two	other	groups	of	exemplary	Indonesian	women	also	graced	the	pages	of	the	issue.	One	group	were	military	protectors	of	the	nation.	Sukarelewati,	or	women	“volunteers”	who	joined	newly	formed	paramilitary	units	attached	to	the	military	and	to	various	political	parties	or	religious	or	social	movements,91	donned	military	uniforms,	trained	in	marksmanship	and	military	tactics	and,	potentially,	prepared	to	be	sent	to	the	front	with	Malaysia.92	In	Puspa	Warna	No.	6,93	these	women	had	been	referred	to,	using	Sukarno’s	appellation,	as	“complete	patriots,”	(patriot	komplit)	for	their	willingness	to		
 
j 	
Figure	6.22:	Puspa	Wanita	celebrates	“the	activity	of	our	female	volunteers.”	
Puspa	Wanita,	December	1964,	p.	500	
 91	See	the	discussion	of	sukarelawati	earlier	in	this	chapter.	92	Sukarno	called	for	the	development	of	such	groups	in	his	August	17,	1963	national	day	speech,	and	women’s	organizations	from	across	the	political	spectrum	responded,	including	elite	women.	Both	Herawati	Diah	and	Gusti	Nurul,	for	instance,	were	members	of	sukarelawati	groups,	and	were	photographed	in	training	exercises.	A	picture	Herawati	Diah	included	in	her	book,	which	must	have	been	taken	in	Thailand	in	1964,	or	perhaps	during	home	leave	during	reassignment,	shows	her	group	of	women	dressed	in	matching	kain-kebaya,	standing	in	formation.	The	kain	appear	to	be	
sarong	cloths,	rather	than	batik.	See	Herawati	Diah.	An	Endless	Journey:	Reflections	of	an	Indonesian	Journalist,	p.	184.	Gusti	Nurul’s	children	also	remember	a	photo	of	their	mother	with	her	sukarelawati	group	of	military	wives	in	Bandung.	No	sukarelewati	groups	were	ever	actually	dispatched	to	participate	in	the	border	skirmishes.		93	Likely	a	January	1964	issue.	One	of	the	first	articles	is	about	horoscopes	for	the	new	year	1964,	including	what	color	dresses	are	best	for	women	of	each	astrological	sign,	and	the	article	on	patriot	komplit	reports	on	a	training	by	members	of	the	Himpunan	Mahasiswa	Islam	Indonesia	(HMI,	or	the	Indonesian	Muslim	Students	Association,)	that	took	place	from	December	21-27,	1963.	
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	sacrifice	themselves	for	the	defense	of	the	motherland.94	The	December	1964	article	on	these	complete	patriots	included	pictures	of	
sukarelwati	training—in	this	case	marching	in	formation	and	breaking	down	weapons	while	blindfolded—just	one	of	several	editions	to	do	so.	(See	Figure	6.22).	“In	these	pictures	below,”	the	article	exclaimed	“readers	can	see	what	nowadays	inflames	the	breast	of	each	Indonesian	revolutionary	woman.”95	The	third	form	of	ideal	woman	presented	in	the	December	1964	edition	of	Puspa	
Wanita	was	the	Javanese	dancer,	specifically	the	quartet	of	young	and	beautiful	dancers	of	
serimpi,	a	spiritually	potent	dance	form	used	to	align	the	powers	of	the	macro-cosmos	with	those	of	the	micro-cosmos	of	a	Javanese	kraton.	(See	Figure	6.23).	The	article	noted	that	the	four	dancers	would	have	been	ritually	cleansed	through	a	ruwatan	ceremony96	and	that	they	would	be	“beautiful,”	(“tjantik-djelita.”)	Indeed,	within	the	story	of	the	first	serimpi,	that	the	article	said	was	performed	for	the	God	Brahma,	the	god	was	struck	by	the	“beauty”	(“keelokan”)	of	both	the	dancers	and	their	refined	movements.	The	purpose	of	the	serimpi	is	to	put	the	energy	of	the	universe	back	in	good	order,	aligning	good	and	evil,	the	healthy	and	the	broken.	“There	is	a	war	between	the	forces	of	the	earth	and	the	heavens,”	the	article	notes,	“or	between	that	which	is	broken	and	that	which	is	good.	It	is	a	war	without	end,	rather	it	must	occur	repeatedly	over	and	over,	so	that	the	balance	of	nature	endures.”97	The	serimpi,	then,	and	ritually	purified	female	dancers	who	perform	it,	are	a	powerful	way	of	mitigating	times	of	moral	distress.	And	the	beauty	of	the	dancers,	of	both	their	faces	and	the	comportment	of	their	bodies,	is	central	to	its	power.	
 94		The	full	definition	from	Sukarno’s	speech	to	the	HMI	volunteers	is:	“seseorang	jang	karena	katjintannja	kepada	tanah	
airnja,	bangsa	dan	negaranja	dengan	ichlas	bersedia	mengabdikan	diri	dan	mengorbankan	apa	sadja	bahkan	djika	perlu	
djiwa	raganja	untuk	membela	menjelamatkan	dan	mengagungkan	demi	kebesaran	Tanah	Air	Negara	dan	Bangsanja	itu.”	(“A	person	who	because	of	their	love	for	the	nation,	people	and	state	is	whole-heartedly	ready	to	devote	themselves	and	sacrifice	anything,	if	necessary,	body	and	soul,	to	defend	and	exalt	the	greatness	of	the	Nation	and	its	People.”)	Puspa	Wanita,	1963,	no.	6	[likely	published	January	1964],	p.	325.	95	“Dalam	gambar2	dibawah	ini	akan	tampaklah	kepada	para	pembatja	apa	jg	kini	sedang	menggelorakan	setiap	dada	
wanita	revolusioner	Indonesia	itu.”	Puspa	Wanita,	December	1964,	p.	500.	96	A	ruwatan,	sometimes	badly	translated	as	an	“exorcism,”	is	a	ceremony	performed	to	remove	obstacles	from	individuals	based	on	various	characteristics	they	may	have	at	any	given	time.	The	ritual	involves	the	performance	of	a	specific	lakon,	or	story	in	the	wayang	kulit	(shadow	puppetry)	repertoire,	that	is	generally	only	performed	by	certain	and	quite	powerful	dalangs	or	puppet	masters.	The	performance	happens,	unusually	for	wayang	kulit,	during	the	day	rather	than	after	sundown,	and	the	story	itself	is	rather	short.	Those	attendees	specifically	seeking	to	be	made	“ruwat,”	or	“healthy,”	come	to	the	event	having	prepared	themselves	ritually	as	well.		97	“.	.	.	peperangan	antara	kekuatan	bumi	dan	langit	atau	buruk	dan	baik.	Peperangan	ini	tak	berkesudahan,	bahkan	harus	
berlangsung	terus	berulang	kali,	agar	keseimbangan	alam	tetap	abadi.”	Puspa	Wanita,	December	1964,	p.	516.	
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Figure	6.23:	Puspa	Wanita	explains	the	power	of	the	serimpi	dance	across	time.	
Puspa	Wanita,	December	1964,	pp.	516-517.	
	
1965:	Ideal	Indonesian	Women	Protecting—or	Endangering—the	Revolution	These	images	of	Indonesian	women	as	ideal	types	who	protected	the	nation	in	various	ways	that	filled	the	pages	of	Puspa	Wanita	in	December	1964	were	not	singular	to	that	issue.	Indeed,	from	the	1963	Konfrontasi	press	changes	forward,	Indonesian	women	began	to	show	up	in	pages	of	women’s	magazines	in	various	types	of	uniforms.	While	this	was	not	unusual	for	the	members	of	the	newly	created	women’s	military	and	police	brigades,	it	also	expanded	to	include	the	members	of	various	social	and	political	organizations.	Various	pictorials	showed	the	women	of	Nahdlatul	Ulama	learning	to	shoot	rifles	(a	common	element	of	“training”	as	part	of	the	Dwikora	mobilizations,)	all	wearing	identical	kain-kebaya.	Gerwani	members	were	shown	marching	in	street	demonstrations	in	identical	kain-kebaya,	wearing	a	specially	designed	batik	pattern	that	featured	strong	
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female	figures	drawing	on	iconography	from	Javanese	wayang,	but	with	modern	touches.98	(See	Figure	6.24).	The	wives	of	the	staff	of	the	Indonesian	Embassy	in	Bangkok,	led	by	Herawati	Diah,	gathered	for	drill	in	kain	sarung,	white	kebaya	and	matching	military	hats,	as	members	of	the	Tjakrawati	Civil	Defense	Force,	connected	to	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.	(See	Figure	6.25).		
	
Figure	6.24:	“Batik	Gerwani-PKI.”	Or	at	least	that	is	how	it	is	labeled	at	the	Danar-Hadi	Museum	in	Solo.	The	piece	shows	heroic	female	wayang	figures,	but	notably	in	short	skirts.	Two	of	the	characters	are	wearing	their	hair	in	ponytails.	
	
	Sukarno’s	description	of	the	various	women	of	Kowani	as	elements	of	a	garden	that	began	this	chapter	could	be	described	through	color	blocks	precisely	because	the	women	from	various	organizations	and	areas	were	wearing	identical	uniforms,	rather	than	because	they	each	chose	an	outfit	that	best	accentuated	their	own	features	and	skin	tone.	So,	while	
 98	The	batik	design	was	intended	to	help	Gerwani	cadres	bridge	cultural	gaps	to	Javanese	peasants,	and	the	pattern	featured	elements	of	wayang	stories	that	emphasized	the	power	of	peasants	and	other	“ordinary”	people	in	groups.	Though	not	discussed	in	this	dissertation,	LEKRA,	the	communist	arts	organizations,	had	worked	specifically	with	
dhalangs,	or	puppet	masters,	to	craft	wayang	performance	styles	that	de-emphasized	the	royal	and	court-centered	expositions	that	were	characteristic	of	many	stories.	The	long,	slow	opening	scenes	would	often	describe	the	court	and	the	characters	at	length,	extolling	the	virtues	of	the	king	and	of	kingship.	The	PKI	often	used	cultural	performances,	and	
wayang	specifically,	to	draw	large	crowds	to	their	political	rallies.	Several	dhalangs	and	wayang	afficiandos	I	spoke	with	during	my	research	periods	recounted	that	a	significant	deconstruction	of	the	traditional,	rather	“set”	form	of	the	lakon	(wayang	tale)	structures	occurred	during	the	early	1960s,	as	LEKRA	dhalangs	needed	to	cut	significant	sections	of	the	story	on	the	fly	when	the	political	speeches	by	PKI	cadres	went	significantly	longer	than	expected.		
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kain-kebaya	had	served,	to	that	point,	as	a	form	of	pakaian	nasional,	with	the	advent	of	a	certain	type	of	political	theatrics	of	domestic	radicalization	that	was	part	and	parcel	of	the	new	culture	of	Konfrontasi,	Indonesian	women	were	now	grouped	together	not	only	by	politics,	but	by	uniform	fashion.			
	
Figure	6.25:	Herawati	Diah	as	sukarelawati.	In	uniform	with	the	Indonesian	Embassy	wives	in	Bangkok.	As	Ambassador’s	wife,	her	outfit	is	slightly	different.	Her	
kebaya	is	with	bef,	and	she	wears	dark	glasses.		Herawati	Diah,	An	Endless	Journey,	p.	184.		This	would	become	a	regular	feature	of	the	New	Order,	and	is	discussed	at	the	end	of	Chapter	7.	But	it	is	clear	from	the	pages	of	women’s	magazines	that	this	practice	dates	to	the	era	of	Konfrontasi.	Clothing	became	not	just	an	expression	of	individual	identity,	but,	in	the	wearing	of	exact	matching	outfits,	of	the	transition	of	women	into	a	kaum	not	only	in	theory,	but	in	terms	of	fashion.	As	such,	uniformed	women	clearly	came	to	represent	collective	identities	in	the	political	world	of	Konfrontasi,	symbolically	representing	the	revolutionary	nation.	
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Revolutionary	political	art	placed	the	idealized	Indonesian	woman	as	the	front-rank	defender	of	the	nation.	On	the	occasion	of	its	seventh	anniversary	in	April	1965,	Varia	published	an	image	that	captured	the	revolutionary	zeitgeist	of	the	Konfrontasi	moment.	A	larger-than-life	cover	of	Varia	showed	the	various	forces	opposing	Malaysia:	the	army,	navy	and	air	force,	Indonesia’s	industrial	capacity	and	its	national	pride	exemplified	in	the	national	flag.	An	ideal	Indonesian	man	was	also	represented,	but	leading	all	these	elements	of	the	revolutionary	nation	was	an	exemplary	Indonesian	woman.	She	wore	a	kebaya,	with	her	hair	pulled	back	in	a	konde,	as	she	stared	down	the	frightened	Malaysian	leader,	Tunku	Abdul	Rahman,	who	collapsed	into	the	grasp	of	an	American	cowboy	(President	Lyndon	Johnson)	and	a	British	banker	(Prime	Minister	Harold	Wilson).	Although	it	is	the	peci-wearing	ideal	Indonesian	man	who	pointed	an	accusing	finger	at	the	neo-colonial	imperialist	forces	threatening	Indonesia,	his	arm	came	from	behind	the	ideal	Indonesian	woman,	who	lead	the	revolutionary	charges	from	the	front.	(See	Figure	6.26.)	
	
Figure	6.26:	Indonesian	forces	aligned	in	Konfrontasi,	with	the	ideal	Indonesian		woman	in	the	lead.	Varia,	April	1965	
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But	these	images	of	the	ideal	Indonesian	woman	also	appeared	alongside	images	of	their	obverse,	the	“sexually	dangerous”	woman.	Examples	appeared	in	both	Varia	and	
Puspa	Wanita	in	late	1964	and	early	1965.	Echoing	the	earlier	constructions	of	“moral	panic,”	these	sexually	promiscuous	women	were	decidedly	western	in	their	clothing,	and	were	shown	in	styles	that	were	suggestive	of	both	Hollywood	starlets	and	Indonesian	glamour	school	students.	But	unlike	women	who	wore	western	fashion	in	ways	that	were	
netjis,	rapih	and	bersih,	these	women’s	hair	had	become	too	high,	their	skirts	too	tight	and	too	short,	and	their	necklines	too	plunging	to	meet	proper	standards	for	revolutionary	Indonesian	women.			
	
Figure	6.27:	“Not	in	keeping	with	Indonesian	identity.”	
Varia,	September	2,	1964,	p.	7.	
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A	Varia	article,	from	September	1964,	featured	illustrations	from	the	Jakarta	police	department,	distributed	to	give	examples	of	women’s	clothing	that	would	be	in	violation	of	a	newly	promulgated	local	regulation	aimed	at	controlling	inappropriate	dress	and		grooming	by	both	women	and	men.99	The	high	hair,	plunging	neck	and	back	lines,	and	short,	tight	skirts	of	the	illustrations,	joined	by	men’s	pompadours	and	“Beatle”	haircuts	were	all	said	to	be	“Not	in	line	with	Indonesian	identity.”100	(See	Figure	6.27).		A	Puspa	Wanita	article,	from	January/February	1965	did	not	mention	any	specific	regulations,	but	it	showed	a	more	artistic	version	of	the	same	drawings	from	Varia	the	year	earlier	of	women	whose	hair	was	too	high	and	whose	legs	and	breasts	were	too	visible.	The	text	made	clear	these	were	not	simply	no	longer	in	keeping	with	Indonesian	identity.	Rather,	that	these	styles	were	now	“Forbidden!”	(“Dilarang!”)	(See	Figure	6.28).		The	full	page	included	other	material	that	made	clear	that	women	dressing	this	way	was	considered	an	attack	on	and	impediment	to	the	development	of	an	Indonesian	revolutionary	identity.	Titled	“Mode	dan	Kepribadian”	(“Fashion	and	Identity,”)	the	article	discussed	images	taken	from	behind	of	two	women	wearing	tight	short	skirts,	the	spanrok-
spanrokan	of	Sukarno’s	July	1964	speech	to	Kowani.	The	brief	text	suggested	that	neither	woman	was	dressed	properly,	but	that	the	skirt	with	the	back	slit	in	it	was	the	worse	of	the	two	options.		The	implications	of	such	choices	were	fully	connected	to	the	fate	of	the	nation.	“Indonesian	women	must	take	warning,”	the	text	cautioned,	“for	the	sake	of	finishing	the	revolution!”	101		Reflecting	the	imagery	of	Hollywood	movie	stars,	these	forbidden	women	
 99	Men’s	fashion	violations	included	wearing	jeans	that	were	too	tight	to	the	leg	and	pompadour	hairstyles.	Both	are	associated	with	rock	and	roll	singers	such	as	Elvis	Presley,	whose	music	Sukarno	had	recently	(and	still	to	this	day	famously)	referred	to	as	“ngak	ngik	ngok,”	for	his	onomatopoetic	representation	of	what	he	felt	was	the	jangling	nature	of	music	by	such	artists	as	Presley,	the	Beatles	and	Nat	King	Cole.	The	intial	use	of	ngak	ngik	ngok	was	in	Sukarno’s	August	17,	1959	National	Day	speech,	though	it	was	tied	generally	to	rock-and-roll	and	the	cha-cha	at	that	time,	and	less	to	specific	artists.	(See	Steven	Farram,	“Wage	War	Against	Beatle	Music!”	p.	249.)	I	have	been	told	stories	of	men	going	out	wearing	tight	jeans	who	would	be	stopped	by	policemen,	and,	if	a	kecap	bottle	(a	fairly	skinny,	narrow	condiment	bottle,)	could	not	fit	between	the	jeans	and	their	wearer’s	calf,	the	police	would	slit	the	legs	of	the	jeans	open	with	scissors.	I’ve	also	been	told	stories	of	men	having	their	hair	forcibly	cut	if	it	was	too	pompadour-esque.	A	cartoon	from	Varia	in	1964,	without	any	captioning,	shows	a	young	man	in	James	Dean-style	tight	jeans,	leather	jacket	and	pompadour	proudly	leaving	his	village	house,	only,	in	a	second	frame,	to	come	back	bent	over	and	running	home,	his	jeans	and	hair	cut	and	his	jacket	gone.	That	this	could	run	without	any	further	context	makes	clear	the	extent	to	which	the	policing	of	young	western	fashion	that	had	gone	“too	far”	was	an	understood	phenomenon	by	late	1964.	It	also	is	another	example	of	the	ability	for	cartoonists	to	include	violence	as	a	response	to	such	violations	without	needing	to	offer	an	explanation.	100	“Jang	tidak	berkepribadian	Indonesia.”	Varia,	September	2,	1964,	p.	7.	101	“harus	mendapat	perhatian	kaum	wanita	indonesia,	demi	penjelesaian	revolusi.”	The	text	is	next	to	two	comparative	photos	of	women’s	hips	and	legs	from	behind,	both	women	wearing	tight	skirts.	The	one	on	the	right,	which	is	shorter,	tighter	and	features	a	slit	up	the	back,	is	expressly	forbidden.	The	one	on	the	left,	which	is	longer	than	the	other,	and	has	
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Figure	6.28:	Fashion	and	Identity:	Forbidden!		Imbedded	in	an	article	on	Makassar	that	discusses	the	presence	of	“cross-boys”	and	young	women	dressed	in	“inappropriate	clothing.”	
Puspa	Wanita,	January/February	1965,	p.	538.	
 no	slit	is	nonetheless	“still	doubtful.”	(“diragukan	lagi.”)	The	article	gives	the	source	of	this	analysis	as	“Laporan	Marthinus	
Kopa,”	a	report	I	have	not	yet	been	able	to	track	down,	or	even	find	any	information	on.	
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	played	on	fears	of	what	Sukarno	had	begun	to	refer	to	in	his	speeches	as	“gila-gila-an”	or	“craziness”	that	was	emanating	directly	from	the	adoption	of	the	“forbidden”	elements	of	western	culture.	In	Sukarno’s	view,	and	reflecting	the	language	of	earlier	episodes	of	Indonesian	“moral	panic,”	Hollywood	movies	and	rock	and	roll	music	were	initial	entry	points	for	western	political	imperialism,	by	which	he	literally	meant	the	west’s	intention	to	invade	Indonesia.	The	leftist	attack	on	western	cultural	influences	was	championed	by	Gerwani.	102	Sukarno’s	public	adoption	of	it	occasioned	important	shifts	in	Indonesian	national	identity	that	were	specifically	linked	to	appropriate	gender	representations	of	both	men	and	women,	and	to	a	strong	sense	of	what	should	be	a	proper	version	of	women’s	sexuality.	At	either	ends	of	the	revolutionary	spectrum,	the	woman	volunteer	and	the	sexually	dangerous	woman,	however,	both	appear	as	“types”	much	more	than	they	do	as	individual	women.	These	“types”	the	mother,	the	young	modern	girl,	the	movie	starlet	and	the	Javanese	dancer	in	particular,	though	now	presented	in	ever-idealized	forms,	were	not	new.	They	were	firmly	part	and	parcel	of	the	politics	of	feminine	beauty	and	the	moral	panic	attached	to	it	that	reached	back	to	the	earliest	days	of	the	Indonesian	Republic.		Within	this	context,	let	us	return	to	Sukarno’s	speech	to	revolutionary	women	in	1964	at	the	national	conference	of	Wanita	Indonesia	Demokrat.	Following	Sukarno’s	laudatory	introduction	and	an	extended	recapitulation	of	his	theory	that	the	national	revolution	would	be	impossible	to	achieve	without	women,	his	speech	took	a	rather	haranguing	turn.	Discussing	youth	fashion	and	cultural	trends	of	the	day,	Sukarno	forcefully	expressed	his	opinion	that	the	Democratic	Women	in	his	audience	were	yet	doing	enough	to	bring	about	a	new	class	of	revolutionary	women.	In	particular,	he	felt	that	on	these	questions,	he	was	“struggling	alone”	103	to	foster	“a	new	type	of	women	who	is	aligned	with	Indonesian	identity.”104	
 102	The	hedonistic	western	youth	“craziness”	is	also	covered	with	appropriate	disapproval	in	Varia	at	several	points	from	late	1964	on.	A	Varia	cartoon	from	late	1964	shows	a	jamu	seller	(jamu	is	a	Javanese	herbal	tonic,	made	and	sold	primarily	by	women,	who	walk	through	neighborhoods,	invariably	wearing	a	simple	version	of	kain	and	kebaya	and	carrying	their	potions	on	their	heads	and	backs)	who	sees	a	western-dressed	women	with	exceptionally	highly	teased	hair,	and	calls	out	to	her	“I	have	something	to	take	care	of	that	bump	on	your	head!”	103	“berdjoang	sendiri.”	Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!,”	p.	13.	104	“wanita	djenis	baru	jang	sesuai	dengan	kepribadian	Indonesia.”	Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	
Tanpa	Wanita!,”	p.	14.	
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“I	am	fighting	alone.		.	.	.	I	am	a	single	fighter105.		.	.	.	But	you	women	and	mothers	do	nothing.		.	.	.		Nah,	that	is	just	left	to	me.	That	is	to	say,	sisters,	why	is	it	I,	I,	I,	a	man	lho,	I	am	a	man,	why	is	it	that	I,	a	man	must	eradicate	teased	hair?		.	.	.			What	are	you?	Woman,	woman,	woman,	woman,	woman,	woman,	why	is	it	that	a	man,	a	Father,	must	eradicate	teased	hair?	.	.	.	why	is	it	that	I,	a	man	lho,	this	man,	must	eradicate	miniskirts,	skirts	that	fall	above	the	knee?	.	.	.		Oh	my,	oh	my,	oh	my	.	.	.	Lha,	this	doesn’t	fit	with	Indonesian	identity,	sisters.	.	.	.	Lha,	once	again	why	is	it	that	I	myself	have	to	struggle,	oppose,	eradicate	this.	Women,	why	aren’t	you	joining	in	eradicating	it?106			Women,	again,	were	being	held	directly	responsible	for	upholding	a	special	role	in	establishing	the	nation’s	revolutionary	identity.	In	failing	to	do	this,	they	were,	themselves,	implicated	in	the	potential	failure	of	the	revolution	as	well.	The	personal	choices	so	clearly	available	to	Indonesian	women	in	the	early	1950’s	about	how	to	be	both	Indonesian	and	modern,	had,	by	this	time	clearly	been	co-opted,	not	only	by	an	increasingly	politicized	Sukarnoist	sense	of	what	served	as	an	appropriate	Indonesian	national	identity,	but	more	precisely	by	what	it	meant	to	be	progressive-revolutionary	women.	Even	among	some	of	the	nation’s	most	active	women,	choice	was	now	sublimated	to	Sukarno’s	visions	of	Indonesian	national	identity,	and	his	scolding	tirades.		As	I	said	at	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	when	Sukarno	concerned	himself	with	questions	of	women’s	beauty,	there	was	much	more	at	stake	in	these	speeches	than	either	simple	flattery	of	women	or	patriarchal	condescension	on	his	part.	Instead,	what	was	at	play	was	the	entire	question	of	what	modern	Indonesia	would	be.	Wrapped	up	in	uniform	
kain-kebaya	and	konde,	women	and	their	appropriate	public	comportment	came	to	represent	the	sanctity	and	purity	of	the	Indonesian	half	of	a	“modern-Indonesian”	national	identity.	And,	as	I	have	argued,	moral	crises	about	these	same	questions	did	not	reflect	fears	of	foreign	cultural	invasion	as	much	as	they	did	a	sense	of	panic	about	the	possible	failure	of	the	nation	from	internal	causes	and	weaknesses.		
 105	These	phrases	were	spoken	in	English.	106	“I	am	fighting	alone	.	.	.	I	am	a	single	fighter	.	.	.	Lha	kok	engkau,	wanita	ibu-ibu	itu	tidak	berbuat	apa-apa.	Nah,	sana,	
serahkan	kepada	Bapak	sadja.	Misalnja,	Saudara-saudara,	kenapa	kok	saja,	saja,	saja,	orang	laki	lho,	saja	ini	laki,	kenapa	
kok	saja	orang	laki	harus	memberantas	rambut	sasak.	Kamu	apa,	wanita,	wanita,	wanita,	wanita,	wanita,	wanita,	apa	kok	
laki,	Bapak	sadja	harus	memberantas	rambut	sasak.	Hajo,	terus	terang	sadja,	kenapa	kok	saja	orang	laki	lho,	laki	saja	ini,	
harus	memberantas	spanrok,	rok	sepan	jang	diatas	lutut	itu.		.	.	.		Aduh,	aduh,	aduh	.	.	.	Lha,	sekali	lagi	saja	bertanja	kenapa	
kok	aku	sendiri	harus	berdjoang,	menentang,	memberantas	itu.	Kaum	wanita,	kenapa	engkau	tidak	ikut-ikut	memberantas?”	Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!,”	p.	14.	
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While	a	traditional	scholarship	of	the	history	of	political	parties	and	platforms,	of	the	expansion	military	force	and	of	international	confrontations,	that	is	of	the	world	of	men,	has	told	us	how	Indonesia	came	to	be,	looking	at	women	tells	us	much	more	about	how	Indonesians	came	to	be.	Reading	Indonesian	history	through	this	lens,	of	women,	of	underwear,	of	hairstyles,	of	dresses	and	of	make-up,	then,	actually	gives	us	a	particularly	sensitive	reading	of	a	politics	of	which	many	historians,	to	this	point,	have	only	examined	half.			 With	this	in	mind,	the	next	chapter	of	the	dissertation	addresses	what	is	arguably	the	central	episode	of	modern	Indonesian	history,	the	events	of	the	evening	of	September	30/October	1,	1965.	It	offers	a	reading	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	and	their	aftermath	that	tries	to	make	sense	of	the	gendering	of	the	story.	It	does	not	simply	assume,	as	many	scholars	have,	that	an	attack	on	the	generals	by	Gerwani	was	sufficient	to	plunge	the	nation	into	genocide.		Rather,	I	argue	that	the	gendered	version	of	the	killings	of	the	generals	was	necessary	for	genocidal	violence	to	explode,	precisely	because	the	gendered	patterns	of	moral	panic	about	the	future	of	the	nation	were	expressly	put	into	play.	While	political	intrigue	and	rivalry,	Cold	War	tensions	and	economic	and	religious	stresses	were	clearly	all	important	to	the	failure	of	Sukarno’s	Indonesia,	the	explosion	of	violence	was	dependent	on	the	recruitment	of	ideas	of	moral	crisis.	In	Indonesia	to	that	point,	moral	crisis	was	principally	about	women’s	moral	health	and	the	moral	health	of	the	nation.	Without	accounting	for	this	gendered	reading,	scholars	of	Indonesian	history	have,	indeed,	only	been	seeing	half	of	the	story.	It	is	only	with	the	inclusion	of	a	gendered	reading	that	the	story	makes	full	sense.	
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CHAPTER	7	
	
Mother	of	the	Nation	or	Godless	Whore:	
Images	of	Indonesian	Women	at	the	Birth	of	the	New	Order,	1965-1966		
											De	man	heeft	grote	kunstwerken	geschapen;	de	vrouw	heeft	de	mens	
geschapen;	en	grote	moeders	maken	een	groot	ras.	
											Memang:	Didalam	pertanjaan:	Besar	atau	tidak	besarnja	kaum	ibunja,	
didalam	pertanjaan	itu	buat	sebagian	adalah	terletak	djawabnja	pertanjaan	
akan	selamat	atau	tjelakanja	sesuatu	bangsa.	Ibu-ibu	kita	Besar	atau	ketjil,	
ibu-ibu	kita	sadar	atau	ibu-ibu	lalai—itulah	buat	sebagaian	berisi	djawaban	
soal	Indonesia	akan	luhur	atau	Indonesia	akan	hantjur.			
														Man	has	created	great	works	of	art;	women	have	created	men;	and	great	mothers	make	a	great	race.											Truly:	Within	the	question:	whether	or	not	our	mothers	are	great,	within	that	question	there	is	in	part	the	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	a	people	will	be	blessed	or	face	misfortune.	Whether	our	mothers	are	Great	or	small,	whether	our	mothers	are	wise	or	our	mothers	are	negligent—that	is	what	forms	part	of	the	answer	to	the	problem	of	whether	Indonesia	will	be	glorious	or	whether	Indonesia	will	be	shattered.	-	Sukarno,	1928.	Re-serialized,	19651		This	dissertation	began	with	an	account	of	the	events	of	the	night	of	September	30-October	1,	1965,	commenting	on	the	quickness	with	which	the	army,	under	the	command	of	soon-to-be-President	Suharto,	assumed	control	of	the	nation.	As	the	military	asserted	this	control,	it	initially	continued	Sukarno’s	nationalist	rhetoric	and	cast	itself	as	the	protector	of	both	the	President	and	his	on-going	revolution.	While	Suharto	gradually	
 1	From	a	Sukarno	article	originally	published	in	the	nationalist	magazine	Suluh	Indonesia	Muda	in	1928,	the	year	of	the	founding	of	the	Indonesian	women’s	movement.	It	was	reprinted	in	serialized	form	in	newspapers	in	1965	as	“Adjaran	
Pemimpin	Besar	Revolusi	Bung	Karno”	(“The	Teachings	the	Great	Leader	of	the	Revolution	Bung	Karno.”)	Newspapers	and	magazines	ran	these	columns	daily,	all	using	this	same	title	and	a	shared	graphic	from	1964	forward	as	part	of	new	press	requirements	in	the	Konfrontasi	era.	They	cycled	through	a	set	of	colonial-era	texts,	though	not	synchronously	among	different	publications.	This	particular	article,	addressing	the	growing	women’s	movement	in	1928	was	republished	in	
Angkatan	Bersendjata	in	July,	1965,	with	the	quote	appearing	in	the	July	13	edition,	p.	2,	but	in	Api	Pantajasila	in	November,	with	the	quote	appearing	in	the	November	13	edition,	p.	3.		The	date	of	the	original	helps	to	explain	the	extended	use	of	Dutch	in	the	text,	since	Sukarno	would,	at	that	time,	have	been	addressing	an	audience	whose	education	was	largely	in	Dutch.	But	Sukarno	continued,	up	to	1966,	to	inflect	his	speeches	with	phrases	in	Dutch,	English,	French,	German	and	Javanese,	mixed	in	with	the	Indonesian.	
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ascended	to	political	power	in	what	John	Roosa	refers	to	as	a	“creeping	coup	d’état,”2	the	violence	against	the	generals	came	to	be	reconstructed	as	an	assault	on	the	Indonesian	nation.	But	Suharto	did	not—at	first—fundamentally	dismantle	Sukarno’s	rhetorical	construction	of	the	country	and	its	revolution.		Rather,	as	this	dissertation	notes	previously,	employing	language	almost	identical	to	that	of	Col.	Untung	and	the	September	Thirtieth	Movement	earlier	in	the	day,	Suharto	used	the	speech	on	the	night	to	October	1	to	position	himself	and	the	army	as	President	Sukarno’s	protectors.	Further,	Suharto	asserted	that	the	military	would	carry	out	the	same	functions	as	the	revolutionary	councils	proposed	by	Col.	Untung	and	G-30-S	earlier	that	day,	to	safeguard	the	revolution	“in	the	center	as	well	as	in	the	regions.”3		Suharto	did	immediately	implement	one	significant	change	to	the	construction	of	the	on-going	revolution,	however,	as	he	excluded	whoever	had	carried	out	the	attacks	from	the	nation,	as	of	that	point	not	yet	fully	identified,	and	called	for	their	“eradication.”	“Listeners	all,”	he	said	in	his	speech	to	the	nation	over	the	radio:	With	this	[information	just	shared	about	the	movement],	it	is	clear	that	their	actions	are	Counter-Revolutionary	and	must	be	eradicated	down	to	the	very	roots.	We	are	confident	that	with	the	full	help	of	the	progressive	revolutionary	masses,	we	can	truly	crush	the	counter-revolutionary	Thirtieth	September	Movement,	and	that	the	Unitary	Nation	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	that	is	based	on	Pancasila	will	certainly	remain	triumphant	under	our	beloved	leader	His	Excellency	President/Commander-in-Chief	of	the	Military/Great	Leader	of	our	Revolution,	Bung	Karno.4			 As	the	shifts	of	overall	power	as	a	result	of	the	events	of	September	30/October	1,	the	process	would	require	a	gradual	manipulation	of	existing	revolutionary	ideas	rather	than	their	simple	replacement.	The	New	Order	would	arise	in	some	ways	as	a	gradual	
 2	John	Roosa,	Pretext	for	Mass	Murder,	p.	4.	3	“baik	di	pusat	maupun	di-daerah2.”	Angkatan	Bersendjata,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	Angkatan	Bersendjata	was	one	of	two	military	daily	papers	published	nationally.	It	was	intended	for	a	general	audience,	while	the	other,	Berita	Yudha,	although	available	generally,	was	the	army’s	“internal”	paper	focused	on	a	military	readership.	Hereafter,	Angkatan	Bersendjata	is	referred	to	as	A.B.	in	the	footnotes.	4	“Para	pendengar	sekalian.	Dengan	demikian,	djelaslah	bahwa	tindakan2	mereka	itu	Kontra	Revolusioner	jang	harus	
diberantas	sampai	keakar-akarnja.	//	Kami	jakin	dengan	bantuan	penuh	dari	masa	rakjat	jang	progresif	revolusioner,	
gerakan	kontra	revolusioner	30	September	pasti	dapat	kita	hantjur	leburkan	dan	Negara	Kesatuan	Republik	Indonesia	jg,	
berdasarkan	Pantjasila	pasti	tetap	djaja	dibawah	Pimpinan	PJM	Presiden/Panglima	Tertinggi	ABRI/Pemimpin	Besar	
Revolusi	kita	jang	tertjinta	Bung	Karno.”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	This	is	the	original	instance	of	many,	pointed	out	by	Geoffrey	Robinson,	of	the	trope	of	“eradication	down	to	the	very	roots.”	
 
 
355 
reimagination	of	Sukarno’s	Revolutionary	Indonesia	rather	than	as	its	immediate	wholesale	repudiation.	It	would	be	reimagined,	however,	without	one	of	its	three	principal	pillars,	Indonesian	Socialism,	that	is,	without	Communism	writ	large,	and	with	its	“fourth	pillar,”	feminism,	torn	asunder.		Furthermore,	the	Indonesian	nation	would	also	be	re-formed	in	ways	that	completely	depoliticized	its	public	culture,	ending	the	politics	of	mass	mobilization	that	had	marked	the	final	years	of	the	Sukarno	era.	In	New	Order	Indonesia,	the	potentially	dangerous	peasantry	was	transformed	into	a	heavily	monitored	“floating	mass.”	Islamicist,	and	indeed	Islamic	identity	was	de-emphasized,	one	of	the	interesting	signs	of	which	was	that	women	were	strongly	discouraged	from	wearing	head	scarves.	Chinese	Indonesians	were	required	to	adopt	“Indonesian”	names,	and	the	use	of	Chinese	characters	and	the	celebration	of	Chinese	festivals	were	suppressed.	The	language	of	National	Revolution	disappeared	by	the	middle	of	1966,	and	was	replaced	by	the	philosophy	of	Pembangunan	
Nasional,	or	National	Economic	Development.		This	fundamental	realignment	all	rested,	as	Chapter	1	explores,	on	the	story	of	the	“treachery”	and	“barbarity”of	the	PKI	at	Lubang	Buaya,	a	narrative	that	emerged	quickly	and	took	its	essential	final	shape	within	several	weeks	of	the	killings	of	the	generals.	That	is,	even	if	there	were	continuities	of	thought	between	the	Old	and	New	Orders,	the	important	shifts	aimed	at	discrediting	the	PKI	began	immediately,	with	the	made-up	story	of	Gerwani’s	sexual	torture	of	the	generals	as	its	primary	evidence.	This	new	narrative	was	then	manipulated	and	shaped	as	necessary,	first	to	meet	evolving	situations	on	the	gound	in	the	first	several	months	after	October	1965,	and	then	to	cement	and	monumentalize	the	New	Order’s	need	to	provide	continuing	secure	control	over	the	nation	for	three	decades.	The	rhetoric	about	Gerwani	that	transformed	the	PKI	into	a	barbaric,	counter-revolutionary	force	can	be	followed	by	tracing	the	tight	changes	in	the	language	used	in	the	media	to	describe	the	September	Thirtieth	Movement’s	perceived	crimes	over	the	course	of	several	months	in	late	1965.	As	descriptions	of	“what	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya,	including	who	carried	out	the	events	and	why,	were	manipulated—sometimes	subtly,	but	always	intentionally—the	shape	of	the	nation’s	internal	enemies	and	dangers,	against	which	it	was	critical	to	act	decisively,	was	given	fuller	form.	As	the	dissertation	has	noted,	
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the	story	that	was	developed	was	fundamentally	false,	and	it	relied	on	the	sexual	demonization	of	communist	women	for	its	fundamental	logic.	This	chapter	analyses	the	story	invented	about	Gerwani	and	its	deployment	in	three	ways.	First,	it	traces	the	development	of	what	I,	joining	other	scholars	such	as	Yosef	Djakababa,	refer	to	as	the	“Lubang	Buaya	Narrative.”	Following	daily	changes	how	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	and	their	aftermath	were	described	in	three	national	newspapers,	the	chapter	demonstrates	that	the	fundamental	falsity	of	the	narrative	can	be	seen	simply	in	the	shifting	language	of	the	narrative	as	it	developed.	That	is,	it	is	clear	from	reading	the	story	tightly	that	the	daily	and	then	monthly	changes	in	the	story	were	being	made	up	or	produced,	clearly	by	the	Indonesian	military.	Furthermore,	it	demonstrates	that	new	elements	of	the	narrative	were	added	to	meet	specific	goals	at	specific	times	between	October	and	December	1965.	We	can	trace	how	the	charges	brought	against	Gerwani	in	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	were	leveraged	and	given	specific	new	focus	at	particular	junctures	by	the	military	to	meet	specific	needs	of	moving	the	campaign	against	the	PKI	forward	in	its	first	months.5		On	the	broadest	level,	the	narrative	about	G-30-S	demonstrates	that	Suharto’s	initial	central	charge	of	being	“counter-revolutionary”	faded	across	1966,	as	the	New	Order	rsegime	re-oriented	Indonesia’s	relations	with	the	west	and	its	place	in	international	politics.	As	the	crime	of	counter-revolution	diminished	and	was	replaced	with	a	more	generally	expressed	accusation	of	“treachery,”6	the	charges	of	religious	and	gendered	crimes	against	the	nation,	embodied	in	descriptions	of	Communist	women	and	which	had	already	been	put	firmly	in	place,	moved	increasingly	to	the	fore.7		
 5	This	section	of	the	dissertation	was	originally	written	in	1994	as	a	seminar	paper	in	graduate	school,	although	I	have	revised	it	since,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	idea	of	the	chronology	of	changes	in	the	story	being	released	at	specific	points	in	the	early	campaign	against	the	PKI.	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	significant	overlap	in	the	primary	sources	used	in	this	section	of	the	dissertation	with	those	used	in	Saskia	Wieringa’s	analysis	in	the	section	of	Sexual	Politics	in	
Indonesia	on	“The	Defamation	of	Gerwani,”	pp.	301-317.	We	read	the	sources	similarly,	although	I	suggest	a	different	final	interpretation	than	she	does	as	to	why	the	killings	were	possible.	6	“Penghianatan,”	which	was	connected	directly	to	the	Communist	Party	in	the	phrase	“Penghianatan	
G-30-S/PKI,”	a	standard	construction	for	the	crimes	against	the	state	revealed	by	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.	7	The	idea	of	various	twinned	constructions	of	the	enemy	of	a	state	shifting	relative	to	each	other	so	one	gains	prominence	as	another	recedes,	and	its	effects	on	the	where	violence	would	be	focused,	is	drawn	from	Arno	Mayer’s	arguments	about	why	the	mass-murder	of	Jews	in	the	Holocaust	happened	at	the	time	and	in	the	spaces	that	it	did.	His	discussion	in	Why	
Did	the	Heavens	Not	Darken?	posits	that	National	Socialism	was	built	on	opposition	to	two	enemies	of	the	German	Volk:	Jews	and	Communists,	both	of	whom	were	attacked	both	within	Germany	and	outside	it	as	the	German	armies	invaded	Eastern	Europe.	The	timing	of	the	decision	to	proceed	with	mechanized	mass	killing	of	Jews,	however,	only	occurred	as	the	fight	against	the	Russians,	and	therefore	against	Communism,	stalled	out	on	the	Eastern	Front	in	Winter	1941-42.	Mayer	argues	that	this	led	all	the	Nazi	Party	energy	around	enemies	of	the	people	to	transfer	fully	onto	the	eradication	of	
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On	a	level	slightly	closer	to	the	ground,	the	chapter	demonstrates	that	the	two	principal	new	revelations	related	to	the	narrative	were	tied	to	specific	watersheds	in	the	national	campaign	against	the	PKI.	The	first,	a	series	of	coerced	and	completely	invented	“confessions”	by	Gerwani	members,	and	which	focused	on	the	nature	of	Gerwani’s	alleged	actions	that	would	separate	them	from	the	community	of	other	Indonesian	women,	were	deployed	just	at	the	time	that	the	rest	of	the	women’s	movement	was	publicly	pressured	to	denounce	Gerwani	in	early	to	mid-November.	These	also	happened	at	a	period	that	showed	an	uptick	in	killings	in	Central	Java	in	particular.		The	second	was	the	nationally	prominent	story	about	the	death	of	the	five-year-old	daughter	of	General	Nasution,	Irma	Ade,	who	was	shot	during	the	raid	on	her	house	as	her	father	escaped	the	attackers	over	the	back	wall	of	his	garden.	The	story	of	Indonesia’s	“Little	Hero”	was	published	in	late	December,	both	in	conjuction	with	the	end	of	the	first	week	of	Ramadan	that	was	also	approaching	Christmas,	and	at	a	time	when	Sukarno	was	pushing	back	publicly	on	the	demonization	of	Gerwani.	Second,	the	chapter	then	goes	on	to	make	the	dissertation’s	important	novel	claim:	that	we	can	begin	to	better	understand	why	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	was	able	to	succeed	in	prompting	and	supporting	the	mass	killing	of	the	Indonesian	left	if	we	look	at	it	through	the	lens	of	Moral	Crisis.	This	claim,	I	argue,	moves	our	understanding	of	1965-66	forward	in	two	important	ways.	First,	it	connects	the	reasoning	for	the	killings	to	an	important—indeed	central—set	of	national	conversations	that	were	replete	with	the	possibility	of	the	failure	of	the	nation,	and	that	earlier	chapters	of	the	dissertation	have	demonstrated	were	already	largely	in	place	by	1949.	Second,	it	provides	solid	reasoning	for	why	women	found	themselves	at	the	center	of	what	could	otherwise	have	been	a	largely	male-dominated	political	fight	between	parties.	In	addition,	building	on	work	by	Julia	Suryakusuma,	it	strengthens	the	arguments	about	why	Indonesian	women	found	their	position	limited	in	specific	ways	with	the	establishment	of	the	New	Order.	Third,	and	in	more	of	an	exploratory	nature,	this	chapter	asks	how	this	gendered	reading	of	the	justifications	for	the	killing	of	the	Indonesian	Left	might	enhance	new	historical	arguments	that	Indonesia	1965-66	might	be	read	as	a	case	of	genocide.	In	
 European	Jewry.	It	explains,	in	his	view,	the	timing	of	the	expansion	of	the	death	camp	network	and	the	beginning	of	mass	deportations	from	ghettos	to	the	extermination	camps	in	the	early	spring	and	summer	of	1942.		
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particular,	it	offers	a	reading	of	the	patterns	by	which	the	Indonesian	kaum	feminis	was	pulled	apart,	and	how	this	dismemberment	of	Indonesian	feminism	lead	to	the	kaum	
wanita	as	a	whole	being	reconfigured.	In	doing	so,	it	suggests	that	these	patterns	match	what	one	might	expect	to	see	in	the	process	of	the	reformation	of	the	nation	without	one	of	its	former	social	components,	a	critical	element	of	the	sociological	definition	of	genocide	put	forward	by	Daniel	Feierstein. 	
Expansions	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	Narrative	and	the	Chronology	of	Eradication		The	first	reading	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	Narrative	provided	in	this	chapter	examines	how	the	army’s	charges	against	Gerwani	were	rolled	out	episodically	across	the	months	of	October-December	1965.	The	charges	were	brought	to	the	fore	in	different	forms	at	specific	times,	tailored	to	meet	specific	political	needs	and	intended	to	produce	specific	reactions	at	those	times.		The	first	presentation	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	occurred	between	October	5-11,	that	is,	immediately	as	the	nation’s	newspapers	were	allowed	to	begin	publishing	again	and	with	strict	military	control	of	their	content.	The	narrative’s	treatment	of	the	alleged	actions	of	Gerwani	served	as	the	critical	element	of	the	initial	revelation	of	the	crimes	of	the	Communist	Party	as	the	military	was	just	beginning	to	assert	control	of	the	nation.	This	story	of	Gerwani,	presented	in	increasingly	lurid	detail	day-by-day,	provided	the	principal	justification	for	the	military’s	actions.	We	know	that	these	details	were	entirely	fictional.8		We	can	read	them	therefore	as	a	representation	of	what	the	military	believed	was	necessary	to	justify	their	move	to	take	power,	since	that	is	clearly	why	the	narrative	was	created.		Despite	the	initial	charges	involved	in	the	story	being	lodged	against	“counter-revolutionary”	forces,	the	initial	narrative	soon	pivoted	to	include	the	mention	of	Gerwani.	This	provoked	almost	immediate	public	actions	against	the	PKI.	Indeed,	Geoffrey	Robinson	writes	that	“within	hours	of	the	appearance	of	these	false	reports	[about	Gerwani],	large	
 8	The	principal	evidence	against	the	stories	of	sexual	torture	and	castration	lie	in	the	reports	of	the	autopsies	carried	out	on	the	bodies	after	their	exhumation.	The	soldiers	were	clearly	all	killed	by	gunshots,	and	there	is	no	evidence	of	slash	wounds	from	razor	blades	or	other	knives.	Additionally,	each	report	lists	whether	its	subject	was	circumcised	or	not,	so	their	penises	also	clearly	remained	fully	intact.	See	Benedict	Anderson,	“How	Did	the	Generals	Die?”	for	a	discussion	and	translation	of	these	documents.	Sukarno	himself	also	made	these	points	in	a	speech	to	the	nation’s	governors	in	December	1965.	
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crowds	began	to	form	in	Jakarta	and	throughout	the	country,	first	calling	for	the	banning	of	the	PKI,	then	ransacking	the	party’s	offices,	and	eventually	attacking	and	killing	PKI	members	themselves.”9		The	initial	charges	against	Gerwani	had	their	desired	effect	of	beginning	the	exclusion	of	the	PKI,	while	making	violence	against	the	Indonesian	Left	possible	and	understandable.	Demonstrations	against	the	PKI	took	place	across	the	nation,	and	PKI,	Gerwani,	BTI	and	other	Communist-affiliated	offices	were	looted	and/or	destroyed	in	multiple	cities.	David	Jenkins	and	Douglas	Kammen,	for	instance,	note	that	beginning	“on	8	October,	the	Army	and	anti-communist	forces	began	to	attack	PKI	offices	and	homes	in	Jakarta:	mass	detentions	soon	followed.”10	The	first	major	“expansion”	of	the	Gerwani	elements	of	the	narrative	took	place	in	early-	to	mid-November,	beginning	on	November	5,	through	the	publication	of	several	“confessions”	by	women	said	to	have	been	present	at	Lubang	Buaya.	The	most	important	“confession”—by	a	15-year-old	young	mother	named	Djamilah,	that	gave	the	initial	detailed	description	of	sexualized	killings	of	the	seven	soldiers—was	published	on	November	6.	A	second	critical	“confession”—this	time	by	Ibu	Trimo,	a	Gerwani	cadre	who	was	not	said	to	have	been	present	at	Lubang	Buaya,	but	who	was	produced	alongside	Djamilah	and	who	decried	Gerwani’s	sins—was	published	on	November	14.11		The	new	critical	element	of	the	confessional	narrative	was	that	it	supplied	lurid	descriptions,	supposedly	in	the	words	of	the	leftist	women	confessing,	of	the	processes	by	which	the	women	were	described	as	having	violated	the	captured	soldiers	sexually	before	castrating	them	with	penknives.	This	greatly	enhanced	the	argument	that	these	women—and	the	PKI	by	extension—were	inhuman	and	godless.		Saskia	Wieringa’s	research	has	shown	that	these	confessions	were	fundamentally	false	and	were	“distributed”	to	the	press	by	the	army.12	This	is	most	easily	seen	in	that	various	newspapers	printed	the	stories	of	the	confessions	using	identical	language.	Their	release	aligned	with	two	important	shifts	in	the	post-October	1	landscape.	First,	on	the	
 9	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	61.	10	David	Jenkins	and	Douglas	Kammen,	“The	Army	Para-commando	Regiment	and	the	Reign	of	Terror	in	Central	Java	and	Bali,”	in	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	MacGregor,	The	Contours	of	Mass	Violence	in	Indonesia,	1965-68,	p.	77.	11	These	two	confessions	are	examined	in	detail	later	in	this	chapter,	in	the	discussion	of	how	the	Gerwani	narrative	was	constructed	as	an	instance	of	moral	crisis.	12	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia.	p.	308.	
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same	day	as	the	release	of	the	confessions,	women’s	organizations	that	formerly	worked	with	Gerwani	were	re-organized	into	the	womens	section	of	a	national	group	,	the	“Coordinating	Body	of	the	Action	Command	to	Crush	Gestapu,”	(the	“Badan	Koordinasi	
Keseatuan	Aksi	Pengganyangan	Gestapu.”)	Wieringa	writes	that	women	from	various	non-Communist	organizations	then	organized	a	mass	demonstration	reported	in	the	press	the	following	day,	in	which,	they	presented	a	resolution	that		“condemned	Gerwani’s	actions,	which	had	lowered	the	prestige	of	women,	and	urged	the	President	to	ban	the	PKI,	Gerwani	and	the	other	mass	organizations	as	soon	as	possible,	in	order	to	safeguard	the	young	generation	from	the	decadent	influences	and	the	ferocity	which	these	organizations	represented.13		
	The	second	element	the	confessions	aligned	with	was	the	military	mobilization	of	civilian	militias	to	carry	out	executions	in	Central	Java	during	the	first	two	weeks	of	November	1965,	one	of	the	first	times	civilians	appear	to	have	been	used	to	round	up	and	kill	members	of	the	PKI.	On	November	13,	certainly	with	a	delay	from	when	the	events	themselves	had	begun	to	occur	in	Solo,	the	US	Embassy	cable	traffic	reported	the	Army	had	“equipp[ed]	some	24	thousand	Moslem	youth	for	action	against	communists.”14	The	timing	of	the	beginning	of	militia-connected	killings	in	Solo	to	the	publishing	of	the	confessions	is	less	exact	than	the	connection	to	women’s	political	reactions.	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	McGreggor	write	that	although	military	brigades	(RKPAD)	under	the	command	of	Col.	Sarwo	Edhie,	that	would	go	on	to	lead	the	first	killings	in	Central	Java,		had	arrived	in	Solo15	in	mid-October,16	Edhie		“believed	he	had	too	few	troops	to	establish	his	authority	in	the	surrounding	rural	areas,	many	of	which	enjoyed	strong	PKI	support.	When	he	contacted	Suharto	to	ask	for	reinforcements,	he	was	told	that	the	additional	troops	
 13	Saska	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	308.	The	quotation	is	Wierienga’s	translation	of	reporting	from	Angkatan	
Bersendjata	on	November	9.	14	See	Telegram	1435,	US	Embassy	Jakarta	to	State	Department,	13	November	1965,	POL	23-9,	INDON,	NARA,	quoted	in	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	MacGregor,	The	Contours	of	Mass	Violence	in	Indonesia,	1965-68,	pp.	91-92.	15	Solo	was	the	first	target	of	the	Edhie	command	for	several	reasons,	principally	that	it	had	been	the	site	of	military	action	in	support	of	G-30-S	on	October	1.	But	the	city	had	a	reputation	as	a	particularly	“red”	city,	strongly	supportive	of	the	PKI,	as	did	the	rural	areas	around	it,	Col.	Untung	was	from	Solo	originally	as	well.	When	Aidit	fled	from	Jakarta	to	hide,	he	went	to	Solo,	where	he	was	eventually	found,	hiding	in	a	well.	A	taxi	driver	I	used	regularly	in	Solo	during	my	research	there,	once	he	understood	part	of	what	I	was	talking	about,	offered	to	take	me	to	the	house	where	the	well	still	exists,	but	the	owners	were	not	home,	so	I	haven’t	yet	visited	the	site.	But	that	this	geography	is	still	known	locally	is	interesting.	16	RKPAD,	the	brigade	under	Sarwo	Edhie’s	command,	arrived	in	Solo	on	October	22,	and	began	arrests	and	executions	on	October	23.	The	exact	timing	of	the	“delay”	before	the	training	of	the	militia	is	less	clear,	but	is	generally	taken	to	have	been	at	least	a	week,	that	is	into	the	month	of	November,	before	youth	milita	were	recruited	and	trained	and	then	began	to	participate	in	the	killings.	Personal	communication	with	John	Roosa,	7/15/2020.	
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would	not	be	available	until	the	end	of	the	month.	He	then	asked	for	permission	to	‘arm	and	train	youths	from	the	religious	and	nationalist	organizations’.”	17			After	a	delay,	Sarwo	Eddie	was	given	the	green	light,	presumably	by	Suharto.	Kammen	and	McGreggor	continue:	“‘We	decided,’	Sarwo	Eddie	recalled,	‘to	encourage	the	anti-communist	civilians	to	help	with	the	job.	In	Solo	we	gathered	together	the	youth,	the	nationalist	groups,	the	religious	organizations.	We	gave	them	two	or	three	days’	training,	then	sent	them	out	to	kill	the	communists’.”18		The	arrests	and	interrogation,	followed	by	killings	involving	militias	in	the	Solo	area	probably	began	in	the	first	and	second	weeks	of	November.19	The	arrests	and	killings	in	Solo	are	known	to	have	settled	into	a	long,	prolonged	process	that	lasted	into	December.20	The	initial	“confessions”	then,	in	which	the	highly	provocative	charges	of	Gerwani	sexual	depravity	were	sensationalized,	and	which	took	over	the	national	media	completely,	were	published	precisely	during	the	period	these	trainings	and	their	concomitant	large-scale	killings	first	took	place	in	Central	Java.	The	following	“confessions”	continued	to	come	out	as	this	locally	focused	violence	was	organized	by	the	military	as	they	moved	across	East	
 17	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	MacGregor,	The	Contours	of	Mass	Violence	in	Indonesia,	1965-68,	p.	88.	The	important	intervention	in	the	historiography	provided	by	Kammen	and	MacGregor’s	book	is	that	the	chronology	of	the	intensification	of	“local”	killings	can	be	matched	to	the	dates	that	RKPAD,	under	Sarwo	Edhie,	moved	from	Central	Java,	across	East	Java	and	then	into	Bali.	It	provides	an	important	piece	of	evidence	for	the	military’s	responsibility	for	the	Indonesian	killings.	18	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	MacGregor,	The	Contours	of	Mass	Violence	in	Indonesia,	1965-68,	p.	88.	The	internal	quote	from	Sarwo	Eddie	is	drawn	from	John	Hughes,	The	End	of	Sukarno,	p.	151.	19	This	allows	for	the	intial	delay	following	the	arrival	on	October	23,	the	process	of	requesting	further	help,	and	then	the	training	of	the	youth	militias	themselves.	In	a	short	story	translated	by	Harry	Aveling,	the	writer	Usamah	recounts	his	interactions	with	people	he	already	knew	when	he	began	working	as	an	“intelligence	assistant”	for	the	local	branch	of	the	“Action	Command	to	Crush	Gestapu,”	(that	is,	the	same	organization	that	the	women’s	organizations	joined	as	they	were	called	to	speak	out	against	Gerwani.)	Usamah	wrote	that	this	happened	at	“the	beginning	of	November.”	Usamah,	“War	and	Humanity,”	(”Perang	dan	Kemanusiaan,”)	translated	by	Harry	Aveling	in	Gestapu:	Indonesian	Short	Stories,	p.	13.	Later	in	the	story,	he	notes	an	incident	in	which	several	women,	including	his	classmate	Sri,	were	executed	because	of	the	army’s	anger	at	Sukarno’s	attempt	to	distance	Gerwani	from	the	killings	in	what	Usamah	refers	to	as	his	“Mother’s	Day	Speech.”	Usamah,	“War	and	Humanity,”	in	Harry	Aveling,	Gestapu,	p.	18.	Wieringa	refers	to	a	Mother’s	Day	speech	given	on	December	21,	but	the	editor	of	a	collection	of	speeches	given	by	Sukarno	following	G-30-S	doesn’t	include	it	in	his	collection,	and	doesn’t	remember	having	seen	a	copy	of	it.	(Bonnie	Triyana,	personal	communication,	7/16/2020).		Sukarno	did	make	a	speech	to	mark	the	anniversary	of	Perwari	on	December	17,	which	was	a	full-throated	defense	of	Manipol-USDEK	and	other	progressive	policies.	(The	full	text	of	this	and	all	of	Sukarno’s	post-October	1,	1965	speeches	has	been	compiled	in	a	collection	by	Budi	Setiyono	and	Bonnie	Triyana	in	Revolusi	Belum	Selesai	(“The	Revolution	Is	Not	Yet	Finished.”)	Sukarno’s	speech	in	which	he	defended	Gerwani	was	made	on	December	13,	1965	at	the	opening	of		the	Conference	of	Indonesian	Governors,	held	at	the	Presidential	Palace	on	December	13.	So	Aveling’s	memory	of	the	context	of	the	speech	may	be	incorrect,	but	it	marks	out	the	chronology	of	the	killing	in	Solo,	and	the	continuing	effect	the	Gerwani	narrative	had	on	provoking	and	enabling	killings.		20	Details	of	the	events	in	Solo,	presented	in	the	form	of	testimonies	and	memories	by	various	of	its	victims	can	be	found	in	Hersri	Setiawan’s	Kidung	Para	Korban.	Some	accounts	cite	dates,	while	others	don’t,	but	the	general	flow	of	the	local	history	of	arrests	and	killings	in	Solo	can	be	gleaned	from	the	accounts.	
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Java	and	into	Bali.	Just	at	the	point	mass	violence	was	called	for,	the	military	produced	evidence	of	the	PKI	as	a	source	of	significant	moral	crisis	that	put	the	very	nature	of	the	nation	at	risk	because	of	the	“ferocity”	of	the	PKI.	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	this	timing	was	coincidental.	A	third	expansion	of	the	narrative	that	was	critical	to	drawing	Gerwani’s	actions	as	an	instance	of	moral	crisis	came	with	the	lionization	of	Irma	Ade	Nasution,	the	daughter	of	General	Abdul	Nasution	in	December.	Irma	died	as	a	result	of	gunshot	wounds	suffered	during	the	attempted	abduction	of	her	father.	As	the	chapter	discusses	later,	“Little	Irma”	was	represented	in	the	press	as	an	ideal	Indonesian	mother,	despite	only	being	five	years	old	at	the	time	of	her	death.		The	series	of	articles	that	transformed	her	into	the	nation’s	“Little	Hero”	were	published	on	December	20-21,	1965.	This	coincided	with	the	end	of	the	first	week	of	Ramadan,	just	as	the	first	stage	of	the	fasting	month,	which	focuses	on	the	idea	of	mercy,	was	reaching	its	apex,	as	well	as	with	the	arrival	of	the	Christmas	season.	It	was	also	the	two	days	prior	to	Hari	Ibu,	and	as	noted	previously,	a	week	after	Sukarno’s	ill-received	speech	to	the	nation’s	Governors	in	which	he	attempted	to	distance	Gerwani	from	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative.	In	particular,	he	was	resisting	both	the	army’s	attacks	on	Gerwani	and	their	attempts	to	“dictate”	his	actions	and	pronouncements.	It	was	a	resistance	that	would	prove	futile.	The	narrative	about	Irma	concluded	with	an	exhortation	for	Indonesian	women	to	learn	from	her	example	and	to	firm	up	their	moral	status,	particularly	by	paying	attention	to	their	religious	duties	and	obligations.	It	specifically	reinforced	their	role	as	tiang	negara,	the	pillars	of	the	nation,	on	whom	the	moral	standing	of	the	nation	was	erected.	It	also	was	clearly	intended	to	evoke	great	sympathy	for	General	Nasution	and	his	wife	and	family,	at	a	time	calculated	to	lift	the	profile	of	the	army	leadership	to	the	nation.	Each	of	these	three	narratives	came	at	what	were	arguably	the	critical	turning	points	in	the	three	months	following	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.	The	first	stories	of	Gerwani	“depravity”	were	linked	to	the	army’s	initial	moves	to	assert	control	over	the	nation.	The	“confessions”	timed	to	both	the	calls	for	women’s	organizations	to	repudiate	Gerwani	and	to	the	beginning	of	their	use	of	youth	militias	in	Central	Java	to	carry	out	the	seizure	and	execution	of	accused	PKI	members	for	the	first	time.	Finally,	the	“Little	Irma”	
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story	linked	to	the	beginning	of	the	Army’s	moves	to	diminish	Sukarno’s	political	position	and	role	in	the	nation.		In	each	case,	the	narrative	that	was	leveraged	centered	on	the	proper	role	of	women	in	Indonesian	society.	In	each	case,	the	danger	that	faced	the	nation	was	constructed	as	a	possible	instance	of	moral	crisis	in	which	the	good	name	and	reputation	of	Indonesian	women	had	been	critically	injured	by	Gerwani’s	actions.		Taken	together,	these	shifts	and	expansions	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	Narrative	connected	to	the	specific	times	they	were	deployed,	suggest	that	the	story	of	sexual	depravity	of	Gerwani,	though	false,	was	already	seen	as	a	powerful	tool	by	the	military	as	they	sought	to	maneuver	the	aftermath	of	G-30-S.	But	in	looking	not	only	at	when	the	military	shifted	elements	of	the	narrative,	but	at	how	the	narrative	was	shifted	as	well,	I	argue	that	the	story	was	constructed	primarily	as	an	instance	of	moral	crisis.		In	particular,	this	helps	strengthen	and	extend	the	arguments	about	why	the	killings	were	able	to	take	place	by	locating	them	it	within	a	broad	social	argument	about	fears	of	excessive	modernity,	what	Indonesian	identity	should	look	like	and	who	Indonesians	should	be	within	a	modern	framework.	I	suggest	this	concept	of	a	broad-based	fear	of	impending	moral	collapse	offers	a	robust	explanation	for	the	reasons	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	worked	on	a	cultural	level,	which	to	this	point	has	been	a	significant	weakness	in	the	scholarly	arguments	of	the	reasons	the	killings	were	not	only	possible,	but	also	carried	out	so	forcefully,	and	in	similar	ways	across	the	nation.		It	also	helps	explain	why	women	and	gender	ideology	were	placed	at	the	center	of	the	army’s	strategy	to	eliminate	the	PKI.	The	definition	of	Indonesia	as	a	strong	nation	held	moral	women	at	its	center.	It	would	follow,	therefore,	that	the	story	the	army	put	forward	in	positing	the	necessity	of	their	defense	of	a	nation-at-peril	would	also	center	women,	though	in	this	case	constructed	as	so	fundamentally	immoral	that	they	put	the	nation	at	risk	of	moral	failure.	Those	women,	and	by	extension	the	whole	Indonesian	Left,	therefore,	needed	to	be	eliminated.	The	chapter	now	turns	to	a	tight	reading	of	the	ways	in	which	the	Lubang	Buaya	Narrative	was	fundamentally	gendered,	and	how	it	used	a	gendered	reading	of	moral	crisis	as	a	cultural	weapon	against	the	progressive	left.		
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Gendering	Moral	Crisis:	The	Shifting	Nature	of	the	Charges	Against	the	PKI	It	should	be	noted	that	the	idea	that	Lubang	Buaya	evoked	a	moral	crisis	based	in	gender	was	not,	of	course,	the	only	arrow	in	the	army’s	quiver.	The	first	charge	against	the	PKI	was	the	idea	that	the	movement	had	put	the	concept	of	the	Indonesian	nation	as	a	product	of	an	on-going	revolution	in	danger.	In	the	first	weeks,	the	most	frequent	charge	against	the	plotters	of	G-30-S,	and	then	the	PKI,	was	that	they	were	“kontra-revolusioner,”	or	counter-revolutionary.	This	category	of	treachery	to	the	nation	was	already	well	established	in	the	national	discourse	in	particular	in	connection	to	the	paranoia	about	foreign	infiltration	of	the	Konfrontasi	era.21		The	charge	of	being	counter-revolutionary	was	firmly	in	place	in	Suharto’s	speech	of	the	evening	of	October	1,	as	it	had	also	been	in	the	pronouncements	of	the	Thirtieth	of	September	Movement	earlier	that	day.	The	charge	was	repeated	the	next	day	in	the	headlines	of	the	military	newspapers.	Being	“counter-revolutionary”	would	remain	an	important	element	of	the	construction	of	the	PKI	as	evil	throughout	1965	and	roughly	through	August	1966.	After	that,	the	revolutionary	construction	of	Indonesian	identity	would	give	way	completely	to	the	establishment	of	the	New	Order.	The	construction	of	Indonesia	as	a	society	based	in	an	ongoing	process	of	revolution	did	not	disappear	at	a	particular	moment.	Rather,	it	gradually	diminished	as	an	element	of	national	discourse	over	the	course	of	1966	as	the	military	formalized	its	command	of	the	nation	and	established	the	New	Order.	But,	as	this	chapter	will	explore,	building	on	the	work	of	Saskia	Weiringa,	the	meaning	of	the	symbols	and	rhetoric	of	Sukarno’s	revolutionary	ideology	would	be	adjusted	in	critical	ways,	even	as	the	language	itself	remained	in	use.		The	formal	shift	of	power	to	Suharto	came	with	the	issuing	of	the	Surat	Perintah	
Sebelas	Maret	(“The	Order	of	the	11th	of	March,	also	known	by	its	acronym	“Supersemar”)	in	March	1966.22	Sukarno	signed	the	Supersemar	document,	giving	Suharto	the	authority	to	take	actions	he	deemed	fit	since	it	was	“necessary	to	assure	calmness	and	stablity	in	
 21	See	the	discussion	of	counter-revolution	as	a	politics	of	fear-building	in	Chapter	6,	which	directly	involved	women’s	clothing	as	a	possible	sign	of	imperialist	cultural	intervention.	22	The	acronym	plays	on	the	name	of	one	of	the	important	clown	characters	in	the	wayang,	Semar,	who	is	both	a	servant	to	the	Pandawa	princes	and	an	incarnation	of	the	gods.	Semar	is	a	rare	character	who	is	able	to	speak	to	gods	in	the	
wayang	as	an	equal.	He	is	often	the	holder	of	important,	but	generally	hidden	knowledge	upon	which	the	plots	of	some	of	the	tales,	or	lakon,	turn.	The	evocation	of	his	name	here	was	replete	with	cultural	power	and	reference	here,	then,	particularly	for	Javanese.	
 
 
365 
Government	and	the	course	of	the	Revolution.”23		Although	there	are	several	versions	of	the	Supersemar	letter,	(and	a	historical	controversy	over	its	authenticity	and	provenance)	the	continuation	of	the	revolution	was	cited	in	all	versions	as	a	critical	reason	for	extending	power	to	Suharto.	However,	by	August	1966,	when	Indonesia	renewed	diplomatic	relations	with	Malaysia	and	by	September	1966	when	it	rejoined	the	United	Nations,	the	continuing	revolution	was	no	longer	cited	as	a	fundamental	basis	for	the	nation.24	While	charges	of	“counter-revolution”	drifted	away,	two	other	prongs	of	the	initial	charges	against	the	PKI	remained	strongly	intact.	Both	were	based	in	the	assertion	that	Indonesian	national	identity,	rather	than	being	based	in	revolution,	would	continue	to	be	based	in	Pancasila,	Sukarno’s	five-legged	state	philosophy.25	The	charges	against	the	PKI	included	that	they	had	violated	the	first	two	prongs	of	Pancasila:	the	first	stating	that	the	movement	was	“godless,”26	while	Indonesia	is	a	nation	built	on	the	“Belief	in	the	One	and	Only	God;”27	the	second	that	members	of	PKI-linked	movements,	and	particularly	Gerwani,	were	“immoral”28	and	“uncivilized,”29	while	Indonesia	was	to	be	based	on	“just	and	civilized	humanity.”30		The	charge	of	being	godless	was	leveled	against	the	entire	secular	Communist	movement,	even	though	the	majority	of	Indonesian	Communists	were	themselves	Muslim.	The	charges	of	immorality	and	lack	of	civilization,	however,	were	leveled	specifically	and	almost	uniquely	against	women,	based	on	the	highly	inflammatory	and	completely	invented	story	that	claimed	Gerwani	women	had	sexually	mutilated	the	soldiers	before	they	were	killed	at	Lubang	Buaya.		
 23	“Sukarno,	Revolusi	Indonesia	Tidak	Dapat	Berdjalan	Tanpa	Wanita!,”.”	The	text	of	the	order	is	available	on	multiple	websites.		24	Thanks	to	Bonnie	Triyana	and	Adrian	Vickers	for	helping	me	figure	out	the	outlines	of	this	phenomenon.	25	The	recitation	of	Pancasila	remained	an	important	element	of	political	socialization	throughout	the	New	Order.	In	particular,	students	would	recite	the	five	prongs	while	lined	up	in	ranks	in	school	courtyards,	with	a	student	leader	calling	the	number,	for	instance	“Satu!”	(“One!,”)	and	the	massed	students	replying	loudly	in	unison	“Ketuhanan	Yang	Maha	Esa!”	(“Belief	in	the	One	and	Only	God!”).	Numerous	friends	have	recounted	that	being	chosen	to	be	the	leader	for	proclaiming	Pancasila	was	a	great	honor,	and	that	the	job	was	taken	very	seriously.	Equally,	however,	many	recount	that,	particularly	by	the	mid-1970s,	the	process	had	become	empty	of	any	real	meaning	or	emotional	power,	something	that	was	also	true	of	the	social	and	political	education	classes	on	Pancasila	that	were	a	requirement	at	all	stages	of	Indonesian	education.	26	“tak	ber-Tuhan,”	in	its	primary	form,	which	is	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	27	“Ketuhanan	yang	Maha	Esa,”	the	first	prong	of	Pancasila.	28	“asusila.”	29	“tak	beradab.”	30	“Kemanusiaan	yang	Adil	dan	Beradab,”	the	second	prong	of	Pancasila.	
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Because	progressive	women,	including	Gerwani,	had	been	working	together	across	political	affiliations,	the	charge	of	immorality	needed	to	be	addressed	by	activist	Indonesian	women	as	a	group,	and	not	just	by	Communist	women.	However,	non-Communist	women,	in	distancing	themselves	from	the	idea	that	activist	women	were	sexually	wanton,	were	forced	into	accepting	a	more	inferior	position	relative	to	men	in	society	and	politics	than	they	had	enjoyed	during	the	Sukarno	era.	The	new	status	would	be	derived	exclusively	from	their	role	as	mothers—of	families	and	of	the	nation—and	as	wives	walking	behind	rather	than	next	to	their	husbands,	rather	than	as	co-leaders	of	the	New	(military)	Order.		The	concept	of	Ibu	Bangsa,	which	women	had	used	to	argue	for	an	increased	role	in	the	political	life	of	the	nation,	was	repurposed,	taking	on	a	new	meaning	that	used	to	remove	women	from	much	real	organizational	power.	Instead,	at	an	official	level	at	least,	women	would	be	reduced	to	their	roles	as	Ibu	sejati,	ideal,	and	ideally	quiet,	mothers	in	charge	of	the	home	and	family.	Writer	Julia	Suryakusuma	makes	a	significant	argument	that	this	retrenchment	of	women,	which	she	referred	to	as	“State	Ibuism,”	came	to	serve	as	a	fundamental	building	block	of	the	New	Order.	I	argue	that	the	development	of	Ibuism	was	a	direct	result	of	the	evocation	of	moral	crisis	by	the	military	in	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya,	as	non-Communist	women	were	placed	in	a	moral	bind	by	their	activist	connections	to	Gerwani.	In	this	way,	ideas	about	women’s	idealized	identity,	born	in	elite	women’s	discourse,	came	to	affect	all	women	in	Indonesia.	Ironically,	it	was	a	result	of	the	manipulation	of	ideology	that	women	themselves	had	used	to	advance	their	own	position.	These	charges	of	immorality	and	lack	of	civilization	stemmed	from	stories	of	“what	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya,	and	of	how	the	generals	were	said	to	have	been	killed.	They	were	fantastic	and	gory.	This	section	of	the	chapter	explores	the	story	tightly.	It	argues	that	the	way	in	which	the	details	shifted	and	changed	are	yet	further	evidence	that	the	story	about	Gerwani	was	completely	made	up.		The	consequences	of	this	story	were	not	simply	about	the	future	political	role	of	Indonesian	women	in	the	New	Order,	however.	This	chapter’s	primary	argument	is	that	the	Lubang	Buaya	story,	while	leading	to	the	dissolution	of	Gerwani	and	the	establishment	of	a	new	gendered	order,	provided	the	army	its	central	justification	for	carrying	out	killings	of	the	left	on	a	massive	scale.	Without	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative’s	focus	on	gendered	sexual	
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violence,	there	would	have	been	no	evocation	of	moral	crisis,	and	without	that,	no	required	broad	response	from	the	military	and	no	mass	eradication	of	the	Indonesian	Left.	To	be	certain,	there	were	multiple	tools	that	the	army	used	to	build	support	for	the	need	to	arrest	and	kill	Communists.	It	crafted	a	general	narrative	of	Communist	viciousness	across	Indonesian	history.	It	also	circulated	stories,	mostly	at	the	local	level	of	PKI	lists	of	its	opponents	to	be	killed,	and	of	the	presence	of	holes	already	dug	to	receive	the	bodies	of	the	to-be-slaughtered	opponents	of	the	Party.	There	is	also	clear	evidence	of	the	army	creating	conditions	under	which	local	youth	militia,	and	citizens	in	general,	were	forced	to	participate	in	the	roundup	and	killings	of	Communists	in	fear	for	their	own	lives	if	they	refused	military	orders	to	act.		But	without	the	evocation	of	moral	crisis,	there	would	have	been	neither	the	“permission”	nor	indeed	the	“necessity”	for	the	killings,	most	specifically	on	a	broad	scale.	In	particular,	the	evocation	of	a	moral	crisis	affecting	the	very	definition	of	the	nation	allowed	for	the	nation-wide	scale	of	the	promulgation	of	mass	violence,	mass	murder	or	massacre,	as	recent	scholars	have	referred	to	the	killings	in	the	titles	of	their	books	on	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya.31		Fears	about	women,	their	clothing	and	their	bodies	and	the	possibility	of	their	unleashed	sexuality	had	been	central	to	the	development	of	Indonesian	national	identity	since	the	beginning	of	the	Republic.	In	this	construction,	moral	crisis,	unanswered,	would	have	brought	about	the	collapse	of	the	nation.	In	this	construction	as	well,	sudden	popular	violence	was	a	possible	and	appropriate	response	necessary	for	the	restoration	of	order.	The	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	provided	all	these	elements.	Thus,	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative,	and	particularly	the	ways	in	which	it	was	gendered,	made	the	eradication	of	the	PKI		both	possible	and	necessary.		The	justification	for	the	violence	that	established	the	New	Order	was	not	woven	of	a	wholly	new	cloth.	Rather,	it	re-worked	threads	already	well-known	and	dyed	into	the	
 31	The	titles	by	non-Indonesian	historians	I	am	referring	to	avoid	the	word	“genocide,”	even	though	they	all,	to	varying	degrees,	make	the	case	that	the	events	of	1965-66	do,	indeed,	constitute	such	a	phenomenon.	See	John	Roosa,	Pretext	for	
Mass	Murder,	Douglas	Kammen	and	Katherine	McGregor,	The	Contours	of	Mass	Violence	in	Indonesia,	1965-68,	and	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season:	A	History	of	the	Indonesian	Massacres,	1965-66.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	two	works	have	also	centered	women’s	experience	during	this	period.	Annie	Pohlman’s	title	refers	to	Women,	Sexual	Violence	
and	the	Indonesian	Killings	of	1965-1966.	Indonesian	author	Rachmi	Diyah	Larasati’s	title,	The	Dance	That	Makes	You	
Vanish:	Cultural	Reconstruction	in	Post-Genocide	Indonesia,	is	the	only	one	that	evokes	genocide	explicitly.		
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Indonesian	national	fabric.	The	motifs	chosen	to	do	this	were	built	around	a	central	story	about	morally	failed	and	sexually	dangerous	Communist	women,	which	are	detailed	below.		
An	Overview	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	Narrative	The	narrative	about	Gerwani	at	Lubang	Buaya	originally	evolved	primarily	in	newspapers	between	October	4	and	11,	1965.	Partially	because	the	magazine	production	cycle	wouldn’t	have	allowed	for	it,	but	also	for	other	reasons	to	be	discussed	later	in	the	chapter,	the	story	was	almost	completely	absent	from	the	magazines	that	have	been	at	the	center	of	the	dissertation	thus	far.	This	part	of	the	chapter,	therefore,	examines	how	the	story	was	presented	in	the	first	ten	days	following	October	1	in	three	Jakarta-based	daily	newspapers:	Angkatan	Bersendjata,	published	by	the	Armed	Forces,	Api	Pantjasila,	an	anti-Communist	newspaper	produced	by	the	Union	of	the	Supporters	of	Indonesian	Independence	(Ikatan	Pendukung	Kemerdekaan	Indonesia,	or	IPKI,	a	political	party	founded	as	an	Army	front	organization	by	General	Nasution	in	1952)	and	Kompas,	a	Roman	Catholic	paper.32	In	the	first	reports,	Gerwani	was	not	implicated	in	the	deaths	of	the	soldiers,	or	in	the	“terror”	(“teror”)	to	which	the	“victims”	(“sang	korban”)	were	subjected.	As	the	week	progressed,	new	details	increasingly	tied	Gerwani	to	the	reported	“humiliation”	(“mempermainkan”)	and	“heavy	torture”	(“siksaan	berat”)	of	the	kidnapped	soldiers.	More	and	more,	press	articles	asserted	that	the	women	were	involved	in	a	sexually	charged	and	bestial	ritual	that	clearly	demonstrated	they	had	left	the	company	of	civilized	society.	By	October	11,	the	Gerwani	women	had	become	both	“Godless”	(“tak	ber-Tuhan”)	and	“without	humanity”	(“tak	berkeperimanusiaan”).33	
 32	Hereafter,	along	with	A.B.,	they	are	cited	as	K.,	and	A.P.	respectively.	I	also	consulted	several	other	newspapers.	Berita	
Yudha,	the	“internal”	army	newspaper	published	in	Jakarta	tended	to	be	significantly	less	sensationalistic	in	its	coverage	than	Angkatan	Bersendjata,	but	at	times	gave	much	more	detail	about	what	the	army	was	doing	to	recover	the	bodies	at	Lubang	Buaya.	Regional	newspapers,	particularly	from	areas	with	high	levels	of	anti-Communist	violence	such	as	Central	Java	and	Bali	also	provide	interesting	views.	The	two	I	have	had	an	opportunity	to	examine	somewhat	are	Suara	
Muhammadijah,	the	magazine	of	the	modernist	Islamic	movement,	published	in	Yogyakarta,	and	the	Surabaja	Post.	Suara	
Muhammadiyah,	which	was	historically	firmly	anti-Communist	included	rather	sensational	coverage	of	the	role	of	Gerwani,	though	tellingly,	Suara	‘Aisjija,	its	sister	publication,	printed	at	the	same	press,	did	not,	as	is	discussed	later.	The	
Surabaja	Post	reported	on	Gerwani,	but	did	not	publish	the	more	prurient	elements	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	story.	Missing	completely	from	this	chapter,	simply	because	I	cannot	find	the	source	materials,	is	an	analysis	of	how	the	Gerwani	narrative	was	presented	and	disseminated	in	radio	broadcasts.	33	Literal	translations	of	the	phrases	would	be	“not	with-God”	and	“not	with	humanity.”	The	prefix	ber-	implies	to	possess	or	be	intimately	connected	to	something,	and	is	often	used	with	traits	or	characteristics	(sifat)	that	tie	people	to	the	larger	
 
 
369 
A	second	presentation	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	story	came	in	early	November	through	several	“confessions”	by	Gerwani	members	and	others	said	to	have	been	present	at	the	killings.	Given	significant,	and	clearly	coordinated	coverage	in	the	newspapers,	these	confessions	merit	close	examination	because,	in	my	view,	they	provide	a	more	problematized	version	of	the	political	and	social	implications	that	arose	for	women	as	Gerwani’s	role	became	central	to	the	Lubang	Buaya	story.		The	details	of	this	confessional	literature,	which	were	“produced”	in	Saskia	Wieringa’s	descriptions,34	clearly	reinforced	the	conglomerated	narrative	presented	in	the	press	during	the	two	weeks	following	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.	But	they	exceed	that	initial	narrative	in	important	ways.	These	confessional	narratives	became	the	vehicle	through	which	ideas	about	proper	womanhood	were	reinforced	and	the	language	of	G-30-S	as	an	instance	of	moral	crisis	was	evoked,	as	is	discussed	in	detail	below.	Gerwani	leaders,	specifically,	were	presented	in	ways	that	suggested	they	were	no	longer	proper	Indonesian	women.	Their	faces,	the	stories	recounted,	remained	calm,	but	the	Gerwani	leaders’	eyes	betrayed	that	their	fundamental	interior	character,	their	batin,	had	been	overtaken	by	Communist	ideology.		Drawing	on	similes	that	had	significant	resonance	in	Sukarno-era	constructions	of	morality,	Communist	women	were	often	described	along	the	lines	of	one	of	two	“stock”	images	from	Indonesian	proletarian	theater:	the	young,	powerless	and	gullible	peasant,	or	the	older,	conniving,	manipulating	and	emasculating	modern	woman.	This	is	another	way	in	which	the	narrative	can	clearly	be	seen	to	have	been	“produced.”	But,	importantly,	the	confessions	also	provided	a	space	in	which	peasant	women	connected	to	Gerwani,	to	some	extent	at	least,	could	be	re-humanized.		These	confessions,	further,	exposed	a	critical	distinction	between	communism	and	sexuality	as	the	fundamental	source	of	Gerwani’s	“depravity.”	Several	possibilities	lay	in	the	gap	between	sexuality,	ideology	and	religion.	If	communism	were	the	primary	dehumanizing	influence,	some	Gerwani	women,	particularly	those	with	less	communist	
 community,	so	to	be	religious	is	to	be	“beragama”	(“with-religion,”)	or	to	have	a	family	is	to	be	“berkeluarga.”	In	this	sense	then,	to	be	not	“with”	God	or	humanity	is	also	to	define	Gerwani	and	the	PKI	as	being	outside	society.	34	See	Chapter	8,	“Gerwani	Defamed,	Sukarno	Overthrown,”	(pp.	280-335,)	and	particularly	the	sub-section	entitled	“Defamation	of	Gerwani,”	(pp.	301-317,)	of	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia.	Wieringa’s	description	and	analysis	of	the	process	are	an	important	element	of	our	understanding	of	these	processes.	
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formation,	might	be	rehabilitated,	regaining	their	humanity	through	tearfully	repenting	for	their	communist	ways,	accepting	religious	stricture,	and	reclaiming	proper	female	internal	self-control.	Indeed,	this	seemed	to	be	a	path	offered	in	particular	to	peasant	women,	whose	involvement	in	the	PKI	could	be	attributed,	as	their	engagement	in	prostitution	had	been	earlier,	to	economic	necessity.	A	second	possibility,	however,	if	progressive	sexuality	paired	with	feminist	activism	lay	at	the	source	of	this	betrayal,	was	that	many	more	Indonesian	women	might	somehow	be	implicated	in	the	moral	crisis	striking	the	nation.	This	would	be	particularly	true	for	non-Communist	women	who	had	been	working	in	Kowani,	in	which	Gerwani	had	played	a	major	leadership	role.	Restoring	the	“good	name”	of	Indonesian	womanhood—that	is,	calming	the	moral	crisis	over	potentially	deviant	female	sexuality—became	a	significant	task	and	responsibility	for	these	activist	women.	A	problem	arose	from	this,	however.	Called	on	to	repudiate	Gerwani	publicly,	in	no	uncertain	terms,	Indonesian	women	found	that	any	discussion	of	the	proper	role	of	women	in	New	Order	society	was	bounded	by	the	same	masculine	sexual	politics	that	spawned	the	imagining	of	Lubang	Buaya.	The	moral	crisis	evoked	by	Lubang	Buaya,	was	after	all,	an	amplification	of	previous,	though	lesser,	moral	crises	about	proper	modern	femininity	that	Indonesian	women	had	been	engaged	with	(and	that	has	been	the	subject	of	the	previous	chapters	of	this	dissertation.)	The	landscape	of	proper	Indonesian	womanhood,	as	I	have	argued	previously,	was	intimately	connected	with	conceptions	of	what	constituted	a	strong	Indonesian	nation.	With	the	revolution	putatively	under	stronger	internal	attack	than	ever	before,	the	cultural	reaction	to	defend	the	nation	drew	strongly	on	ideas	about	appropriate	femininity	as	a	marker	of	the	strength	of	the	nation.	Complicating	this	problem	was	that	in	the	wake	of	G-30-S,	the	initial	“ideal”	New	Order	woman,	however,	was	not	a	woman,	but	a	little	girl.	The	eighth	victim	of	G-30-S	was	the	“Little	Hero,”	Irma,	the	five-year	old	daughter	of	General	Nasution,	who	was	shot	in	the	attack	on	her	house,	while	her	father	slipped	over	the	garden	wall,	evading	capture.	Lionized	in	the	press,	Irma	was	presented,	despite	her	young	age,	as	the	quintessential	Indonesian	woman	and,	despite	her	presumed	virginity,	as	an	ideal	mother.	It	was	the	image—quite	clearly	unreal—of	one	exemplary	Indonesian	daughter	that	provided	the	counterpoint	to	images	of	the	depravity—also	unreal—of	Gerwani.	Indonesian	women	
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found	themselves	caught,	then,	between	two	polarized	sets	of	ideal	but	completely	unreal	images:	the	“true	mother”	and	the	“godless	whore.”	It	is	to	the	specifics	of	tracing	the	process	through	which	Indonesian	women	balanced	between	the	images	of	‘Gerwani	
Tjabol’35	and	of	‘Ibu	sejati’	that	the	chapter	now	turns.	
	
“What	Happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya	“What	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya	first	appeared	in	the	Indonesian	press	between	October	4	and	11.	Although	the	seven	soldiers	had	been	kidnapped	and	killed	on	the	night	of	September	30/October	1,	1965,	there	was	essentially	no	press	coverage	of	the	event	for	two	days.	The	newspapers	for	October	1	had	been	put	to	bed	before	any	news	of	the	night’s	events	was	available,	so	the	press	on	that	Friday	morning	was	no	different	than	any	other	day.	On	October	2,	while	the	political	situation	was	still	fluid,	only	the	left-wing	newspapers,	including	the	Communist	papers,	and	the	military	paper	Angkatan	Bersendjata	published	editions.36		
Angkatan	Bersendjata’s	headline	stated	that	the	30th	September	Movement,	which	it	branded	as	“counter-revolution,”	(“kontrarevolusi,”)	had	been	“crushed.”37	The	paper	assured	readers	that	the	intended	attack	against	Sukarno,	as	they	classified	the	movement,	was	“paralyzed,”38	and	that	any	radio	transmissions	from	those	“who	called	themselves	the	‘Revolutionary	Council’	were	lies.”39	In	Angkatan	Bersendjata	that	day,	there	was	no	specific	mention	of	the	Communist	Party	as	the	source	of	the	events	of	the	previous	days.	Rather,	the	paper	focused	on	distancing	the	military	from	the	30	September	Movement	and	its	Revolutionary	Council.	Most	particularly,	it	asserted	that	the	“Council	of	Generals”	was	not	real	and	that	the	generals	listed	on	it	were	loyal	to	the	Revolution.	In	a	public	declaration,	the	commander	of	the	Navy,	E.	Martadinata,	was	careful	to	assert	that	the	movement	“was	not	just	an	internal	
 35	“Gerwani	Whore,”	a	slogan	Wieringa	notes	that	anti-communist	student	demonstrators	began	using	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	publication	of	the	Djamilah	confession.	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	308.	36	The	content	of	the	October	2	edition	of	Harian	Rakjat,	the	PKI	daily,	and	particularly	its	editorial	in	support	of	the	“Revolutionary	Council”	which	had	staged	the	kidnappings,	formed	a	central	piece	of	evidence	against	the	PKI	in	many	histories	of	the	coup.	A	picture	of	the	newspaper’s	front	page	from	October	2	was	published	on	the	front	page	bottom	of	
Angkatan	Bersendjata	on	October	4,	along	with	claims	that	the	PKI	had	“dinodai	rakjat,”	check	text.	or	“tainted	the	people.”	37	“‘Gerakan	30	September’	(kontrarevolusi)	ditumpas.”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	38	“lumpuh.”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	39	“Semua	siaran	dari	apa	jg	menamakan	diri	‘Dewan	Revolusi’	adalah	bohong.”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	
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problem	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia,	but	was	a	National	problem	that	endangered	the	Revolution.”40		Maj.	General	Suharto,	who	had	named	himself	the	head	of	the	Armed	Forces,	positioned	the	military,	along	with	the	people,	as	the	defenders	of	the	Revolution	and	the	protectors	of	Sukarno,	promising	to	take	strong	actions	in	that	regard.	“It	is	clear,”	he	said	in	the	speech	that	was	published	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata,	that	the	actions	[of	the	movement]	are	Counter	Revolutionary	and	must	be	eradicated	to	their	very	roots.		 We	are	confident	that	with	the	full	help	of	our	progressive	revolutionary	society	that	we	can	surely	destroy	and	scatter	the	counter-revolutionary	30th	September	[movement]	and	that	the	Unified	Nation	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	based	on	Pancasila	will	remain	triumphant	under	the	leadership	of	His	Excellency	the	President/Supreme	Commander	of	the	Armed	Forces/Great	Leader	of	the	Revolution	.	.	.	Bung	Karno.41		As	was	noted	in	Chapter	6,	Sukarno’s	use	of	the	“counter-revolutionary”	label	was	well	established	within	Indonesian	political	discourse	during	the	Konfrontasi	with	Malaysia.	It	carried	with	it	a	specific	concern	about	“internal	enemies”	who	threated	the	health	of	the	nation	and	its	ability	to	finish	the	revolution.	The	military	therefore	was	not	introducing	a	new	idea	into	the	political	landscape.	Rather,	they	were	building	directly	on	the	rhetoric	of	the	time.		By	October	3,	Harian	Rakjat,	the	PKI	paper,	had	been	shut	down,	and	all	non-military	newspapers	had	been	ordered	to	suspend	publication	by	the	army.	Only	the	army	dailies	were	allowed	to	publish	on	October	4	and	5.	On	October	4,	Angkatan	Bersendjata	began	to	present	a	narrative	about	Lubang	Buaya	and	the	death	of	the	soldiers.	It	published	portraits	of	the	missing	generals,	and	the	accompanying	headline	asked:	“SHOT	TO	DEATH?	Where	is	the	grave?	The	people	demand	[to	know]!”42		This	article	was	only	a	preface	to	the	story	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	that	would	be	presented	over	the	next	week.	As	yet,	there	were	no	bodies,	no	torture	and	no	
 40	“‘GERAKAN	30	SEPTEMBER’	tidak	sadja	merupakan	persoalan	intern	Angkatan	Darat	Republik	Indonesia,	tetapi	telah	
merupakan	persoalan	Nasional	jang	membahajakan	Revolusi,”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	41	“djelaslah	bahwa	tindakan2	mereka	itu	Kontra	Revolusioner	jang	harus	diberantas	sampai	keakarakarnja.	//	Kami	yakin	
dengan	bantuan	penuh	dari	masa	rakjat	jang	progresif	revolusioner,	gerakan	kontra	revolusioner	30	September	pasti	dapat	
kita	hantjur	teburkan	dan	Negara	Kesatuan	Republik	Indonesia	jg	berdasarkan	Pantjasila	pasti	tetap	djaja	dibawah	
Pimpinan	PJM	Presiden/Panglima	Tertinggi	ABRI/Pemimpin	Besar	Revolusi	kita	.	.	.	Bung	Karno.”	A.B.,	10/2/1965,	p.	1.	42	“DITEMBAK	MATI?	Mana	kuburnya?	Rakjat	menuntut!”	A.B.,	10/4/1965,	p.	1.	
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atrocities.43	But	the	headline	raised	two	issues—the	deaths	of	the	generals	and	the	relationship	of	their	killings	to	the	“people”	(“rakyat”)	and	the	nation—that	remained	central	to	the	story	as	it	unfolded	in	the	newspapers.	By	the	next	day,	October	5,	the	kidnapped	soldiers’	bodies	had	been	exhumed	from	the	well	where	they	had	been	dumped.	Photographs	of	the	corpses	were	splashed	across	the	front	page	of	the	military	newspaper,	along	with	the	pronouncement	that	the	bodies	had	been	“thrown	in	an	old	well	at	Lubang	Buaya.”44	The	photographs	were	of	poor	quality.	Since	the	by-then	four-day-old	corpses	were	in	an	advanced	state	of	putrefaction,	what	may	have	happened	to	the	bodies	was	not	immediately	clear.	There	was	not	yet	any	talk	of	atrocity	beyond	the	murders	themselves,	but	the	presence	of	Gerwani	and	Pemuda	Rakyat45	members	and	their	connections	to	the	PKI	were	both	noted.	Lubang	Buaya	itself	was	referred	to	as	a	“slaughtering	place”46	in	the	army	editorial	for	the	day.	On	the	following	day,	October	6,	newspapers	aligned	with	the	organizations	and	political	movements	not	implicated	in	or	connected	to	the	PKI	or	“Gestapu”	(as	the	events	were	being	called	by	then),	were	allowed	to	resume	publication.	Kompas,	the	Roman	Catholic	daily,	was	filled	with	news	of	the	previous	five	days.	The	paper	ran	the	same	photos	of	the	bodies	that	had	run	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata	the	day	before,	and	published	the	“Story	of	excavating	the	corpses	at	‘Lobang	Buaja’,”47	which	included	the	first	hints	of	torture	and	sexual	mutilation:	The	bodies	of	the	dead	lead	one	to	imagine	that	they	had	suffered	severe	torture	before	they	were	killed.	Some	have	ruined	faces,	and	are	missing	their	genitals,	their	eyes	and	their	fingers	and	toes.48		Even	so,	there	was	not	yet	any	explicit	connection	between	these	acts	and	Gerwani,	although	the	paper	reported	the	presence	of	activists	from	the	women’s	group	at	Lubang	
 43	The	bodies	of	the	generals	and	the	lieutenant	were	exhumed	from	the	well	later	that	same	afternoon.	44	“dilempar	kedalam	lobang	sumur	tua	di	Lobang	Buaja”	A.B.,	10/5/1965,	p.	1	45	Pemuda	Rakyat	(People’s	Youth)	was	the	youth	movement	of	the	PKI.	Pemuda,	meaning	“youth,”	is	an	Indonesian	term	with	a	specific	historical	and	political	meaning.	It	refers	to	the	activist	wing	of	a	political	organization,	that	is	those	people,	mostly	young,	who	went	into	the	streets	and	got	things	done.	Pemuda	were	instrumental	in	the	Indonesian	Revolution,	and	youth	party	wings	remain	important	in	Indonesia	today.	46	“tempat	penjembelihan,”A.B.,	10/5/1965,	p.	1.	47	“Kisah	penggalian	djenazah	di	‘Lobang	Buaja’,”	K.,	10/6/1965,	p.	3.	48	“Tubuh	para	djenazah	membajangkan	bahwa	mereka	telah	mengalami	siksaan	berat	sebelum	dibunuh.	Ada	yang	rusak	
wadjahnja,	hilang	tanda	kelaminnja,	matanja	dan	djarin2nja.”	K.,	10/6/1965.,	p.	2.	
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Buaya.	Nor	was	there	any	account	of	how	the	various	appendages	came	to	be	“missing.”	These	details	would,	indeed,	still	need	to	be	imagined.	The	first	explicit	connections	were	made	the	succeeding	day,	October	7.	Angkatan	
Bersendjata	ran	a	front-page	story	that	both	discussed	the	torture	and	linked	it	to	Gerwani.	The	headline	read:	“Vile	Torture	by	Godless	people:	Revolutionary	Heroes	have	their	Eyes	Gouged	Out,	their	faces	destroyed	to	the	point	that	they	cannot	be	recognized.”49	The	principal	aim	of	this	article	was	to	identify	the	various	corpses,	which	were	described	as	having	“faces	which	were	already	rather	damaged,”50	and	“eyes	which	are	gouged	out,”51	and	one	of	which	was	described	as	having	a	“broken	neck.”52	Because	of	the	“torture,”53	the	identification	process	was	difficult:	Next	from	below	were	raised	two	victims	who	had	been	tied	together	to	become	one.	Although	the	condition	of	the	bodies	was	already	very	damaged	as	a	consequence	of	the	torture	by	the	“September	30th	Movement”	group,	which	was	aided	by	the	Pemuda	Rakjat	and	Gerwani,	the	victims	could	still	be	recognized	as	Maj.	Gen.	S.	Parman	and	Maj.	Gen.	Suprapto.54		This	article	marked	the	beginning	of	three	important	trends	in	the	revelation	of	the	story	of	Lubang	Buaya.	First	and	most	important	was	the	link	between	Gerwani	and	the	torture	of	the	Revolutionary	Heroes,	even	if	to	this	point	they	were	only	seen	to	“have	helped”55	the	September	30th	Movement.	This	connection	came	to	serve	as	the	centerpiece	of	“what	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya.	The	second	and	third	trends	are	important	because	of	the	implications	that	would	follow	from	them	and	the	type	of	responses	to	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	that	would	then	not	only	become	allowed,	but	indeed	be	seen	as	necessary.	The	second	was	the	connection	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	to	“godless	people”	as	both	Gerwani	and	the	Pemuda	Rakyat	were	characterized.	The	linkage	to	godlessness	had	several	important	consequences,	the	first	of	which	is	that	it	began	the	process	of	dehumanizing	Gerwani,	implying	that	the	people	who	carried	out	such	actions	were	not	
 49	“Penjiksaan	Biadab	oleh	orang	tak	ber-Tuhan:	Pahlawan2	Revolusi	di	Tjunkil	Matanja,	dirusak	wadjahnja	hingga	tak	
dapat	dikenal,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.		50	“mukannja	jang	sudah	agak	rusak.”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	51	“mata	ditjunkil,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	52	“lehernja	rusak,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	53	“siksaan,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	54	“Kemudian	dari	bawah	diangkat	lagi	dua	korban	jang	diikat	djadi	satu.	Walaupun	keadaan	tubuh	korban	sudah	sangat	
rusak	akibat	siksaan	dari	golongan	“Gerakan	30	September”	jang	dibantu	oleh	Pemuda2	Rakjat	dan	Gerwani	para	korban	
masih	dapat	dikenal	sebagai	Majdjen	S.	Parman	dan	Majdjen	Suprapto.”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	55	“dibantu,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	
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whole	people.	The	further	consequence	of	having	no	God	was	that	it	distanced	such	people	from	being	good	Indonesian	nationalists,	since	the	first	tenet	of	the	national	revolutionary	ideology	of	Pancasila	was	belief	in	one	God.	While	both	these	processes	(of	dehumanization	and	de-nationalization	of	Gerwani)	became	much	more	explicit	in	later	reporting,	this	marked	their	beginning.56	The	third	trend	began	the	grouping	of	the	generals	and	lieutenant	into	a	single	collective	victim,	all	the	more	apparent	in	this	Angkatan	Bersendjata	article	because	it	is	one	of	the	few	versions	of	the	event	that	tried	to	identify	each	man	separately.	Yet	in	this	story	we	also	see	“two	victims	who	had	been	tied	together	to	become	one.”57	Although	a	few	newspaper	articles	published	later	focus	on	several	of	these	men	individually,58	in	most	of	the	subsequent	reporting	on	Lubang	Buaya,	the	seven	men	were	not	treated	as	individuals.	Rather,	they	became	referred	to	collectively	as	the	“Seven	Revolutionary	Heroes”	or	“the	victims,”	and	in	that	way,	they	quickly	melded	into	an	ideal	type,	a	small	kaum,	the	“sang	
korban,”	or	the	victims	of	Gerwani	atrocity.	They	were	accorded	a	common	funeral	and	a	common	national	monument	to	their	martyrdom.	As	such,	they	served	as	a	common,	singular	and	most	importantly	male	representation	of	the	nation:	the	collective	and	ultimate	victim	of	“Gestapu.”59		The	process	of	dehumanization	and	de-nationalization	of	Gerwani	continued	over	the	next	four	days,	October	8-11,	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata.	The	paper	ran	a	series	of	articles	entitled	“Here	is	the	story	of	the	bestiality	of	‘Gestapu’.”60	In	setting	up	the	narrative	of	the	
 56	The	charge	of	Communists	not	believing	in	God	is	one	that	dates	back	to	the	early	days	of	Indonesian	nationalism,	and	the	split	in	Sarekat	Islam	(SI)	between	members	of	Muhammadiyah	and	those	men	who	transformed	the	“Red	SI”	into	the	PKI.	See	Takashi	Shiraishi,	An	Age	in	Motion,	particularly	Chapter	6,	and	M.C.	Ricklefs,	Polarizing	Javanese	Society.		57	“dua	korban	jang	diikat	djadi	satu,”	A.B.,	10/7/1965,	p.	1.	Emphasis	mine.	There	were	also	only	six	pictures	published	of	the	corpses,	because	one	of	them	was	of	the	two	bodies	that	were	shown,	still	bound	together.	58		This	was	particularly	true	of	Lt.	Tendean,	who	was	an	unknown	quantity	before	the	killing.	59	Throughout	their	coverage	of	the	events	following	October	1,	and	not	just	in	coverage	of	Lubang	Buaya,	the	newspapers	continually	list	the	names	of	all	seven	soldiers,	usually	in	the	same	general	order:	Yani,	Parman,	Suprapto,	Harjono,	Panjaitan,	Sutojo	and	Tendean.	Often	the	names	were	linked	by	hyphens:	Yani-Parman-Suprapto-Harjono-	etc.	The	repetitive	nature	of	this	roll-call	of	the	dead	served	to	turn	the	names	collectively	into	a	New	Order	charm,	more	than	it	recalled	them	each	individually	and	separately.	Perhaps	this	is	because	the	soldiers	were	now	more	use	to	the	emerging	New	Order	as	bodies	(tubuh),	corpses	(djenazah,)	and	victims	(sang	korban,)	or	as	Revolutionary	Heroes	(Pahlawan	
Revolusi)	whose	names	became	a	totem,	than	there	were	as	individual	people.	They,	too,	had	become	an	idealized	kaum.	60	“Inilah	tjerita	kebinatangan	‘Gestapu’,”A.B.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1.	The	word	kebinatangan,	translated	here	as	“brutality,”	could	also	be	translated	as	“bestiality”	(though	not	in	its	English	sexual	meaning),	since	the	root	word	is	binatang	or	“animal.”	
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kidnappings	and	killings,	the	articles	labeled	the	people	in	the	movement	as	ungodly,	evil	and	bestial,	that	is	as	both	kasar61	and	un-Indonesian:	The	corpses	of	the	Seven	Heroes	of	the	Revolution	who	were	kidnapped,	tortured,	killed	and	had	their	faces	destroyed	in	a	vile	manner	and	were	thrown	the	hole	of	an	old	well	by	the	“Gestapu”	terror	band	have	clearly	already	proved	the	savagery	and	brutality	of	the	“Gestapu”	band	which	is	blood-thirsty	and	which	could	only	be	carried	out	by	Godless	people.		.	.	.		The	counter-revolutionary	“Gestapu”	terror	band	has	clearly	already	left	behind	and	even	trampled	on	Pancasila,	humaneness	and	the	teachings	of	Religion.		.	.	.		“Gestapu”	has	lost	a	moral	base,	has	lost	humanity.	All	that	is	left	is	a	blood-thirsty	brutality.62		This	first	article	of	three,	published	in	Angkata	Bersendjata	on	October	8,	did	not	mention	Gerwani	specifically.	Rather,	it	was	primarily	concerned	with	the	initial	kidnappings	in	which	Gerwani	members	were	not	reported	to	have	been	involved.	But	it	clearly	established	the	framework	within	which	future	revelations	about	Gerwani’s	role	would	be	judged.	These	revelations	were	made	explicit	for	the	first	time	the	next	day,	October	9,	in	the	second	piece	in	the	series.	This	article	clearly	connected	Gerwani	with	the	story	reported	about	Lubang	Buaya.	It	also	placed	the	communist	women	firmly	at	the	center	of	the	action,	claiming	that	Gerwani	activists	sexually	molested	and	humiliated	the	kidnapped	soldiers	before	they	were	killed:	Of	the	so	many	humiliating	things	which	GESTAPU	carried	out	against	the	officers	who	were	victimized,	several	of	the	officers	who	were	still	alive	were	humiliated	by	Gerwani	volunteers	who	had	been	assigned	the	task	by	the	Gestapu	of	filling	up	the	slaughter	hole	with	dirt	and	trash.	In	the	course	of	humiliating	[the	officers],	they	played	with	the	genitals	of	the	victims	while	exposing	their	own	genitals.	Soon	thereafter	the	honored	victims	were	killed	with	all	sorts	of	tortures	and	cruelty.63	
 61	Kasar,	literally	“coarse,”	is	the	opposite	of	the	Javanese	social	ideal	of	being	halus,	or	refined,	both	externally	and	internally.	To	call	someone	kasar	is	to	imply	that	they	are,	essentially,	uncivilized.	62	“Djenazah	dari	Tudjuh	Pahlawan	Revolusi	jang	telah	ditjulik,	disiksa,	dibunuh	dan	dirusak	wadjahnja	setjara	biadab	dan	
dilemper	kedalam	lobang	bekas	sumur	oleh	gerombolan	terror	“Gestapu”	.	.	.	telah	membuktikan	kebuasan	dan	
kebinatangan	gerombolan	“Gestapu”	jang	haus	darah	dan	jg	hanja	mampu	dilakukan	oleh	orang2	jang	tak	Ber-Tuhan.		.	.	.	
Gerombolan	terror	kontra-revolusioner	“Gestapu”	sesungghunja	meninggalkan,	bahkan	mengindjak2	Pantjasila,	
perikemanusiaan	dan	adjaran2	Agama.		.	.	.		“Gestapu”	telah	lenjap	dasar	kesusilaannja,	telah	lenjap	perikemanusiaanja.	
Jang	tinggal	hanja	kebinatangan	jg	haus	darah.”	A.B.,	10/9/1965,	p.	1.	
			The	same	article	also	makes	the	first	clear	comparison	between	“Gestapu”	and	“Gestapo,”	stating	that	the	Indonesian	movement	had	the	“same	standing	with	.	.	.		the	Nazi	Secret	Police	.	.	.	the	instrument	of	Hitler	that	did	not	know	God.”	(“setanding	kedjamnja	dengan	.	.	.	Polisi	Rahasia	Nazi	.	.	.	alat	Hitler,	yang	tak	mengenal	Tuhan	itu.”)	A.B.,	10/9/1965,	p.	1.	63	“Dari	sekian	kedjadian	penghinaan	jang	dilakukan	oleh	GESTAPU	terhadap	Perwira2	jang	dijadikan	korbannja,	beberapa	
orang	Perwira	jang	sewaktu	tiba	di	Lobang	Buaja	masih	hidup,	telah	dihinakan	oleh	aunggauta2	sukarelawati	Gerwani	jang	
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	This	fully	established	the	connection	between	torture	and	the	Gerwani	women’s	reported	sexual	abuse	of	the	soldiers.		More	was	still	to	be	said	about	the	nature	of	this	Gerwani	sexuality.	The	next	article	in	the	series	scapegoated	the	Gerwani	women	even	further.	Published	two	days	later	on	October	11,	the	third	article	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata	focused	on	the	story	of	Lt.	Tendean,	the	aide	to	General	Nasution,	who	had	been	captured	in	his	place.	Implying	that	Tendean	was	tortured	particularly	hard	because	the	torturers	believed	that	his	capture	had	allowed	Nasution	to	escape,	the	article	reported	that	Tendean,	“who	had	his	feet	and	hands	tied,	then	became	the	‘obscene	plaything’	of	the	‘evil	women’	of	Gerwani	who	with	their	actions	had	lowered	the	status	of	Indonesian	womanhood.64	This	was	the	first	press	coverage	where	a	derogatory	description—“evil	women”—was	tied	directly	to	Gerwani.	More	importantly	however,	it	also	marked	the	first	accusation	that	the	Gerwani	women	derived	some	sort	of	sexual	pleasure	from	their	actions	once	Tendean	became	their	“vile	plaything.”	This	was	not	only	a	crime	against	Tendean,	it	suggested,	but	also	against	the	entire	nation—specifically	against	the	“dignity	of	Indonesian	womanhood.”	The	demonization	of	Gerwani	had	therefore	entered	a	new	stage.	The	connection	between	their	reported	actions,	the	torture	of	the	soldiers,	and	“obscene”	or	“deviant”	sexuality	and	crimes	against	proper	Indonesian	women,	and	indeed	against	Indonesian	womanhood	(“kaum	wanita	Indonesia”)	had	all	been	established	and	linked.	The	charges	that	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	were	principally	shaped	through	expressions	of	Gerwani’s	sexuality	were	also	evident	in	the	reporting	in	Kompas	on	the	same	day,	October	11.	In	its	coverage,	the	paper	quoted	directly	and	almost	completely	from	the	Angkatan	Bersendjata	article	of	October	9,	which	claimed	that	the	Gerwani	activists	had	played	with	or	handled	the	soldier’s	genitals.	For	the	first	time,	Kompas	made	the	Gerwani	actions	the	focus	of	reporting,	entitling	their	story	“Gerwani’s	Morals.”65	In	a	
 
ditugaskan	oleh	GESTAPU	untuk	menimbun	lobang	pendjagalan	tanah	dengan	tanah	dan	sampah,	dengang	djalan	
mempermainkan,	memegang2	kemaluan	sang	korban,	sambil	memamerkan	kemaluannja	sendiri;	kemudian	baru	sang	
korban	dibunuh	dengan	segala	siksaan	dan	kekedjian.”	A.B.,	10/9/1965,	p.	1.		64	“jang	diikat	tangan	dan	kakinja	telah	mendjadi	‘permainan	tjabul’	dari	‘ibu2	djahat’	Gerwani	jang	dengan	perbuatan	
mereka	itu	telah	merendahkan	martabat	kaum	wanita	Indonesia.”	A.B.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	65	“Moral	Gerwani,”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	
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report	based	on	“sources	that	can	be	believed,”66	Kompas	furthered	the	claims	that	Gerwani	activists	had	been	involved	in	some	sort	of	sexualized	frenzy.	“The	Gerwani	members,”	the	article	claimed,	“danced	in	front	of	the	victims	completely	naked,	which	reminds	us	of	cannibalistic	rituals	that	were	carried	out	by	primitive	peoples	tens	of	centuries	ago.”67	In	this	formulation	then,	Gerwani	women	had	also	ceased	to	be	modern.	The	emphasis	on	Gerwani	in	the	Kompas	version	of	the	article	was	accentuated	by	switching	which	organization’s	name	is	in	capital	letters:	in	the	Angkatan	Bersendjata	original,	the	organizations	are	GESTAPU	and	Gerwani,	while	in	Kompas,	they	are	Gestapu	and	GERWANI.	The	story	also	completed	the	dehumanization	and	“primitivization”	of	both	Gerwani	and	their	sexuality,	comparing	the	women	to	“cannibals”	involved	in	some	pre-historic	ritual.	In	this	image,	the	women	become	kasar,	barbaric	and	sexually	out	of	control,	the	complete	antithesis	of	Indonesian	women	as	Ibu	Sejati	and	by	extension	Ibu	Bangsa.68	And	in	doing	so,	it	furthered	their	removal	from	a	proper	and	orderly	kaum	wanita.	In	the	eight	days	from	October	4	to	11,	then,	the	story	of	“what	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya	expanded.	Beginning	from	the	simple	question	of	where	the	bodies	were,	the	narrative	veered	to	general	stories	of	execution	and	torture,	and	then	settled	on	accounts	that	linked	Gerwani	to	the	sexual	exploitation	of	the	living	victims.	As	each	new	piece	of	the	story	surfaced	day-by-day,	Gerwani	women	were	increasingly	and	more	luridly	implicated	in	what	came	to	be	viewed	as	a	betrayal	of	God,	the	Revolution	and	the	good	name	of	Indonesian	womanhood.		They	were	also	rendered	as	fundamentally	primitive	and	inhuman;	perpetrators	of	a	disgusting	violation	of	human	decency	that	could	only	have	been	carried	out	by	people	who	had	completely	lost	both	their	morals	and	their	humanity	in	a	total	surrender	to	both	Marxist	ideology	and	sexually	deviant	desires.	By	October	11,	however,	the	reports	of	Gerwani’s	actions	were	still	incomplete.	As	Gerwani	members	were	captured	and	interrogated	over	the	succeeding	weeks,	further	details	and	embellishments	of	the	stories	continued	to	emerge.	In	particular,	a	series	of	“confessions”	by	Gerwani	women	presented	increasingly	explicit	stories	of	the	sexual	
 66	“sumber2	jang	dapat	dipertjaja,”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	67	“anggauta2	GERWANI	itu	menari2	dihadapan	korbannja	dengan	dalam	keadaan	telandjang-pandjang	jang	
mengingkatkan	kita	pada	upatjara	kanibalis	jang	dilakukan	oleh	suku2	primitip	puluhan	abad	jang	lalu.”	K.,	10/11/1965,		p.	3.	68	This	is	the	contrast	Sylvia	Tiwon	refers	to	as	“Models	and	Maniacs.”	See	the	discussion	in	Chapter	1.	
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mutilation	of	the	officers.	These	confessions,	which	were	published	in	these	same	newspapers	from	the	end	of	October	through	the	middle	of	November,	(precisely	as	the	army-led	killings	first	in	Central	Java	and	then	in	East	Java	began)	not	only	futher	implicated	Gerwani	activists	as	being	inhuman	and	barely	above	the	level	of	animals,	but	also	this	time	by	their	“own”	admission.		
The	“Confessions”	The	first	major	confession	to	appear	in	the	papers	was	from	a	male	“executioner”69	named	Simun.	It	is	important	to	begin	with	Simun’s	story	more	for	what	is	not	there	than	for	what	it	is;	the	story	stood	in	great	contrast	to	the	accounts	of	Gerwani	involvement	that	were	brought	forward	later.		Simun’s	confession	appeared	in	all	three	newspapers—Angkatan	Bersendjata,	Api	
Pantjasila,	and	Kompas—on	the	same	day,	October	29,	almost	a	month	after	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.70	All	three	accounts	were	essentially	the	same.	The	stories	described	the	affiliations	and	process	that	brought	him	to	“training”71	at	Lubang	Buaya	for	about	one	month	before	G-30-S.	“About	two	days	before	October	1,”	the	papers	reported,	“Simun	and	his	friends	were	informed	by	their	leader	that	they	should	train	hard	because	they	were	to	face	a	difficult	task,”72	for	which	Simun	and	his	comrades	were	given	“green	uniforms”73	and	“various	types	of	weapons.”74		The	task	assigned	to	them	may	have	been	difficult,	but	the	actually	killing	was	passed	over	fairly	quickly	in	all	three	accounts.	Kompas	reported	it	in	one	short	paragraph:	At	dawn	on	October	1	several	trucks	and	jeeps	arrived	full	of	people	wearing	uniforms.	Next	shots	were	heard	fired	at	the	seven	people	who	were	brought	
 69	“algodjo,”	K.,	p.	1;	A.B.,	pp.	1	and	3;	and	A.P.,	p.	3,	all	on	10/29/1965.	70	See	K.,	p.	1;	A.B.,	pp.	1	and	3;	and	A.P.,	p.	3,	all	on	10/29/1965.	71	“latihan,”	K.,	p.	1;	A.B.,	pp.	1	and	3;	and	A.P.,	p.	3,	all	on	10/29/1965.	72	“Kira-kira	dua	hari	sebelum	tgl.	1	Oktober	Simun	dengan	kawan2nja	mendapat	keterangan	dari	pemimpinnja	supaya	
sungguh2	berlatih	karena	akan	dihadapkan	dengan	tugas	berat.”	This	is	the	version	from	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1.	The	other	two	versions	are	almost	identical.	73	“pakaian	seragam	hijau,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1,	that	is,	the	activists	were	made	to	appear	to	be	soldiers,	rather	than	members	of	youth	groups.	The	uniforms	provide	an	interesting	detail	about	the	role	of	Gerwani	at	Lubang	Buaya,	that	is	addressed	below.	74	“sendjata	dari	pelbagai	djenis,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1.	
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down	from	a	truck.	Simun	joined	in	the	shooting	and	he	even	joined	in	dumping	the	corpses	into	the	well.75		The	rest	of	the	story	went	on	to	relate	Simun’s	escape	route	and	eventual	capture.	Most	of	the	account	of	Simun’s	action	was	concerned	with	establishing	the	details	of	his	background,	his	training	at	Lubang	Buaya	and	his	escape	after	the	collapse	of	the	movement.	Little	was	written	about	the	treatment	of	the	soldiers,	who	appeared	in	the	article	only	as	“seven	people”	who	were	shot	at	and	who	then	became	“corpses”	that	were	dumped	in	a	well.	There	was	no	sense	of	torture	or	mutilation.	There	were	no	women	dancing	naked	around	sanctified	victims	of	a	cannibalistic	ritual.	There	was	no	sexual	mutilation.	There	were,	notably,	no	women	present	in	Simun’s	story	at	all.	Neither	atrocity	nor	harsh	reaction	was	noted.	Simun	was	finally	stopped	and	handed	over	to	“the	authorities”76	who	determined	that	he	was	a	“cruel	and	despicable	executioner	who	went	along	in	the	slaughter	of	our	Army	officers.”77	The	final	phrase	was	the	total	measure	of	any	part	of	the	story	that	might	be	considered	sensationalistic.	A	second	confession,	again	by	a	man,	appeared	in	Kompas	the	next	day,	October	30.	Entitled	“‘I	regret	participation	in	training	at	Lubang	Buaya	.	.	.’,”78	the	article	recounted	the	story	of	a	twenty-five-year-old	member	of	the	Pemuda	Rakyat,	MSN,	who	received	instructions	to	go	to	Lubang	Buaya	on	the	morning	of	October	1.	There	he	noted	the	presence	of	a	“woman	that	he	knew	was	named	Ibu	Djumono	from	the	National	Central	Committee	of	Gerwani.”79	She	was	among	“several	leaders	of	Lubang	Buaya”80	who	were	conferring	in	a	tent	while	in	another	tent	two	corpses	could	be	seen,	one	of	which	was	in	pajamas.	These	corpses	appeared	smeared	with	blood.	Nearby	stood	five	men	who	were	guarded	with	weapons	pointing	at	them.	At	the	time,	they	seemed	happy	and	were	singing	spiritedly.81		
 75	“Tanggal	1	Oktober	subuh	tiba	beberapa	truk	dan	jeep	jang	penuh	berisi	orang	jang	berpakaian	seragam.	Kemudian	
terdengar	tembakan	terhadap	7	orang	jang	diturunkan	dari	truk.	Simun	ikut	menambakinja	dan	iapun	ikut	memasukkan	
majat2	itu	kedalam	sumur.”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1.	76	“yang	berwadjib,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1.	77	“algodjo	kedjam	dan	kedji	jang	ikut	mendjagal	para	perwira	TNI	kita,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.1.	78	“‘Saja	menjesal	mengikuti	latihan	di	Lubang	Buaja	.	.	.’,”	K.,	10/30/1965,	p.	1.	79	“seorang	wanita	jang	dikenalnja	bernama	Ibu	Djumono	dari	DPP	[Dewan	Pimpinan	Pusat,	or	Central	Leadership	Body]	
Gerwani,”	K.,	10/30/1965,	p.	1.	80	“beberapa	pemimpin	Lobang	Buaja,”	K.,	10/30/1965,	p.	1.	81	“perundingan2	didalam	kemah,	sedang	di	lain	tenda	terlihat	2	majat	satu	diantaranja	berpakaian	pajama.	Majat2	ini	
tampak	berlumuran	darah.	Didekatnja	berdiri	5	orang	dan	didjaga	dengan	todongan	sendjata.	Dalam	pada	itu,	mereka	
tampak	bergembira	dan	menjanji2.”	K.,	10/30/1965,	p.	1.	
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Following	that,	the	two	corpses	were	thrown	in	the	well,	and	the	five	who	were	still	alive	were	shot	one	by	one	and	thrown	in	the	hole	as	well.	The	people	then	“sang	while	filling	the	well	with	trash,	banana	tree	logs	and	dirt.”82	Although	this	confession	contained	both	references	to	Gerwani’s	presence	and	to	a	general	celebratory	mood	among	the	people	involved	in	the	killing	of	the	kidnapped	soldiers,	again	there	was	no	apparent	torture,	explicit	atrocity	or	sexual	deviance	mentioned	as	part	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya.	The	contrast	with	the	description	of	women	in	stories	that	focus	on	Gerwani,	however,	is	striking	and	important.	This	was	visible	in	the	previous	day’s	edition	of	
Kompas,	which	filled	the	space	at	the	end	of	its	article	on	Simun	with	an	account	of	the	capture	of	a	Gerwani	member	in	Siantar,	North	Sumatra.	The	woman,	who	was	a	“graduate	of	the	training	at	Lubang	Buaya,”83	was	seized	at	her	house	by	the	“masses	of	the	people.”84	They	then	fought	with	her	because	“the	people	were	mad”85	and	burned	her	house	down.	The	story	closed	by	noting	that	several	“eye	gouges”86	were	found	in	her	house.	In	even	a	short	story	about	Gerwani,	then—one	that	was	tagged	on	at	the	end	of	the	story	of	Simun’s	confession	at	that—Communist	women	were	implicated	in	the	torture	of	the	victims	at	Lubang	Buaya,	and	evidence	of	such—“eye	gouges,”	whatever	the	objects	may	actually	have	been—was	produced.	Additionally,	all	this	was	seen	as	justifying	the	people’s	violent	response.	In	the	women’s	confessions	that	were	produced	later,	both	these	elements—atrocity	and	the	justified	vengeful	reaction	of	the	people—combined	to	complete	the	demonization	of	Gerwani.		Importantly,	the	contrast	between	the	linked	but	highly	differentiated	stories	about	Simun	and	the	un-named	Gerwani	member	suggest	an	important	distinction	about	how	stories	of	Communist	men	seem	to	have	been	framed	quite	differently	from	those	that	were	written	about	Communist	women.	Women	were	constructed	as	the	bringers	of	terror,	as	a	fundamentally	destabilizing	force	that	required	strong	reactions.	This	is	related	to	the	patterns,	as	is	discussed	later	in	this	chapter,	involved	in	the	constructions	of	moral	crisis	
 82	“menjanji	ber-sama2	menimbun	sumur	dengan	sampah2	batang	pisang	dan	tanah.”	K.,	10/30/1965,	p.	1.	83	“lulusan	pendidikan	Lubang	Buaja,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.	1.	84	“massa	rakjat,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.	1.	85	“rakjat	marah.”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.	1.	86	“pentjunkil	mata,”	K.,	10/29/1965,	p.	1.	
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that	was	fundamentally	gendered	at	is	core.	And	this	gendering	was	visible	in	the	“confessions”	from	women	that	followed.	The	most	important	and	most	explicit	confession	by	a	woman	appeared	in	the	story	of	Ibu	Djamilah,	published	on	November	6	in	Api	Pantjasila,	a	week	after	Simun’s	account	appeared.	The	article	claimed	that	Djamilah	was	part	of	a	group	dubbed	the	“heroines	of	Lubang	Buaya”87	by	their	fellow	members	of	the	Pemuda	Rakyat	because	of	their	“role	in	carrying	out	the	slaughter.”88	It	also	clearly	linked	Gerwani	to	the	reported	sexual	mutilation	of	the	kidnapped	soldiers’	bodies.		The	headline	to	the	story	read:	“Mrs.	Djamilah,	who	joined	in	the	killings	of	the	Generals:	We	were	given	knives	to	stab	the	generals	who	were	killed	at	Lubang	Buaya.”89	The	story	contained	the	“confession”90	given	by	Djamilah	to	the	armed	forces	upon	her	capture.	It	began	much	like	that	of	Simun,	with	the	story	of	how	Djamilah	came	to	be	at	Lubang	Buaya.	She	told	her	army	questioners	that	she	was	fifteen	years	old,	married	and	three	months	pregnant.	Both	she	and	her	husband	were	members	of	the	Pemuda	Rakyat	of	Tanjung	Priok,	the	port	area	of	Jakarta,	who	had	been	ordered	to	attend	“training”91	at	Lubang	Buaya,	where	she	was	part	of	the	group	that	“carried	out	and	witnessed”92	the	actions	against	the	captured	officers.	Her	confession	continued	with	an	account	of	Pemuda	Rakyat,	Gerwani	and	other	forces	gathering	together	at	Lubang	Buaya.	They	were	led	by	the	platoon	commander	who	told	them	they	should	be	“on	guard”93	because	the	“destruction	of	the	Neocolonialists	and	the	Capitalist	Bureaucrats	was	about	to	begin.”94	At	around	five	in	the	morning	there	was	a	“roll	call,”95	and	at	six,	everyone	gathered	together,	“about	500	people,	among	them	100	members	of	Gerwani.”96	The	members	of	Gerwani,	“including	Djamilah	herself	were	given	
 87	“Srikandi	Lobang	Buaja,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	The	term	”Srikandi”	infers	military	heroism	by	women.	Srikandi	is	a	prominent	female	character	in	Javanese	wayang	theater.	See	discussion	of	the	term	in	Chapter	6.	88	“pegang	peranan	dalam	melakukan	pemjembelihan2,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	89	“Nj.	Djamilah	jang	turut	membunuh	Djendral2:	Kami	diberi	pisau	until	menusuk	djendral2	jang	dibunuh	diLubang	Buaja.”	
A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	90	“pengakuannja,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	91	“latihan,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	92	“melakukan	demikian	dan	menjaksikan,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	93	“waspada,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	94	“pengganjangan	Nekolim	dan	Kapbir	akan	segera	dimulai.”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	Nekolim	(an	acronym	for	“neo-colonialists”)	and	Kapbir	(short	for	“capitalist	bureaucrat”)	were	politically	potent	terms	used	by	Sukarno	during	the	Guided	Democracy	era	to	identify	the	enemies	of	the	Indonesian	people	and	their	revolution.	95	“apel,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	96	“kira2	500	orang.	Diantaranja	100	orang	anggota	Gerwani.”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	
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pen	knives	and	razor	blades.	‘We	were	only	given	razors	at	that	time,’	noted	Djamilah.”97	They	then	saw	the	arrival	of	someone	in	an	army	uniform	whose	hands	and	eyes	were	bound	with	red	cloth.	The	story	continued,	quoted	here	at	length:	The	platoon	commander	ordered	us	to	beat	this	person;	then	to	stab	this	person’s	genitals	with	the	penknives.	The	first	people	we	saw	beating	and	stabbing	the	person’s	genitals	was	the	leader	of	Gerwani	from	Tanjung	Priok	named	S.	and	Mrs.	Sas.	Next	several	other	friends	[went].	The	ones	I	knew	were	Si	and	A	who	did	that.	After	that,	we	ourselves	joined	in	torturing	that	person.	All	the	women,	not	less	than	100	people,	did	that	and	witnessed	it.	Next	we	saw	the	victim	brought	close	to	the	well	by	people	wearing	camoflage	uniforms		.	.	.		The	victim	was	shot	three	times,	then	he	fell;	but	he	wasn’t	dead	yet.	Someone	in	green	clothes	.	.	.	ordered	Gerwani	to	advance.	Everyone	did	what	they	had	before,	stabbing	the	genitals	of	the	victim,	and	with	the	razors,	sliced	his	genitals	and	body;	until	he	died.	At	that	time,	I	still	asked	my	friends	who	the	person	who	had	been	killed	was,	said	Djamilah,	but	instead,	we	were	struck	on	our	mouths	so	that	we	no	longer	dared	ask.		After	that	the	corpse	was	thrown	in	the	well.	In	a	state	of	fear	and	nervousness,	we	ran	to	the	front	of	the	house.	There	we	heard	whispers	that	the	one	who	had	been	killed	was	a	general.98		Djamilah’s	confession	explicitly	tied	Gerwani	to	the	torture	and	killing	of	at	least	one	of	the	Seven	Revolutionary	Heroes.	In	this	version,	not	only	were	the	Gerwani	women	present	at	the	killing	of	this	general,	but	under	the	orders	of	the	platoon	commander	and	the	leadership	of	a	Gerwani	official,	they	actually	became	the	ones	who	performed	the	slaughter	and	bloodletting,	eventually	killing	the	general	even	after	he	had	been	shot	three	
 97	“Kepada	anggota	Gerwani	termasuk	Djamilah	sendiri	dibagi2kan	pisau	ketjil	atau	pisau	silet.	Kami	hanja	dibagikan	pisau	
silet	pada	waktu	itu:	demikian	Djamilah.”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	98	“Dan	Ton	memerintahkan	me-mukul2	orang	tersebut;	kemudian	menusuk-nusuk	dengan	pisau	ketjil	kemaluan	orang	tsb.	
Jang	kami	lihat	pertama	me-mukul2	dan	menusuk-nusuk	pisau	pada	kemaluan	orang	itu	ialah	pimpinan	Gerwani	Tanjung	
Priok	bernama	S.	dan	Nj.	Sas.	Kemudian	teman2	lain;	jang	saja	kenal	ialah	Si	dan	A	melakukan	demikian.	Sudah	itu	kami	
sendiri	jang	turut	menjiksa	orang	tersebut.	Semua	anggota	wanita	jang	tak	kurang	dari	100	orang	itu	melakukan	demikian	
dan	menjaksikan.	Kemudian	kami	melihat	sikorban	dibawa	kedekat	sumur	oleh	orang2	berpakaian	seragam	loreng2	.	.	.	
					Sikorban	di	tembak	tiga	kali	kemudian	djatuh;	tetapi	belum	mati.	Seorang	berpakaian	hidjau	.	.	.	memintahkan	pada	
Gerwani	untuk	madju.	Semua	melakukan	seperti	jang	telah	dibuat	tadi	menusuk-nusuk	kemaluan	korban	itu;	dan	dengan	
pisau	silet	mengiris	kemaluan	dan	badannja;	sehingga	ia	mati.	Waktu	itu	saja	masih	menanjakan	pada	kawan2	siapa	orang	
jang	telah	dibunuh;	demikian	Djemilah;	tetapi	mulut	kami	malahan	dipukul	sehingga	tak	berani	lagi	kami	menanjakan.	
					Sudah	itu	majat	tadi	dimasukkan	kedalam	sumur.	Dalam	keadaan	takut	dan	gelisah	kami	lari	kedepan	rumah.	Dari	
sinilah	kami	dengar	bisik2	bawah	jang	dibunuh	ialah	seorang	Djendral.”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	
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times.	The	entire	story	had	the	air	of	some	sort	of	crazed	ritual	sacrifice,	in	which	the	women	descended	en	masse	on	the	hapless	general,	hacking	away	with	their	extended	penknives	and	razors	as	they	went.99		Interestingly,	there	was	no	mention	of	the	women	dancing	in	a	frenzy	in	front	of	the	general,	“playing”	with	his	body,	or	exposing	and	manipulating	their	own	genitals,	all	details	from	the	October	11	version	of	the	story.	But,	as	I	argue	below,	one	of	the	effects	of	Djamilah’s	confession	was	to	transfer	the	guilt	of	killing	the	officers	from	the	specific	women	at	Lubang	Buaya	and	onto	Communist	women	as	a	whole,	the	link	between	the	individual	and	the	collective	being	conceived	of	as		their	shared	ideological	formation.		The	intitation	of	the	frenzy	in	the	story—the	point	at	which	social	order	breaks	down	most	fundamentally—was	attached	therefore	to	a	“leader	of	Gerwani	from	Tanjung	Priok	named	S.	and	Mrs.	Sas.”	There	then	was	a	gradual	entry	into	the	frenzy,	where	a	few	of	Djamilah’s	friends	are	identified	by	their	initials,	before	the	whole	group	descended	en	
masse.	Interestingly,	none	of	them	is	individually	named	as	having	danced	nude,	an	interesting	omission	that	seems	to	have	left	a	space	within	which	a	broader	charge	of	depravity	against	the	women	as	a	group,	and	against	Gerwani	as	a	whole—even	those	who	were	not	present—could	be	lodged.	To	be	sure,	this	was	only	the	story	of	the	execution	of	one	general,	and	not	of	the	other	officers	killed	at	Lubang	Buaya	that	night.	But	given	that	the	victim	was	only	finally	identified	as	“a	general”	after	the	fact,	and	given	the	previous	note	on	how	the	generals	were	often	fused	symbolically	into	one	person	in	the	press	at	the	time,	it	was	clear	that,	by	extension,	Gerwani	was	being	made	responsible	for	the	killing	and	torture	of	all	the	victims.	And,	since	Gerwani	members	present	were	all	given	penknives	and	had	“we	ourselves	joined	in	the	torturing”100	Gerwani	as	a	whole	was	implicated	by	Djamilah’s	confession.		There	are	conflicting	tensions	apparent	in	this	confession.	In	the	language,	there	was	a	strong	sense	that	Djamilah	and	her	“friends”	were	being	given	orders	from	above:	the	platoon	commander	“ordered”101	them	to	beat	the	general,	and	someone	in	a	green	uniform	
 99	I	would	like	to	be	clear	that	I	am	not	suggesting	here	that	some	sort	of	“running	amok”	was	taking	place,	or	that	the	idea	of	“amok,”	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	offers	a	possible	explanation	for	the	killings	of	the	officers.	I	am,	rather,	pointing	out	an	element	of	how	the	story	seems	to	have	been	constructed.	There	is	a	discussion	of	this	idea,	citing	the	work	of	Sylvia	Tiwon,	later	in	this	chapter.	100	“kami	sendiri	jang	turut	menjiksa,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	101	“memerintahkan,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	
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“ordered”102	them	to	advance	on	the	recently	shot	victim.	This	sense	of	Djamilah	being	ordered	or	commanded	was	also	made	clear	in	the	first	sentence	of	the	article	which	said	that	“she	was	ordered	from	above	to	carry	out	such	vile	actions.”103	In	this	conception	of	the	events,	then,	individual	Gerwani	members	were	not	responsible	for	conceiving	and	carrying	out	the	plan	on	their	own.	Furthermore,	Djamilah	appeared	coerced	into	following	the	orders	when	she	was	struck	on	the	face	for	asking	who	was	being	killed.	But	as	they	were	reported,	the	description	of	the	events	following	the	generals’	death	also	suggested	a	force	beyond	coercion	at	work	in	the	Gerwani	actions.	There	was	a	strong	sense	that	the	Gerwani	women	were	overtaken	by	a	mass	trance	or	hypnosis,	to	use	both	terms	loosely,	leading	up	to	the	killing.	While	actually	involved	in	the	attack,	the	Gerwani	women	did	not	seem	concerned	with	who	their	victim	was,	or	in	his	reactions.	Djamilah	did	not	mention	any	screams	or	protestations	from	the	man	being	sliced	open,	nor	did	she	convey	a	sense	of	his	being	actively	silent.	The	lack	of	description	of	his	reaction	to	pain	reinforced	the	story’s	focus	on	the	massed	members	of	Gerwani	“carrying	out	such	[actions]	and	witnessing”104		them.	Djamilah’s	focus	was	narrowed	on	the	mob	and	its	own	sense	of	what	it	was	doing	corporately,	from	which	the	victim	was,	in	an	odd	sense,	excluded.	This	sense	of	collective	frenzy,	therefore,	appears	to	come	in	the	form	of	the	explosion	of	an	interior	lack	of	moral	control	that	was	brought	from	within	the	women.	That	is,	their	batin	rusak	(“ruined	internal	morality”)	was	pulled	forth	in	all	its	destructive	power.	By	contrast,	questions	of	what	actually	happened	and	to	whom	only	come	to	the	fore	upon	the	actual	death	of	the	general.	It	was	precisely	“at	that	time”105	that	Djamilah	asked	her	friends	who	the	man	was,	and	that	the	sense	of	coercion	to	what	the	women	are	doing,	which	had	disappeared	during	the	‘mass	trance,’	returned	to	the	narrative.106	This	return	to	individual	consciousness	became	even	clearer	once	the	body	had	been	dropped	in	the	well,	when	the	women,	so	recently	fearless,	ran	to	the	front	of	the	house	“in	a	state	of	fear	and	
 102	Again,	“memerintahkan,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	103	“dia	diperintahkan	oleh	atasnja	untuk	melakukan	perbuatan	biadab	tsb.”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	104	“melakukan	demikian	dan	menjaksikan,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2,	as	also	cited	above.	105	“waktu	itu,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	106	Again,	I	am	noting	this	element	of	the	narrative	as	it	is	presented,	not	suggesting	this	as	an	explanation	apart	from	this	narrative.	
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nervousness,”107	where	they	“heard	whispers”108	that	the	person	killed	had	been	a	general.	It	was	as	if	the	death	of	the	general	broke	the	spell	created	by	the	frenzied	mob	action.	The	women	returned	to	a	more	self-controlled	state,	in	which	they	could	again	feel	what	should	have	been	be	their	‘natural’	feelings	of	fear	and	nervousness	at	such	audacious	action.		This	confession,	then,	presented	the	possibility	of	removing	total	blame	from	individual	members	of	Gerwani.	Djamilah	was	described	as	a	woman	who	was	very	young,	married	and	recently	pregnant,	and	from	the	poorer	strata	of	society.109	While	she	was	involved	in	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya	to	the	extent	of	becoming	a	“heroine,”	she	also	seemed	to	a	large	extent	to	have	lost	her	autonomy	in	the	situation.	She	was,	perhaps	like	the	daughters	whose	mothers	worried	about	them	as	they	moved	to	the	city,	not	yet	fully	morally	formed,	despite	being	already	married.	These	mitigating	descriptions	did	not	mean	that	the	repercussions	for	her	actions	would	not	be	stiff,110	but	Djamilah	did	not	take	ultimate	responsibility	for	the	reported	actions	of	Gerwani.		Rather,	that	was	reserved	for	the	leadership	“forged”111	over	the	years	in	the	ideology	of	the	Indonesian	Communist	Party.	A	different	kind	of	confession	came	from	Ibu	Trimo,	of	the	national	leadership	of	Gerwani.	Published	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata	on	November	14,	eight	days	after	Djamilah’s	confession,	Ibu	Trimo’s	“interview”	with	the	press	was	striking	for	the	fact	that	the	person	confessing	wasn’t	even	present	at	Lubang	Buaya.		The	heading,	“Gerwani,	come	back	to	the	true	path.	Ibu	Trimo’s	message	while	crying—with	Djamilah	at	her	side,”112	implied	a	sort	of	repentance	on	the	part	of	Ibu	Trimo.	Described	as	part	of	the	“‘brains”	of	Gerwani,	to	whom	was	given	the	duty	of	making	the	organizational	program	successful,”113	Ibu	Trimo	had	been	arrested	in	the	roundup	of	PKI	leaders	following	the	collapse	of	G-30-S.	She	was	interrogated,	and	as	part	of	this	process,	
 107	“dalam	keadaan	takut	dan	gelisah,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	108	“dengar	bisik2,”	A.P.,	11/6/1965,	p.	2.	109	One	central	element	of	New	Order	ideology	became	the	idea	that	Indonesia’s	large	mass	of	poor	peasants	and	low-level	laborers	were	“floating,”	that	is,	unconnected	from	the	nastiness	and	brutishness	of	politics.	Given	that	land	reform	was	at	the	center	both	of	PKI	activism	and	pre-coup	social	disruption,	this	de-politicization	of	the	masses	was	a	critical	element	of	New	Order	policies	of	control	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	and	beyond.		110	Saskia	Wieringa	does	point	out,	however,	that	none	of	the	girls	who	furnished	confessions	were	brought	to	trial.	111	“gemblengan,”	which	also	implies	”indoctrinated.”	112	“Gerwani	kembalilah	kedjalan	benar.	Ibu	Trimo	berpesan	sambil	nangis	–	Dengan	Djamilah	disampingnja.”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	pp.	1,	3.	The	first	sentence	is	an	exhortation,	implying	that	a	return	to	the	”true	path”	could	in	fact	be	a	possibility.	113	“salah	satu	‘otak’	Gerwani	pada	siapa	diserahkan	tugas	mensukseskan	program	organisasi,”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	
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she	met	with	Djamilah,	who	passed	on	her	account	of	“what	had	happened”	at	Lubang	Buaya.	Ibu	Trimo	was	then	presented	to	the	press	alongside	Djamilah	for	an	interview	about	the	role	of	Gerwani	in	the	whole	affair.	The	article	quoted	the	detailed	questions	and	answers	Ibu	Trimo	gave	about	the	reported	events	at	Lubang	Buaya:	
– Do	you	agree	with	the	actions	of	Gerwani	at	Lubang	Buaya?	–				No	I	don’t	agree	with	it!		–				Do	you	find	it	true	if	you	are	told	that	the	actions	of	Gerwani	are	quite	cruel?	–				Yes,	that’s	it.	Djamilah	already	told	me	the	stories.	(Tears	begin	to	flow).		–				Isn’t	it	with	these	actions	of	Gerwani	that	the	name	of	Indonesian	womanhood	is	also	spoiled?	As	well,	isn’t	Gerwani’s	struggle	disgraced	and	defeated?		–				Yes	.		.	.	.	.	.	.	(she	wipes	away	tears).	–				Should	Gerwani	be	maintained?	–				I	would	like	that	it	just	be	disbanded.	(Her	tears	flow	more	rapidly).	–				People	are	demanding	that	the	PKI	be	disbanded.	If	that	is	already	the	way	it	is,	there	is	not	another	way	except	to	disband,	she	answered	faintly.114		The	view	of	Ibu	Trimo	was	of	a	defeated	leader	tearfully	asking	for	some	sort	of	forgiveness	and	seeking	a	moderate	reaction	for	actions	taken	by	her	organization	that	she	did	not	know	about.		However,	the	description	of	Ibu	Trimo	that	surrounded	this	set	of	responses	made	clear	that	the	reporter/interviewer	considered	her	regret	and	repentance	to	be,	at	least	in	part,	an	act.	Instead,	her	true	character	was	visible	through	her	face	and	her	comportment.	The	article’s	introduction	of	Ibu	Trimo	noted	her	“hesitant”115	handshake,	her	“forced	
 114	“-Apakah	Ibu	setudju	dgn	perbuatan	Gerwani	di	Lubang	Buaka?	
	 -	Tidak.	Saja	tidak	setudju.	
	 -	Apakah	Ibu	dapat	membenarkan	kalau	dikatakan	bahwa	perbuatan	Gerwani	itu	kedji	sekali?	
	 -	Ja	itulah.	Djamilah	sudah	tjerita	pada	saya.	(Airmatanja	kembali	berlinang2).	
	 -	Tidakkah	dengan	perbuatan	Gerwani	ini	nama	wanita	Indonesia	djuga	tjemar?	Disamping	perdjuangan	Gerwani	
djuga	turut	ternoda	dan	ala2.	
	 -	Ja	.	.	.	.	.	.				(Menghapus	airmata)	
	 -	Apakah	Gerwani	dapat	dipertahankan?	
	 -	Saja	ingin	supaja	bubar	sadja	(Airmata	makin	deras)	
	 -	Orang	menuntut	supaja	PKI	bubar.	Kalau	sudah	demikian	tidak	ada	djalan	lain	ketjuali	bubar.	Djawabnja	lemas.”		
A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	3.	115	“ragu2,”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	
 
 
388 
smile”116	and	“her	gaze	full	of	suspicion	that	couldn’t	be	hidden,”117	all	signs	of	her	disingenuousness,	and,	I	would	argue	in	addition,	of	her	broken	morality,	that	she	carefully	and	intentionally	hides.	“These	features	that	are	distinctively	PKI,”	the	author	continued,	“show	clearly	in	her.	These	are	the	results	of	indoctrination	which	has	gone	on	for	years,	the	results	of	perseverance	and	diligence	in	handling	the	demands	and	discipline	of	a	strict	organization.”118	In	the	writer’s	eyes,	this	Communist	indoctrination	made	Ibu	Trimo	guilty,	even	if	it	did	appear	that	she	“knew	nothing	at	all	about	the	plans	for	Gestapu.”119		It	is	important	to	remember	that	these	elements	of	both	character	and	inner	beauty—the	quality	of	her	smile	and	the	look	in	her	eyes	reflecting	the	true	nature	of	her	inner	morality—were	the	first	ones	discussed	in	Wanita	magazine’s	initial	article	on	beauty	in	1949.	The	implication,	clearly,	is	that	Ibu	Trimo’s	batin	had	been	seriously	affected	by	her	Communist	indoctrination,	leaving	her	no	longer	properly	Indonesian,	or	properly	moral.		The	apparent	strength	and	influence	of	this	communist	formation	on	Ibu	Trimo’s	character	was	most	visible	in	the	contrast	the	reporter	drew	between	Ibu	Trimo	and	Djamilah	as	they	sat	side	by	side:	When	we	take	note	of	the	faces	of	Ibu	Trimo	and	Djamilah	“Heroine	of	Lubang	Buaya,”	there	is	the	feeling	that	there	are	characteristics	that	that	separate	the	leader	from	the	follower.	Besides	her	attitude	that	is	too	guarded,	one	moment	stiff,	one	moment	friendly,	Ibu	Trimo	is	not	able	to	hide	the	look	in	her	eyes	that	is	full	of	suspicion.	Djamilah	does	not	possess	a	gaze	like	that,	because	she	is	not	yet	hardened,	she	hasn’t	yet	been	strongly	force-fed	party	doctrine.120		The	importance	of	Ibu	Trimo’s	confession	lies	within	this	difference	between	the	party	leader	innocent	of	atrocities	but	“guilty”	of	years	of	Communist	formation	and	the	young	follower	“guilty”	of	the	terror	carried	out	against	the	officers,		but	still	innocent	in	her	as-yet	unhardened	spirit.	There	are	clearly	different	ways	in	which	Communist	women	
 116		“senjum	jang	dipaksakan,”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	117	“sorot	mata	penuh	tjuriga	tak	dapat	sembunjikan,”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	118	“Tjiri2	watak	jang	chas	PKI	terlihat	djelas	dalam	dirinja.	Ini	adalah	hasil	gemblengan	jang	bertahun2,	hasil	dari	
kegigihan	dan	ketekunan	dalam	menaggulangi	[sic]	tuntutan2	dan	disiplin	organisasi	jang	keras.”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	
119	“tidak	tahu	menahi	tentang	rentjana	Gestapu.”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	3.	120	“Bila	kita	perhatikan	wadjah2	Ibu	Trimo	dan	Djamilah	’Srikandi	Lubang	Buaja’	terasa	ada	tjiri2	jang	membedakan	
seorang	pemimpin	dan	anak	buahnja.	Disamping	sikapnja	jang	terlalu	waspada,	sebentar	kaku,	sebentar	ramah,	Ibu	Trimo	
tidak	dapat	menjembunjikan	sorot	mata	jang	penuh	tjuriga.	Djamilah	tidak	mempunjai	sorot	mata	seperti	ini	karena	ia	
belum	gemblengan,	belum	begitu	hebat	ditjekoki	doktrin	partai.”	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	1.	
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could	be	labeled	as	guilty	in	the	aftermath	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya,	but	there	are	also	ways	in	which	they	could	be	seen	as	victims.	In	the	opinion	of	the	reporter	who	produced	the	article	on	Ibu	Trimo,	at	least,	the	Communist	inculcation	seemed	to	be	the	worse	of	the	two	crimes.		It	is	interesting,	however,	that	both	Djamilah	and	Ibu	Trimo	were	presented	to	some	degree	as	stock	images.	In	a	book	on	proletarian	ludruk	theater	based	on	fieldwork	in	Surabaya	in	1962-63	(though	published	after	1965),	American	anthropologist	James	Peacock	noted	that	almost	all	female	roles	in	ludruk	fell	into	one	of	few	types,	two	of	which	were	the	“middle-aged	nagging	wife”	and	the	“thirtyish	villainess	wife.”121	Ibu	Trimo	was	presented	as	a	combination	of	the	two,	with	an	implied	meddlesome	mouth	and	an	aggressive	forward	manner	that	was,	in	the	opinion	of	the	interviewer,	barely	contained.	The	thirtyish	villainess	wife	in	ludruk	also	had	a	tendency	to	kill	her	husbands	and	lovers.		Many	of	the	plot	synopses	Peacock	presented	in	his	work	also	included	young	peasant	women	who	had	been	summoned	to	work	in	the	modern,	urban	houses	in	which	most	ludruk	plots	occurred.	These	women,	like	Djamilah,	were	often	presented	as	naïve	and	unprepared	for	the	intrigues	in	which	they	would	soon	be	involved.	There	are	also	two	“good”	characters,	the	long-suffering	hero’s	mother,	and	the	beautiful	young	mistress.	Peacock	argues	that	these	characters	“either	protest	against	or	compensate	for	the	male’s	position	in	the	matrifocal	household,”122	that	is,	they	were	either	the	cause	of	or	the	solution	to	a	situation	in	which	men’s	proper	authority	had	been	usurped.		That	all	women’s	roles	in	ludruk	were	played	by	male	transvestites	only	serves	to	highlight	the	stock	nature	of	the	“characters”	these	two	Gerwani	women	are	drawn	as.123	It	is	also	important	to	remember	that	in	popular	media	since	1963,	Indonesian	women	had	largely	been	drawn	as	stock	ideal-type	characters,	most	particularly	in	relation	to	their	position	in	the	representation	of	the	nation.		
 121	James	Peacock,	Rites	of	Modernization,	pp.	77-78.	122	James	Peacock,	Rites	of	Modernization,	p.	78.	123	The	irony	of	including	Peacock’s	work	in	this	analysis	is	that	ludruk	was	another	victim	of	the	New	Order	campaign	against	communism.	In	the	Suharto	era,	ludruk	troops,	which	had	often	been	linked	to	proletarian	arts	movements,	were	disbanded	and	the	theater	form	ceased	to	exist.	The	transvestite	actors	were	often	pressured,	as	were	Indonesian	women,	to	“cleanse”	themselves	and	assume	“appropriate”	(male)	gender	roles,	including	stopping	having	men	as	sexual	partners.	Many	ludruk	actors,	particularly	those	who	played	the	women’s	roles,	are	reported	to	have	been	killed	in	the	massacres	of	late	1965	and	early	1966.	
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In	the	confessional	literature,	both	Ibu	Trimo	and	Djamilah	were	presented	more	as	ideal	types	than	as	individuals.	As	such,	they	played	roles	in	the	national	discourse	on	Lubang	Buaya	that	went	far	beyond	their	personal	experiences.	In	“producing”	the	confessions	of	a	fundamentally	false	narrative,	the	military	explicitly	used	constructions	of	women	who	were	“implicated”	in	the	killings	of	the	seven	national	heroes	in	ways	that	were	intended	to	invoke	a	serious	incident	of	moral	crisis	at	a	national	scale	and	with	national	consequences.		The	presence	of	the	possibility	of	some	degree	of	innocence	in	each	of	these	women,	and	the	more	general	types	of	women	they	represented,	however,	necessitates	further	discussion	about	what,	in	fact,	made	women	potentially	culpable	in	the	wake	of	the	killings.	In	any	case,	the	more	hard-cut	stock	images	of	the	Gerwani	women	as	frenzied	cannibals,	
kasar	savages	and	morally	depraved	activists,	which	filled	the	initial	reports	of	Lubang	Buaya	had	at	least	partially	been	softened	by	more	complicated	and	full—if	in	some	ways	more	horrific—images	of	Communist	women	whose	fundamental	eastern	and	Indonesian		character	had	been	transformed	by	indoctrination.	These	did	not	stand	by	themselves.	Rather,	these	more	complex	views	of	Gerwani	were	presented	in	contradistinction	to	images	of	non-Communist	women.		In	particular,	five-year-old	Irma	Ade	Nasution	became	an	important	symbol	of	the	purity	of	Indonesian	womanhood	against	which	the	stains	of	Gerwani	could	be	measured.		
Irma,	the	Little	Heroine	Irma	Ade	Surjani	Nasution,	the	second	daughter	of	General	A.H.	Nasution,	was	an	omnipresent	figure	in	the	Indonesian	press	after	the	events	of	G-30-S.	Shot	in	the	crossfire	aimed	at	her	father,	Irma	became	the	eighth	victim	of	G-30-S	when	she	died	later	in	the	hospital.	Her	last	photograph,	a	formally	posed	shot	of	a	sweet	little	girl	in	a	light-colored	pinafore,	was	published	at	least	several	times	in	each	of	the	three	newspapers.	Her	funeral	with	full	military	honors	on	October	7	received	significant	coverage	as	well.	Her	father’s	words	to	her	at	her	graveside	were	printed	in	both	Kompas	and	Angkata	Bersendjata,124	as	were	prayers	recommending	her	soul	to	heaven	and	words	of	consolation	to	her	mother.	
 124	See	A.B.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1,	and	K.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1.	
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She	became	the	ultimate	victim	of	the	“ferocity	and	savagery”125	of	G-30-S,	standing	in	stark	contrast	as	the	ultimate	symbol	of	female	innocence	against	which	Gerwani	had	sinned.		
	
Figure	7.1	Irma	Ade	Nasution,	1965.		The	heartfelt	loss	of	a	father	was	a	clear	factor	in	the	beatification	of	Little	Irma.	At	her	graveside,	he	addressed	her	saying:	“My	most	beloved	child.	You	have	preceded,	falling	early	as	a	shield	for	your	father.	And	you	have	preceded	all	of	us	in	facing	Allah.		.	.	.		Have	a	good	journey	my	child.	Have	a	good	journey,	until	we	meet	again,	because	we	will	follow	you.”126	Indonesians	responded	to	his	loss,	taking	it	on	as	their	own.	For	several	months,	the	newspapers	were	full	of	advertisements	taken	out	to	express	the	condolences	of	various	organizations,	army	battalions	and	private	companies	towards	the	Nasution	family,	to	pray	that	Irma	would	find	a	place	with	God,	and	to	excoriate	the	counter-revolutionary	terror	of	Gestapu	that	had	caused	the	death	of	the	“Little	Hero.”127	
 125	“keganasan	dan	kebuasan,”	A.B.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1.	126	“Anak	saja	jang	tercinta,	Engkau	telah	mendahului	gugur	sebagai	perisal	untuk	ajahmu.	Akan	tetapi	engkau	mendahului		
kami	semua	menghadap	kepada	Allah	SWT.		.	.	.		Selamat	djalan,	anakku.	Selamat	djalan,	sampai	ketemu,	karena	kami	akan	
menjusulmu.”	K.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1.	127	“Pahlawan	ketjil.”	K.,	10/8/1965,	p.	1,	but	the	term	was	used	broadly.	
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Irma’s	life	was	lionized	for	popular	consumption	in	a	series	of	articles	published	in	
Angkatan	Bersendjata	on	December	20	and	21.	In	this	short	biography,	Irma	was	painted	as	an	exemplary	young	girl,	who	lived	up	to	her	name	Surjani,	meaning	the	sun,	which	“brings	radiance	and	happiness.”128	But	her	relationship	to	everyone	she	knew	was	represented	through	her	nickname,	Adik,	meaning	“younger	sister,”129	and	she	was	“cute	and	lively	to	all	who	knew	her.”130	But	she	was	not	presented	in	the	series	primarily	as	a	younger	sister.	Rather,	Irma	was	described	principally	as	a	future	mother.	Her	great	concern	for	her	friends	at	school	prompted	her	teacher	to	observe	that	she	“possessed	maternal	characteristics,”131	and	that	she	would	bathe	her	doll	with	several	friends.	Moreover,	the	hagiography	noted,	she	possessed	the	motherly	quality	of	putting	the	needs	of	other	before	her	own:	She	even	paid	more	attention	to	the	interests	of	other	people	than	to	her	own.	If	a	friend	or	any	other	child	from	her	family	was	crying	Adik	would	comfort	them	with	the	sweet	words	“Don’t	cry,	OK?”132		Irma	was	also	a	good	daughter	and	granddaughter.	When	her	father’s	mother	was	being	nursed	in	the	hospital	for	an	eye	infection,	she	visited	her	grandmother	regularly	and	watched	the	doctors	carefully	as	they	treated	the	older	woman.	Once	her	grandmother	returned	home,	Irma	followed	her	around	and	“busied	herself	waiting	on	her	grandmother’s	needs.”133	She	“never	forgot	to	visit”134	her	maternal	grandmother	in	Bandung	during	her	vacations,	(as	if	a	5-year-old	would	have	agency	in	such	a	thing,)	and	upon	leaving,	gave	her	grandmother	a	doll	in	case	the	woman	would	miss	Adik,	saying	that	“Grandma	mustn’t	be	sad.	Adik	will	come	back	soon.”135	
 128	“memberi	tjahaja/kebahagiaan,”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	129	“Adik,”	means	both	“younger	sister”	and	“younger	brother,”	and	is	used	as	a	direct	form	of	reference	to	a	young	member	of	a	family,	sometimes	also	shortened	to	“dik.”	Its	use	signals	closeness	to	the	younger	relative	on	a	personal	level.	So,	to	some	extent,	in	reading	about	Irma	in	Indonesian	referred	to	as	Adik	extended	that	sense	of	familiarity	to	the	entire	country.	She	became	the	nation’s	younger	sister.	130	“lutju	dan	ramah	terhadap	semua	jang	dikenalnja.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	“Lucu”	literally	means	funny,	but	it	is	a	word	often	used	to	describe	young	children	in	the	sense	that	they	are	funny,	but	cute	in	both	appearance	and	bearing.	Indonesians	would	never	describe	a	child	as	beautiful,	though.	That	might	attract	bad	luck,	and	culturally,	it	is	not	done.	So,	women	hovering	over	a	newly	born	baby	and	its	mother	will	invariably	describe	the	child	as	“lucu,”	while	clearly	being	absolutely	entranced	by	the	new	arrival.	131	“memiliki	sifat	keibuan,”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	132	“Iapun	lebih	banjak	memperhatikan	kepentingan	orang	lain	daripada	dirinja	sendiri.	Kalau	temannja	atau	salah	seorang	
putra	dari	keluarganja	menangis	Adik	manghibur	dengan	kata2	manis	’Djangan	menangis,	ja?’,”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	133	“berusaha	melajani	kebutuhan	nenek,”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	134	“tidak	pernah	lupa	mengundjungi,”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	135	“Oma	djangan	sedih	ja.	Adik	lekas	kembali.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	
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The	story	reported	that	Irma	used	to	welcome	her	father	home	when	he	returned	from	affairs	of	state,	and	would	sometimes	ride	around	the	city	sitting	in	his	lap	“constantly	talking	and	asking	him	about	all	sorts	of	things.	Quite	satisfied,	Pak	Nas	always	answered	his	little	daughter,	without	feeling	even	a	little	tired.”136	And	with	her	mother,	she	was	so	good	that	it	was	difficult	for	the	woman	ever	to	be	mad	at	Irma.	Her	mother	also	reported	that	Irma	was	quite	the	young	beautiful-woman	in	training.	In	a	description	that	clearly	reflects	the	development	of	modern	Indonesian	women’s	glamour	culture	discussed	in	various	women’s	magazines	as	laid	out	in	previous	chapters,	by	age	five,	Irma,		who	was	still	little,	wore	lipstick	and	paid	attention	to	beauty.	She	owned	a	collection	of	children’s	lipsticks,	which	had	been	specially	bought	for	her	by	Ibu	Nas	.	.	.	and	her	favorite	shade	was	mocha	polka.137			She	also	had	an	innate	sense	of	fashion	and	style.	She	often	picked	out	her	mother’s	clothes	or	lipstick,	and	“according	to	Ibu	Nas,	really	sometimes	Adik’s	choices	were	appropriate	and	proper.”138	In	the	peaceful	days	before	the	shooting—though	imagined	after	it—Irma	was	the	absolute	symbol	of	Indonesian	womanhood:	mother,	daughter,	and	younger	sister.	Irma	was	intelligent,	ambitious	and	not	afraid	of	the	future.		While	watching	her	grandmother’s	eye	treatment,	against	the	wishes	of	her	mother,	Irma	defended	her	actions	saying	“Adik	wants	to	become	a	doctor,	mama,	so	I	must	watch	so	that	later	I	will	know.”139	The	biographer	sees	this	as	a	good	thing.	“It	appears,”	he	wrote,	“that	this	little	girl	possessed	a	courageous	nature.”140	Yet	this	adventurous	streak	was	balanced	by	her	desire	to	be	beautiful	and	her	concern	with	makeup	and	fashion,	which	would	make	her	appealing	in	the	eyes	of	others.	But	both	these	attributes	were	secondary	to	her	concern	for	others	and	her	“maternal	characteristics.”	She	was,	above	all,	born	to	be	a	mother.		
 136	“tak	henti2nja	berbitjara	dan	bertanja	tentang	segala	sesuatu.	Dengan	senang	hati	Pak	Nas	selalu	melajani	puteri	
ketjilinja	ini,	tanpa	merasa	lelah	sedikitpun.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	137	“jang	masih	ketjil	itu	ialah	memakai	lipstik	[sic]	dan	memperhatikan	keindahan.	Ia	mempunyai	koleksi	lipstick	anak2,	
jang	chusus	dibelikan	oleh	Ibu	Nas	.	.	.		dan	warna	kesukaanja	ialah	moccha	polka.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	Note	the	two	different	spellings	of	“lipstick.”	138	“menurut	Ibu	Nas,	memang	kadang2	pilihan	Adik	itu	tepat	dan	pantas.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	In	other	words,	Irma	as	a	”good”	Indonesian	woman,	even	if	just	by	sartorial	standards.	139	“Adik	mau	mendjadi	dokter	mama,	djadi	mesti	melihat	supaja	nanti	tahu.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	140	“Ternjata	gadis	ketjil	itu	memiliki	watak	pemberani.”	A.B.,	12/20/1965,	p.	1.	
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If	she	were	ideal	in	her	daily	life,	the	forbearance	and	concern	for	others	with	which	Irma	was	credited	after	being	shot	was	truly	incredible.	The	story	reported	the	violence	of	the	night	of	September	30/October	1	as	follows:	Ibu	Nas	for	a	moment	carried	Adik	who	was	smeared	with	blood.	The	sweet	little	one	did	not	cry	or	even	moan	a	little	bit.	When	her	mother	asked	“Are	you	hurt?”	she	answered,	“I’m	hurt	mother.”	Ibu	Nas	asked	again:	“Are	you	still	alive?”	“Alive,	mama,	I’m	still	alive’	Mama.”	.	.	.	[After	her	operation]	she	saw	her	older	sister	crying,	then	she	said:	“You	must	not	cry,	I	will	recover	soon.”	To	her	mother	she	asked	“Why	was	Daddy	shot,	mama?”141		Not	only,	then,	did	the	mortally	wounded	young	girl	reportedly	not	cry	after	being	shot	during	a	noisy	and	confusing	late-night	raid	on	her	house,	she	also	took	the	time	and	effort	to	reassure	her	mother	that	she	was	still	alive,	even	though	she	was	in	pain.	She	made	an	effort	to	comfort	her	older	sister	and	to	inquire	after	her	father,	and	as	she	grew	weaker	and	could	only	nod	her	head,	she	still	dutifully	answered	when	her	mother	asked	if	she	was	feeling	sick.	Irma	was	presented	in	this	biography	as	an	example	of	moral	excellence,	and	particularly	of	the	type	of	behavior	that	good	Indonesians	should	show	in	times	of	trouble:	Adik	was	only	a	little	child.	But	what	lessons	can	we	find	to	take	from	her,	precisely	because	her	death	happened	when	she	was	so	young?		For	children	the	same	age	as	her,	Adik	left	behind	good	characteristics	that	are	proper	to	follow.	Give	preference	to	the	needs	of	others	and	always	be	ready	to	help.		.	.	.		friendly	to	whomever	without	differentiating.	Diligent	and	obedient	at	school.	Truly	she	was	one	of	the	smart	children.		To	her	family	and	to	all	the	people	of	Indonesia,	Adik	implanted	the	conviction	that	each	person	must	be	resolute,	even	in	the	face	of	critical	moments.142		
 141	“Ibu	Nas	seketika	mendukung	Adik	jang	berlumuran	darah.	Si	ketjil	mungil	tidak	menangis	atapun	mengerang	
sedikitpun.	Waktu	ibu	bertanja	‘Adik	sakit?’	ia	mendjawab:	‘Sakit	mama,’	Ibu	Nas	bertanja	lagi:	‘Adik	masih	hidup?’,	‘Hidup	
mama,	Adik	terus	Mama.’		.	.	.		ia	melihat	kakanja	menangis,	lalu	ia	berkata	‘Kakak	djangan	menangis.	Adik	akan	lekas	
sumbuh.’		Kepada	Ibu	Nas	ia	bertanja:	‘Mengapa	Ajah	ditembak,	mama?’,”	A.B.,	10/21/1965,	p.	3.	142		“Adik	hanjalah	seorang	anak	ketjil.	Tetapi	peladjaran	apa	kita	ambil	dari	padanja,	djustru	kepergiannja	dalam	usia	jang	
demikian	muda?	
					Untuk	anak	jang	sebaja	dengan	dia,	Adik	meninggalkan	sifat2	baik	jang	patut	ditiru.	Medahulukan	kepentingan	orang	
lain	dan	selalu	sedia	membantu.		.	.	.		ramah	tamah	terhadap	siapa	sadja	tanpa	membeda2kan.	Radjin	dan	patuh	disekolah.	
Kebetulan	pula	ia	termasuk	anak	jang	tjerdas.	
					Pada	keluarga	dan	seluruh	masjarakat	Indonesia	Adik	telah	menenamkan	kejakinan	bahwa	setiap	orang	harus	tabah,	
walaupun	dalam	menghadapi	saat2	jang	kritis.”	A.B.,	10/21/1965,	p.	3.	
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The	“little	hero”143	became	an	equal	totem	in	the	newspapers	to	the	“Seven	Heroes	of	the	Revolution.”	She	also	became	the	image	of	the	perfect	Indonesian	woman,	and	a	clear	counter-image	to	the	women	of	Gerwani.	While	they	were	portrayed	as	coarse	and	sexual,	or	as	calculating,	she	was	elegant	and	genuine,	and,	at	five	years	old,	she	was	presumably	sexually	innocent.	While	they	were	bossy,	she	was	obedient.	While	they	had	taken	the	lives	of	seven	soldiers,	she	had	been	her	father’s	“shield.”	While	they	eventually	ran	from	their	actions	in	fear	and	nervousness,	she	faced	her	death	with	calm,	dignity	and	concern	for	others.	While	they	were	“orang	tak	ber-Tuhan,”	she	was	clearly	not	only	Godly	in	her	character,	but	also	now,	was	in	his	presence	in	body	and	spirit,	delivered	to	face	Allah	with	the	prayers	of	her	father	and	the	nation.		Thus,	the	images	of	Gerwani	as	they	are	presented	in	the	press	must	be	seen	in	contradistinction	to	the	images	projected	of	Irma	Ade	Nasution.144		As	part	of	their	perceived	attacks	on	the	various	distinct	parts	of	Indonesian	society,	the	Gerwani	women	were	also	seen	as	attacking	the	young	girl.	A	call	for	the	dissolution	of	Gerwani	by	the	head	of	the	Gerakan	Wanita	Korban	Negara,	(Women’s	Movement	of	the	Sacrificial	Heroes	of	the	Nation),	for	instance,	noted	that:		As	a	women’s	organization,	Gerwani	committed	treason	against	the	family,	the	People,	the	State,	the	Nation,	the	Indonesian	Revolution,	and	directly	against	.	.	.	the	Great	Leader	of	the	Revolution	Bung	Karno	.	.	.	the	seven	revolutionary	heroes	and	a	female	revolutionary	hero	Miss	ADE	ERMA	SURJANI	NASUTION,	second	daughter	of	.	.	.	Gen.	A.H.	Nasution.145		Both	sets	of	images	drew	distinctly	on	ideal	types	of	Indonesian	women	that	had	been	actively	used	in	defining	the	moral	success	of	the	nation,	and	in	the	answers	to	the	question	Sukarno	asked	in	1926	of	whether	Indonesia	would	be	glorious	or	Indonesia	would	be	shattered.	What	we	can	see	in	this	close	reading	of	the	various	successive	iteration	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	between	the	second	week	of	October	and	the	end	of	December,	
 143	“pahlawan	ketjil”	A.B.,	10/21/1965,	p.	3.	144		These	contrasting	images	are	not	only	created	through	text,	they	can	also	be	seen	in	the	photos	of	captured	Gerwani	women	as	they	contrast	with	the	famous	photo	of	Irma.		145	“Sebagai	organisasi	wanita,	“Gerwani”	telah	berchianat	terhadap/kepada	keluarga,	Masjarakat,	Negara,	Bangsa,	
Revolusi	Indonesia	dan	langsung	kepada	.	.	.	Pemimpin	Besar	Revolusi	Bung	Karno	.	.	.	7	pahlawan2	revolusi	dan	seorang	
pahlawan	revolusi	wanita	Nona	ADE	ERMA	SURJANI	NASUTION	putri	kedua	.	.	.	Djendral	A.H.	Nasution.”	A.B.,	10/18/1965,	p.	3.	
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therefore,	is	that	each	new	expansion	and	adaptation	of	the	narrative	showed	a	marked	and	increasing	use	of	specific	elements	of	earlier	moral	crisis	narratives	that	the	dissertation	explores	earlier.			What	was	being	manipulated,	the	moral	constructions	of	national	women,	were	a	critical,	central	element	of	the	construction	of	Indonesian	national	identity.	And	these	manipulations,	all	fully	constructed	by	the	military,	were	designed	to	show	that	the	very	essence	of	the	nation	was	put	at	mortal	risk	by	the	actions	of	Gerwani.	When	read	in	relation	to	the	context	of	how	moral	crisis	had	been	constructed	over	the	previous	twenty	years,	this	manipulation	begins	to	show	what	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	placed	at	risk	should	G-30-S	have	succeeded,	namely	the	continued	fundamental	moral	strength	on	which	the	nation	had	been	built.		
Moral	Crisis	and	the	Strengthening	of	the	Historiograpy	of	the	Indonesian	Killings	It	was	this	evocation	of	moral	crisis,	I	argue,	that	was	critical	to	activating	the	intent	towards	mass	killing.	It	provides,	I	argue,	an	explantion	for	why	this	reaction	could	occur	that	is	fully	imbedded	within	already	extant	central	forces	within	Indonesian	cultural	and	social	politics.	It	is	an	explanation	that	reflects	the	tensions	of	Indonesians	looking	to	be	
moderen,	and	not	simply	modern.	It	also	provides	important	supplementation	to	two	of	the	best	explanations	of	the	
why	of	the	killings	that	have	been	provided	by	historians.	Both	Geoffrey	Robinson,	most	recently,	and	Saskia	Wieringa	earlier,	have	presented	important	arguments	about	the	causes	of	the	killings	from	within	an	Indonesian	cultural	context.	Importantly,	both	of	them	have	placed	these	explanations	within	contexts	of	Indonesian	society	and	history	seen	largely	in	Indonesian	terms,	eschewing	explanations	of	the	killings	as	some	form	of	mass	
amok	that	flow	from	an	Orientalist	interpretation	of	the	region.	I	argue	that	adding	Moral	Crisis	as	an	important	lens	for	understanding	1965-66	strengthens	each	of	their	arguments	in	important	ways.	In	his	new	work	on	Indonesia’s	“Killing	Season,”	Geoffrey	Robinson	observes	that	there	is	a	problem	in	much	of	the	historiography	on	this	era,	namely	that	“none	of	the	competing	interpretations	of	the	movement—including	the	official	one—can	possibly	
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explain,	much	less	justify,	the	mass	killing	and	incarceration	of	1965-66	that	followed.”146	Along	with	other	new	scholarhip	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	Robsinson	takes	an	exceptionally	clear	stance	on	who	was	responsible	for	the	killing.	The	“resort	to	mass	killing	and	detention,”	he	writes,	“was	neither	inevitable	nor	spontaneous,	but	was	encouraged,	facilitated,	directed	and	shaped	by	the	army’s	leadership.”147	Further,	he	argues,	“the	mass	violence	of	1965-66	was	the	product	of	a	particular	interpretation	of	the	movement	that	blamed	the	killing	of	the	generals	on	the	PKI,	and	portrayed	the	party	as	guilty	of	murder	and	treachery.”148		In	order	to	build	an	explanation	for	the	justification	of	the	killings,	Robinson	suggests	that	they	must	be	understood	through	three	“broad	claims”	that	both	“account	.	.	.	for	the	variations	and	particularities	of	the	Indonesian	case	.	.	.	while	also	making	possible	its	comparison	to	other	instances	of	mass	killing	and	detention.”149	His	first	two	claims	are	broadly	structural:	that	the	army	leadership	played	a	“pivotal	role	.	.	.	in	provoking,	facilitating,	and	organizing	it,”150	and	that	“the	actions	of	powerful	foreign	states—especially	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom—together	with	aspects	of	international	context	were	instrumental	in	facilitating	and	encouraging	the	army’s	campaign	of	mass	violence	in	1965-66.”151	These	first	two	claims	are	critical	to	understanding	how	the	larger	structural	patterns	of	the	events	was	achieved,	but	neither	explains	why	the	killings	were	able	to	work	on	an	autonomous	cultural	level.	Robinson	addresses	this	problem	of	“why”	in	his	third	broad	claim,	namely	that	specific	historical	conditions	“made	the	killings	in	Indonesia	much	more	likely	to	happen.	They	did	so,”	he	wrote,	“by	influencing	political	ideas	and	conflicts,	shaping	key	political	institutions,	and	structures,	and	providing	the	basis	for	politically	powerful	historical	reconstuctions	and	memories.”152	In	other	words,	the	Indonesian	killings	he	argues,	and	I	
 146	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	80.	He	is	referring	here	to	the	same	various	interpretations	of	the	G-30-S	movement’s	genesis	that	are	outlined	in	Chapter	1.	147	Geoffery	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	19.	This	is	the	first	of	three	arguments	he	makes	that	form	what	he	calls	his	“new	account”	of	the	events	of	1965-66.	148	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	81.	149	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	19.	150	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	19.	151	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	21.	152	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	24.	
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fully	agree,	must	be	seen	and	understood	fundamentally	from	within	an	Indonesian	historical	context.	Robinson	names	five	of	these	specific	historical	contexts.	First	was	the	existence	of	a	strong	political	fault	line	between	the	Left	and	Right	as	a	result	of	“bitter	ideological	differences”153	between	the	two	poles	that	reached	back	to	the	1920’s.	Additionally,	the	events	at	Madiun	in	1948154	had	led	to	the	“emergence	of	a	perception	within	the	army	and	the	political	Right	more	generally	that	the	PKI	represented	an	existential	threat	to	army	unity	and	to	the	nation.”155	He	also	argues	that	the	process	of	state	formation	during	World	War	II	and	the	Revolution	gave	rise	to	a	conservative	army	and	a	highly	militarized	state,	and	the	“early	development	of	an	army	doctrine	and	practice	of	mobilizing	civilian	militias	to	combat	domestic	enemies.”156	The	army	became	capable,	as	a	result,	of	mobilizing	civilian	militias	as	needed,	including	in	1965-66.		Finally,	Robinson	notes	that	these	tensions	between	left	and	right	and	the	army’s	desire	to	consolidate	power	were	“accelerated	by	the	polarizing	logic	of	the	Cold	War,”	including	Sukarno’s	increasingly	“sometimes-bellicose	language	.	.	.	of	anticolonial	nationalism.”157	Indonesia	in	the	first	half	of	the	1960’s	he	writes,	was	marked	by	“a	politics	notable	for	its	militancy	and	high	levels	of	mass	mobilization,”	which,	it	should	be	noted,	was	true	across	the	Indonesian	political	spectrum	and	in	all	three	aliran.	The	dynamism	of	the	time	was	important.	He	does	“not	mean	to	suggest,”	he	writes,		that	the	mass	killing	and	incarceration	were	preordained,	or	planned	from	start	to	finish.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	worth	emphasizing	that	the	violence	emerged	and	changed	in	response	to	conditions	on	the	ground.158		
 153	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	24.	154	In	1948,	during	the	height	of	the	Revolution,	the	PKI	actively	supported	peasant	rebellions	against	landowners	in	the	Madiun	Regency	in	East	Java.	The	army,	under	the	orders	of	Sukarno	and	Hatta,	suppressed	the	actions	and	attacked	the	PKI.	PKI	Chairman	Aidit	fled	Central	Java	and	went	into	hiding	in	Jakarta.	The	Madiun	Affair	exasperated	the	tensions	between	the	Army	and	the	PKI,	including	personally	among	individual	members	of	the	leadership	of	the	two	organizations,	and	the	suspicions	between	the	army	and	the	communists	in	the	1960s	often	reflected	some	of	its	roots	in	the	“Madiun	Affair.”	155	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	24.		156	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	25.	157	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	25.	158	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	26.	
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But	the	conditions	were,	in	fundamental	ways,	Indonesian	conditions,	and	the	tensions	were	Indonesian	tensions	that	need	to	be	understood,	and	I	fully	agree,	within	a	fundamentally	Indonesian	framework.	This	chapter	has	suggested	an	additional	source	of	tension.	Namely,	it	argues	that	the	army	unveiled	its	attacks	against	the	PKI,	and	the	left	more	generally,	ultimately	as	a	case	of	national	moral	crisis.	Further,	it	argues	that	this	was	centrally	dependent	on	their	sexualization	and	bestialization	of	Gerwani	activists	in	the	various	iterations	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative.	To	some	extent,	this	offers	an	explanation	for	why	that	suggests	a	deep	pattern	of	what	was	“at	stake”	culturally	and	politically	that	helps,	I	would	argue,	complicate	and	enrich	Robinson’s	analysis.	His	argument	looks	more	at	how	the	killing	was	able	to	be	carried	out	so	effectively,	and	doesn’t,	to	my	reading	at	least,	offer	a	full	explanation	for	why	the	killings	appears	to	have	been	necessary.		In	placing	gender	at	the	center	of	this	question,	the	dissertation	is	not,	of	course,	the	first	writing	to	do	so,	far	from	it.	In	particular,	and	as	I	have	noted	previously,	Saskia	Wieringa’s	scholarship	has	that	question	at	its	very	center.	And	the	treatment	of	Gerwani	is,	of	course,	something	that	Robinson	and	other	scholars	not	only	recognize	but	emphasize.	“In	no	case,”	Robinson	writes,	“were	the	intentions	of	this	official	vilification	[of	the	PKI	and	its	affiliates]	so	evident	and	the	consequences	so	grave	as	in	the	demonization	of	Gerwani.”159	Yet,	Robinson’s	analysis	does	not	exceed	arguments	previously	advanced	by	other	scholars.	“Apart	from	casting	the	Gerwani	women	as	inhuman	witches,”	he	writes,	the	story	[of	sexual	torture	of	the	generals]	powerfully	evoked	male	anxieties	about	castration.	Moreover,	as	Saskia	Wieringa	has	convincingly	argued,	it	played	on	the	particular	anxieties	of	conservative	men,	for	whom	the	ostensibly	uncontrolled	sexuality	of	Gerwani	women—not	to	mention	their	autonomy	and	lively	political	engagement—represented	an	unacceptable	threat	to	their	patriarchal	position	and	worldview.160		Indeed,	as	the	dissertation	notes	in	Chapter	1,	Wieringa	finishes	up	her	work	squarely	in	an	analysis	about	male	castration	anxiety.	“Men,”	sje	wrote,	especially	the	military	and	religiously	conservative	men,	became	so	disturbed	by	what	they	regarded	as	
 159	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	167.	160	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	Season,	p.	167.	
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the	castration	of	their	voice	by	the	articulate	Gerwani	that	they	transferred	their	fear	into	a	fantasy	of	castration	of	that	other	organ	of	male	power	over	women,	their	penises.”161		This	argument	gets	repeated,	as	Robinson	has	done,	and	it	may	indeed	be	correct.	Certainly,	as	this	dissertation	argues	fully,	the	fears	of	what	might	have	happened	had	the	military	not	destroyed	the	Indonesian	left	were	centered	on	a	false	narrative	of	the	power	of	a	destructive	and	morally	broken	feminist	engagement	with	modernity.	This	certainly	provides	a	logical	why	to	the	analysis	of	the	killings.	But	this	is	also	not,	I	believe,	the	best	expression	of	Wierienga’s	argument.	I	have	long	been	wary	of	the	explanation	about	gender	lying	in	an	argument	about	castration	anxiety.	Castration	certainly	lay	at	the	center	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative,	to	be	sure.	And	there	is	plenty	of	evidence,	both	historical162	and	literary,163	that	the	particularly	violent	responses	aimed	at	Communists,	both	male	and	female,	too	often	seemed	to	reflect	a	particularly	male	anger	that	was	particularly,	and	often	sexually,	vicious.164		One	of	the	elements	of	her	argument	I	wish	that	Wieringa	had	offered	direct	evidence	for,	however,	is	about	the	ways	in	which	“male	anxieties	about	castration”	among	conservative	men	were	expressed.	I	haven’t	seen	an	explicit	discussion	of	castration	anxiety	itself	in	the	sources	I	have	looked	at.	I	didn’t	see	discussions	of	it	in	the	myriad	discussions	of	the	fears	of	a	burgeoning	Indonesian	modernity	in	the	sources	on	the	1950s	and	1960s.	That	is,	of	course,	not	to	say	it	isn’t	there,	but	if	it	was,	it	does	not	appear	to	have	been	a	consciously	expressed	element	of	the	Indonesian	discussion	of	national	identity	or	
 161	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	327,	the	final	page	of	the	main	text	of	her	work,	and	the	central	argument	of	her	conclusion,	although	there	is	an	interesting	Epilogue	in	which	she	writes	about	the	Indonesian	feminist	movement	that	had	“matured	significantly”	a	generation	after	Gerwani’s	destruction,	and	coming	out	of	the	New	Order	dictatorship.	162	See	in	particular,	see	the	discussion	of	Rachmi	Diyah	Larasati’s	The	Dance	that	Makes	You	Vanish,	and	Annie	Pohlman,	
Title,	on	the	ways	in	which	patterns	of	the	oppression,	rape,	internment,	torture	and	execution	of	women	were	gendered,	and	centered	around	male	violence	in	the	aftermath	of	1965-66.	Usamah’s	short	story	“Perang	dan	Kemanusiaan”	gives	a	spare	but	powerful	example	of	women	being	specifically	targeted	for	execution	out	of	soldiers’	anger	at	Sukarno’s	defense	of	Gerwani	in	a	December	1965	speech,	likely	to	the	nation’s	Governors.	163	See	the	discussion	of	gendered	literary	views	of	the	violent	social	reaction	by	men	in	response	to	female	power	in	such	novels	as	Ahmad	Tohari’s	The	Dancer	and	Eka	Kurniawans	Beauty	is	a	Wound	in	Chapter	1.	164	Though	I	do	not	have	time	and	space	to	write	about	it	here,	a	not	uncommon	feature	of	the	execution	of	Communist	men	involved	castration,	with	the	penises	being	nailed	or	strung	up	in	public	afterwards.	The	sexually	violent	elements	of	the	torture	and	execution	of	women,	including	rape	with	sharpened	bamboo	poles	and	other	highly	sexually	violent	practices	is	also	something	that	points	to	the	gendered	sexually	violent	nature	fundamental	to	the	army’s	destruction	of	the	Indonesian	left.	
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of	moral	crisis.	So	I	am	not	completely	comfortable	placing	it	at	the	center	of	the	explanation	of	why	the	killings	happened.		While	castration	and	other	sexual	power	anxieties	might	perhaps	help	address	another	of	Robinson’s	as-yet	unanswered	questions—“why	were	methods	like	disappearance,	bodily	mutilation,	corpse	display,	and	sexual	violence	so	common?”—and	while	Annie	Pohlman’s	research	on	the	interrogation	and	torture	of	Gerwani	prisoners	makes	absolutely	clear	that	the	army’s	response	to	communist	women	depended	centrally	on	the	deployment	of	sexual	violence	against	them,	the	case	for	male	castration	anxiety	as	a	sufficient	answer	to	explain	“the	why”	seems	to	me	to	be	a	difficult	one	to	make	from	existing	sources,	even	as	castration	lies	at	the	center	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative.		Rather,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	the	use	of	the	castration	anxiety	argument	has	become	an	inference	and	assumption	that	has	crept	into	the	analysis	without	much	critical	analysis	of	its	assertion.	In	any	case,	the	evocation	of	witchcraft,	male	castration	anxieties	and	reactionary	patriarchal	fear	still	do	not	provide	a	full	explanation	for	why	the	broader	killings	became	possible,	even	when	taken	together.		I	would	suggest,	to	the	contrary,	that	the	largely	unexamined	explanation	of	castration	anxiety	may	in	fact	have	contributed	to	a	general	lack	of	refinement	of	the	gendered	explanations	about	why	killings	were	possible.	In	providing	a	plausible	but	not	fully	supported	reasoning	for	the	reaction	against	Gerwani,	the	argument	about	castration	anxiety	has	not	prodded	scholars	to	ask	deeper	questions	about	the	details	of	how	Gerwani	women	were	demonized,	and	how	they	might	have	made	sense	in	the	cultural	and	political	contexts	of	mid-1960’s	Indonesia.	It	remains	an	assumption,	and	one	that	while	provocative,	and	likely	even	true,	does	not	yet	further	our	insights	about	the	cultural	specifics	at	play.		Indeed,	if	we	are	smart	to	contrast	“modern”	and	“moderen,”	as	Adrian	Vickers	calls	us	to,	should	we	should	also	probably	attempt	to	distinguish	between	“patriarchy”	and	“patriarki,”	and	between	“castration	anxiety”	and	“kecemasan	kastrasi,”	which	might	have	been	given	the	Dutch	gloss	of	“castratie	angst”	by	an	Indonesian	evoking	the	concept	at	the	time	in	any	case.165	In	any	case,	we	need	further	examination	of	those	concepts	within	
 165	As	has	been	seen	in	previous	chapters,	when	Indonesian	writers	addressed	psychological	matters	in	1950’s	magazines,	they	usually	reverted	to	provided	Dutch	terminologies	alongside	newly	invented	Indonesian	language	for	such	concepts.	
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1950’s	and	1960’s	Indonesia	in	order	for	us	to	strengthen	our	analysis	of	the	sexualized	nature	of	the	1965-66	killings	and	the	justifications	for	it.	Indeed,	Wierienga	documents	other	readings	of	the	social	dynamics	at	work.	In	particular,	without	using	the	language	of	“moral	crisis”	specifically,	she	writes	about	the	political	aftermath	of	G-30-S	among	women’s	organizations	in	ways	that	support	this	reading.		She	documents,	for	instance,	that	some	women’s	organizations	took	on	active	roles	in	the	suppression	of	G-30-S.	In	writing	about	the	women’s	groups	that	joined	the	women’s	section	of	the	Badan	Koordinasi	Kesatuan	Aksi	Pengganjangan	Gestapu	Pusat,	(the	Central	Coordination	Body	of	the	Action	Front	to	Crush	Gestapu,)	established	in	early	November,	her	examples	of	the	public	pronouncements	by	the	women’s	organizastions	themselves,	and	by	Gen.	Suharto	in	response,	both	center	of	a	discussion	of	the	failure	of	proper	national	feminity	and	its	consequences.		The	organizations	that	joined	the	Central	Coordination	Body	included	the	religiously	oriented	women	of	Nadhlatul	Ulama,	Muhammadiyah	and	Wanita	Katolik,	among	others.166	At	a	mass	demonstration	organized	by	the	women’s	section	of	the	Coordination	Body167	and	led	primarily	by	its	youth/student	members,	the	resolution	drafted	by	the	25	women’s	organizations	“condemned	Gerwani’s	actions,	which	had	lowered	the	prestige	of	women.”168	The	statement	also	called	that	the	PKI	and	Gerwani	be	banned	“as	soon	as	possible,	in	order	to	safeguard	the	young	generation	from	the	decadent	influence	and	the	
ferocity”	of	the	communist	movement.169		Wieringa	then	quotes	Suharto,	at	length,	from	his	speech	to	“the	30,000	women	present,”	that	carried	the	general	message	that	“without	women’s	help	the	safety	of	the	nation	could	not	be	safeguarded.”170	I	suggest	that	the	quotation,	taken	from	Wieringa,	represents	a	particularly	clear	expression	of	the	ways	in	which	the	expected	response	of	
 In	any	case,	I	have	never	seen	any	contemporary	sources	use	either	patriarki	or	kecemasan	kastrasi	or	other	similar	terms	in	their	discussions	of	Lubang	Buaya.	This	is	all	post-event	analysis.	166	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	308.		167	Notice	that	in	the	creation	of	the	organization,	which	had	only	just	occurred,	a	“women’s	section”	had	been	established,	along	with	a	youth/student	wing,	and	that	the	women	were	called	on	specifically	to	address	ths	issue	of	Gerwani.	168	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	308.	169	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	308.	Weiringa’s	translation	from	an	article	in	A.B.,	11/9/1965.	My	emphasis.	170	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	309.	Her	language	and	analysis.	
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Indonesian	women	was	expressed	in	terms	of	gendered	moral	crisis.	She	quotes	Suharto	saying	Gerwani	had	left	behind	our	special	identity,	for	they	have	damaged	the	identity	of	Indonesian	women	.	.	.	and	because	women	as	mothers	possess	a	special	importance	in	the	education	of	children,	our	young	generation	has	to	be	
rescued	from	the	moral	deviation	the	counter-revolutionaries	have	plunged	it	
into;	they	must	be	taught	to	become	Indonesian	patriots	who	obey	the	Lord.171		
	In	the	Epilogue	to	her	monograph,	an	argument	I	must	admit	I	had	missed	in	my	initial	re-reading	of	her	work	for	this	dissertation,	Wieringa	also	makes	the	argument	that	the	history	of	the	Indonesian	women’s	movement	is	best	read	through	looking	at	through	the	examination	of	small	shifts	in	what	it	meant	to	be	an	Indonesian	woman.	Perhaps	because	her	writing	in	this	instance	strikes	a	different	tone,	or	because	it	discusses	rhythms	of	change	about	gender	dynamics	in	Indonesian	society,	I	find	her	argument	in	the	Epilogue	to	be	significantly	more	satisfying	than	the	conclusion	of	the	monograph’s	central	text	about	castration.	I	would	therefore	like	to	quote	this	bit	of	her	argument	at	length:	The	history	of	the	Indonesian	women’s	movement	reveals	at	certain	points	a	process	of	restructuring	gender	relations.	In	my	exploration	of	this	history	I	have	not	employed	the	concept	of	gender	so	much	in	the	context	of	what	people	do.	I	have	not	focused,	for	instance,	on	the	changing	sexual	division	of	labour	between	women	and	men.	Rather	I	have	searched	for	changing	definitions	of	gender—for	instance,	those	contained	in	the	naturalizing	[of]172	women’s	kodrat—and	how	these	are	embedded	in	social,	cultural,	and	political	processes	of	signification.	At	times	these	changes	were	barely	perceptible.	At	others	the	processes	of	gender	definition	and	redefinition	were	violent	and	could	entail	moments	of	conscious	manipulation.	This	raises	interesting	questions	about	agency.	It	is	not	only	the	women’s	movement	(or	its	various	organizations)	that	takes	the	issue	of	changing	gender	relations	to	heart.	Other	actors,	in	this	case	the	military,	political	and	religious	groups,	also	see	gender	as	crucial	in	a	process	of	social	regulation.	In	Indonesia	women	are	granted	the	symbolic	power	to	save	(give	birth	to)	and	devour	(or	castrate)	men.173		This	argument,	in	its	essence,	is	completely	reflective	of	the	processes	I	have	written	about	in	this	dissertation,	and	from	different	sources	than	Wieringa	uses	herself.	Indeed,	
 171	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	309.	Wieringa’s	translation	from	an	article	in	Berita	Yudha,	11/9/1965.	My	emphasis.	172	The	word	seems	to	be	missing	in	the	original	text.	173	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	338.	
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following	this	paragraph,	Wieringa	goes	on	to	reference	many	of	the	specific	shifts	in	the	history	of	what	I	refer	to	in	the	dissertation	as	Indonesian	women’s	“theorizing	of	themselves.”	She	also	notes	the	question	of	rhythms	and	amplitudes	in	these	shifts	about	the	construction	of	gender,	sometime	gradual	and	other	times	sudden,	sometimes	small	and	other	times	larger.	And	importantly,	she	notes	moments	of	both	seemingly	organic	change	and	others	that	reflect	conscious	political	and	cultural	manipulation.		These	are	all	elements	I	have	written	about	in	the	dissertation,	based	on	my	reading	of	women’s	magazines.	As	I	point	out,	I	came	to	these	conclusions	without	being	aware	of	the	argument	of	her	Epilogue	until	after	I	began	my	revisions,	a	clear	shortfall	on	my	own	part.	I	say	this	not	to	“claim	position”	or	to	write,	somehow,	against	having	“been	scooped.”	Rather,	I	am	gratified	that	what	I	was	seeing	in	my	sources,	independently,	Wieringa	also	lays	out	so	clearly.		In	other	words,	my	sources	also	support	her	important	argument.	And	perhaps,	ideally	even,	they	provide	insights	into	thoughts	about	modernity,	gender	and	the	construction	of	Indonesian	national	identity	that	suggest	future	research	that	can	strengthen	both	of	our	general	positions.	I	particularly	would	argue	that	seeing	the	killings	of	1965-66	as	a	moral	crisis—which	can	of	course	also	include	questions	of	conservative	male	fear	and	anxiety,	something	I	have	not	yet	looked	at	in	detail—for	which	this	dissertation	offers	significant	evidence,	would	expand	the	ways	in	which	future	scholars	can	engage	these	fundamental	questions	that	need	to	move	to	the	center	of	the	analysis	of	the	development	of	the	Indonesian	nation	during	the	Sukarno	era	and	beyond.		
Caught	in	the	Middle:	Indonesian	Women	and	the	Fracture	of	Kaum	Wanita	A	third,	and	final,	reading	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	and	its	aftermath	concerns	the	forced	fracture	of	the	Indonesian	feminist/activist	movement	and	its	effects	on	Indonesian	women	as	a	whole.		One	of	the	concepts	presented	earlier	in	the	dissertation	suggests	that	Indonesian	identity	that	emerged	in	the	Sukarno	era	took	the	form	of	a	complex	web	of	mutually	inter-connected	cultural	influences.	The	dissertation	also	explores	multiple	ways	in	which	women	found	ways	of	being	simultaneously	“Indonesian”	and	“modern.”	It	notes	that	one	central	way	in	which	this	seemingly	hybrid	identity	was	achieved	was	by	centering	“eastern”	concepts	of	women’s	morality	as	a	principal	internal,	
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spiritual	marker	of	a	proper	indigenous	or	asli	feminitity.	As	long	as	they	held	on	to	a	properly	focused	batin,	Indonesian	women,	particularly	through	the	1950’s,	enjoyed	significant	latitude	in	their	choices	about	how	to	express	their	modernity,	often	in	harmony	with	other	elements	of	their	identity	and	the	communities	in	which	they	lived.	One	of	the	advantages	of	reading	this	sense	of	identity	as	a	web	is	that	it	helps	move	our	understandings	away	from	seeing	Indonesian	women’s	identities	as	binary:	left	v.	right,	rural	v.	kampung	v.	metropolitan;	modern	v.	traditional,	or	even	old-fashioned;	religiously	pious	v.	politically	ideological.	Rather,	these	elements	and	others,	overlapped	and	expressed	to	differing	degrees	and	from	different	influences,	provide	us	ways	of	understanding	the	multiple	points	at	which	Indonesian	women	could	stand	in	that	web,	whether	individually	or	in	relationship	to	some	collective	identity,	and	all	while	still	remaining	“modern	Indonesian	women.”	When	threads	of	this	collective	web	of	female	identity	were	drawn	taught	in	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya,	most	specifically	those	connected	to	Communism	and	other	leftist	political	identities,	then,	they	brought	tension	into	the	whole	web	of	women’s	identity.	In	particular,	the	military	narrative	cast	Marxism	as	a	foreign	and	hyper-modern	identity,	while	simultaneously	attacking	Gerwani	as	hyper-sexualized,	uncivilized	and	savage,	that	is,	as	those	who	took	part	in	“cannibalistic	rituals	that	were	carried	out	by	primitive	peoples	tens	of	centuries	ago.”	The	military	narrative	about	the	PKI	attacked	women	in	a	particular	way,	while	the	sexual	narrative	dehumanized	them	from	a	different	direction.	But	while	this	second	line	of	attack	focused	principally	on	Gerwani	and	other	leftist	women,	it	had	implications	for	Indonesian	women	and	their	collective	identity	as	a	whole.	It	is	understandable	that	different	communities	of	women	responded	to	these	pressures	in	different	ways,	and	on	different	schedules.	Quite	interesting	in	this	was	the	response	of	some	Gerwani	women	themselves,	for	whom	the	answer	was	to	move	away	from	the	Marxist	pole	through	a	return	to	“traditional”	religious	values	that	stressed	women’s	roles	as	wives	and	mothers.	A	story	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata	on	November	5	reported	that	several	communist	women	in	Bandung	had	chosen	to	“repent	and	want	to	
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pray174	like	they	did	before	entering	Gerwani”175	After	saying	that	they	hoped	to	“come	back	to	the	true	path”176	and	that	they	would	help	the	Armed	Forces	“restore	security,”177	the	women	“shed	tears”178	because	of	their	actions,	“apologized”179	and	“repented	to	God	that	they	would	be	pious	and	pray	as	they	did	before	they	entered	Gerwani.”180	Having	taken	these	appropriate	measures	of	contrition,	shed	true	tears	(as	opposed	to	Ibu	Trimo’s	false	ones)	and	asked	for	forgiveness	from	both	the	people	and	from	God,	these	women	could	return,	via	a	particular	performative	piety,	to	the	true	path	of	acceptable	Indonesian	womanhood.181		But	the	ways	in	which	Gerwani	had	been	demonized	also	required	a	response	from	“good”	Indonesian	women	as	well.	In	its	“Moral	Gerwani”	article	from	November	5,	Kompas	made	the	same	claim	that	Sukarno	had	during	his	talk	to	Kowani	in	December	1964	about	teased	hair	and	tight	skirts.	Pronouncing	moral	judgment	against	Gerwani	activists	was,	it	was	made	clear,	women’s	work.	“It	is	up	to	women,”	the	Kompas	editors	wrote,	“to	judge	the	morals	of	the	GERWANI	women	who	are	more	depraved	than	animals.”182	This	also	aligned	with	Suharto’s	address	to	the	mass	meeting	of	the	members	of	the	Central	Coordination	Body,	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	when	he	exhorted	the	crowd	present	that,	as	women,	they	carried	a	“special	identity”	that	Gerwani	had	rejected.	That	is,	that	as	a	
kaum	ibu,	they	“possess[ed]	a	special	importance	in	the	education	of	children,	our	young	generation	has	to	be	rescued	from	the	moral	deviation	.	.	.	“183		
 174	The	word	used	is	“sholat,”	which	refers	specifically	to	Islamic	prayers,	i.e.,	five	times	a	day	on	a	specific	schedule,	facing	Mecca,	following	ritual	ablutions,	and,	for	women,	with	restrictions	during	menstruation.	The	implication	is	more	than	just	returning	to	some	sort	of	personal	religious	practice,	but	rather,	to	one	fully	imbedded	within	social	structures	that	are	accompanied	by	measures	that	assure	a	proper	femininity.	175	“Tobat	dan	mau	Sholat	seperti	sebelum	masuk	Gerwani.”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	176	“akan	kembali	kedjalan	jang	benar,”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	177	“memulihkan	keamanan,”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	178	“mentjutjurkan	air	mata,”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	179	“minta	maaf,”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	180	“bertobat	kepada	Tuhan	serta	akan	beribadat	sembahjang	seperti	sebelum	masuk	Gerwani,”	A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.		181	This	is	a	culturally	cogent	practice	in	Indonesian	Islam,	specifically	at	Lebaran,	the	end	of	Ramadan.	People	“mohon	
maaf	lahir	batin,”	or	ask	for	forgiveness	both	externally	and	in	spirit.	There	are	several	possible	readings	of	the	use	of	the	term,	which	are	recognized	by	Indonesians	in	this.	“Lahir”	or	“batin”	here	can	refer	to	the	nature	of	the	sins	committed,	or,	similar	to	the	Christian	Act	of	Contrition,	“for	things	done	and	things	left	undone,”	but	imagined.	They	can	also	refer	to	the	forms	in	which	people	are	offering	their	repentance,	but	in	external	forms	and	with	internal	intention.	For	example,	people	kneel	before	their	parents,	place	their	heads	on	their	parents’	laps,	and	ask	forgiveness	for	any	offenses	and	mistakes	made	during	the	previous	year.	In	these	acts	of	contrition	by	Gerwani	activists,	therefore,	there	is	at	least	some	possibility	of	this	representing	a	sincere	repentance	on	their	part	asked	in	a	way	that	allows	for	cleansing	in	some	form.		182	“Terserah	kepada	kaum	wanita	untuk	menilai	moral	kewanitaan	GERWANI2	tsb	jang	telah	bedjat	melebihi	binatang.”	
A.B.,	11/5/1965,	p.	2.	“Menilai,”	translated	here	as	“judge,”	can	also	mean	“to	measure”	in	the	sense	of	to	assess	or	evaluate.	183	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	pp.	309,	quoting	Berita	Yudha,	11/9/1965.	
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It	is	important	to	note	here	that	this	re-emphasis	of	women’s	kodrat	wanita,	their	“special	identity”	as	women,	was,	again,	connected	to	the	idea	of	raising	a	moral	nation.	The	argument	that	progressive	women	had	used	to	carve	out	a	space	for	themselves	in	the	Sukarno	era,	one	that	gave	them	a	particular	path	for	establishing	a	form	of	political	power,	in	Suharto’s	hands,	became	a	specific	way	of	limiting	women’s	agency.184		Wieringa	points	out	that	different	women’s	groups	took	anti-Gerwani	stances	earlier	than	others,	and	that	Wanita	Katolik	and	conservative	Islamic	groups	were	among	the	first	to	distance	themselves	from	the	Communists.185	The	women	of	‘Aisjijah	seem	to	have	been	the	first	to	publicly	condemn	Gerwani,	on	October	11,	at	the	end	of	the	first	week	of	revelations	of	torture	and	the	initial	suggestions	of	sexual	abuse	and	mutilation.	In	a	public	statement,	the	leadership	of	‘Aisjijah	called	for	the	dissolution	of	Gerwani,	which,	the	Muhammadiyah	women	said,	had	“clearly	soiled	.	.	.	the	standing	of	Indonesian	Women.”186	In	making	their	case,	the	leadership	of	‘Aisjijah	denounced	the	despicable	actions	that	were	carried	out	by	the	women	of	Gerwani	in	the	terror	of	the	September	30th	movement	at	Lubang	Buaya,	where	before	the	victims	met	their	end,	they	were	handled	in	an	immoral	fashion,	were	ridiculed	and	degraded	in	a	vile	and	despicable	way,	then	through	mass	action	the	victims	were	killed	with	all	types	of	torture	and	baseness.187		This	was	a	fairly	standard	formulation	of	the	events	of	Lubang	Buaya	as	they	were	being	reported	on	that	day,	though	perhaps	without	some	of	the	gruesome	details	furnished	elsewhere.	But	the	article	went	on	to	assert	a	concern	that	was	largely	reserved	for	women’s	comments	on	the	event:	That	“such	actions	could	only	have	been	carried	out	by	women	who	were	without	morals,	and	it	clearly	stained	the	status	of	Indonesian	women	who	are	famous	for	their	lofty	character	and	their	high	personal	integrity—based	on	Pancasila.”188	
 184	To	be	sure,	kodrat	wanita,	while	being	used	by	women	to	claim	a	space	in	Indonesian	political	culture,	had	also	always	provided	limits	on	their	participation	as	well.	But	the	shift	in	this	instance	went	from	the	argument	about	kodrat	wanita	going	from	supporting	women’s	participation	in	general	to	making	them	take	a	step	back	relative	to	men.	185	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	pp.	312-313.	186	“jang	njata2	mentjemarkan	.	.	.	martabat	Wanita	Indonesia.”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	187	“tindakan	kedji	jang	dilakukan	oleh	anggauta2	wanita	Gerwani	dalam	terror	Gerakan	30	September	di	Lobang	buaya,	di	
mana	sebelum	para	korban	tersebut	menemui	adjalnja	telah	diperlakukan	setjara	a-susila	dipermainkan	dan	dihinakan	
setjara	biadab	dan	kedji,	kemudian	setjara	meramai2	sangkorban	dibunuh	dengan	segala	siksaan	dan	kekedjian.”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	The	November/December	1965	edition	of	Suara	’Aisjijah,	however,	is	completely	silent	about	not	only	Lubang	Buaya,	but	about	the	entire	political	situation.		188	“tindakan	ini	hanja	mungkin	dilakukan	oleh	wanita2	jang	tak	bermoral,	dan	djelas	menodai	martabat	wanita	Indonesia	
jang	terkenal	berbudi	luhur	dan	kebribadian	tinggi	–	berdasarkan	Pantjasila.”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	
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It	is	important	to	note	that	in	contrast	to	the	lurid	discussions	of	the	alleged	physical	details	of	the	killings	of	the	officers	in	the	various	newspapers	during	the	previous	few	days,	the	women	of	‘Aisjijah	used	more	measured	rhetoric.189		The	references	to	the	“immoral	fashion”	in	which	the	“corpses	met	their	end,”	and	of	how	they	were	“degraded	in	a	“vile	and	despicable	way,”	were	significantly	softer	than	the	descriptions	in	Angkatan	
Bersendjata,	Kompas	and	Api	Pantjasila.		Yet	as	other	women’s	organizations	began	to	make	public	proclamations,	even	as	soon	as	a	week	later,	they	did	not	include	specific	mention	of	the	alleged	sexual	torture	out	of	their	descriptions	of	“what	happened”	at	all.	In	particular,	the	condemnation	of	Gerwani	by	women’s	organizations	took	the	form	of	calls	for	the	organization	to	be	expelled	from	Kowani,	the	Indonesian	Women’s	Congress,	and	the	argument	was	about	Gerwani’s	failure	to	be	good	Indonesian	women.	These	calls	did	not	occur	randomly.	Rather,	they	were	part	of	a	coordinated	campaign	to	attack	the	PKI	that	was	led,	at	least	partially,	by	the	newly	appointed	National	Front	Minister,	Sudibjo.190	But	as	these	public	condemnations	by	women’s	groups	about	the	role	of	Gerwani	progressed,	the	specific	mention	of	atrocity	faded	into	the	background.	Instead,	women’s	public	rhetoric	focused	on	the	idea	of	Gerwani	as	failed	national	women,	the	result	of	their	impure	actions	at	Lubang	Buaya,	that	in	some	occasions,	at	least	was	also	connected	with	their	Communist	grooming.191	But	in	these	condemnations	by	other	women,	the	overwhelming	sin	Gerwani	was	said	to	have	committed	was	to	have	put	the	“good	name”	of	Indonesian	women—and	therefore	the	moral	formation	of	the	whole	nation—at	grave	risk.	The	general	calls	for	Gerwani’s	removal	from	Kowani	began	on	October	20.	The	women’s	wing	of	Nahdlatul	Ulama,	the	national	organization	of	“traditional”	Islamic	scholars,	urged	that	Gerwani	be	kicked	out	of	Kowani	“because	Gerwani	was	clearly	
 189	Again,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	here	that	Suara	Muhammadiyah	and	Suara	‘Aisjijah’s	offices	were	(and	remain	today)	less	than	a	block	apart	in	Yogyakarta,	and	the	general	newspaper	and	the	women’s	periodical,	while	produced	independently,	were	the	products	of	a	single	community	of	the	national	leadership	of	the	modernist	Islamic	movement.	Indeed,	as	noted	earler	in	the	dissertation,	the	editor	of	Suara	‘Aisjijah	was	often	sent	on	missions	for	dakwah,	or	Islamic	religious	education	within	the	Muslim	community,	by	the	leaders	of	Muhammadiyah.	The	two	publications	were	also	printed	at	the	same	printing	house.	So	the	comparison	between	the	two	publications	carries	interesting	implications.	190	See	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	pp.	310-311.	She	notes	that	when	Sudibjo	addressed	the	women’s	organizations	that	made	up	Kowani	on	October	28,	discussed	below,	he	was	“in	military	uniform”	while	he	“lectured	the	women	in	his	audience	that	women’s	ultimate	role	should	be	to	fulfill”	Sukarno’s	revolutionary	political	goals.	191	As	has	been	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter.	
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implicated	in	the	counter-revolutionary	affair	‘Gestapu’.”192	They	called	on	Kowani	to	“cleanse	itself”193	of	all	counter-revolutionary	influences	to	“protect	Kowani’s	purity	as	a	constructive	revolutionary	tool	for	People	and	Country.”194	The	NU	statement	did	not	include	any	explicit	discussion	of	Gerwani’s	actions	or	retelling	of	the	narrative	of	Lubang	Buaya.			Also	on	October	20,	Ibu	Subandrio,195	the	President	of	Kowani,	argued	in	an	article	in	Angkatan	Bersendjata	that	all	connections	between	Gerwani	and	Kowani	should	be	cut	“because	that	women’s	organization	[Gerwani]	clearly	helped	‘Gestapu’.”196	The	actions	of	the	Gerwani	women,	she	claimed	“were	not	appropriate	with	the	character	of	our	Indonesian	nation	or	with	the	authority	we	have	as	women.”197	There	was	no	discussion	of	the	details	of	sexual	misconduct	or	of	atrocity	in	Ibu	Subandrio’s	statement.	Only	at	one	point	were	the	actions	of	Gerwani	at	Lubang	Buaya	described	as	“barbaric,”198	which	was	one	of	the	common	epithets	for	Gerwani	at	the	time.	This	pattern	was	repeated	in	the	various	calls	for	Gerwani’s	dispersal	in	general	and	banishment	from	Kowani	specifically	that	were	printed	over	the	next	several	days.	On	October	23,	for	example,	Wanita	Katolik,	the	Roman	Catholic	women’s	organization,	published	a	similar	appeal,	stating	that	Kowani	should	ban	Gerwani	because		“the	Gerwani	organization	went	along	in	an	active	way	with	the	‘September	30	movement’	incident	and	[because]	the	actions	of	the	Gerwani	members	at	Lubang	Buaya	showed	an	attitude	that	trampled	the	moral	principles	of	God	
 192	“karena	Gerwani	njata2	telah	terlibat	dalam	petualangan	kontra-revolusioner	‘Gestapu’.”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	193	“membersihkan	dirinja,”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	194	“mendjaga	kemurnian	Kowani	sebagai	alat	revolusi	jang	konstruktif	bagi	Bangsa	dan	Negara,”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	The	word	kemurnian,	translated	here	as	“purity,”	can	also	mean	“chastity,”	so	there	was	an	implication	that	Kowani	should	protect	itself	from	being	perceived	as	sexualized,	and	that	by	doing	so,	it	could	remain	a	useful	part	of	the	revolution.	195		Hurustiati	Subandrio,	one	of	the	first	female	medical	doctors	in	Indonesia,	was	a	major	leader	of	the	progressive	wing	of	the	women’s	movement	throughout	the	Sukarno	era.	In	particular,	she	advocated	for	issues	of	women’s	health,	including	their	right	to	choice	in	family	planning.	She	was	also	the	wife	of	Sukarno’s	Foreign	Minister,	Subandrio.	She	was	not	a	member	of	Gerwani,	at	least	not	publicly.	Subandrio	(the	husband)	was	convicted	of	being	involved	in	the	movement	by	the	Extraordinary	Military	Court.	He	was	initially	sentenced	to	death,	but	this	was	commuted	to	exile,	and	he	remained	in	prison	until	1995.	Saskia	Wieringa	notes	that	as	late	as	1999,	Ibu	Subandrio	continued	to	be	publicly	accused	of	membership	in	Gerwani.	See	Weiringa,	“Reformasi,	Sexuality	and	Communism	in	Indonesia,”		196	“karena	organisasi	wanita	tsb	dengan	terang2an	membantu	‘Gestapu’.”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	197	“tidak	sesuai	dengan	kepribadian	bangsa	kita	Indonesia,	apabila	dengan	kewibawaan	sebagai	wanita.”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	198	“biadab,”	A.B.,	10/20/1965,	p.	2.	
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and	Humanity	and	which	lowered	the	position	and	level	of	the	women	of	Indonesia.”199			Kowani	began	the	process	of	formally	stripping	Gerwani	of	their	membership	in	the	coalition	on	October	29	at	a	public	meeting	in	Jakarta.	Wieringa	notes	that	in	his	address	to	the	gathered	women,	National	Front	Minister	Sudibjo	“lectured	his	audience	that	women’s	ultimate	role	should	be	to	fulfill	the	President’s	Dwikora	program	and	to	struggle	against	the	Nekolim	and	Gestapu,”200	adding	the	G-30-S	movement	into	the	list	of	established	enemies	of	the	revolution.	Wieringa	writes	that	in	response,	Ibu	Subandrio	“explained	that	it	would	only	be	fitting	in	relation	to	the	‘Great	Guide	of	the	Indonesian	Revolutionary	Women’s	Movement’,	President	Sukarno,	that	Kowani	join	in	throwing	out	the	swines	of	the	Gestapu	Movement.”201	The	Minister,	Wieringa	noted,	“concluded	his	speech	by	urging	the	women	to	be	‘both	active	in	constructive	mass	actions	and	in	creating	a	quiet	and	orderly	climate.’”202		When	Kowani	actually	did	take	formal	action	to	ban	Gerwani	from	membership	in	the	organization	two	days	later	on	November	1,	they	did	so,	they	announced,	as	part	of	an	effort	to	“cleanse	Kowani”203	of	organizations	that	were	involved	in	G-30-S.	The	Communist	women	were	therefore	expelled	because	“Gerwani	was	clearly	implicated	in	the	counter	revolutionary	September	30th	Movement,”204	that	is,	for	their	alleged	political	actions.		Again,	it	is	notable	that	there	was	no	dwelling	on	Gerwani’s	carnal	sins	in	the	Kowani	statement.	Rather,	the	announcement	focused	on	the	role	Kowani	would	play	moving	forward,	stating	specifically	that	Kowani	should	“protect	and	foster	unity	and	association	of	women	specially	and	of	the	Indonesian	people	generally,	to	raise	the	struggle	against	neo-colonialism	for	the	sake	and	success	of	the	Indonesian	Revolution.”205	That	is,	Kowani	saw	itself	as	largely	playing	the	same	role	it	had	previous	to	Lubang	Buaya,	connecting	women	across	organizations,	and	thereby	serving	as	a	source	of	unity	for	the	
 199	“organisasi	Gerwani	telah	turut	setjara	aktif	dalam	peristiwa	‘Gerakan	30	September’.	Dan	bahwa	perbuatan	anggota	
Gerwani	di	Lubang	Buaja	telah	menundjukkan	sikap	jang	mengindjak-ngindjak	sila2	Ketuhanan	dan	Perikemanusiaan	serta	
menurunkan	martabat	dan	deradjat	wanita	Indonesia.”	K.,	10/23/1965,	p.	1.	200	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	pp.	310-311.	201	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	311.	202	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	311.	203	“membersihkan	Kowani,”	A.P.,	11/3/1965,	p.	2.	204	“Gerwani	njata2	terlibat	dalam	kontra-revolusi	Gerakan	30	September,”	A.P.,11/3/1965,	p.	2.	205	“memelihara	dan	memupuk	kesatuan	dan	persatuan	wanita	chususnja,	bangsa	Indonesia	umumnja	untuk	meningkatkan	
perdjoangan	melawan	nekolim	demi	suksesnja	revolusi	Indonesia.”	A.P.,	11/3/1965,	p.	2.	
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nation	as	a	whole.	But	the	organization	proposed	do	this	having	cleansed	itself	of	the	stains	of	Gerwani.206	That	is,	the	women	of	the	nation	would	re-form	themselves,	but	without	the	presence	of	a	formerly	important	element	of	their	collective	identity.	As	I	have	noted	earlier	in	the	chapter,	it	is	important	to	note	the	continuation	of	Sukarnoist	revolutionary	rhetoric	throughout	the	process	of	Gerwani’s	expulsion	from	Kowani.	Wieringa	makes	a	similar	point,	which	underscores	the	transition	that	occurred	in	the	construction	of	Indonesian	political	women.	“This	ceremony”	on	October	29,	she	writes,	showed	the	same	symbols	in	use	as	prior	to	October	1965	but	the	tone	had	completely	changed.	Gestapu	was	added	to	the	revolutionary	pantheon	of	enemies	Indonesian	women	should	challenge	and	the	same	slogans	were	used	but	with	their	implications	totally	different.207		For	women	who	were	not	a	part	of	Gerwani,	but	who	instead	had	organizational	connections	to	the	group	before	the	killings	through	Kowani,	therefore,	the	path	away	from	their	association	with	Gerwani	held	some	danger.	Wieringa	writes	that	Perwari	“manoeuver[ed]	very	carefully	in	this	situation.”	She	notes	that	while	in	Jakarta	and	at	the	national	level,	Perwari	and	Gerwani	had	often	been	in	conflict	with	each	other,	that	“at	the	local,	especially	urban	level,	members	of	both	organizations	had	cooperated	and	there	were	instances	of	double	membership”	by	some	women.	Perwari,	she	concludes,	was	“therefore	.	.	.	vulnerable	to	charges	that	its	members	were	sympathetic	to	communism.”208	Kowani’s	leaders	included	many	wives	of	politicians	and	high-ranking	army	officers,	and	certainly	some	of	them	found	safety	in	those	personal	and	systemic	connections.	But	that	also	depended	on	the	political	alignments	of	their	husbands.	Ibu	Subandrio,	for	instance,	found	herself	excluded	from	Kowani	when	her	husband,	Sukarno’s	Foreign	Minister	and	Chief	of	Intelligence,209	and	the	architect	of	his	leftward	swing	in	foreign	
 206	This	was	even	the	hope	of	Ibu	Trimo,	if	for	other	reasons,	who	said	in	her	confession	that	she	“hoped	Gerwani	could	come	back	to	the	true	path	from	having	lost	its	way	all	this	time.	Our	enemy	is	still	Malaysia.	Because	of	that	among	our	peers	we	don’t	need	to	have	any	dissension	or	even	more	so	hostility	as	we	do	now.”	(“harap	agar	Gerwani	kembali	
kedjalan	jang	benar	dari	kesesatannja	selama	ini.	Musuh	kita	sebenarnja	adalah	Malaysia.	Karena	itu	antara	sesama	kita	
tak	perlu	ada	pertjahan	apalagi	bermusuhan	seperti	sekarang	ini.)	A.B.,	11/14/1965,	p.	3.	207	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	p.	311.	208	Saskia	Wieringa,	Sexual	Politics	in	Indonesia,	pp.	312-313.	Wieringa	goes	on	to	note	that	on	their	20th	anniversary	celebrations	in	December	1965,	Perwari	took	pains	to	“remind	its	audience	that	it	had	never	aligned	itself	with	any	political	party.”		209	This	was	just	one	among	several	of	his	appointments	in	the	Sukarno	administration.	Subandrio	had	been	Sukarno’s	envoy	in	Europe	during	the	Revoluation,	and	had	been	named	Foreign	Minister	in	1956,	when	he	was	recalled	from	being	the	Ambassador	to	the	Soviet	Union.	He	also	became	the	Second	Deputy	Prime	Minister	in	1960	and	the	Minister	for	Foreign	Economic	Relations	in	1962.	He	served	in	all	three	capacities	until	his	arrest	in	1966.	
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policy,	was	arrested,	charged	with	having	prior	knowledge	of	the	“coup,”	tried	and	sentenced	to	death	by	the	Mahmillub,	(Mahkamah	Militer	Luar	Biasa,	or	Extraordinary	Military	Court.)210		Politically	active	women	had	to	establish	a	workable	definition	of	what	constituted	a	‘good’	Indonesian	woman	in	the	wake	of	the	killings	of	the	Seven	Revolutionary	Heroes.	If	the	name	of	all	Indonesian	women	had	indeed	been	“soiled”211	by	the	actions	of	Gerwani	as	Ibu	Trimo	had	agreed,	then	these	women	had	to	find	a	way	to	“cleanse”	their	organizations	and	to	clear	their	own	names,	while	still	holding	on	to	as	much	progress	on	women’s	issues	made	in	coalition	with	Gerwani	as	they	could.		One	way	to	do	so	was	to	fuse	this	aberrant	sexuality	with	communism	to	some	degree—that	is	to	re-enter	the	discussion	of	what	constituted	“proper”	femininity.	The	femininity	of	Communist	women	would	be	deviant,	not	so	much	because	of	the	sexual	implications	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative,	but	rather	because	of	the	possibility	that	their	eastern	attributes,	that	is,	their	batin,	the	source	of	their	fundamental	Indonesian	identity,	had	been	corrupted	by	Communist	ideology.	If	Gerwani	members’	femininity	were	to	be	re-grounded	in	proper	values	and	beliefs,	their	internal	moral	strength,	could	perhaps	be	“cleansed.”	To	achieve	this,	both	Gerwani	women	and	those	other	activist	women	they	had	worked	in	congress	with	ended	up	placing	themselves	firmly	within	elements	of	gender	ideology	that	labeled	their	primary	responsibilities	to	society	in	terms	of	their	roles	as	wives	and	mothers.		But	in	protecting	themselves	through	the	Ibuism	that	would	come	to	dominate	women’s	political	culture	in	the	New	Order,	Indonesian	women	would	also	need	to	distance	themselves	from	the	political	activism	that	were	at	the	heart	of	their	united	stances	within	national	politics.	That	is,	the	national	kaum	wanita	would	cease	to	play	their	role	roles	as	a	“national	group”	in	the	same	way	they	had	been	previously,	and	they	would	be	re-
 210	The	Mahmillub	was	the	specially	convened	court	in	which	“the	most	important	political	show	trials	were	held	for	both	civilian	and	military	suspects,”	in	Geoffrey	Robinson’s	description.	Although	he	was	in	Sumatra	on	September	30	and	October	1,	Subandrio	was	nonetheless	charged	with	having	knowledge	of	the	uprising.	But,	Robinson	notes,	the	“clear	purpose	of	these	political	trials	was	to	implicate	Sukarno’s	closest	allies	and	inflict	irreparable	political	damage	on	Sukarno	himself,	and	in	so	doing	pave	the	way	for	the	complete	eradication	of	the	Left.”	Geoffrey	Robinson,	The	Killing	
Season,	p.	63.	In	the	end,	Subandrio’s	death	sentence	was	not	carried	out,	at	the	request	of	the	British	crown,	given	his	long	association	with	the	British	government	over	the	previous	twenty	years	as	Subandrio	led	much	of	Indonesia’s	high-level	foreign	policy.	211	“tjemar”	K.,	10/11/1965,	p.	3.	
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constituted	into	a	kaum	Ibu	that,	besides	lacking	some	of	its	former	members,	was	also	significantly	constrained	in	the	positions	they	could	take	and	in	what	they	could	achieve	both	politically	and	socially.	The	irony	is	that	Indonesian	Communist	women	were	reputed,	originally,	to	be	particularly	morally	straight.	Gerwani	consistently	stressed	to	its	cadres	that	they	needed	to	live	examined	lives,	that	they	should	dress	simply	and	neatly,	avoiding	frippery,	and	that	they	should	bear	the	responsibility	of	demonstrating	this	orderliness	as	an	example	to	other	women.	Gerwani	also	took	the	lead	in	calling	for	the	censorship	of	Hollywood	films	that	were	too	licentious.	Unique	among	Indonesian	political	parties,	the	PKI	had	a	history	of	expelling	members	for	entering	polygamous	marriages	or	engaging	in	extra-marital	affairs.	Communist	women	were,	in	many	ways,	the	most	ideal	of	ideal	Indonesian	women.212		The	goal	of	non-communist	activist	women	was	to	reclaim	a	place	in	the	Indonesian	political	arena.	Having	clearly	been	affected	by	the	actions	of	Gerwani,	these	women	had	to	distance	themselves	from	that	organization.	But	to	do	so	by	bringing	up	the	litany	of	atrocities	with	which	Gerwani	had	been	smeared	would	only	renew	the	stains	of	uncontrolled	power	that	might	be	used	against	any	activist	women.	So	they	turned	the	focus	onto	Gerwani’s	betrayal	of	Pancasila,	People	(“Bangsa,”)	and	State	(“Negara”)	as	part	of	the	PKI-led	“September	30th	Movement.”	In	other	words,	they	attempted	to	shift	the	nation’s	gaze	from	the	sexual	realm	to	the	ideological.			This	shift	is	made	most	clear	by	a	proclamation	of	“women	volunteers”	(“sukwati”)	from	groups	outside	the	army,	which	was	published	in	Api	Pantjasila	on	December	6:	WE,	the	Women	of	Indonesia	in	general,	and	volunteers	especially,	who	are	part	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	with	its	base	in	Pancasila,	[remain]	sincere	and	do	not	accept	it	when	the	good-name	of	Indonesian	women	in	general	and	the	good	name	of	volunteers	specifically	were	flawed	and	stained	by	the	actions	of	a	group	of	women	who	called	themselves	Indonesian	woman-volunteers	as	was	done	by	members	of	the	Indonesian	Women’s	Movement	(Gerwani)	in	their	god-forsaken	actions	as	a	part	of	the	actions	of	“G-30-S”	which	clearly	formed	a	hindrance	and	a	deviation	from	the	national	
 212	Cornell	University	possesses	a	rare	Gerwani	document	in	its	Special	Collections,	the	outline	of	a	Gerwani	cadre	training	course	held	at	various	times	in	the	1960’s.	Each	of	these	elements	is	reflected	in	the	training	course,	along	with	a	class	schedule	that	was	quite	heavy	on	reading	and	discussing	Marxist	theory.		
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revolution.213		In	order	to	continue	as	“volunteers,”	that	is,	specifically	as	militarily	trained	volunteer	troops,	but	also	as	women	with	an	agenda	on	social	issues,	activist	women	in	the	aftermath	of	G-30-S	would	have	to	base	their	actions	and	identities	within	acceptable	gender	roles	and	a	constricted	field	in	which	they	could	maneuver.		This	meant	they	would	largely	have	to	live	up	to	their	public	reputation	of	being	“noble	in	character,	refined	in	speech,	bright	of	face,	full	of	energy,	lofty	of	heart	and	soul	and	friendly	and	simple	in	behavior.”214	Only	by	retreating	to	be	Ibu	sejati	and	Ibu	Bangsa,	by	serving	as	the	proper	bulwark	against	the	nation’s	most	serious	incidents	of	moral	crisis,	would	they	be	able	to	continue	their	work,	the	essence	of	which	was	emblazoned	on	a	banner	at	the	Twentieth	Anniversary	Meeting	of	the	Organization	of	Indonesian	Women	(Persatuan	Wanita	Indonesia)	on	December	17	“Women	are	Capable	of	Bringing	About	their	Mandate	[of	ending]	the	Suffering	of	the	People.”215	In	accepting	this	position,	women	were	placed	within	a	framework	created	by	Sukarno	in	which	they	had	“the	same	rights	.	.	.	and	the	same	rank	as	Indonesian	men,”216	but	one	in	which,	under	Suharto’s	New	Order,	men	and	women	had	increasingly	distinct	political	roles.	The	men	would	largely	be	leaders	while	the	women	would	be	expected	to	be	well-ordered	followers	charged	with	the	special	duty	to	be	“good	mothers”	at	the	crux	of	whether	“Indonesia	would	be	glorious”	or	“Indonesia	would	be	shattered.”	And	while	it	is	important	to	note	that	all	Indonesians	found	their	identities	depoliticized	within	the	New	Order,	women	were	doubly	so,	both	by	the	general	process	of	political	neutralization	within	the	Suharto	regime,	and	in	the	necessity	of	imposing	kodrat	wanita,	perhaps	better	
 213	“KAMI,	Wanita	Indonesia	umumja,	sukarelewati	chususnja,	jang	bernegarakan	Republik	Indonesia	dengan	dasar	
Pantjasila	.	.	.	iklas	dan	tidak	rela	nama-baik	wanita	Indonesia	umumnja,	nama	baik	sukarelawati	chususnja	diberi	tjatjat	
dan	noda	oleh	tindakan	sekelompok	manusia	perempuan	jang	menamakan	dirinja	sukarelawati-wanita	Indonesia	seperti	
dilakukan	oleh	anggauta	Gerakan	Wanita	Indonesia	(Gerwani)	dalam	tindakan	mereka	jang	tertutuk	sebagai	bagian	dari	
pada	tindakan	”G-30-S”	jang	njata2	merupakan	panghalang	dan	penjelewengan	revolusi	nasional.”	A.P.,	12/6/1965,	p.	1.	214	“berbudi	luhur,	berbahasa	halus,	berwadjah	tjerah	bergaja	ampuh,	berhati	mulia	dan	berkelakuan	ramah-sederhana.”	
A.P.,	10/16/1965,	p.	1.	215	“Wanita	Sanggup	Melaksanakan	Amanat	Penderitaan	Rakjat.”	The	slogan	is	clearly	visible	on	a	photograph	in	A.B.,	12/18/1965,	p.	1.	This	was	during	the	period	that	Sukarno	was	specifically	defending	Gerwani	from	the	attacks	against	it,	one	of	the	elements	that	helped	lead	to	his	increasing	loss	of	political	power.		216	“sama	haknja	.	.	.	dan	sama	deradjatnja	dengan	kaum	bapak	Indonesia,”	A.P.,	11/8/1965.	This	is,	in	some	ways,	an	interesting	restatement	of	the	essence	of	the	Communist	movement,	which	had	as	an	early	slogan	in	the	1920’s	a	formulation	taken	from	Islamic	teaching:	“sama	rasa,	sama	rata,”	very	loosely	translated	to	mean	that	all	people	who	in	the	Islamic	sense	of	the	term,	were	one	before	Allah,	should	also	have	“the	same	feeling,	the	same	rank”	in	a	democratic,	anti-feudal	new	national	society	as	the	PKI	proposed	it.	See	Shiraishi,	An	Age	in	Motion.	
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described	as	kodrat	Ibu,	or	in	Julia	Suryakusuma’s	term	“State	Ibuism”	on	all	their	actions	as	well.	The	term	“wanita”	to	refer	to	women	would	lose	its	centrality	in	New	Order	Indonesian	rhetoric.	While	“Ibu”	would	remain	in	use,	the	general	term	for	“women”	switched	to	the	term	“perempuan,”	that	linguistically	connected	women	to	men,	or	“tuan.”	“Wanita”	took	on	connotations	of	“feminist,”	but	in	the	sense	of	disorderly	and	disruptive	women	who	asked	for	unwanted	change,	similar	to	“nasty	women”	in	the	current	conservative	American	usage.		Moving	forward,	men’s	positions	in	the	New	Order	would	significantly	dictate	the	political	roles	their	wives	would	play.	Although	politically	engaged	women	would	continue	to	work	together	most	specifically	on	the	promulgation	of	a	new	marriage	law	in	the	early	1970’s,	the	wives	of	politicians	and	military	officers	would	be	required	to	implement	New	Order	gender	policies	down	to	the	village	level.217	For	the	sake	of	the	Revolution,	their	on-going	work,	and	their	continued	political	viability,	then,	activist	women	would	need	to	remain	mothers	first,	a	little	less	powerful	and	forceful	than	they	were	before,	a	little	more	the	“women	creating	the	men	who	create	great	art,”	and	“the	mothers	of	a	good	race.”			
Gerwani’s	New	Order,	or,	Reading	Markers	for	Gendered	Genocide	The	women	of	Gerwani	were	not	to	be	included	among	the	good	mothers	of	New	Order	Indonesia.	They	and	their	entire	organization	were	labeled	counter-revolutionary	by	the	military	establishment,	and	they	were	marked	as	traitors.	As	part	of	a	national	program	of	“total	cleansing”	(pembersihan	total)	from	the	“stains”	of	counter-revolution,	the	military	regime	oversaw	a	significant	campaign	against	the	PKI,	including	Gerwani.	Large	numbers	
 217	The	most	intrusive	of	these	was	“Keluarga	Berancana,”	(“KB,”	or	“Family	Planning,”)	which	began	in	the	early	1970s.	The	wives	of	village	headmen	and	neighborhood	chiefs	were	trained	to	become	family	planning	monitors	who	not	only	carried	out	public	health	education	initiatives,	but	who	also	consulted	with	all	the	women	in	their	areas	of	geographic	responsibility.	For	each	woman,	the	monitors	would	record	their	method	of	birth	control	and	take	note	of	any	pregnancies.	In	some	instances,	the	results,	whether	real	or	invented,	were	tabulated	publicly	on	black	boards,	with	the	rates	of	compliance	also	reported	up	the	line	and	then	evaluated	by	their	husbands’	superiors.	This	particular	practice	ended	with	the	overthrow	of	the	New	Order	in	1998,	but	public	health	initiatives	are	still	disseminated	in	a	similar	fashion.	While	I	was	carrying	out	my	research	in	Solo,	the	officer	at	the	National	Press	Monument,	who	had	been	very	helpful	to	me	and	had	become	a	friend,	was	absent	for	a	week.	When	he	returned,	he	told	me	he	had	been	at	“training,”	(here	called	“sosialisasi,”)	for	a	new	program	to	encourage	people	to	use	water	rather	than	toilet	paper	to	clean	themselves	after	they	used	the	bathroom.	He	also	noted	that	his	wife	had	been	trained,	and	it	was	her	responsibility	to	educate	the	women	on	the	organization’s	staff.	Since	I	was	under	his	care	officially	while	I	was	present	almost	daily	at	the	archive,	he	also	“socialized”	me.		
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of	Gerwani	women	were	rounded	up	and	arrested.	Some	were	executed.	Many	were	tortured	and	interrogated	with	methods	that	included	rape	and	starvation.	Others	spent	up	to	between	15	and	25	years	in	prison	or	detention	camps.218	Many	of	those	not	imprisoned	were	required	to	present	themselves	regularly	to	police	offices	for	examination,	which	sometimes	included	providing	sexual	services.	Others	were	excluded	from	the	legitimate	economy	and	reduced	to	poverty	to	the	point	that	the	term	“Gerwani”	would	be	synonymous	with	“prostitute”	or,	perhaps	more	accurately,	“whore.”219		Indeed,	from	the	immediate	aftermath	of	G-30-S,	the	name	Gerwani	quickly	became	synonymous	with	the	word	“whore.”	And	this	relationship	would	come	to	be	actualized	over	time.	Several	new	historical	works	on	communist	women	in	the	early	days	of	the	New	Order	also	document	that	ex-Gerwani	members	were	often	put	into	the	position	of	having	to	barter	sexual	favors,	or	even	forced	marriage	to	soldiers,	in	order	to	avoid	the	harshest	surveillant	practices	of	the	New	Order	state.220	And	this	matches	with	the	idea	from	Benedict	Anderson,	noted	earlier	in	the	dissertation,	that,	with	their	husbands	disappeared	or	sent	into	exile,	many	Communist	women	were	forced	to	turn	to	prostitution	to	support	their	families	beginning	in	the	early	1970s.		In	the	end,	Gerwani	women	became	an	important	symbol	in	the	New	Order.	Their	accused	treachery	lay	at	the	base	of	the	authority	of	the	Suharto	regime.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	the	official	New	Order	narrative	of	Gerwani	and	Lubang	Buaya	was	monumentalized	in	several	important	ways.	The	image	of	Gerwani	as	dancing	torturers	and	killers	at	Lubang	Buaya	was	placed	front	and	center	on	the	frieze	of	the	Monumen	Pancasila	
Sakti	Lubang	Buaya	Jakarta,	(“The	Sacred	Pancasila	Monument	at	Lubang	Buaya,	Jakarta,”)	the	national	monument	to	the	Seven	National	Heros	erected	in	1969	on	the	site	of	the	
 218	For	an	account	of	the	executions,	see	the	short	story	by	Usamah,	“Perang	dan	Kemanusiaan,”	translated	in	Harry	Aveling,	GESTAPU:	Indonesian	Short	Stories.	For	information	on	the	jailings,	see	Wieringa,	“Aborted	Feminism,”	1988.	The	longer	figure	for	incarceration	comes	from	conversations	with	Rudolf	Mrázek.	219	Ben	Anderson	once	told	me	that	it	was	important	to	distinguish	periodicity	when	making	this	connection.	He	said	that	references	to	Gerwani	as	prostitutes	in	the	early	days	were	rhetorical.	He	suggested	that	by	the	late	1960’s	and	early	1970’s,	and	most	specifically	after	1971,	however,	severely	constricted	economic	circumstances	for	people	who	were	
“terlibat,”	or	“implicated”	in	being	PKI	led	ex-Gerwani	cadres	to	prostitution	as	one	of	the	few	ways	left	for	them	to	support	their	families,	when	they	were	shut	out	of	the	legitimate	economy.	He	also	suggested	this	was	particularly	true	if	their	husbands	had	been	killed	or	were	in	prison.	(Conversation	with	Ben	Anderson,	Ithaca,	Summer	1991.)	For	an	account	of	women	turning	to	prostitution	in	this	way,	see	Gerson	Poyk’s	short	story	“A	Woman	and	Her	Children,”	translated	in	Aveling,	GESTAPU:	Indonesian	Short	Stories.	220	See	Rachmi	Larasati,	The	Dance	That	Makes	You	Vanish,	particularly	Chapter	III,	“Historicizing	Violence,”	and	Annie	Pohlman,	Women,	Sexual	Violence	and	the	Indonesian	Killings	of	1965-66,	specifically	Chapter	I,	“Women	and	Violence	Following	the	following	the	1965	Coup.”	
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killings.	Beginning	with	the	Suharto	regime,	the	commemorative	ceremony	has	been	held	at	Lubang	Buaya	has	been	televised	nationally	each	year	on	October	1.221	It	continues	to	be	the	case	today.222		The	official	version	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	narrative	also	provided	the	key	scene	of	the	1984	film	Pengkhianatan	G-30-S/PKI	(“The	Treachery	of	G-30-S/PKI,”)	directed	by	Arifin	Noer	that	was	shown	annually	on	television	and	in	schools.223	Every	year	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	and	in	spite	of	activist	women’s	early	efforts	to	shift	the	nation’s	gaze	away	from	them,	images	of	uncontrollably	sexual	women	committing	crimes	against	Indonesian	men	and	the	military	order	they	represented	remained	at	the	forefront	of	the	narrative	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	New	Order’s	conception	of	the	Indonesian	state.	The	story	of	Gerwani	at	Lubang	Buaya	was	a	New	Order	creation,	and	a	male	military	fantasy	as	well.	The	story	of	“evil	women”	cutting	at	generals’	genitals	in	a	frenzy	of	ungodly	madness	became	one	of	two	foundational	violences	against	which	the	New	Order	came	to	be	organized.	The	second	was	the	remembered	“potential”	bloodletting	that	is	widely	said	would	have	occurred	had	the	“communist”	coup	succeeded.	Neither	of	these	two	great	communist	violences	actually	occurred,	while	the	mass	arrest,	torture,	exile	and	killing	of	those	branded	(correctly	or	not)	as	PKI	did	occur,	yet	were	officially	forgotten	and	silenced.		What	was	remembered,	however,	was	the	imagined	occurrence	of	a	moral	crisis.	Because	of	its	political	sensitivity,	the	intentional	creation	of	false	memories	on	the	part	of	the	New	Order	remains	largely	undiscussable	in	Indonesia,	even	to	this	day.	The	New	Order	policed	these	memories	fiercely,	and	little	hard	documentary	evidence	remains	of	either	the	Gerwani	story	or	the	mass	killings	of	the	PKI.224	Historians	then,	faced	with	official	
 221	Being	chosen	to	participate	in	the	annual	ritual	was	a	great	honor	for	school	children	in	particular.	Yosef	Djakababa	told	me	that	in	elementary	school,	he	practiced	the	mouth	accordion	diligently	in	an	attempt	to	be	selected	to	perform	at	the	commemoration.	His	elder	sister	had	been	chosen	previously,	and	this	was	something	he	was	quite	envious	of	at	the	time.	222	It	is	possible	this	was	not	the	case	during	the	administration	of	Abdurrahman	Wahid.	223	For	further	information	on	both	these	New	Order	monuments	to	the	killings,	see	John	Roosa,	Pretext	for	Mass	Murder.	Josef	Djakababa’s	2009	PhD	dissertation	from	the	University	of	Wisconsin,	“The	Construction	of	History	Under	Indonesia’s	New	Order:	The	Making	of	the	Lubang	Buaya	Official	Narrative,”	provides	a	major	source	of	Indonesian	scholarship	on	these	questions.	224	The	most	important	development	in	the	historiography	of	the	transition	to	the	New	Order	is	arguably	the	recent	work	of	Jess	Melvin,	in	which	she	discusses	the	set	of	primary	documents	outlining	the	Army’s	actions	in	Aceh	beginning	on	the	morning	of	October	1.	That	she	was	given	access	to	these	documents	remains	a	singular	exception	to	the	ability	of	historians	to	document	the	military’s	plans	for	mass	killing	of	Communists	directly	from	primary	sources.	
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stories,	must	resort	to	mining	other	sources	of	evidence	as	we	seek	to	discuss	“what	happened”	in	one	of	Asia’s	bloodiest	political	transitions	in	the	twentieth	century.	A	close	reading	of	gender	in	the	sources	that	do	exist,	however,	allows	us	to	read	between	the	gaps	in	the	official	stories	that	presented	women	as	stock	characters	rather	than	as	real	people.		This	pattern	of	authoritarian	regimes	creating	and	employing	official,	and	very	often	“produced”	memories	of	violence	is	not	unique	to	New	Order	Indonesia.	Rather,	it	is	an	issue	across	Asia,	where	large-scale	violence,	regime	change	and	created	origin	myths	have	often	been	close	partners.	My	hope	is	that	this	dissertation	has	demonstrated,	however,	that	in	the	close	reading	of	even	the	foundational	accounts	of	intentionally	mis-remembered	official	histories,	we	can	begin	to	see	that	the	process	of	the	creation	of	the	stories	themselves	often	relies	on	the	fantastical	deployment	of	patently	unreal	imagery	of	either	deviant	or	idealized	women.225	Recognizing	that	these	stories	are	often	the	creation	of	Wieringa’s	“masculine	memories,	hopes,	and	humiliations,”	we	can	also	begin	to	understand	why	certain	stories	based	on	a	masculine	sexual	politics	not	only	can,	but	almost	always	will,	be	told	in	the	creation	of	new	order	after	mass	violence.	One	interpretation	of	the	Indonesian	violence,	offered	both	by	the	Indonesian	military	and	by	the	CIA/western	scholars,	was	that	the	killings	were	“spontaneous.”	We	now	know	quite	clearly,	however,	that	this	contention	is	false.	The	most	important	cause	for	violence	was	the	presence	of	the	army	in	a	region.	The	military	itself	did	not	carry	out	all	the	killings;	indeed,	they	were	quite	successful	at	mobilizing	local	youth	militias,	particularly	from	Islamic	organizations,	to	carry	out	both	roundups	of	local	Communists	(or	those	accused	of	being	Communist,)	and	their	executions.	The	narrative	of	the	violence—and	even	“cleansing”—against	the	PKI	as	a	spontaneous	popular	reaction	only	makes	sense	within	the	idea	that	the	“events”	at	Lubang	Buaya	were	a	massively	destabilizing	incidence	of	national	moral	crisis.	Indeed,	the	intent	of	producing	the	story	of	Gerwani	depravity	was	precisely	to	evoke	moral	crisis,	and	thereby	to	render	the	violent	solutions	to	it	as	not	only	possible,	but	more	importantly,	necessary.	Without	the	evocation	of	moral	crisis	and	its	potential	to	destroy	the	nation	
 225	And,	I	would	add,	though	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation,	of	non-gender-compliant	men	as	well.	
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from	within,	there	was	no	easily	acceptable	rationale	for	mass	killings,	and	particularly	for	mass	killings	that	took	place	across	the	nation	in	relatively	similar	ways.226		If	we	come	to	see	the	Indonesian	killings	of	1965-1966	as	a	case	of	moral	crisis,	it	also	helps	explain	the	breadth	of	the	violence.	Actions	of	moral	crisis	of	that	imagined	severity	in	any	one	place	put	the	entire	nation	at	risk.	The	“crime”	of	which	Communists	were	accused	went	beyond	individual	guilt.	People	could	be	involved	without	having	been	present	or	doing	anything	specific.	They	became	“terlibat,”	or	implicated,	simply	because	of	their	connection	to	a	group,	and	were	targeted	because	of	it.	In	this	case,	the	kaum	komunis	became	terlibat	largely	because	of	the	actions	with	which	Gerwani	women	were	charged.	Within	this	framework,	we	can	also	ask	to	what	degree	it	makes	sense	to	see	the	killings	as	an	act	of	genocide.	Communists,	as	a	kaum,	a	national	group,	were	targeted	in	whole,	and	the	nation	was	re-ordered	anew	without	them	in	it.	But	there	was	a	second	national	group—the	kaum	feminis	in	both	its	progressive	
and	radical	incarnations—that	was	also	targeted.	After	the	violence,	the	nation	was	re-formed	with	their	political	position	and	power	significantly	altered.	Leftist	women	were	not	merely	excluded,	they	were	made	to	disappear.	Progressive	non-Communist	women	found	their	political	position	significantly	changed,	even	the	wives	of	ministers	and	military	officers.	Importantly,	it	was	women	themselves	who	were	tasked	with	carrying	out	the	exclusion	from	their	own	ranks,	though,	to	be	clear,	they	were	not	made	responsible	for	the	disappearances.	Indonesian	women,	as	a	whole,	therefore,	whether	they	were	terlibat	or	not,	saw	their	place	in	Indonesian	society	significantly	altered.	Even	the	word	used	to	describe	them	as	a	group	changed.	As	noted	above,	the	term	wanita,	containing	echoes	of	revolutionary	nationalism	that	reached	back	to	the	1920s	gave	way	to	the	distinctly	New	Order	term	
perempuan,	with	its	strong	implication	of	women	as	wives	attached	to	tuan2,	or	men.	The	word	Ibu	would	continue	to	be	used,	but	with	a	significantly	adjusted	meaning.		
 226	There	are	two	other	reasons	that	are	cited	as	having	had	an	effect,	though	neither	has	been	written	about	much.	Both	offer	reasons	that	play	out	on	a	local	level,	but	seem	to	have	been	put	into	effect	in	provinces	across	the	nation.	Both	are	also	demonstrably	false.	The	first	is	that	the	PKI	had	drafted	“hit	lists”	of	people	to	be	killed,	and	that	people’s	families	were	on	the	imagined	list.	This	led	to	a	“kill	or	be	killed”	effect	on	the	local	level.	The	second	were	rumors,	backing	of	up	the	idea	of	the	PKI	extermination	lists,	that	holes	had	already	been	dug	by	the	PKI	for	the	corpse-to-be.	Again,	this	was	a	rumor	that	occurred	on	local	levels	across	the	nation.	So	while	this	may	explain	local	actions	in	some	places	and	to	some	extent,	on	balance,	they	don’t	explain	the	national	scope	of	the	killings,	or	the	need	for	a	national	purge	to	the	same	extent.			
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This	re-formation	of	Indonesian	women	as	a	group	fulfills	important	elements	of	Feierstein’s	sociological	definition	of	genocide.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	Daniel	Feierstein	suggests	genocide	“essentially”	comprises	“a	partial	destruction	of	the	perpetrator’s	own	national	group—a	destruction	that	is	intended	to	transform	the	survivors	through	the	annihilation	of	the	victims.”	It	is	a	“power	strategy”	in	which	“the	ultimate	purpose	.	.	.	is	not	the	destruction	of	a	group	as	such	but	the	transformation	of	society	as	a	whole.”227	Or,	as	Jess	Melvin	and	Annie	Pohlman	explain	it	“genocide	can	be	understood	as	a	creative	process	in	which	the	nation	is	remade	without	a	part	of	its	former	self.”228	As	this	dissertation	has	argued,	in	the	Indonesian	case,	this	transformation	of	national	identity	depended	critically	on	the	creation	of	a	moral	crisis	that	threatened	the	continuation	of	the	nation	itself.	The	dissertation	also	has	demonstated	that	the	patterns	of	moral	crisis	invoked	were	both	already	firmly	encoded	in	Indonesia’s	experience	of	the	tensions	inherent	in	becoming	a	modern	nation,	and	that	this	idea	of	crisis	revolved	particularly	strongly	around	the	moral	position	of	women	as	a	kaum	wanita.		I	argue	that	in	the	aftermath	of	the	events	at	Lubang	Buaya,	it	was	most	importantly	the	invocation	of	a	moral	crisis	centered	on	the	alledged	sexual	deviance	of	Gerwani	that	made	the	Indonesian	killings	possible,	and	that	this	invocation	brought	about	serious	implications	for	Indonesian	women	as	a	whole,	no	matter	what	their	own	cultural	affiilitations	and	sub-identities	might	have	been.		Whether	or	not	the	killing,	imprisonment,	rape,	torture	and	impoverishment	of	leftist	women	constitutes	its	own	case	of	genocide,	or	whether	it	is	a	distinct	subset	of	a	larger	process	focused	on	Indonesian	communists,	is	perhaps	not	the	most	important	question.	Rather,	the	pattern	of	fallout	for	Indonesian	women	as	a	whole,	in	any	case,	suggests	enough	differences	from	the	experience	of	men—the	sense	of	non-Communist	women	needing	to	personally	repudiate	other	women	by	adjusting	their	own	identity	in	particular—that	it	is	worth	repeating	the	assertion	that	a	full	understanding	of	the	aftermath	of	Lubang	Buaya	must	place	women’s	experiences	at	their	center.	This	would	also	be	true	for	scholars	seeking	further	support	for	the	idea	that	the	killings	in	Indonesia	
 227	Daniel	Feierstein,	Genocide	as	Practice,	p.	68,	quoted	in	Jess	Melvin	and	Annie	Pohlman,	“A	Case	for	Genocide:	Indonesia,	1965-1966,”	Katherine	McGregor,	et.	al.,	eds.,	The	Indonesian	Genocide	of	1965,	p.	35.		228	Jess	Melvin	and	Annie	Pohlman,	“A	Case	for	Genocide:	Indonesia,	1965-1966,”	In	Katherine	McGregor,	et.	al.,	eds.,	The	
Indonesian	Genocide	of	1965,	p.	35.	
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constitute	a	case	of	genocide.	I	would	suggest	further	that	looking	at	genocide	specifically	through	the	lens	of	gender	in	global	compartative	cases	would	also	offer	a	profitable	and	expansive	line	of	analysis.		This	dissertation	shows,	nonetheless,	that	gender	offers	historians	a	marker	of	the	possibility	of	genocide	in	the	Indonesian	case.	Reading	women’s	magazines	from	the	New	Order,	for	instance,	would	demonstrate	the	absolute	disappearance	of	activist	leftist	women	as	a	force	in	the	construction	of	Indonesian	national	identity	in	the	Sukarno	era.	Their	only	appearance	would	come	in	their	annual	deployment	each	October	1	as	ideal	types	of	sexually	wonton	and	patriotically	dangerous	women—that	is,	as	potential	destroyers	of	the	nation.	They	would	also	serve	as	ghostly	reminders	of	the	ever-lurking	potential	for	massive	moral	crisis	in	any	women	who	would	do	too	much	amd	stray	too	far	from	the	path	of	proper	national	femininity.	The	details	of	this	massive	shift	in	Indonesian	national	identity,	I	suggest,	would	be	most	visible	in	such	things	as	fashion,	film	and	advertising	for	women.	There	would	be	much	to	be	learned	from	parsing	the	details	of	the	how	New	Order	women	were	expected	to	wear	kain	and	kebaya,	of	how	they	represented	the	nation	in	fashion	shows	at	home	and	abroad,	of	how	they	reacted	to	the	close	monitoring	of	their	reproductive	lives,	and	of	how	the	place	in	the	nation	of	Ibu	Tien,	Suharto’s	wife.	It	would	also	need	to	take	into	account	the	explosion	of	“mod”	fashion,	with	short	skirts	and	thigh-high	boots	that	can	be	seen	all	over	Indonesian	women’s	magazines	in	the	1970’s.	Indeed,	I	am	not	suggesting	a	simple	explanation	of	reductionist	gender	roles.	Perhaps	one	of	the	longer	term	effects	of	the	way	the	New	Order	gendered	itself	was	that	the	call	for	national	identity	was	to	become	less	pressing	in	some	ways,	and	in	particular	in	how	women	dressed	in	their	own	lives.	But	that	would	be	an	interesting	question	for	further	research.	Taken	together,	along	with	many	others,	this	would	allow	scholars	to	closely	examine	the	constitution	of	Indonesian	identities	once	socialism	was	no	longer	included	as	a	component.	It	would	also	allow,	for	instance,	for	a	particularly	complicated	reading	of	the	New	Order’s	obsession	with	supressing	Islamist	movements	(in	part	visually	through	banning	significant	public	wearing	of	the	veil),	or	of	the	growing	stultification	and	emptiness	of	official	New	Order	culture.	Reading	those	details	in	comparison	with	the	Sukarno	era	would	allow	scholars	to	trace	instances	of	continuity	and	change	in	what	it	
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meant	to	be	a	modern	Indonesian	in	the	1970’s-1990’s.	Seeing	the	present-day	political	situation	through	a	lens	of	fears	of	moral	crisis	tied	to	rapid	modernization	and	women’s	and	gay	men’s	sexuality	would	also	be	productive.	In	short,	if	both	Indonesian	and	foreign	scholars	are	to	understand	Indonesia	as	well	as	we	possibly	can,	we	would	be	well	served	to	put	the	cultural	politics	of	gender	at	the	center	of	our	analysis.	Certainly	there	are	more	interesting	questions	than	the	one	Sukarno	asked	in	1928,	of	whether	Indonesia	would	be	glorious	or	Indonesia	would	be	shattered.	But	just	as	certainly,	he	was	correct	that	some	of	the	answers	to	those	and	other	important	queries	would	lie	within	the	serious	examination	of	lives	of	Indonesia’s	women.		 	
 
 
423 
	
Visual	Postlude:	
Two	Images	of	Ideal	Indonesian	Women		 Two	images	of	ideal	Indonesian	women	summarize	the	new	realities	that	faced	
kaum	wanita	with	the	violent	arrival	of	the	New	Order.	The	first	image	is	of	Gerwani	activists	gathered	on	a	field	outside	the	Central	Javanese	communist-dominated	city	of	Solo,	most	likely	on	October	18	or	19,	1965,	in	the	days	following	the	arrival	of	army	brigades	in	the	city.	It	shows	the	women,	surrounded	by	their	neighbors,	before	they	were	likely	taken	to	prisons	from	which	many	of	them,	likely,	were	executed.229		Please	note	that	they	are	immaculately,	though	simply,	dressed,	in	both	
kain	and	kebaya,	and	in	western	dresses,	their	hair	pulled	back	cleanly.	They	are,	visually,	the	epitome	of	“proper”	Indonesian	women	in	the	Sukarno	era.	The	second	image	is	taken	from	Julia	Suryakusuma’s	work	on	Ibuism	in	Fantasizing	
the	Feminine.	The	women,	wearing	uniform	kain-kebaya,	are	also	immaculately	dressed	and	coiffed,	almost	to	the	point	of	not	being	easily	distinguished.	They	are	the	leadership	of	
Dharma	Wanita,	the	national	organization	of	Civil	Service	wives	established	under	the	Suharto	regime.	They	are	gathered	together	alongside	General	Benny	Moerdani,	the	commander	of	ABRI,	the	Indonesian	Armed	Forces,	between	1983-1988.			
 229	I	have	tried	to	identify	some	of	the	women	in	the	photograph,	and	think,	with	time	and	patient	connections	to	the	community	in	which	it	was	taken,	that	I	will	be	able	to	know	more	about	them	individually.	But	I	do	not	as	yet.	These	types	of	stories	only	come	forward	quietly,	cautiously	and	slowly	from	those	who	know	about	them.	But	I	do	have	very	general	stories	about	what	happened	there	from	one	of	my	Javanese	language	teachers	in	Solo,	whose	house	is	near	the	particular	village	where	this	photo	was	taken.	
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Figure	7.2:	Ibu-ibu	yang	terlibat	PKI	di	Kartosuro,	Kab.	Sukoharjo	di	kumpulkan	di		
Lembaga	Penerbangan	dan	Antariksa	Nasional	(LAPAN)gan.	Women	accused	of	supporting	or	belonging	to	the	Indonesian	Communist	Party	are	gathered	together	in	a	public	field	in	Kartosuro.	Solo,	October	1965	Photo	by:	W.	Sutarto,	caption	and	use	of	the	image	courtesy	of	The	Lontar	Foundation.		
	
FIgure	7.3:	From	Julia	Suryakusuma,	“The	State	and	Sexuality	in	New	Order	Indonesia,”		in	Laurie	J.	Sears,	ed.	Fantasizing	the	Feminine,	p.	100.
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